UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

PEASANTS AND FAMILY FARMS: THE POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS IN COTTON PRODUCTION IN A VILLAGE OF WESTERN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the ways in which peasants in a village of Western Turkey produce cotton, a commodity sold on national and international markets. By looking at the way in which the various means of production are procured and deployed by cotton producers, the study hopes to demonstrate the role played by social, non-market structures such as the village and the household in the organisation of production. The study is based on data collected during a period of eighteen months' fieldwork in 1978 and 1979 in a cotton-producing plain in Western Turkey. Apart from a number of subsequent visits, a further two-months were spent conducting a survey of the households of the village during the summer of 1984.

The thesis begins by setting out the theoretical parameters within which peasant studies have been carried out to date. The various ways in which peasants have been conceptualised in anthropology and in political economy are examined and the use of structural models in to create universal analytical categories such as 'peasant' or 'petty commodity producer are questioned. It is argued that to the extent that the village and the household remain one of the most important pools from which inputs, especially labour, are supplied, it is very difficult to predict production decisions or understand the mechanisms that make the production of commodities by peasants possible.

In the next three chapters, the social units, such as households and neighbourhoods that make up the village are described. A brief exploration of regional history shows the relatively recent origins in Söke of villages as well as of peasant production. Existing social and economic exchanges within the settlement are shown to constitute the village as a totality which has significance in the organisation of commodity production undertaken by households. A discussion showing the role of the state in establishing peasant farming of cotton is followed by a delineation of the technological limits under which cotton production is carried out. Land and labour are isolated as the traditional inputs which largely limit production. It is argued that with the increasing importance of modern inputs which can only be acquired with money, the place of land and labour in agricultural production has radically changed. A look at the organisation of work shows the extent to which different factors become the factors limiting production in the different production units found in the Söke plain.

The subsequent three chapters describe in detail the ways in which peasant producers have access to each of the major inputs, land, cash and labour. In this context, emphasis is placed on the role of households, neighbourhoods and other socially significant relationships in influencing the production process. In the last section, the mechanisms through which capital is accumulated by peasant households are examined, and the possibilities of expanded reproduction by small commodity producers are explored. By including social variables in a study of economic production, it is hoped that broad generalisations regarding the persistence or dissappearance of peasants under conditions of increasing commoditisation can be avoided.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to delineate the conditions under which peasants in a village of Western Turkey are able to produce successfully a commodity that is bought and sold on national and international markets. The bulk of Turkey's agricultural crops are still produced by farmers who live in small communities which are integrated in varying degrees into national commodity circuits. Within these communities, patterns of social interaction between the different producers affect calculations on which productive decisions are based. Tuz is such a community whose inhabitants specialize in the production of cotton. Information on social and economic relations obtaining in Tuz village was collected in the course of fieldwork initially undertaken between 1978 and 1979; subsequent visits in 1981, 1983, 1984, and 1987 proved invaluable for an understanding of short-term changes, as well as for repeated evaluations of the models constructed.[1] It is during these subsequent visits that the extent of the role of the community in reproducing peasant farms became clearer. The impossibility of providing an explanation of peasant production by looking at economic variables alone lies at the root of another problem that the study addresses itself to: the ways in which economic and social variables can be combined to account for the persistence of small commodity production. Below, I shall consider different attempts at theorising the relation of economic and social factors in the context of peasant studies. I shall also indicate the relevance of some of the concepts developed in the course of the discussions to the study of Tuz cotton producers.

1.1 Peasant and Petty Commodity Producer as Theoretical Constructs

Attempts to construct general statements regarding the conditions of existence and reproduction of the peasantry have long been part and parcel of economic anthropology (Silverman 1979). Generalisations that purport to have universal validity have proven to be one of the main stumbling blocks of these endeavours. Universalist concepts provided by diverse approaches to the subject have all been criticised for not explaining the particular case studied by the author in question. Marxist theorists have substituted the concepts of political economy, particularly concepts such as 'mode of

production', 'wage', 'capital' and 'simple reproduction' for other universals such as 'maximisation', 'rationality' and 'human nature' employed by formalist discourse in economic anthropology. The particularism inherent in the substantivist approach has been criticised for precluding proper comparison and generalisation. The problem of where to search for generalities and how to incorporate specificities is an ongoing one that incites theoretical discussion and empirical research.

Early anthropological concerns with regard to the peasantry bore the impact of the evolutionist and culturalist approaches dominant in American anthropology during the thirties and forties (Silverman 1979). In these approaches, the peasant represented both a culture type named 'folk culture' by Redfield (Redfield and Singer 1971:341) as well as an intermediary stage in the progression from tribal groups to the modern industrial city (Redfield, cited in Silverman 1979). As Silverman shows, the establishment of the peasant as an analytical category was mainly a development of the mid-fifties. This largely empirical category included in its definition behavioural, socio-economic, political, and cultural variables. Thus, peasants were inhabitants of small rural communities mainly involved in subsistence production. Techniques of production were backward, but more importantly, production was determined by a set of values or traditions. Furthermore, peasants were subordinated both economically, politically, and culturally to other sections of the larger society of which they were a part (Wolf 1966). The socio-political correlates for these cultural variables have been conceptualised largely in terms of patronage/clientage links which take specific forms in specific cultures. Thus one could talk of 'compadrazgo' in Latin America, 'caciques' in Spain, the Mafia in Italy, 'zamindars' in India, and 'beys' in the Middle East.

The economic context within which peasant studies developed was increasingly determined by the world-wide extension of the market. Therefore, the integration of rural producers into commodity markets and the latters' reaction to this process have provided the main focus of discussion. Would peasants adopt new crops and new methods of cultivation or would they keep to their traditional 'way of life'? The question of rationality was at the centre of this debate. While some argued that

peasant opposition to commodity production could be understood as a rational approach to objective conditions characterised by uncertainty (Ortiz 1971; Popkin 1979), others stressed the role of 'tradition', or 'culture' in determining behaviour. Tradition or culture itself was evaluated differently by different authors. According to some, subordination accounted for those values or sets of social relations that helped peasants protect themselves from greater exploitation by outside forces.* The opposite view was also propounded, namely that cultural variables in the guise of values and norms described variously as 'The Image of the Limited Good' or 'Amoral Familism' were the cause of poverty among these communities (Foster 1965; Banfield 1958).

In the course of these debates, the peasant concept lost some of its transcendental qualities as a human type. Since the mid-sixties, peasant studies increasingly took the form of attempts to locate the emergence of peasant communities in relation to historical processes such as colonialism and the development of capitalism. For example, Shanin, in attempting to formulate a concept of peasant economy that takes account of historical changes, defines the peasant in terms of four inter-related 'facets' that each define the social unit (the family farm), the means of livelihood (mixed farming), a specific culture (linked to small communities), and a set of specific social relations with outsiders (subjection) (1974:64). In discussing the family labour farm, Shanin makes use of Chayanov's depiction of the labour process, while his other categories owe a lot to the Redfieldian approach as revised by Wolf and Mintz (1974:67).

It was in this context that the relevance of concepts taken from political economy to the study of rural producers began to be discussed. Two of these concepts, namely 'class' and 'mode of production' have had a wide currency in relation to peasant studies and have become the focus of much debate. Writers who, following Lenin, argued that capitalist relations of production were being fast established in rural regions, have put a greater emphasis on the concept of class. For these authors, the problem has been to reject the unity of a concept of peasantry and to elucidate the different class positions that emerged in the countryside. By contrast, others have maintained that different systems of <u>production</u> could be

discerned in different parts of the rural world and that for this reason, it would be more fruitful to use Marx's concept of mode of production to elucidate the parameters of these various systems. These writers find inspiration in Chayanov's (1966) attempt to construct a theory of peasant economy.[3]

As Smith argues (1984b:60), most of the social scientists studying rural economies agree that market relations tend to dissolve formerly existing structures. While formalist and substantivist anthropologists stress the changes in value orientations, Marxists concentrate on the material bases of these changes. According to both formalists and substantivists, change means the erosion of the community, the individuation of the productive enterprise, and the transformation of techniques of production and levels of consumption. For Marxists, on the other hand, change means the emergence of either new classes in the countryside (that is, a class of rich capitalist farmers and a rural (semi)proletariat), or of new modes/forms of production (petty/small commodity production). These changes, for Marxists, are contingent on the dissolution of a natural economy comprised of a category of 'independent' subsistence producers (Bernstein 1979) or a historically determined pre-capitalist mode of production (Meillassoux 1981, Kahn 1975).[4]

The different positions within Marxism became crystallised in the course of debates on agrarian transformations. Although these debates were country-specific, the extensive use they made of Marxist concepts led to their elaboration and refinement.[5] The substantive issues these debates dealt with included questions regarding the exact mechanisms through which rural producers are exploited, the conditions under which peasant production is reproduced and/or transformed, the nature of the units engaged in production, and the forms of calculation that guide their production decisions. These are also the questions that are pertinent in an analysis of rural cotton producers in villages of Western Turkey. It is the aim of this study to attempt to explain the reasons why and the conditions under which these villagers manage to produce a capital- and labour-intensive cash crop such as cotton. In the following pages, I shall set out some of the analytical concepts derived from the debates mentioned above that are

particularly useful in understanding the relations observed during the course of field research. Next, I shall attempt to determine the most appropriate unit of analysis. I shall argue that in spite of the fact that many of the processes influencing commodity producers are determined at a broader level (such as the region, the nation and the world-economy), the village constitutes a significant unit with regard to peasant production.

1.2. The Peasantry within Political Economy

Within political economy, it was the writing of Lenin and Kautsky that set the stage for a discussion of the fate of independent rural producers faced with the spread of market relations and the new division of labour that was to come in its wake (Ennew, Hirst, Tribe 1977; Kahn 1986). Kautsky's analysis emphasized the differences between industrial and agrarian capitalism, and argued that a class of small landholders with holdings insufficient to sustain them would be part and parcel of capitalist development in the countryside. These producers would supply the labour needed on large farms and in industry. Despite their property, Kautsky was of the opinion that these producers would best be characterised as proletarians. The middle peasantry, namely those able to eke out a living from agricultural production, would only do so by increasing their inputs of labour and decreasing their levels of consumption (Kahn 1986:48-9). Lenin's position was similar in its broad outlines.[6] He, too, stresses the increasingly capitalist nature of the relations dominating agricultural production, and the precariousness of the category of the independent middle peasantry (Ennew et. al. 1977: 305). As capitalist relations spread, both Lenin and Kautsky predicted that a process of differentiation would gradually erode the conditions of existence of this middle peasantry.[7]

These arguments have constituted one pole of what has been called the characterisation debate.[8] The other pole, those who argue for the persistence of the peasantry, have attempted in various ways to revive Chayanov's attempts to contruct a specifically peasant economy.[9] According to Chayanov, peasant production constituted a system of production that was distinct from feudalism as well as capitalism (Chayanov 1966:4-5; Harrison 1977).[10] Peasant production had a rationality specific to itself, one that

was based on the absence of wage labour. Labour needed for production was obtained within the family (hence the term 'family-labour farm') and the level of production was the result of a combination of consumption requirements and the drudgery of work. Thus, rather than factors such as prices, it was the demographic structure of the family that determined the quantity of labour expended. In spite of the fact that Chayanov intended this analysis only as an explanation of the specific situation in Russia at the turn of the century, many attempts were made to apply (Dove 1981), and even to universalise (Sahlins 1974) this model. It was also Chayanov's careful analysis of the labour process under conditions of subsistence production that was used by those writers who argued that peasant production had a distinct logic which could not be reduced to the workings of capitalism.

1.2.1 The Differentiation Thesis

Those students of agrarian structures who stress the inevitability of the process of differentiation, are also those who have given serious attention to the rural class structure found in many parts of the third world (Banaji 1977; Bernstein 1979; Roseberry 1978; Deere and de Janvry 1979). From this point of view, the major problem they faced was the non-separation of the producers from the most important means of agricultural production, namely land. Since, class was based on the relation of the producer to the means of production, it would be difficult to characterise small commodity producers as proletarians. This, and the absence (or near-absence) of wage labour led these writers to develop the concepts of real/formal subsumption that Marx uses in his historical analysis of the development of capitalism, and to the designation of rural producers as semi-proletarians (Roseberry 1978).[11] According to the analysis developed by Banaji, the extent to which producers in individual enterprises are separate from their means of production will not reveal anything about the nature of the production system, since the labour process or the individual enterprise cannot provide clues with respect to modes of production: "... modes of production are born and emerge historically before the enterprises which sustain them have organised the process of labour to correspond to their inherent motion" (1976a:301).[12] According to the logic of Banaji's

argument, independent peasant production is in fact under the domination of the laws of motion of capitalism.[13] Therefore, the income producers obtain after selling their produce on the market is a 'concealed wage' and any form of subsistence production undertaken by peasants can only be understood as a way of reproducing labour power (Banaji 1977:34).

The main mechanism through which full proletarianisation takes place has been identified by Bernstein as the 'simple reproduction squeeze' defined as, "those effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant households that can be summarized in terms of increasing costs of production/decreasing returns to labour" (Bernstein 1979:427). With the incorporation of commodity relations within the reproduction cycle of the peasant, commodity circuits will increasingly govern production decisions: as product prices decline, peasants will have to produce more, often under conditions of decreasing soil fertility. In this way capital will be able to obtain commodities without having to bear costs of management or supervision (1979:429) and capitalism becomes internal to household decision-making. Peasants are able to sustain deteriorating terms of exchange for considerable periods of time and therefore can "compete effectively with capitalist enterprises producing the same commodities" (ibid). Therefore, although differentiation is linked to intensification and the commoditisation of labour power, the process is not automatic and depends "on concrete conditions" (1979:431).[14]

The positions taken by Banaji and Bernstein have drawn attention to the problems of limiting analysis to on-farm processes.[15] But by making the logic of capital central to their analyses, they have greatly reduced the possibility of explaining variations among small-scale commodity producers.[16] There are different degrees and mechanisms of subsuming labour under capital. As I shall try to show, the returns to labour obtained by Söke cotton producers are high enough to allow them to invest in improved means of production, while African peasants discussed by Bernstein may at best be able to scrape together daily subsistence. The production of subsistence as opposed to cash crops, the role of merchants and/or state agencies may all affect the actual mechanisms through which production is subsumed under capitalism.[17] The tendency in these approaches

is to view differentiation as a unitary process. The way in which the differentiation thesis has been argued in empirical cases (e.g. Deere and de Janvry 1981) has tended to conflate three separate processes of conmmoditisation which may not be causally linked: the commoditisation of output, of the means of production, and of labour power (Kahn 1982:9).

With regard to cotton producers in Western Turkey, I shall show that the commoditisation of labour and the means of production has not proceeded apace with that of output. Although wage labour has become an integral aspect of cotton production, it is very difficult to conclude that proletarianisation will be inevitable. In fact, for many of the Söke producers the differences between wage labour and household labour cannot be easily differentiated. In many cases, the wage acts as a means to extend the use of household labour.[18] Nevertheless, differentiation and concepts such as 'simple reproduction squeeze' are helpful in analysing the conditions under which commodity producers reproduce themselves. In Söke differentiation does not take the form of access to versus separation from land, but there is differentiation with regard to access to cash and cash inputs. To the extent that commodities are necessary in the process of production, cost of input and level of return to labour will influence production decisions. Whether the relationship between these variables will produce the 'squeeze' predicted by Bernstein, depends on a host of factors that have to be determined empirically. Finally, the fact that producers operate within a system of generalised commodity production does not mean that they can easily be characterised as 'capitalists', 'proletarians', or 'semi-proletarians'.

1.2.2 The Persistence Thesis

If the differentiationists can be accused of reducing variety to a few manifestations of the movement of capital, those who emphasize persistence show a tendency to stress the uniqueness of each empirical case they study. Unlike differentiationists, they underplay the extent of accumulation or dispossession. Especially in its functionalist versions, the persistence thesis, not unlike the differentiationists, tends to explain the viability of the small producer in terms of the needs of capitalism for cheap

commodities, be it labour or produce (Bradby 1975:128-9).[19] The main thrust of the persistence position has been to try to conceptualise either precapitalist modes of production (leading to the articulationist position) or to the concept of forms of production as a way of analysing different types of small-scale commodity production in all their specificity. Advocates of the forms of production approach explain the preservation of non-capitalist production processes in terms of the competitive advantage these have over capitalist production in most cases (Taussig 1978), under certain economic conjunctures (Friedmann 1978), or within certain branches of production (Mann and Dickinson 1978; Smith 1984b).[20]

The Modes of Production Approach:

Sahlins (1974), Meillassoux (1972, 1981) and Wolpe (1972) were among the earliest writers who attempted to construct specific modes of production on the basis of a labour process and relations of production that were characteristic of various peasantries. The elements of these modes of production were: units of production often composed of families/households in which consumption and production were united, the absence of wage or servile labour, and what can loosely be called a use-value orientation. These attempts had a number of shortcomings. The ways in which relations of production were conceptualised were so general that many other modes of production could in fact be seen to share the same characteristics. For example, Wolpe's African Mode of Production was defined in terms of some form of communal landholding worked by some kind of kinship unit within which resources were allocated according to these kinship ties (1972:432).[21] Sahlins' formulation of the Domestic Mode of Production (DMP) lacked any concept of social or economic totality and denied any importance to relations that may link the different production units.

For Meillassoux, another proponent of the DMP, the latter was able to develop and flourish because of its usefulness for capitalism. According to this view, the DMP was the result of the impact of colonial capitalism on the traditional Lineage Mode of Production that had originally dominated West African societies. The internal structure of the Lineage Mode of Production remained largely unchanged, since it was geared to the

organisation of the labour force. As a result, Meillassoux's DMP emerges as the effect of capitalism on pre-capitalist societies. The latter, according to this view, passively continue to function for the benefit of another mode of production. Attention is no longer focused on the possibilities of internal change, but on the ways in which the pre-capitalist mode of production 'articulates' with capitalism. Although different modes of production were constructed to account for the difference in modes of calculation and rationality exhibited by different productive systems, the emphasis on articulation reduced these varieties to so many ways of fulfilling the needs of capitalism. As Foster-Carter argues (1978), because most articulationist approaches construct a monolithic universal capitalism, they are forced to search for variation in the pre-capitalist modes of production. Furthermore, as shown by Bernstein, it is not possible to argue that the only impact of capitalism on pre-capitalist societies is in the re-direction of the flows of surplus. Capitalism cannot long remain external to the production process, but affects production decisions themselves through the simple reproduction squeeze.

The attempt to construct a petty commodity mode of production (PMP) as a non-capitalist rather than a pre-capitalist mode of production has been more rigorous and has avoided many of the pitfalls mentioned above. According to one of the more succinct constructions, the PMP is composed of independent and separate producers who all have access to their own means of production. The only link they have to one another is through the market for which they produce commodities using largely commoditised inputs (Kahn 1980:143).[22] According to Kahn, it is the operation of market forces themselves which produce both separation and equality, the basic relations of production that characterise PMP (1980:203). Any increase in productivity would come into conflict with these relations of production and produce a form of class differentiation (1980:148). For Kahn, it is these structural conditions that account for the inability of producers to raise levels of productivity, not an imputed 'subsistence ethic', that is an unspecified drive towards producing only what is necessary for subsistence. According to Kahn, differentiation is not a structural necessity, and can only be determined in concrete cases (1980:149).[23] In this way, Kahn tries to specify without any reference to the capitalist mode of production the

internal constitution of PMP as a specific productive system having its own rationality and contradictions; but PMP is nevertheless a mode of production that is 'dominated' by capitalism. Having constructed PMP as an abstract and distinct mode of production, Kahn has to turn to articulation to understand its relations with capitalism. Again, there is recourse to the internal operation of the mode of production to locate the specificity of the various production systems found in the periphery of the world capitalist system.

Nevertheless, compared to Meillassoux's concept of articulation in which the logic of capitalism provided a sufficient explanation of the working of the domestic community, Kahn's is less functionalist since it allows determinacy to the logic of the pre-capitalist mode of production. The emergence of PMP itself is concomittant on the destruction of a pre-capitalist economy, a process which is largely the result of incorporation in the world capitalist economy (1980:135). For PMP to emerge, a generalised commodity economy is necessary. But its own persistence is more complex: the long-term dynamic of PMP may show a cyclical pattern, as PMP appears under certain conditions and dissolves under others (1975).[24] In spite of his insistence that it is the logic of PMP that accounts for low productivity, Kahn also maintains that surplus is siphoned off to capitalist sectors from PMP, especially since labour power is largely reproduced within a subsistence economy (1980:206). This confuses the extent to which the barrier to the development of the forces of production can be attributed to the internal structure of PMP, since the transfer of surplus to capitalism is said to have the same consequences.[25]

Articulation theories are widely used to explain the ways in which capitalism (capitalists?) extracts surplus from non-capitalist systems of production.[26] This surplus extraction, whatever the mechanisms through which it is effected, is the main factor that accounts for low levels of productivity and inability to enter into expanded reproduction (cf. Vergopoulos 1978). It is in explaining the incomplete proletarianisation of wide sections of the world population that the articulation approach has proved to be most useful (Wolpe 1972, Scott, C.D. 1976; Keyder 1983a).[27] But even here, political processes may offer at least an important part of

the explanation for the situation in which many producers find themselves in (Rey and Dupré 1973; Taussig 1978; Smith 1984c; 1986). The problem of conservation/dissolution of pre-capitalist modes of production is one that has not been adequately solved by articulationist approaches. According to this view, nothing except the needs of capitalism explain the persistence of pre-capitalist modes of production. In that case we need to ask the question whether there will never be a transition to capitalism in the periphery, or if there is such a possibility, which conditions will bring such a transition about. Articulation becomes a relation between structures rather than a complex set of relations involving concrete people; as a result, the impact of the class struggle in determining the nature of exploitation is neglected. Kahn's approach also suffers from the same weakness: a tension between the wish to explain historical processes as an outcome of structural contradictions on the on hand, and as the result of concrete struggles on the other. It seems that individual or group action and class struggle are drawn into the analysis on an ad hoc basis in order to explain what the structural analysis cannot account for. Thus, on the one hand there are attempts to construct general theories of articulation, and yet the impossibility of this endeavour is constantly reaffirmed.[26]

These attempts to formulate a logic to petty commodity production have nevertheless produced valuable analyses of the processes of production still extant in many parts of the world. These studies show that reliance on primarily unpaid household labour produces forms of calculation that are different from those that characterise capitalist enterprises. Village producers calculate returns to labour rather than costs of labour; it is on this basis that they decide whether to engage in cotton production and on what scale. By contrast, since capitalists have to calculate a rate of profit on the amount of capital invested, labour acquires a different cost. Hence, the decision to cultivate cotton is based on different calculations.

However, the insistence of PMP theorists on the inability of petty commodity producers to enter into expanded reproduction, that is, to invest in the development of forces of production constitutes a serious drawback. This insistence follows from the attempt to account for the persistence of

this mode of production. But, as the case of village producers in Söke shows, expanded reproduction on the basis of family and/or wage labour is possible. Expansion is a strategy that producers undertake quite deliberately, often in order to meet a specific need such as the marriage of a son or the purchase of an expensive agricultural machine. By being able to differentiate between the logic of simple reproduction and that of expanded reproduction, it will be possible to explain the simultaneous occurrence of different strategies of production. Otherwise, it would either be necessary to argue that different villagers are subsumed to capitalism through different mechanisms (according to formal subsumption logic), or that some producers are capitalist for some of the time, petty commodity producers at other times, and semi-proletarians yet at others. Both the differentiation and the mode of production approach take the dynamic out of the system and affix uniform processes in order to explain a much more complex reality. Both approaches tend to depict a particular concrete case as the outcome of one single determinate logic, that of capitalist penetration. The empirical case then simply becomes an end product. In order to understand reversals in economic position and the question of the coexistence of different production systems under the same 'external conditions, a more flexible approach is needed.

The Forms of Production Approach:

The various problems associated with the articulation and differentiation theses discussed above have led to the development of a new approach to the study of petty commodity production (PCP). Attempts to grapple with the internal logic of PMP showed that, a wider economy with fairly well established commodity flows was a necessary precondition for the existence of PMP (Kahn 1980). This formulation resulted from the wish to distinguish firstly the specificity of forms of calculation that could not be labelled as capitalist, and secondly, to provide a non-functionalist explanation for the absence of differentiation. This was in a sense an attempt to combine the insights of class analysis with those derived from the mode of production analysis. In her recent reformulation of the concept of forms of production, Scott summarises the problems that a new formulation would have to face in the following way:

> "...first how to deal with the variant and invariant manifestations of PCP?; second, how to combine the economic with the political and the ideological in the analysis of structure?; third, how to combine the elements of structure and agency into the analysis?; and finally, how to establish a form of causality that is neither functionalist, teleological nor tautological?" (1986:93)

Although the concept of form of production had been used for some time (e.g. Foster-Carter 1978:75; Bernstein 1979:421, 425), Friedmann (1980:160) was the first to provide a rigorous definition. For Friedmann, the concept of form of production implied a double specification of the unit of production and the social formation in which the units in question operate.[13] Smith suggests that this approach is able to account for variation without reducing it to the effects of unique circumstances,:

> "One assumes that the <u>combination</u> of external market conditions and internal labour dynamics determines both forces and relations of production as well as their relationship to each other in any particular form. One finds, therefore, no single 'logic' to any particular form, such as SCP. The logic of a system is given instead by the combination of elements within it, combinations that are neither endlessly diverse nor lacking determinate internal relationships, but that <u>do</u> vary historically in significant ways." (1984d:202)

Thus, in her analysis of Guatemalan petty commodity producers, Smith (1984b) shows that the absence of differentiation can be explained in terms of the internal mechanisms of SCP (the low level of costs of entry and of profits) and the logic of capitalism (capitalists seeking profit would not invest in such a branch of production). This formulation again leads to the identificaton of capitalism as external to the production process, a viewpoint that cannot adequately resolve the problems of articulation. In general, the concept of form of production has been used to refer to characteristics of production that are less encompassing than the concept of mode of production (Scott 1986:94). But as Scott argues, there have been no theoretical analyses that seek to determine "the elements of forms of production <u>in general</u>" (ibid, Scott's emphasis).

Most constructions of SCP are based on the notion that producers are individual, separate and mobile, a position also maintained by Kahn (1980).

This formulation is used by Friedmann in order to differentiate between peasants and petty commodity producers. For Friedmann simple commodity production is a logical concept, "referring to the complete separation of the household from all ties except those of the market" (1980:163). This separation allowed Friedmann to deduce the relations that would characterise SCP on the basis of categories derived from political economy. Using these concepts to include a notion of class position within the analysis, Friedmann identifies SCP as a class of combined labourers and property owners within a capitalist economy (1980:162).[30] The conditions in which SCP is reproduced are defined by a complete mobility of all factors of production, including labour. Peasants, in contrast to commodity producers, are supposed to be involved in circuits of reproduction that are not fully commoditised.

There are two problems with this conception. Firstly, since the labour inputs of SCP are supposedly provided from within the family/household which is the main unit of production, it is still impossible to deduce the conditions under which such labour will be available simply on the basis of deductive concepts taken from political economy. Thus I find this distinction between peasants and simple commodity producers impossible to sustain. Secondly, as G. Smith maintains, in most empirical cases, inputs other than labour are also obtained from within the household as well as from the community. To deny the community any role in influencing productive relations is to repeat Sahlins' mistake. Households exist and are reproduced within larger social contexts, often composed of communities. As I shall show in the case of Tuz cotton producers (chapters 2 and 3), the presence of the community as a territorial, social, and (sometimes ethnic) unity, may segregate the labour force and put restrictions on its unimpeded mobility (Smith, G. 1985:104). Exchanges of labour and produce within the village serve to indicate that non-commoditised forms of circulation also occur outside the boundaries of the household. These exchanges help to reduce cash costs of production as well as ensure adequate supplies of labour under conditions of temporary labour shortage. Therefore, the role of non-commodity relations both within and between production units has to be taken into account in order to explain the conditions of production and reproduction of Tuz farmers.[31]

Lastly, the impossibility of expanded reproduction continues to be a feature of theories of SCP. Scott succinctly summarises this point,: "In essence, simple commodity production is production of commodities without surplus product" (1986:99).[32] The point that is interesting here is that political economy in general seems to substitute the notion of cultural backwardness proposed by anthropologists in the fifties with a technological backwardness more narrowly defined. But even so, cultural and political backwardness are never far away: for most 'classical' analyses, the peasantry represents an anachronistic stratum that is bound to dissapear (Kahn 1986:49-50). Positions which argue for a careful consideration of peasant demands (such as land reform) in formulations of economic policies are labelled 'populist' as was the case for Chayanov and his followers in the Soviet Union. It therefore seems that the wish to do away with the concept of 'peasantry' informs all of the three Marxist approaches discussed here. As argued in a review by Kahn (1985), recent studies on peasant ideology which demonstrate the complexities of peasant consciousness and political involvement speak against a too facile labelling of such activity as 'progressive' or 'backward'. For example, G. Smith suggests that 'community consciousness' may be a "a from of class consciousness appropriate to petty producers at a certain stage in the development of the forces of production" (1986:106).

It seems that it is the wish to remain within the confines of a 'simple commodity logic' that prevents these authors from recognising the potential for accumulation that lies in 'self-exploitation'. In a recent contribution, Gibbon and Neocosmos have criticised this emphasis on a 'subsistence ethic', referring to any approach which imputes a distinctive logic to peasant economy as 'peasantist' (1985:157-67). By contrast, Gibbon and Neocosmos's approach (as well as Bernstein's revised position), with its emphasis on class relations, includes the possibility of expanded reproduction, leading to differentiation (1986:21). We have now come full circle. By reducing all peasant activity to particular operations of the logic of capitalism, we have lost all the tools that may have helped us in the analysis of the particular instance. The contradictory nature of the petty commodity producer as a combination of labour and capital can only be understood by looking at concrete cases and observing how particular

conjunctures and struggles will resolve the contradiction.[33] It has been recently suggested by Kahn (1986) that it may not be possible to explain peasant ideology with concepts derived from political economy. Could it be that to the extent that economic activities are not that far removed from the way people think, the same applies to peasant economy?

In this study, rather than offer an answer to the question posed above, I shall use the concepts discussed in the context of the 'peasant question' in an attempt to explain the means through which petty commodity production in a village of the Söke plain is reproduced. Instead of mode or form of production, I shall use the term petty commodity production to describe a form of economic calculation that depends on the absence of wage as a category of costs. I shall nevertheless retain the concept of peasant as a way of indicating the continued importance of the community in reproducing petty commodity production. I shall show that accumulation on the basis of wage labour and/or household labour is possible for some of these producers. Based on such accumulation, not only are productive forces developed, but the transformation of rich peasants into capitalists is also effected. Thus, although petty commodity production does not dissapear, differentiation is an ongoing process.

These purely on-farm economic processes will have to be contextualised. The first area that I shall turn to is an investigation of the immediate context within which production takes place: the community (chapters 2 and 3) and the household (chapter 4). Next, I shall try to assess the role of the state in creating the economic conditions necessary for the perpetuation of petty commodity production in cotton (chapter 5). A description of the labour process (chapter 6), will be followed by three chapters showing the different mechanisms through which peasants obtain access to the basic means of production, namely land (chapter 7), cash (chapter 8), and labour (9). A final chapter (10) showing the dynamics of accumulation will conclude the study.

Finally, I would like to make a few comments on the nature of the terminology used in this thesis to describe peasant producers. The terms 'peasant', 'petty commodity producer' and 'family farmer' have been employed

indiscriminantly in spite of the many theoretical considerations that militate in favour of specifying these terms. Peasant as a descriptive term indicating part-subsistence part-commodity producers in rural areas is often associated with village studies in anthropology which have explained the lack of 'modernisation' in terms of peasant 'mentalities'. The term 'petty commodity producer' was introduced (Ennew, Tribe and Hirst 1977) as a way of applying analytical concepts derived from political economy to study rural producers more rigourously. But, as Friedmann (1980) has argued, not all agricultural producers in the periphery of the world capitalist system can be defined in these terms. However, as argued above, the distinction she introduces between peasants and petty commodity producers rests on an all too rigid definition of non-commoditised relations. Such a 'perfect' capitalism is difficult to find empirically, and even the wheat producers she analyses obtained one of their inputs, namely labour, outside of commodity relations. 'Family farmer', a term coined by Chayanov, contains all the implications of Chayanov's theory, and as such is impossible to use in a situation where wage labour exists. Thus, each of these concepts points to a body of literature which has provided different answers to the problem posed by the continued existence of a peasantry in many parts of the globe. Before I turn to a description of the setting within which cotton production is undertaken, I would like to discuss briefly the problem of unit of analysis encountered by most 'village' studies.

1.3 The Unit of Analysis

Efforts to analyse agricultural production have always been hampered by problems regarding the unit of analysis. The Frank-Laclau debate of the early seventies has posed this problem within a Marxist context: what should be the relative weight given to relations of production as opposed to relations of circulation? In the latter case, the unit of analysis becomes the world capitalist economy, an entity too large to define as the unit of analysis.[34] 'Relations of production', on the other hand, constitute an abstract concept that cannot immediately be translated into concrete terms.

The revival in the seventies of the debate between Chayanov and his Bolshevik critics has brought another type of analytical unit within the scope of peasant studies: the farming enterprise, often synonymous with a property-holding family/household.[35] Most of these studies treat the household as a primordial unit which somehow 'remains' as a result of the destruction of larger forms of organisation by the enchroachment of market forces. For example, Meillassoux's (1981) 'agricultural domestic community' does not clearly occupy centre stage in his analysis. Since Meillassoux gives primacy to the concept of reproduction, he is forced to take into account the ways in which women circulate between domestic communities. A unit wider than the 'domestic community', usually a lineage, is designated as the social totality within which women circulate. The domestic community, the 'minimal' lineage or the extended family functions only as the unit of production. Since, according to Meillassoux, reproduction is analytically prior to production, it is the former that constitutes the basic unit. His own confusions in constructing the unit of reproduction theoretically, however, often lead him to write of the domestic community as the privileged unit of analysis.[36]

Irrespective of their theoretical orientations, a wide range of authors dealing with rural production conceive of the family/household-based unit of production as <u>the</u> unit which organises factors of production. As a result, the household determines output as well as labour input. This, of course, is analogous to the privileging of the 'firm' in neoclassical economics. In the context of peasant producers, the farm takes the place of the firm and the household is the basic decision-making unit.[37] 'External' factors, are excluded from the analysis on the grounds that they are 'given' and peasants do not have the power to influence them. As a result, in attempts to construct patterns of economic behaviour and resource allocation, on-farm processes are attributed an unwarranted primacy. When these views are coupled with a biased attitude that conceives of households as isolated and self-sufficient 'natural' units (Harris 1981), it becomes impossible to understand those social forces that account for the emergence and the form of households/families/productive units.

Many analyses which argue for the persistence of peasant/petty commodity production locate the sources of the viability of this type of production in the very structures of the family/household.[38] Viability is the result of flexibility. Flexibility results from the sexual division of labour according to which women's work in subsistence activities serves to reduce the level of wages peasants are prepared to accept (Meillassoux 1981; Deere 1979).[39] According to these arguments, flexibility and viability are also due to the subsistence production undertaken by the family and to the variable way in which the latter can allocate labour to various tasks (Melhuus 1984). In other formulations, relations of exchange between different households that reduce the need to depend on market relations work in the same way (Glavanis 1984). Most of these studies take the sexual division of labour or the relation between households as given. However, there is no necessity for the household to be the basic unit of production, much less a flexible one. I shall try to show that households do constitute units of production within the village economy, but that the relations that obtain within them and between them are a result of historical processes and cannot simply be relegated to naturalistic phenomena such as the developmental cycle or the sexual division of labour.

By contrast, within 'traditional' anthropological studies of rural producers/dwellers, the village constitutes the basic unit of analysis. Early descriptions, particularly those of Redfield and his students, "...were first of all, village studies and only incidentally studies of peasants" (Silverman 1979: 49). In these approaches, cultural variables such as meanings, values, and world-views are stressed. These values are shared by people who constitute a community, that is a settlement characterised by the domination of face-to-face relations incorporating values and relations very different from those prevalent in the wider society of which these cultures are a part. Whether these values produce a social structure that is harmonious and orderly (Redfield 1930) or not (Lewis 1951), the community is identified by the nature of relations that prevail within it. These relations are primarily defined in contradistinction to 'industrial' society where anonymous relations predominate. Although, in time, the constitutive elements of the concept of community have undergone considerable changes, the concept has been retained.[40]

The concept of the community has also been part of the study of what anthropologists call 'complex' societies, localised patterns of interaction between people of a neighbourhood or village within 'developed' societies such as Europe and the United States.[4] Mediterranean Anthropology which deals with such complex societies, has, especially in its early phase, prioritised the study of the community (Gilmore 1982:184). As clearly stated by Pitt-Rivers in his preface to the second edition of The People of the Sierra, the type of societies which anthropologists have found in Europe (or the Middle East) differs considerably from the African societies studied by his teacher, Evans-Pritchard. "Armed," as he was with "models of lineage systems and age groups" developed in the African context, he found himself "devoid of any [models] which turned out to be relevant to the social structure of Andalusia" (1971:xv). The community, which Pitt-Rivers identifies as the basic unit of social structure in Andalusia, has much in common with the Redfieldean approach. It is primarily defined by the pervasiveness of shared values. The Andalusian pueblo is, according to Pitt-Rivers, a moral unity, a "... unity achieved through a lively and highly articulate public opinion" (1971:31). While an ideology of friendship and equality characterises relations within the pueblo, authority and power define relations with the 'outside', the state and the ruling structure. These distinctions have allowed Pitt-Rivers to isolate the community and trace its boundaries, without necessarily neglecting the role of relations to wider social and political processes.

Since Pitt-Rivers wrote his monograph on Alcalá, new theoretical orientations have given rise to a plethora of varying treatments of the local community/village which deny it an unquestioned position of analytical centrality (cf. Gilmore 1982:184-5). But, whether the focus is on the workings of the world capitalist system (Schneider and Schneider 1976), regional class dynamics (White 1980), or the nature of the subordination of women (Harding 1975), the village still figures as the typical setting within which anthropologists are able to observe social interaction and illustrate theoretical positions. For example, Friedmann maintains that the village is the immediate arena of reproduction for peasants, although not for petty commodity producers (1980:165). Keyder, writing on the structure of agrarian transformation in Turkey, argues for

the analytical primacy of the village on the grounds that it "... provides an intermediate level of determination, between the household and the relevant social formation" (1983b:35). This contention however is challenged by Hann (1985) who points to the importance of the region. This, according to Hann, is the level at which processes of change, particularly in the direction of proletarianisation, can be located. Emphasis on village units may, therefore, obscure certain dynamics, in this case, by stressing homogeneity at the expense of class struggle.

Thus, within a study of agricultural production, the role of the village or other relevant social groupings has to be carefully set out rather than left assumed. Ideologies such as that described by Pitt-Rivers which stress equality within the community, may have profound consequences for the organisation of agricultural production. Although such statements may not reflect the real nature of social hierarchies, they often point to a certain grammar that may serve to restrict the commoditisation of relations within the community (G. Smith 1986:101). In the case of Tuz villagers described in this study, this restriction has important implications with regard to production strategies and the reproduction of peasant agricultural enterprises. Similarly, in spite of the fact that there are many different forces that cut across the unity of the household, households constitute the basic unit of accounting, in social as well as in economic terms. The village and the household are the two important strucures that mediate the relation of the individual to the social and economic forces that shape his/her life. As I shall argue in the following pages, it is the existence of these structures that has facilitated the production by peasants of a commodity such as cotton that has no immediate use value.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. Apart from observations in the village itself, interviews were conducted with government officials and large producers in the town of Söke. Records of land transactions in the Söke Land Register were consulted. Other villages of the region were visited for shorter periods of time, and differences between plain and mountain villages were investigated. Lastly, a census of all village households was undertaken in 1984, and questions regarding productive activities were also included.

2. See for example, Wolf's construct of the closed corporate community (1957), or the approach taken by 'moral economists' during the late sixties and early seventies (e.g. Scott 1976).

3. Variations on these general positions are important and I propose to look at them in more detail in the following pages.

4. These authors try to construct a 'domestic' and 'petty commodity' mode of production respectively on the basis of a pre-existing lineage mode of production.

5. The debates in question were the Russian, the Indian, the Greek and the much less known Turkish debate. The proponents of the former debates wrote in the pages of The Journal of Peasant Studies, and in the Economic and Political Weekly. For the Turkish debate, see Seddon and Margulies (1984) and Aydin (1987).

6. Both Kahn (1986:50-1) and Ennew, Hirst and Tribe (1977:298-302) stress the differences between the views held by Lenin and Kautsky.

7. As shown by Kahn (1986:49-51), Lenin also takes account of the fact that capitalism might bring into existence 'a number of "new middle strata"... again and again'. Kahn finds Kautsky's position more unilinear since it holds that the elimination of the middle peasantry is inevitable (1986:50).

8. See the discussion between Laclau and Frank over the nature of the social formations in Latin America (Laclau 1971).

9. It should be immediately made clear that while the 'differentiationists' acknowledge their debt to Lenin, those who argue for the persistence of rural commodity producers do not see themselves as 'followers' of Chayanov.

10. But Banaji (1976b) argues that Chayanov was only trying to delineate a peasant process, not mode, of production.

11. Thus, agricultural commodity producers who enter into production on the basis of the resources available to the household may be "incorporated within the circuits of capital and subjected to its domination" (Bernstein 1979:439, note 9). In these cases the process of production is not directly organised by capital and labour is not socialised.

12. Enterprises, according to Banaji, cannot be 'capitalist' or 'feudal', but some of them may only be the 'crystallization' of the logic or 'the laws of motion' of one or another mode of production (1977).

13. See also Littlejohn (1977) and Ennew, Tribe and Hirst (1977) for arguments to the effect that commodity production can only be understood in terms of capitalist categories.

14. It is interesting to note that for Kautsky, the competitive advantage of the small farm was an illusion since the latter only existed as a pool of labour or a market for the capitalist enterprises (Kahn 1986:47-8).

15. This is a problem associated with the Chayanovian position and has been extensively critised by Littlejohn (1977), and Harrison (1975, 1977), among others.

16. Chevalier summarises this tendency in terms of "a reduction of real variation in relations of production to so many expressions of the essential wage-labour relationship and to the functional moments of the all inclusive logic of capital accumulation" (1983:181, note 4).

17. Kahn (1981) and Smith (1984c) have also criticised these views for being too general.

18. See chapter 9. The proponents of the differentiation thesis in Turkey have almost totally restricted their attention to the forms of land appropriation and what they consider to be the automatic effects of the market (Aydin 1987:93).

19. Vergopoulos, who maintains that the small family farm is a creation of capitalism and should therefore be understood as a capitalist enterprise (1976:447) is a case in point. For criticisms, see Friedmann (1980).

20. A recent publication (Scott 1986) goes quite some way in bridging the gap between the two positions.

21. See also Cliffe (1982) for a similar vagueness.

22. The presence of wage labour is not important for Kahn, since even where it does exist its effects are different under PMP than under capitalism. The important point is that under PMP accumulation of capital on the basis of wage labour is not possible since producers are not involved in the calculation of profits, but on getting the average return to labour (139-140). See also Smith (1984b).

23. In this way, Kahn hopes to counteract the notion that PMP can only be a transitory mode of production leading toward the development of capitalism (Ennew, Hirst and Tribe 1977). Agreeing that this could be seen as the gist of Marx's comments on the subject, Kahn maintains that Marx uses the argument in the course of an exposition of the emergence of capitalism in Britain and not as a general logical conclusion on the nature of PMP.

24. Kahn shows that under conditions of import substitution industrialisation, for example, PMP may be transcended and large scale enterprises may be created.

25. With regard to the Turkish peasantry, it was Boratav (1980) who elaborated a concept of PMP which was articulated to capitalism through merchant capital. See Aydin (1987) for a critical evaluation.

26. For example, Glavanis and Glavanis (1983:36-7) locate the mechanism of surplus extraction in the lower wages, or the total absence of wages received by agricultural commodity producers.

27. But it is not necessary to posit a separate mode of production to explain the abundance of labour at times when wages are low, as the form of production approach argues. See below.

28. In a later work (1986), Kahn draws attention to this contradiction.

29. Friedmann and other advocates of this approach use the term simple (SCP) rather than petty commodity production. Scott (1986:98-9) differentiates between these two terms: SCP is conceived as an abstract term indicating production relations, and PCP incorporates the historically specific contexts within which the former are found.

30. Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) and Bernstein (1986) try to refine this concept and argue that small producers operating within a context of generalised commodity production occupy a contradictory class position.

31. In a recent publication, both Smith and Friedmann make similar points. While Friedmann criticises herself among others for treating the family as a black box (1986:47), Smith finds the relations between the labour process and local communities undertheorised (1986:32).

32. There are exceptions. Chevalier (1983) says that variations in productivity under conditions SCP can take place and Smith, in her recent article concedes that accumulation occurs but within certain limits (1986:33).

33. Scott's atttempt to refine the concept of SCP also results in relegating questions of articulation, or linkage as she calls them to the status of secondary level models which can only be refined in concrete situations (1986). The same applies to political struggles whether within the productive unit or within the 'social formation'.

34. Wallerstein's World Capitalist System defines various units of analyses according to the purpose of the study. Thus, the nation-state is an important unit of analysis in the study of political movements and class structures; the household in a consideration of income management and strategies of survival within a world capitalist economy. But to understand the logic of the totality of forces that governs the present system, nothing short of the whole globe can do.

35. See Shanin (1971 and 1974), Sahlins (1974) for attempts to apply Chayanovian concepts to the study of 'peasantries'.

36. For other criticisms of Meillassoux's approach, see Mackintosh (1977), Edholm, Harriss and Young (1977), O'Laughlin (1977).

37. See Ortiz (1973) and Cancian (1972). Donham (1981) provides a thorough criticism of Chayanovian approaches which take domestic units such as households as given.

38. The argument is based on the fact that production and consumption decisions are taken within the same unit. This means that the household can intensify work or decrease consumption according to need. This unity gives the production a degree of flexibility that makes it viable under changing circumstances.

39. This argument has been generalised by Bennholdt-Thomsen (1981) who argues that women in centre economies and peasants in the periphery are in a similar position vis-a-vis capital in that their subsistence activities reduces the costs of reproduction of labour.

40. These changs have been in the direction of emphasising social rather than cultural variables. See for example, Geertz's description of Balinese villages as 'a set of marvelously complex social systems' (1967:255).

41. See Worsley (1977:335-40).

CHAPTER 2: THE REGION AND THE VILLAGE: HISTORY AND PRESENT ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Rural Turkey is a mixture of nucleated villages and small towns which act as administrative and economic centres.[1] Having a common history, these villages are often seen as constituting social and cultural unities within which ties of kinship and contiguity create distinct forms of social interaction (Erdentug 1956,1959; Stirling 1965). It is further argued that social change whether economic and/or political affects these unities and the impact of this change is often seen as a force disrupting these internal relations (Keyder 1983b, Kandiyoti 1975, Stirling 1974, Yasa 1969). The extent to which villages can be conceived as privileged units in the analysis of change in rural Turkey cannot be determined in an apriori manner. The processes that account for the structure of these villages are too diverse to allow for generalisation. In this chapter, I shall try to investigate the historical and social processes that have been operative in the formation of the village of Tuz. I shall argue that close ties to other villages and to the regional capital, puts into question the image of the isolated village community. Focusing particularly on marriage patterns, I shall try to show that in spite of kinship and ethnicity, a notion of the village as a significant social grouping does guide villagers' perceptions of themselves and of others.

2.1 The Region: The Present

Söke is the name of an administrative unit, a district located in the western province of Aydin (see map 1). The district capital, also called Söke, is a large agro-town situated 156 kilometres south of the large port of Izmir to which it is linked by an asphalt road. It is also connected by asphalt roads to the resort towns of Kusadasi in the west and Bodrum in the south and to the provincial capital (Aydin) in the east. These roads extend to the rest of the country, linking the region to the national capital, Ankara as well as to Istanbul, the commercial capital in the north-east. Good road transport facilities and the extension of telecommunication networks have served to integrate the region fully in the economic and political life of the nation (see map 2).



Map 1. Turkey and the province of Aydın



Map 2. District of Söke

The district is situated on the western edge of the Anatolian plateau, along the shores of the Aegean. Western Anatolia is composed of a series of wide flat-bottomed valleys, each separated by mountain ranges oriented in an east-west direction. Each of the valleys is traversed by major rivers, the Gediz, Küçük Menderes, and Büyük Menderes (hereafter referred to as the Meander). The town of Söke lies to the northeast of a large deltaic flood plain created by the Meander river and flanked by mountains to the north, east and south (see map 3). The flood plain and part of these mountains make up the Söke administrative district. The northern Samsun ranges (the Mycale of Antiquity) are quite high, reaching a peak of 1229 metres; the southern range is no more than an elevated plateau (65 metres maximum), on which groups of nomads still winter in their black tents. To the east the Samsun range merges imperceptibly with the foothills of the Aydin mountains which, further east, rise in altitude, reaching over 1800 metres. To the south east, the area is bordered by the Bafa lake (the bay of Latmos, filled by the alluvial deposits brought by the Meander) and the Besparmak mountains, the westernmost fringes of the Taurus ranges, on the southern flanks of which lie the ruins of the Carian city of Heracleia. The area between the Besparmak mountains and the town of Söke is also a high mountaineous plateau where there are many villages depending on a combination of olive and animal husbandry.[2]

Framed by the mountains, the Meander plain lies in the middle; it is an alluvial delta valley, covered by marshes and small ponds. These are the result of countless diversions that the course of the Meander river underwent over the centuries. The river has been filling up its delta so that the ruins of Miletus and Priene, the well-known coastal cities of Ionia, are now well inland.[3] Until 1970, when the main drainage canal was built and linked to the river, the Meander flooded its banks every year, preventing proper crop rotation.[4] A few patches of higher ground around the villages of özbasi and Batmaz (the Lade islands) are the only breaks in the flat landscape. The soils of the delta show numerous differences in quality. Due to frequent changes of the river's course, the latter are distributed throughout the valley in a complex mosaic pattern (öney 1975:188-9). In general, however, the eastern parts of the valley are


Map 3. The Meander Basin: Natural Features
Coastal & deltaic plains
Flood plains
Foothill plains
Hilly areas
Low plateaux
High plateaux
Mountainous areas
Slopes
Steep shores
Low shores
Meander delta
Old river beds
Marshes
ORTAKLAR
INCIRLIOVA
SOKE
BAGARASI
SAMSUN D.
BAFA GOLU
DESPAPINAR

richer in topsoil and consequently make better farmland compared to the saline-alkaline soils of the delta area.

According to a number of socio-economic indicators, Söke is one of the most developed regions of Turkey. The level of literacy in the province as well as the district capital is higher than the national average.[5] Other indicators, such as low infant mortality, low birth rate, number of printing houses, hospital beds per head of population also point to a relatively advanced level of development for the province as a whole.[6] Its population has increased dramatically since the early fifties, fuelled by immigration from poorer areas of the country:[7]

Table 2.1. Population of Söke

Years	Total	Urban	Rural	Turkey Total
1935	29 338	10 912	18 426	16 158 018
1940	32 000	11 472	20 528	17 820 950
1945	34 301	11 870	22 431	18 790 174
1950	41 159	13 385	27 774	20 947 188
1955	66 080	21 343	44 737	24 064 763
1960	67 061	23 593	43 468	27 754 820
1965	74 738	27 558	47 180	31 391 421
1970	82 761	30 000	52 761	35 605 176
1975	89 680	35 407	54 273	40 347 719
1980	93 146	37 413	55 733	44 736 957
1985	109 275	44 556	64 719	50 664 458

Source: State Statistics Institute (DIE), Census of Population, selected years.

In effect, for the last five years, the annual growth rate of the Söke district (3.5 %) has been above that of the national average (2.6 %) (DIE 1986:2). At present, the bulk of the national population increase is accounted for by the growth in the urban population (7.3 %/annum) (DIE ibid). Turkish rural population has in fact been declining since 1980. Söke diverges from the national averages in both respects: population growth in Söke town is about 3.8 % per annum, while the rural population has been increasing at a rate of 3.2 % per annum. Until the sixties, the rural population in the district had been increasing at a faster rate than the urban population. The reversal of the trend since that date indicates population movement from the countryside to the town. The male population

of the town is higher than the female population, while in the countryside the opposite holds. Keeping in mind that men often migrate ahead of their families in search of work, we can infer that rural-urban migration in the district will continue for some time to come. Moreover, national migration to Söke district affects rural as well as urban areas, but the villages to a lesser extent than the town. Nomadic groups registered in other parts of the country also continue to settle in Söke and thus increase local population figures.

The ethnic diversity of the population is quite marked. The oldest identifiable group are the Yürüks, Sunni Muslim groups of pastoral nomads who have been settling in the region ever since the fourteenth century (Planhol 1968:227). Evliya Çelebi describes the inhabitants of Söke in the latter half of the seventeenth century as "pale skinned, blue-eyed and Turkish speaking," (1935:149), characteristics typically associated with the Yürük.[8] In the mountain villages, remnants of Shi'ite tribal groups, the Tahtaci (woodcutters) live alongside another group of Shi'ite tribesmen, the Çepni, descendants of one of the original Turkmen tribes, namely the Boz Ulus, who had originally colonised Anatolia (Gökalp 1980:25-36; Planhol 1968:235-7).[9] From the southern region of Milas, large numbers of gypsies (çingene) have emigrated to the urban as well as rural areas of the district. Kurds from eastern Anatolia were encountered by Evliya Çelebi as early as the 1670's (1935:149-50). Large groups of Macedonian Turks, called muhacir have been settled in the region in exchange for the Greek population in and after 1923. Some of these were born in Bulgaria, others around Salonica, Albania, and even Yugoslavia. Muhacir also vary ethnically: there are Bosnians, Pomaks, (Muslim Bulgarians), and Tikvesli's. Lastly, within the past twenty years, individuals and families from many parts of Turkey have also come to settle in the villages and towns of the Meander plain.

The town of Söke is a large and prosperous-looking settlement divided by tree-lined boulevards, dotted with pleasant parks, and luxurious houses. Its centre boasts numerous shops and businesses, two less inviting hotels, restaurants and cinemas. On closer inspection, differentials in wealth and standard of living become apparent. Housing, for example, is varied.

Government-built low-quality high rise apartment blocks designed for workers and low-level civil servants are ranged near the northern entrance to the town, on the Izmir-Bodrum highway. In the centre, the better built apartment buildings of the local bourgeoisie and the villas belonging to large landholders are found. The hills surrounding the northwestern part are occupied by shanty-towns where the majority of the gypsy population lives. To the south and the east lie the one-story village-style houses built by immigrants from Söke villages. Conditions of sanitation in the shanty town and village-style districts are much worse than in the other, wealthier ones. The town is divided into two by the Söke stream, a cesspool during much of the summer months, which the municapility finds it impossible to clear. The stream is crossed by three bridges, one which dates to the late nineteenth century.

Although the region is replete with historical sites, (Priene, Miletus and Didyma), there is no museum in the town. Cultural activities are limited to a few concerts a year (of the Western pop music kind and popular Turkish music) performed in local cinemas or in the Ionian amphitheatres, low-quality (often pornographic) films shown in the local cinemas, as well as on video-players without which coffee-shops are doomed to lose their clientèle, and to dances in the inevitable wedding-salons (düğün salonu) of which there are two. There are about ten mosques in the town, one of which dates to at least the seventeenth century.[10] Before the 1980 coup, the National Teachers' Union had a local branch building where left-wing literature could be read aloud and discussed. Within the town, there are about 10 primary schools and 10 secondary schools. One of these is a co-educational lycée which prepares pupils for higher education, and another 4 are what are called 'vocational high schools' (meslek okullari) where pupils are taught specific skills such as commerce and agricultural management. One of these is an all-girls school which specialises in the teaching of sewing and home-economics courses. Twenty-five kilometres to the north of Söke, near Ortaklar, there is a teacher training college, which, before 1980, was the site of violent clashes between right- and left-wing students of the kind that were then taking place all over the country.

Politically-speaking, the town accurately reflects wider national currents, as can be seen from some of the comments above. All political parties have local branches.[11] Trade unions and student organisations of the pre-1980 period were well represented at the local level; in June, 1975, various left-wing political parties and trade unions had even tried to organise an unsuccessful strike among the locally settled seasonal workers. The abolition of the middleman system in contracting seasonal labour and efforts to raise agricultural wages (and to equalise the differential rates obtaining between men, women and 'children', defined as individuals under sixteen years of age) were among the issues around which these groups tried to mobilise labour.[12] On the whole, however, politically, the region is rather conservative. The personal influence of Aydin-born Adnan Menderes, the leader of the banned Democrat Party of the fifties, is still very much felt. As a result, Demirel, his successor and leader of one of the opposition parties today, commands a large number of votes. Nevertheless, the role of Ismet Inönü, Ecevit's predecessor as the leader of the RPP, in winning the Turkish War of Independence (1923) is also an important political factor even today. Hence, Söke has one of the few social democrat mayors of Turkey, a man who belongs to the new centre-left party headed by Inönü's son.

Being an administrative seat, Söke has a Government House which houses the local representatives of the different ministries. Within this building there are courts, the tax office, the Director of Education, the Agricultural Extension Office, the Directorate of Waterworks, the Land Registry, and the offices of the kaymakam, the district governor. These government institutions also serve the forty-seven villages which are administratively linked to Söke. There is a large post-office with an automatic international telephone exchange[13], many branches of national banks, both public and private, offices of government-sponsored agricultural cooperatives, as well as a train station, which doubles as a park in summer. The station is on a branch of the Izmir-Aydin railway line, built by the British and completed in 1866 (Kurmus 1974:64).[14]

The economic life of Söke is quite diversified, but its dependence on the agricultural sector, and on the production of cotton in particular, is

undisputable.[15] In the course of 1978, 63 % of all the value of trade in the Söke commodity exchange was accounted for by seed cotton and another 15.7 % by lint cotton (Söke Exchange, Annual Report, 1978.)[16] About 63 % of all arable land in the district is cropped to cotton (Köseli 1975:62).[17] Consequently, there are over fifteen cotton gins in town which process raw cotton from neighbouring regions such as Milas, Selcuk, Kusadasi, and Germencik. Many of the larger gin-owners also act as cotton traders, buying the seed cotton from over a wide area and selling it in the Söke (established in 1966) or Izmir exchanges (Köseli 1975:16). There is also a modern cotton yarn factory which has twenty-five thousand spindles and which was founded in 1972 with capital provided by a few of the local landholders. Cotton and agriculture in general has also allowed the establishment of more than fifteen factories and workshops where agricultural implements, particularly tractor-drawn ploughs and cultivators suited to local soil conditions are produced. Some of the larger of these workshops are able to supply the whole of the Izmir region. Apart from cotton, tobacco and animal husbandry are the most important agricultural products of the region, followed closely by olive and olive oil production and fish produced in two large fish farms.[18] Oil-bearing seeds have become the basis of a slowly enlarging business sector in Söke. Olive oil had, of course, been produced for a long time, and there are many modern as well as more traditional presses in town as well as in some of the villages. Since 1979, the cultivation of sunflower seeds and various fodder crops such as vetches has started to replace cotton, especially on large farms. However, the continued entry into cotton production of small-scale peasant farmers has, to a large extent, counteracted this movement away from cotton.

Alongside this agricultural activity, trade and services have also flourished. The professions are well-represented, lawyers and doctors being the most numerous. The volume of trade undertaken via the Söke Commodity Exchange amounted to 363 million TL in 1978 (approx. 14.5 million US dollars). Tractor and tractor-tyre agencies are the most thriving businesses of Söke. The repair sector associated with mechanical agriculture is able to sustain more than one hundred workshops, all situated in the newly established Söke Small Industry Quarter (Küçük Sanayi Sitesi). The bazaar area, çarsi, is full of shops selling cloth, woollen

yarn, ready-to-wear clothing, kitchen utensils (including the latest in Braun electric kitchen appliances purchased by the growing numbers of middle-class professionals), furniture, and so on. Open-air markets are held twice a week and draw into town large numbers of villagers who mainly come to buy in bulk those vegetables that are in season. Very few villagers sell themselves in the market which is dominated by professional vendors who travel all around the district. Some poorer inhabitants of the town itself, including women, occasionally sell a few items of their own production, fresh plants, cheese, even embroidered scarves. There are also supermarkets as well as small grocery stores, large cheese manufacturing and selling concerns. Another sector which is expanding is tourism. The Söke area boasts two large and well-known summer resorts, Didim, a beautiful bay ten kilometres south of Apollo's temple, and Kusadasi, the old Scala Nova. Many estate agents and hotel/motel/camping managers/owners have sprung up in Söke as a result of the tourist boom.[15]

As a result of the social and economic dynamism of Söke, links to the provincial capital, Aydin (Tralles to the Greeks and Güzelhisar to the Ottomans), are few and limited to occasional business with the few governmental offices not represented in Söke. With its government offices, trade, markets and industry, Söke is the regional capital. Regular transport between the villages and the town allows the integration of the town with the countryside. Economically and socially the district is more linked to Izmir than to Aydin. The rich move to Izmir and send their children to school there (if not abroad), and the villagers have at least visited the city once in their lives (especially the fair that is held in September every year). Two hours' drive away, Izmir also offers larger and better equipped hospitals. Local girls hope to marry (and many have done so) into the outlying districts of Izmir, creating even stronger ties with the city. As a result of these multi-stranded ties, it is difficult to draw geographical or social boundaries that circumscribe the region. At best, Söke can be identified as the political and economic centre of a cotton-producing plain that has an important place in the Turkish economy.

2.1.1 The Region: The Past

In the past, Söke has not always been such a hub of economic activity. For over four centuries or more, the plain was a malaria-infested marshland used by nomadic pastoralists as winter grazing grounds.[20] The relative paucity of historical documents on the region attests to this fact. The economic 'boom' that the region has experienced is fairly recent. A brief spurt of activity in the latter half of the nineteenth century apart, it dates to the introduction of tractors and the partial draining of the marshes in the nineteen thirties; but, at this time, the increase in agricultural production affected only a few of the large landholding families of the region. The 'real' boom, that which mobilised a large portion of the population, is a phenomenon of the early nineteen sixties, when state-backed irrigation and drainage projects managed to drain marshes and keep the Meander river under control. State credits to large and small farmers, government-sponsored cooperatives, buying cotton at set prices were the main factors that created the boom (see chapter 4). In a way, the peasantry of the Söke region can be seen as a creation of state action, an action which, although not absent during the Ottoman period, has really been effective only within the last forty years.

There are no clear records regarding the period and the circumstances of the foundation of the town, but a number of authors believe that it was founded by Turkish immigrants rather than earlier (Gökbel and Sölen 1936:246).[21] By the middle of the seventeenth century Söke was an established market town in the kaza (district) of Akçasehir.[22] Already around 1478, Akçasehir was a market-village where 48 taxpayers lived (TT 8:697), a population which, fifty years later, had risen to 68 taxpayers (TT 148). From the records in Ottoman tax registers, it seems that the area was a prosperous one where trade and agriculture complemented one another. The agricultural base was quite diverse, including animal husbandry (particularly sheep), cereals, pulses, vegetables and fruit, vineyards, and cotton (TT 148).

When Evliya Çelebi visited the region in 1670, Söke was the capital of the sancak of Sigla and the pasa of Sigla had his residence there. The

town was divided into nine mahalle, quarters, with a total of 1100 adobe houses, six mosques, and seventeen shops (Evliya Çelebi 1935:148-9). European travelers, who, in search of the ruins of classical antiquity visited the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chandler in 1765, Texier in 1835), report that the coastal area near Miletus was, on account of its foul air, completely deserted except for a few nomads (Texier 1882:336).[23] By contrast, Soukeui (or Su Köy, water village) is described by Texier as a big town where an agha, the commander of the district resided (1882:345). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Söke was a large town of more than 6000 inhabitants, with three factories, 880 shops, 3 baths, 17 hans, and 5872 houses (Aydin Salnamesi 1315 (1900):305).[24]

The history of landownership in the area is even fuzzier. The absence of private property in land and the allocation of land revenues to various state officials (the timar holders) characteristic of the Ottoman land tenure system seems to have applied to the region.[25] Evliya mentions the existence of six hundred timar holders, as well as twenty-six zaim, administrators of large timars, all of which had a serbest gedik, that is they did not have to share the income of their district with the district governor, the sancak bey (ibid). By 1749 at the latest, tax farming replaced the timar system in Söke (Gökbel and Sölen 1936:252; Kocagöz 1977:23). At this time, it seems that one family, the Ilyaszade, rose to prominence and became the müteselim, (collector of dues for absent sancak bey) of the sancak of Sigla. This family is cited as one of the large ayan families who were able to establish what Lewis describes as autonomous and hereditary principalities derebeylik[26]; the Ilyaszade ruled the sancak of Mentese from about the middle of the eighteenth century (Lewis and Morttman 1965:207.[27]

What ayan rule meant in practice was that the members of the Ilyaszade family could collect land revenue of the area over which they held power. They also provided soldiers to and fought in the Ottoman navy to repress a rebellion in the island of Sakiz (Gökbel and Sölen 1936: 249). It is probable that they also engaged in commercial activities, especially in the sale of olive oil, in a way comparable to one ayan of the Edremit

area described by Faroqhi (1987).[28] They also must have collected taxes (and maybe the rents of grazing grounds?) paid by nomads. The family managed to acquire the ownership of large tracts of land after the passing of the 1858 land laws which allowed private property in land.[29]

According to one of the older landholders of the region, H.F., the çiftlik (large farm) of Balat, which is at present owned by Tan, had been the property of the Ilyaszade who turned it over to the Kocagöz. These latter are a landholding family whose ancestor was, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, appointed müsellim by the central government.[30] The Kocagöz, were able to control large tracts of land in the southwest and the northeast regions of the plain (about twenty-five thousand decares according to S. Kocagöz). According to H.F., the Kocagöz had about eighty to one hundred black slaves who were used as ploughmen.[31] Today, the Kocagöz still have small amounts of land in Burunköy. Their holdings in the south, however, were at one time apparently sold to a Greek landowner, Benlioglu; the exact date and circumstances of the transfer of the land are not known. This is the same area which, after the 1923 population exchange with Greece, was given to Tan in compensation for the loss of his çiftlik in Thrace.

The fate of one of the çiftliks controlled by the Ilyaszade provides further information about transfers of land in the region. Upon the death in the 1890's of the last descendant of the Ilyaszade, the holding reverted to the state. One of the çiftliks of the estate which measured 55,000 decares and included within its territory fourteen villages, was then bought for 12,000 gold liras by Sultan Abdulhamid, from whose heirs H. F. bought it in 1340 for the sum of 55,000 liras.[32]

Until the middle of the twentieth century, Söke had a mixed economy, within which the landlord-peasant relationship dominated. Its integration into commodity markets was partial, but more advanced than that of many other regions of the country, and trade and industry were not unimportant. Big landlordism prevailed: it seems that at the turn of the century, at least four large çiftliks, two of which were in the possession of Greeks, existed in the region. Until the fifties, large holdings were often

parcelled out to sharecroppers, Turkish and before the 1923 exchange of population, Greek villagers of the region. There were, towards the end of the nineteenth century, efforts by Christian merchants (among whom the British figured prominently) to establish farms which employed wage labour (Kurmus 1977:112-4). According to Kurmus, the first land occupations by peasants occurred in the Söke and Nazilli areas in 1883 as a result of attempts by British landowners to dispossess them (1977::121).

Cereals, tobacco, figs, grapes and olives were the main crops cultivated in Söke farms.[33] The more important export crops of this period included animal products (wool and cheese), valonia (used in the tanning industry) and liquorice root.[34] The last two did not require any special methods of cultivation, but grew in abundance and were collected by peasants.[35] In spite of improved roads and trains, camel trains, mainly under the control of local yürük, constituted the main form of transport until the late fifties.

The period between 1900 and 1950 saw significant changes in the local population. The War of Independence fought with the Greeks, removed all the Christian population of the region.[36] In their place large numbers of migrants from the Balkan territories that the Ottoman Empire had lost, were settled in the region whose Muslim population had been decimated as a result of the long wars marking the last years of the Empire. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the sedentarisation of the transhumant animal herders of the region has accelerated. Many villages in the Söke region bear the name of the tribe (asiret) by which they have been established.[37] This process gained impetus in the fifties and sixties, partly as a result of the distribution of government owned land to landless families. But more important was the reduction of grazing grounds in the area resulting from land improvements and the commoditisation of agriculture.[38] By the end of the fifties, a sedentary peasantry was well established on the plain.

If the late nineteenth century was a time for the consolidation of large landholdings in the Söke district, the twentieth century marked their dissolution. As commoditisation increased, land values also rose. This led

to the minute division of estates between numerous heirs.[39] The increase in trading activities allowed the accumulation of capital, which was then invested in land, more as a status symbol than as a profit-making investment.[40] However, in the long run, greater income provided by non-agricultural pursuits encouraged landowning families to sell at least part of their land in order to acquire capital to invest in business.[41] Lastly, constant rumours of an intended land reform programme led many of the landowners to sell land to the peasants who had been working it as their sharecroppers.[42] It should not, however, be assumed that these sales of land to peasants occurred without pressure 'from below'. Landless sharecroppers tried many methods of making their grievances known: they formally demanded land, pleaded with landlords, refused to hand the landlord's portion, or to cultivate the land at all.[43]

As a result of all these processes, land has changed hands many times. The larger landholders, descendants of the ayan of the last century, have largely moved away from the land. Initially they were replaced by merchants who bought land and tried to consolidate estates (of course, on a much smaller scale than their predecessors). Since the mid-sixties, the merchants have also started to move away from the land. This time, it has been the villagers, particularly the settled yürük, who have been buying land, using as capital the money they receive from the sale of their animals which they can no longer care for. Consequently, the size of the average landholding has diminished even more.

As the table below shows, the majority of village dwellers own on the whole more land than the town dwellers. 23 % of the land in Söke is owned by large landholders owning more than 1000 decares of land, and these families represent less than 1 % of the total farming families of the district. Middle farmers with whom this thesis is concerned constitute about half of the total farming families of Söke, and they own only about 34 % of the total. Looking only at farming families living in villages, middle farmers own about 45 % of the land and make up 54 % of village farming families. Keeping in mind that peasant ownership of land in the region was insignificant half a century before these figures were compiled,

we can see that small-to-middle ownership has developed to a considerable extent in the intervening years.

Table 2.2 Land Ownership in Söke District

Area (da)	Owners in Villages (no)	Land (da)	Owners in Town (no)	Land (da)	Owners Total (no)	Land Total (da)
0	3343	0	0	0	3343	0
1-25	1588	27779	629	8554	2217	36333
26-50	1252	52248	454	16747	1706	68995
51-100	1080	78370	355	25890	1435	104260
101-200	280	44531	187	28313	464	72844
201-500	125	45300	72	26827	197	72127
501-1000	18	15360	31	25405	49	40765
1000+	4	27500	53	91977	57	119477
TOTAL	4347	291088	1781	223713	6125	514801

Source: Köyisleri 1981, Tables 12 and 13, pp.21,22.

2.2 The Village Setting

Tuz,[44] a medium-sized village to the northeast of the Söke plain, provides the social setting within which I shall analyze cotton production. The relative prosperity that the village enjoys today is a recent phenomenon dating to the late sixties, and is largely the result of the cultivation of cotton. In this and many other ways, Tuz is a creation of the events of this century. Apart from cotton production itself, the size and composition of its population is the product of the events that led to the creation of the Turkish Republic, particularly the War of Independence fought against the Greeks. Its present economy has been created within the last thirty-five years, largely as a result of state intervention.[45] For these reasons, it is quite impossible to consider Tuz a closed 'society' or a bounded unit of analysis, unless the reasons for making such a supposition are specified more carefully.

Compared to many villages in the region, Tuz has a fairly short history: it is no more than a hundred years old. At the end of the nineteenth century about ten Greek houses stood on its present site.[46] The village must have been founded by Greek immigrants from Dogan, a village seven kilometres to the east, which, until the late sixties had been the centre of a nahiye (an administrative unit smaller than the kaza).[47] About one kilometre to the east of the Greek Tuz, four or five yürük had constructed reed and mud huts (çit dam) which they occupied only part of the year. They spent the summer months roaming the pine forests of the Samsun mountains. Some of these yürük had opened up land and were engaged in agriculture. In these cases, part of the household remained in the village to look after the crops. This form of seasonal transhumance continued among Tuz yürük until 1964, when the state, in an effort to protect the much depleted forests, forbade access to the mountains.

The site of the village was chosen to avoid the annual floods that occurred as the Meander before regulation, broke its banks every winter. The settlement lies on a mountain slope, its northern borders reaching well into the Samsun ranges. Here are found olive groves, numerous water-mills (only one of these is still in use) and small gardens, all constructed long ago by the Greeks. As a result of numerous fires and over-grazing, the natural tree-cover has, in many places, degenerated into a maquis, which is used by villagers as firewood, building material, and as a source of medicinal plants. To the east and the west, valleys created by mountain streams mark the village boundaries. Water from these streams is used to irrigate gardens on the hill-slopes as well as the kitchen-gardens that surround the houses. In order to minimise disputes, the muhtarlik employs a villager to distribute stream water according to a strictly-controlled system of rotation. Water fees are used to pay the the distributor's salary.[48] To the southeast, the village lies on level ground that merges with the Meander plain and it is the cotton fields that mark the boundaries of the settlement. The infertile area between the village and the sea to the southwest, patched with a scrub-thorn growth, constitutes the rather inadequate pasture-land (mera). State-owned and administered by the muhtarlik, it is the only stretch of land used communally.[49] Due to the

low level of the land, the sea seasonally floods the coastal plains and leaves in its wake deposits of salt, regularly collected by the villagers.

The village is situated on the Söke-Karina-Miletus asphalt road which links it to the regional capital and to other villages in its vicinity. The approach to the village from the main road brings the visitor to a central square surrounded by shops, three coffeehouses, and the large state-built muhtarlik building. The latter houses the office of the village headman, the muhtar, two guest rooms, and the wedding salon. Official buildings also include the primary school (built in 1967) and the logements for forest rangers. There are two mosques, one of which is disused. Village shops include five general stores (bakkal), one barber, one restaurant, one cotton-purchasing agency, an blacksmith, an electrician specialising in the repair of tractor batteries, and a carpenter. Communications with neighbouring villages are easy and frequent. Apart from minibuses owned by the village as a corporate body and by enterprising individuals, transport to neighbouring villages is possible on the numerous tractors as well as the few private cars and pick-ups. Villagers travel to the regional capital, for many different reasons ranging from visits to the doctor, shopping, and to attend weddings.[50] Relatives settled in Söke are often visited on market days, after the day's shopping.

The village is a fairly compact settlement made up of peasant houses (see map 4). Its immediate appearance provides clues of prosperity only to the experienced eye. Village streets are unpaved, tortuous, and muddy (or dusty, depending on the time of the year), buildings are small and irregular. And yet, it is the houses that display the signs of wealth. Most are one-story buildings constructed of plastered and whitewashed cement bricks; many have iron doors and window bars. The majority of houses are composed of three rooms (oda or ev) arranged around a central sitting room (salon).[51] Most of the rooms are all-purpose spaces covered with mats and kilims; nevertheless, there is usually a kitchen and a washing area at the back of each house.[52] Apart from the houses in the old Greek quarter, most are situated in the middle of a courtyard where vegetables, fruit trees and flowers are grown. Each courtyard is encircled by walls whose height indicates the wealth of its owner. Apart from the


Map 4. Sketch Drawing of Tuz
Houses with kitchen gardens
Gardens
S Shop
R Restaurant
K Coffee house
W Workshop
M Mosque
A Muhtarlik
P Postoffice-shop
to watermill
Hillside Gardens
Olive Groves
STREAM
Gardens & Olive Groves
to Doğan
Village Meadow
Hill
Main Square
Cotton Fields
Cotton Fields
to Söke
Cemetary
Primary School
Forest Rangers

main building, the courtyard also contains a number of outhouses which serve different functions: kitchen, garage, store house, and barn. Electrification came in 1974, and by now, almost all the households possess TV sets. Apart from electricity, houses boast running water: in 1981, a centralised water distribution system was established, making obsolete the neighbourhood fountains (and the social interaction generated around them).

2.2.1 The People

Tuz has a population of 893 souls living in 170 households.[53] The population of the village increased in the five to six years immediately following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The settlement of Balkan Turks in villages vacated by the departing Greeks largely accounted for population growth. Since then, two new waves of settlement have occurred around the mid-fifties and in the late sixties. The first was caused by the influx of muhacir from Dogan. As this village declined in importance, many of its inhabitants emigrated to Tuz.[54] Immigrants maintain that the villagers of Dogan, many of whom are their kin, are lazy and quarrelsome and have bad morals; they say they came to Tuz in order to protect their daughters, who would end up by eloping with someone if they remained in Dogan. In effect, the rate of marriage by elopement is much higher in Dogan compared to Tuz.[55] The second wave of emigration and settlement in Tuz were undertaken by yürük. Restrictions on grazing led to the settlement in the mid-sixties of two groups (mahalle) of tribal yürük.

Table 2.3. Population of Tuz Village

Year	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
Pop.	208	148	247	311	399	465	665	728	811	993	1177
↑ (%)		-6	13	5	6	3	9	2	2	4	4

Note: The drop in numbers between 1935 and 1940 was, according to villagers, the result of the flight of immigrants from mountain villages in Macedonia who could not support the heat and the malaria.

Until the nineteen fifties, Tuz was a small, malaria-ridden village with a mixed subsistence economy. It was then that government began to

drain marshes, distribute state-owned land, and actively subsidize agricultural production, especially in areas where export crops were grown. The resulting increases in cotton yields spurred economic activity in the region, making many of the villages of the Meander plain economically attractive. Population growth after 1950 was, on average, about 3.6 % per annum, the rate that obtains for the whole district. Apart from natural factors, a small trickle of immigration continues to swell the numbers of Tuz inhabitants. Dogan families continue to move east to Tuz. In a westward movement of population, immigrants from villages in the Söke plain and from other provinces of Turkey also settle in the village. By contrast, the move away from the village is limited: the village is neither rich enough nor poor enough for out-migration to take place on any significant scale. The departure of women upon marriage is, by and large, counteracted by the number of incoming brides.[56] Within the last thirty years or more, only two families migrated out of the village, about 10 adult males left to find work elsewhere and another 10 moved out on becoming civil servants. Many of these individuals maintain links with the village.[57]

The ethnic composition of present-day Tuz bears the traces of past events. Of a total of 893 individuals I counted in 1984, about half are muhacir, and the rest are yürük. Ethnicity is defined here mainly in terms of self-ascription. As such, it forms a component of social identity, along with gender, kinship and residence.[58] Ethnic ascription in Tuz does not produce bounded groups, but is effective in explaining difference among people who perceive themselves to be similar in many ways. The inhabitants of Tuz are all Sunni Muslims.[59] This relative homogeneity is greatly valued by the villagers and is seen as a source of stability and lack of politicization.[60] Within the two main groups, there exist finer distinctions which nevertheless are quite important. Muhacir are distinguished according to their place of origin: Macedonians, Albanians, or Salonicans. The largest group originates from Kilkis, a district north of Salonica. There are five households from Bosnia, three from Bulgaria, and two from Albania.

The main distinction between the yürük is between the eski yürük, the old yürük, and the recent settlers who are locally called yeni (new) yürük

in contradistinction to the other group. The eski yürük, according to Planhol, may be descendants of the original nomadic peoples who settled in Anatolia prior to the second wave of migration from the east that took place in the seventeenth century (Planhol 1958:193; 1968:238). These groups have no memory of tribal organisation, nor of long-distance migrations. The term itself appears in eighteenth century Ottoman registers and indicates a unification for religious or historal reasons of groups who have no common origin (Planhol 1958:193).

By contrast, the yeni yürük have clear tribal (asiret) affiliations; until recently, they migrated every year to their summer pastures (yayla) on the central Anatolian plain near Afyon, Usak and Kütahya. These groups who claim to have originated from the Taurus ranges, had winter pastures (kislak) in the Kirikiçi hills to the south of the Meander plain, and only in early spring and late autumn spent a few weeks in the Samsun ranges near their present place of residence. The yeni yürük in Tuz belong to two of the many purely nomadic asirets which still live in the Taurus mountains: the Karatekeli and the Karahacili (Planhol 1958:191-3).[61] Smaller subdivisions, called oba (groups of tents) by Planhol, and mahalle (=town quarter, a term maybe used as an extension of its urban sense) by the Tuz yürük themselves, can also be discerned among these groups.[62] In Tuz, elderly yürük maintained that the Karatekeli tribe could be subdivided in seven mahalle; two of these, the Siçmazlar and the Karnikaralar, make up the majority of Tuz yeni yürük.

Table 2.4 Population of Tuz According to Ethnicity

	Men	Women	Households**
Yeni Yürük	105	108	40
Eski Yürük	100	104	41
Muhacir	218	220	82
Others*	16	22	7
Total	439	454	170

* This category includes seven households that have moved to Tuz from provinces such as Konya, Eskisehir and Denizli. These households and nine women who married into the village do not belong to any of the ethnic groups present in the settlement. Three of these women are from villages within the area, but they designate themselves as yerli, locals. This might mean they are descendants of slaves, or gypsies, or simply that they do not (or cannot) associate with any distinct ethnic group. One woman is of Kurdish origin. The teachers and the forestry officials are excluded from this table on the grounds that they are civil servants and have not migrated to Tuz out of free choice.
** Households are classified according to the ethnicity of the household head.

2.2.2 Ethnicity in Tuz

As a result of the increasing homogeneity in their way of life, the distinctions between these groups have largely disappeared. Differences in speech and physical appearence do remain between yürük and muhacir.[63] The yürük, apart from three households, have all sold their sheep and goats and have turned to full-time agriculture. None live in tents. House structures, and furnishings are almost identical except for a few hand-woven kilims that still remain in a few of the older yürük houses.

A more subtle difference between the two group exist with regard to the public behaviour of women. In public, yürük women wear small scarves tied under the chin.[64] They feel no 'shame' (ayip) walking in public spaces, especially in front of the coffeehouses. They venture out of the village more freely than the muhacir women, in order to collect firewood or edible weeds, a practice which is much derided by muhacir men.[65] By contrast, muhacir women cover themselves in a larger cloth that covers their shoulders, çarsaf. They rarely walk alone in the village square and avoidance behaviour is more marked among them.[67]

Differences that are not immediately visible can also be discerned. Firstly, marriage practices current among each group are different and mutually incomprehensible. The muhacir say they marry outsiders (yedi göbek disardan=at a distance of seven wombs), while the yeni yürük insist on marrying close kin (cognates as well as agnates). This form of endogamy is almost absent among the eski yürük who express no special preferences in obtaining marriage partners. Villagers say that muhacir marry strangers, while yürük marry among people they know.[68] More importantly, however, yeni yürük marriages in the older generation approximated a form of sister exchange, a type of marriage that is fairly widespread in the Middle East.[69] It has been argued that exchange marriage is 'distasteful' to Turks because it implies low status at least on the part of one of the parties involved, since it involves waiving bride-price payments (Bates 1973:77), or because it makes women difficult to control (Meeker 1976:412).[70] However, for the yürük, the implication that exchange marriage is distasteful or that it implies lower status does not seem to hold. Among all the yürük, giving a daughter in marriage is one of the best ways of obtaining a bride. But, reciprocation is not always sought and marriages do not necessarily take the form of immediate restricted exchange. With increasing 'modernity' however, all forms of marriage that involve close kin, including exchange marriage, are being downgraded as expressions of backwardness and ignorance (Sirman, forthcoming).

Compared to muhacir, yürük kinship ties between different households are more clearly recognised and more frequently activated. The yürük are interested in genealogies and kinship connections and readily discuss these subjects, while the muhacir often claim ignorance about their genealogies. As a result of their past semi-nomadic history, the eski yürük have a wide range of agnatic as well as cognatic kin dispersed all over the Söke plain, while the yeni yürük keep in close contact with their kin in Tekeli village, near Izmir. Muhacir often try to take advantage of the wider kin network available to their yürük neighbours, especially in matters regarding cotton production and marriage. Yürük always try to maintain good relations with their affines, a relation which often involves strong ties of economic cooperation. Nevertheless, affinal and cognatic ties among yürük are in

theory subordinated to agnatic ties and a man who cultivates the former ties at the expense of the latter is disapproved strongly.

Among the yürük authority and respect characterise relations between agnates. Younger men are supposed to defer to their elders, and women to men. Young men are expected to take the advice of their older agnates (father, mother, elder brother, elder brother's wife) before making any decisions of importance, and consult them in economic and family matters. A man shows respect by not interrupting elder men, by not smoking in front of them and by not adressing his own wife and children by name in the presence of older agnates. Similarly, a woman is supposed to obey and show respect to the older women in her husband's family group, especially his mother, sisters and elder brother's wife. Based on the kinship hierarchy, relations between households are supposed to be cooperative, a situation which is not often borne out in reality. The dominance of agnatic ties in defining inter-household relations reinforces the authority of the (usually male) yürük household head. The authority of the father is, at least in theory, never to be contested openly, a fact which becomes quite apparent in the organisation of work teams. While muhacir work more often for a wage, wives, daughters and sons in yürük households spend more time working in their own and in their kinsmen's fields.

By contrast, conceptions of agnatic kinship are not stressed among the muhacir. This leads to an emphasis on inter-personal relations in forming the basis of inter-household cooperation. Conceptions of friendship (arkadaslik) among male household heads are overtly expressed. The fact that friendship depends on choice and mutual reinforcement of the relationship means that patterns of cooperation among muhacir households are subject to frequent alteration. Cooperation between kin, whether agnatic, cognatic or affinal carry far less importance among the muhacir than they do among the yürük. Muhacir assert their autonomy and independence from kin ties, often in an effort to emphasise personal merit in obtaining wealth and status. Consequently, relations within muhacir households are also different. Although a certain amount of deference is supposed to be shown to older people, respect and authority within the household is often subject to negotiation and struggle. Unmarried daughters

as well as young sons are able to criticise and even act against the wishes of their elders. Thus, the competition and struggle that define relations within and between households are expressed openly among the muhacir, but is couched in idioms of respect and authority among the yürük.

Ethnic stereotyping is an important aspect of interaction between these groups. The yürük are considered to be honest, but dirty, shameless and ignorant. The latter are reminders of the time they used to live in tents where running water, privacy, and education were luxuries hard to come by.[71] By contrast, muhacir are described as lazy, quarrelsome and slanderous. The yeni yürük are further stereotyped according to the smaller mahalle they belong to. Thus, the Siçmazlar, the largest group in Tuz, are said be hardworking and generous; but, it is also said that they have bad tempers, use foul language and are inhospitable. The interesting aspect of these stereotypes is that each group by and large accepts the identity conferred by these characterisations. In many ways, stereotypes are used to smooth inter-personal conflicts that threaten the stability of larger groups. Referring to these stereotypes can, to a certain extent, serve to restrain tempers and alter the course of disputes.

One serious dispute between two neighbours provides a case in point: one of the women involved was Güllü, an eski yürük whose mother was a yeni yürük, a Siçmaz, and the other was Meryem, a muhacir married to an eski yürük. The real reason behind the conflict centered around questions of equality and reputation and involved Meryem's husband's elder brother and his wife, Güllü's mother's sister (see Appendix IV). Güllü started the quarrel by shouting abuse at her neighbour from her front room window. Next, she insulted Meryem's visitors, including myself. Meryem ran out of her house with a knife, but was held back by neighbours. The argument which pacified Meryem was that Güllü was, after all, a Siçmaz and that it was her, Meryem's, merit that they had been able to remain on good terms for as long as they had done. Calmed, but not satisfied, Meryem went to Güllü's mother-in-law to complain and to demand some authority to be exercised over her unruly neighbour. The mother-in-law, a Siçmaz herself, apologetically argued that it was very difficult to control Siçmazli's since they had no respect for age or status, and that they were liable to use

foul language. Meryem was not completely satisfied; she wanted to cleanse her own good name in a more efficient manner by sueing Güllü for libel. But court cases are expensive and in the end, the public denunciation of Güllü by her own mother-in-law, even if couched in general terms (that is in terms of the Siçmaz in general, rather than Güllü in particular), was the best retribution Meryem could get. Using the generally accepted Siçmaz stereotype, the mother-in-law had been able to avoid damaging Güllü's reputation too badly. At the same time, any rebuke from the mother-in-law in response to Meryem's request could have escalated things beyond control. As it was, the two women were not on speaking terms (dargin) for a period of six years.[72]

Despite these differences yürük and muhacir live together harmoniously. However, differences in marriage practices are sometimes the cause of misunderstandings between the two groups. Yürük who attempt to initiate marriage proceedings with the daughters of their muhacir neighbours find that the latter will cut off all communication after such a demand.[73] For the muhacir, such an act is a breach of trust: for them it only means that their neighbours had previously coveted their daughters who consequently had been in danger of dishonour.[74] Unformulated ideas of incest are also present: muhacir believe that unrelated children who grow up together are like siblings and should therefore not marry. As can be seen from the discussion above, many neighbourhoods (mahalle) are mixed (see map 5) and close economic or other social relationships are forged across ethnic boundaries as often as they do within them. Although marriages across ethnic boundaries have increased within the last ten years, ethnic endogamy is still prevalent.

As the Table below shows, the eski yürük, the oldest inhabitants of the region, seem to be the least endogamous of all Tuz inhabitants. The smaller number of marriages between the yeni yürük and the muhacir is an indication of the recent incorporation of the former into village life. Compared to men, women tend to marry within ethnic boundaries to a larger extent. The muhacir are more endogamous than the yürük even when the distinction between the two yürük groups is ignored: 71 % eski yürük and 76 % yeni yürük men marry other yürük. Interestingly enough, it is yeni yürük


Map 5.Tuz Quarters According to Ethnicity
Yeni Yörük
Eski Yörük
Muhacir
to watermill
Hillside Gardens
Olive Groves
STREAM
Gardens & Olive Groves
to Ak
Hill
M
A
Cotton Fields
to Doğan
Primary School
Main Square
K
to Söke
Village Meadow
Forest Rangers
Cemetary
Cotton Fields

women who constitute the most endogamous group (97 % of all marriages are contracted with other yürük), while the eski yürük women marry non-yürük men in 33 out of a hundred cases.

Table 2.5 Marriage According to Ethnicity
(As Percentage of Total Recorded Marriages within Each Group)

	MEN			WOMEN*		
Partners	ey	yy	m	ey	yy	m
ey**	47	21	11	49	22	10
yy	24	55	2	18	75	3
m	21	7	82	23	0	84
others	8	16	5	10	3	3

* The marriages considered encompass all marriages for which information exists. Since most marriages are patrilocal, many of the women whose marriages are included in the table do not reside in Tuz. The table includes everyone who considers him/herself to be from Tuz (Tuzlu) as a result of birth or immigration. Following local custom, individuals of mixed parentage have been considered to belong to the father's ethnic group.
** Legend: ey=eski yürük, yy=yeni yürük, and m=muhacir

2.2.3 Ethnic versus Village Identity

Within the last twenty years, many important processes operating at the national level have undermined the conditions within which ethnicity could remain the basic attribute of group identity. Common residence (hemsehrilik), is gradually replacing ethnicity in conferring identity, a process that is in evidence mainly among younger people.[75] It seems that in the process of nation-building, residential contiguity is the only form of identity allowed apart from the all-encompassing one of being a Turk. It is interesting that the young and the educated are the ones who seem to be the least interested in finding out about their ethnic past. These people were very critical of my efforts to do so, since as an educated Turk, I should have been more interested in modernisation, that is in the future rather than the past.

In Tuz, TV and school-attendance are the two major avenues through which national culture and modernity penetrate the village. Although the

rate of literacy in the village is quite high, the TV and the radio, rather than national newspapers are the main sources of information. In 1965 about 20 % of the population was literate (DIE 1968:99). In 1984, of a total village population of 707 over the age of 12, more than 70 % could read and write. The rate of literacy among women over the age of thirty is lower compared to men, both among the yürük and the muhacir. The establishment of a primary school in the village in 1967 accounts for the increase in literacy rates.[76] The school, with its centrally-determined curriculum and its example-setting teachers is a very important factor integrating the village within national culture.[77] Young people in the village try to study beyond the primary school level in the hope of finding a job in the Turkish bureaucracy.[78] The bureaucracy is attractive for several reasons: apart from a steady income and retirement pensions, it offers status. As a civil servant (memur), one becomes part of the state and is able to shed the identity of villager (köylü) with all its negative connotations (Sirman forthcoming).

As a result of these processes, 'villageness' has begun to compete with ethnicity in conferring a sense of identity and belonging. As with ethnic groups, a definite attribute is ascribed to each village in the region, and people are stereotyped according to where they reside. These adjectives are ranged in a series of oppositions: thus villages can be 'clean' as opposed to 'mixed' or 'confused', 'industrious' or 'lazy', peace-loving or quarrelsome, public-spirited' or not. Furthermore, villages are compared and ranked according to the degree to which they possess the characteristic in question. Thus, Tuz is considered to be industrious but not as industrious as Yuva; or At is mixed (a negative characterisation referring to At's Tahtaci's and Kurds), but less than Sari, and so on. As communications improve, social interaction between villages increases, further developing, rather than dispelling, already existing stereotypes. Comparison, the most important way of establishing personal as well as group identity, serves the same purpose with regard to village identity.

Many forms of social interaction exist between villages, making it difficult to conceive of each settlement as a closed social entity. Inter-village economic cooperation takes place most frequently between

neighbouring villages. Many individuals in Tuz own land in At, Yuva and Dogan. Some yürük even own olive groves in the mountains near lake Bafa, at a distance of more than seventy kilometres.[79] A number of Tuz families have share-cropping relations with people from Dogan, At and Yuva. Most importantly, enterprising Tuz villagers rely on close relations with Tan, the large landowner of Batnos, for access to land. As a result of population movements, many Tuz residents, the eski yürük in particular, have kin (sometimes even brothers) whom they regularly visit in almost every village of the Söke plain. These visits serve to disseminate news and information; they also have the effect of further homogenising social life in the region as a whole. Generally speaking, close cooperation between individuals resident in more distant villages only develops in the wake of affinal relations which are by far the main channels along which inter-village social relations are created. A look at the rate of village exogamy serves best to dispell the image of the village as a bounded social unit:

*Table 2.6 Marriage Patterns of Tuz Villagers According to Origin of Spouse**

	MEN			WOMEN		
	ey	yy	m	ey	yy	m
Tuz	38	47	43	63	49	49
Dogan	8	3	27	0	0	4
Other	54	50	30	37	51	47

* The table only includes the marriages that were contracted within the last twenty years for which information was available. Before this date, the population of Tuz was still in flux, with many of its present inhabitants either living in tents, or in the neighbouring village of Dogan.

It is during marriage negotiations that questions of ethnicity and villageness receive most attention. Compared to ethnic endogamy, village endogamy seems to have less importance in contracting marriages. The most striking difference occurs among the muhacir as would be expected from their marriage preferences: while 82 % of the men marry within the ethnic group, only 43 % marry within the village, showing that ethnicity is an important criterion for selecting suitable spouses. Compared to men, women generally tend to marry within the village. Marriages outside the village conform to a certain pattern. While yürük women marry into Yuva (14 % of all marriages) and Tekeli (10 %), yürük men find their spouses from the

villages of At (22 %), Yuva (19 %) and Ak (13 %).[60] Muhacir women marry into At (9 %), Bahçe (7 %) and Yeni (7 %), their brothers obtain brides mainly from Dogan (27 %). In general, brides also go to the villages from which brides are obtained, creating a form of reciprocity, which in the long term, may balance out.[61]

These patterns are largely explained by the main guidelines that are followed in contracting marriages. A rough equality in status between the families is one of the most important criteria that determines the choice of spouse. In order to accomplish this, reliable knowledge regarding the individuals concerned is always sought. While the yürük solve this problem by marrying people they know, the muhacir rely on go-betweens. Wealth, physical and moral characteristics, standards of living, numbers of male and female relatives are all taken into account in determining desirability. Because these balances are difficult to strike, an affinal tie established with a neighbouring village, is often duplicated in subsequent marriages. Rather than reinforcing alliances, it is the ease of finding a spouse among groups with whom social contacts have already been forged, that accounts for this tendency.[62] As a result of these different considerations, marriages do not necessarily take place between people of equal wealth.

2.3 Conclusion

As I have tried to show in this chapter, Tuz is a village which is well integrated into the social and economic networks that exist within the region as a whole. Good communications link villages to the capital as well as to one another. The many social and economic ties that are forged by individuals residing in different villages questions the extent to which the village can be seen as a unit of analysis. Any unity that may exist within the village is continually challenged by ties forged with 'outsiders' on an individual basis, ties that at times cut accross village loyalties, and at other times undermine kinship loyalties. Furthermore, the village cannot be considered a bounded community composed of people who are basically similar to one another. Ethnic diversity is another axis along which village unity is undermined. Lastly, contrary to many other examples from Turkey, Tuz villagers are not necessarily linked to one other through

their common past. Different ways of life and different experience of the war serve to separate rather than unite the inhabitants of Tuz. And yet, the village does constitute a significant entity in ordering production and exchange relations. In the next chapter, I shall turn to those social and economic relations that transform the village from an agglomeration of habitations to a more or less unified, but open community.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. According to official statistics, there are 36,000 villages in Turkey; not all of these are nucleated (cf. Hann 1985).

2. See Gökalp 1980:157-168.

3. According to geographer S. öney, since the last glaciation (Würm), the Meander has created a strip of land measuring thirty to thirty-two kilometres in an northeast-southwest direction (1975:57).

4. Heavy rain in the early autumn could even endanger the cotton crop.

5. According to the 1980 census, the national literacy average for men is 79.8 % and for women, 53.8 %. The Söke figures are 85.5 % and 67 % respectively. The figures for the villages in Aydin province (there are no comparable figures available at district level) are 77.8 % and 53.8 % (DIE 1983 a:16-21; DIE 1983 b:48). Of the total number of village-dwelling illiterates in Aydin province, 8 % live in Söke villages (Köyisleri 1981:58).

6. Although figures at the district are very difficult to come by, even a cursory glance at the physical appearance of Söke is enough to convince the observer of its relatively advantageous position compared to other districts in the Aydin province.

7. In 1980, about 20 % of the population of the province of Aydin had been born in other parts of Turkey, the majority coming from Denizli and Isparta (DIE 1983:14). Unfortunately the same figure is not available at district level.

8. I am grateful to Prof. Faroqhi for making Evliya's work available to me and helping me to understand the old Turkish. According to Planhol (ibid), nomad groups in Western Anatolia acquired the name Yürük (from yürümek = to walk, the walkers, or the marchers) in the fifteenth century, during a process of increasing sedentarisation and marginalisation.

9. These terms and distinctions should be treated with care since many of them are contested. See Gökalp (1980:33).

10. Evliya Celebi, who travelled in the region around 1670 describes the mosque in detail (1935:149). This mosque was, in 1812, rebuilt by the ayan of Söke, Ilyas bey (see below).

11. The local leaders of the two largest national parties prior to 1980 (the Republican People's Party (centre-left) and the Justice Party (centre-right) were two brothers belonging to one of the large landholding families of the region, a state of affairs that reflects the personal nature of national politics at the local level.

12. On one large landholding (14 000 decares of cotton), local landless workers (the majority were and still are Kurdish immigrants) attempted to stop the employment of migrant workers.

13. When I first arrived in Söke in 1976 for a preliminary visit, there were only about 1500 field-telephones in the town.

14. The Söke branch was not completed until January, 1890 (ibid:72).

15. According to the Village Inventory Surveys, Söke accounts for 27 % of the total cotton produced in Aydin (Köyisleri 1981:47). The district has more than 770, 000 decares of arable land, 27 % of which is irrigated (Köyisleri 1981:18).

16. Trade in cereals accounted for 14 % of total value, followed by oil-bearing seeds (4 %) which includes cotton seed, olives and sesame seed. Tobacco, another important agricultural item in the region, is not sold on the exchange, due to a state monopoly system. Of animal products, only cheese figures in the exchange transactions and accounts for a mere 0.7 % of all transactions.

17. Although fluctuations do occur, I was told by agricultural extension officers that the proportion of cotton in the region has been approximately the same over the intervening years.

18. One of these fish farms is the lake Bafa and the other, covering an area close to 75 000 decare, has been formed by the activity of the Meander; both of these, now under the management of peasant cooperatives, were, for a long time, exploited by one of the large landholding families. The transfer of the management of the Bafa fish farm to the peasants resident in the five villages along its shores has largely been the result of peasant activism during the late sixties and early seventies. A national left-wing party, the Turkish Worker's Party, was also involved in the struggle.

19. This trend started in the mid-sixties; at that time the Ministry of Tourism commissioned one of Turkey's best known sociologists, Mübeccel Kiray, to carry out a survey in the area to assess its touristic potential (Kiray 1964b).

20. See Benedict (1974: 55-66) for a description of similar circumstances in the Gökova plain to the south of the Söke region.

21. A number of hypotheses are summarised in Gün and özdemir 1941:71-75. According to these authors, the town must have been founded sometime in the fourteenth or fifteenth century when the region was under the domination of the Aydinoglu, a Turcoman principality established in Ionia (Gökbel and Sölen 1936:90). See Inalcik (1969:75-8; reprinted in Inalcik 1985) for a discussion of the position of these principalities in the early stages of the Ottoman Empire. One of the beys of another of these principalities, the Menteseogullari who ruled the Milas district, had a mosque built in the town of Balat in 1403. The mosque still stands. Balat is built near the ruins of ancient Miletus and its name derives from a palace built there by the Byzantines, Palatia.

22. It is often assumed that Akçasehir is the Ottoman name for Söke town and certainly by the nineteenth century the two names were used synonymously (Gün and özdemir 1941:78). At the end of the sixteenth

century, Akçasehir had been the name of a kaza which included Ayaslog to the north, present-day Selcuk near Ephesus and Batnos, near Balat to the south (TT 148:163). I am grateful to Prof. Faroqhi for making these references available to me. TT stands for Tapu Tahrir, the land registers used by the Ottoman bureaucracy.

23. The Register mentioned above also attests to the presence of nomads in the area at an earlier date: the collection of a winter grazing tax kislak resmi was an important part of the state revenues.

24. I would like to thank Caroline Finkel for reading this material for me.

25. See Inalcik 1969 for a brief summary of Ottoman land tenure and its transformations in the seventeenth century.

26. According to Bowen, ayan were "... among those who were the most distinguished inhabitants of any district or town quarter, those who exercised political influence and were accorded official status" (1960:778).

27. The origins of this family and the exact area over which it exercised power are not clearly known. Kocagöz suggests that between 1765 and 1859, the family dominated an area stretching from Torbali south of Izmir to Germencik in the east, and lake Bafa in the south (1977:21). See also Wittek, cited by Kocagöz. The extent of the area whose tax revenue was collected by the Ilyaszade is not known; Kocagöz suggests an area of 50,000 decares of arable land, the extent of the Söke plain.

28. According to S. Kocagöz, his ancestors were engaged in the exportation of millet to Germany where it was used in beer brewing. A local saying describing the sources of wealth of the large families confirms this: "Kocagözoglu daridan (from millet), Haci Halil Pasa karidan (from his wife), and Ibrahim aga aridan (from bees) zengin (rich)".

29. See Quataert 1973:38-48 for a discussion of the impact of this law.

30. I am grateful to Samim Kocagöz, well-known novelist and descendant of the original Kocagözoglu Mehmet Aga, for providing me with this information.

31. See Kurmus (1977:109-12) for an account of slave trading in the Aegean provinces in the late nineteenth century.

32. I am grateful to H. F. for providing me with this information.

33. Cotton does not figure in any of the inventories I saw dating to the turn of the century. In the 1900 Aydin Salname (yearbook), cotton is only mentioned once (p.555). It seems that the relatively minor importance of cotton production continued well into the twentieth century since Gün and özdemir, writing in 1941, mention only tobacco and figs (1941:122-6). By contrast, the list of goods carried by rail from Söke in 1936 includes about forty-eight metric tonnes of cotton, a sum that today can be produced on 200 decares of land (ibid:114-121).)

34. Until the early fifties, meat on the hoof had been exported to Greece via the port of Scala Nuova (Gün and özdemir 1941:26).

35. In 1879, the MacAndrews and Forbes company hired 12,000 people to collect liquorice (ibid:160) A British firm founded a liquorice processing factory in Söke in 1854 (there were three others in Aydin, Kusakli and Nazilli) and the exploitation of lignite mines (Kurmus 1977:188), the MacAndrews and Forbes company continued operations until the 1950's. By 1941, it was owned by Americans and processed 5,000 tonnes of liquorice root a year (Gün and özdemir ibid:27). The houses which the firm built for its employees still stand in the quarter which is named after the original owners.

36. By the late nineteenth century, there were more than 11,000 Greeks living in the region as a whole which had a population of 27,000 (Aydin salnamesi 1315 (1900): 306). Of these 2684 lived in the district centre, making up 43 % of its population (ibid: 305).

37. For example, we can cite Avsar, Sofular, Kizilisik, Karacahayit, Çavdar (see also Gökbel and Sölen 1936:241).

38. A very important source of cash for Söke landowners had been the rental, as grazing land, of unused (and unusable) stretches of pasture to pastoral nomads migrating over long distances. Local transhumants preferred to deal with peasants, with whom they had closer contact. Furthermore, they had smaller herds, a result of the fact that they were not grouped into large tribal units as the migrating yürük were. Also among the herders who rented large tracts of land were sheep drovers (celep) who came from as far away as Konya to graze their animals before selling them to Greek merchants in Samos.

39. S. Kocagöz maintained that of the original 25,000 decares, he only owned 250.

40. The increase in the number of land sales registered in Söke during those years confirms this observation.

41. Many Söke landowners own hotels in Kusadasi which has become an important summer resort. Others have invested in agriculture-linked industry.

42. In the end, when the Land Reform Bill finally appeared in 1945, it had lost much of its sharper clauses. It amounted to a distribution of government-owned unclaimed land (See Aktan 1966). Among local landlords who thus sold land to peasants, Tan and H. F. can be cited.

43. H. F. insists that this is the reason for which he sold his land.

44. This is a pseudonym, as are all the names of villages in its immediate vicinity.

45.This intervention is most felt in terms of landholding patterns and credit facilities. These will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

46. The Salname of 1900 mentions the existence of two villages called Tuz, one Christian, one Muslim (p.307). The Muslim section of the village was probably no more than a few nomad huts. British Admiralty Reports published in 1919 only note the existence of a Greek village on the road from the coast to Sokia (Söke), without mentioning a Muslim settlement (1919:395). Earlier references to the village are virtually non-existent. Larger villages along the mountain range have a longer history. A cadastral register of the late sixteenth century (c. 1575) mentions At, a village with a present-day population of 2612 souls; in the sixteenth century, it was composed of about thirty-six households (TK 167:77, 94). European travellers such as Fellows (1840:148) also note this village. Kelibesh, an even larger settlement to the east of At is cited by Texier (1882:345) as well as by Fellows (ibid.) Among the other older villages in the area, the 1575 register records Batnos, where sixty-three tax-paying inhabitants resided (ibid). Today, this village, with a much reduced population, is part of Tan's property and bears a slightly different name. On the ruins of Miletus is situated Balat, another village with a fairly long history.

47. Dogan was a large Greek village in the nineenth century. Its position near the small port of Karine allowed it to dominate the export route to the Greek islands; apart from trade, agriculture and fishing were also important in the economy of the village. Large two-story stone houses with balconies edged with beautiful wrought-iron balustrades, and the many store-houses and shops testify to the one-time glory of this village. The Admiralty Reports describe Dogan as 'a large prosperous village' (1919:395). Today, Dogan is more or less deserted as a result of the resettlement of the population in a new location three kilometres south of its old site. The move was demanded by the villagers themselves who wanted to be closer to the main road as well as to their fields.

48. Muhtarlik is a term used to designate the village as a corporate body, as well as the office of headmanship. Headmen are elected every four years and constitute the lowest rung in the state administration. The corporate nature of the village is a result of Turkish administrative regulations: each village has its own budget, which is administered by the headman and the elected village council (ihtiyar heyeti).

49. A smaller communal area of about seven hundred square metres was, in the past, used as the village threshing floor. Since cereal cultivation is no longer undertaken on the same scale, it is now only occasionally used for the meagre bean harvest.

50. The town of Söke is at a distance of about twenty-five kilometres and the journey takes twenty minutes.

51. The entrance to the house leads directly to the salon, which in former times was open at the front and was called hayat. Many houses in Tuz were in fact converted by closing the hayat with a wall and adding windows and doors.

52. Since matresses are spread each night on the floor, all the rooms can double as bedrooms. New fashions are affecting styles and for new brides, special bedrooms and guest rooms with suitable furniture are becoming de

rigeur. Toilets are always outside. More recent houses are larger and composed of four rooms opening on to a central corridor, the mark of modernity.

53. The ethnographic present is used to indicate the year 1984. According to the 1985 census figures, Tuz appears to have a population of 1177. This discrepancy might, to a certain extent, be accounted for by the fact that I have excluded civil servants resident in the village from my survey. These are the teachers and the forest rangers. Furthermore, the census may also have included Tuz-born civil servants on holiday in the village. The fact that censuses are carried out in the summer months strengthens this possibility. During a short visit in February, 1987, I also found out that two new households had migrated to Tuz since 1984.)

54. In 1984, the heads of thirty-one households had been born in Dogan.

55. 45 % of Tuz brides born in Dogan married by eloping.

56. As opposed to 60 Tuz women below the age of fifty marrying out of the village, 64 women moved into the village after marriage.

57. In Turkey, civil servants are rarely posted to their place of birth. Thus, many of these individuals retain close ties to their home village, some own land, and spend their holidays in the village. For example, one man who became a police officer, married a village girl and is now resident in Mus, a province in southeastern Turkey, about 1500 kilometres away. The parents of both husband and wife have already been to Mus on visits. After their child was born, the young couple had come to the village on the traditional round of visits which are made forty days after the birth of a child. This is the first time a child, after a ritual washing, is taken out of the house and 'shown' (göstermek, or gezdirmek), that is publicly displayed in the village. Gifts of small sums of money are accepted as part of this process through which a new individual, regardless of gender, is socially recognised.

58. The ethnic ascriptions of yürük and muhacir are widely recognised within Turkey as a whole; the social and cultural ramifications described below, however, are limited to the local setting and may therefore differ from national patterns.

59. There is a young Shi'ite (Tahtaci) from At who started an electrical repair shop in Tuz and a single gypsy, who according to Sunni Muslims have no recognised religion.

60. This statement is not borne out by reality. Parties on the left and the right are represented in the village; in the general election of 1987, the ruling right-of-centre party obtained a majority of the votes. At the same time, left wing agitation could also be observed in the village during the late seventies. See Sirman (forthcoming) for a view of Tuz political ideology.

61. According to Planhol, these asirets, the most inclusive social units presently found among Anatolian nomads, are remnants of the larger Oguz tribes that fragmented after losing their political unity. As a result

individual asirets are now completely isolated and maintain no connection with one another. Planhol maintains that asiret names are totemic (?) names, followed by the suffix li(u), indicating origin or belonging (1958:190). Karatekeli means the people of the black billy-goat and Karahacili, the people of the black cape.

62. Mahalle is used by Tuz yürük for a social group composed of the inhabitants of two or at most three black tents (kara çadir), and who, being related to one another through some form of agnatic tie, migrate and herd cooperatively. Bates (1973:39) suggests that mahalle is a recent verbal acquisition and designates a group of patri-kin with no territorial connotation.

63. The latter are lighter skinned, and many of them have fair hair and blue eyes. Yürük, by contrast, have a darker complexion.

64. The older women wear the yaglik, a larger scarf, often made of a yellow-and-white chequered material which is wrapped under the chin and tied on the top of the head. This scarf is also worn by all women on cotton fields as it is large enough to cover one's mouth, a protection against the dust. All women tie their hair back with an embroidered scarf made of lighter material (yemeni) over which the outer scarf is worn.

65. On one wood-collecting excursion, one yürük woman was almost drowned after falling in shallow water while carrying a pack of wood on her back. A muhacir man protested afterwards that he would rather die of cold rather than be warmed by wood provided by his wife. He also ridiculed the woman's husband for sitting in the coffeehouse, fattening his behind. Nevertheless, this does not mean that muhacir women do not work outside the home. They work in cotton fields as well as in the olive groves as much as the latter do, but are always escorted by a male relative.

67. The fact that I lived in the main square right across the three coffeehouses meant that I had very few muhacir women visiting me.

68. Marriage practices often create difficulties for muhacir who have to search far afield for brides. One man expressed the problem by saying, "How am I to know that someone fifty kilometres away has a marriageable daughter?"

69. See Appendix I for the incidence of sister exchange among one mahalle of yeni yürük.

70. Among Hakkâri Kurds, in spite of statements to the contrary by the locals, exchange marriages do not seem to be linked to bride-price payments (Yalçin 1986:322-9). Since brideprice payments are non-existent among the Söke yürük, I have not been able to observe the relation between these practices.

71. Stories about the difficulties faced by newly-married couples who are forced to sleep in the same tents with the rest of the groom's family are told with relish among the yürük themselves.

72. Another point that arises from this example is the identification of Güllü as a Siçmaz in spite of the fact that her father is an eski yürük. In this ostensibly patrilineal, patriarchal culture, the identification of a person in terms of the mother's identity is worthy of notice.

73. The same applies to relations between muhacir neighbours. But no muhacir would would think of inititating marriage proceedings with a neighbour: all marriages between muhacir that were close neighbours were brought about by elopement.

74. These accusations account for the breakdown of relations between Meryem and Emine, a muhacir woman. Her husband's nephew had pressurised Meryem against her better judgement to ask Emine's daughter's hand in marriage. Emine reacted very strongly and severed all links with the family. The two women have not been on speaking terms (dargin) ever since, in spite of the fact that their husbands still visit one another.

75. Writing about hemsehrilik in an urban context, Duben maintains that hemsehrilik is only manifest in gurbet, being away from the homeland. In the latter, he argues, hemsehrilik is a non-existent category (1976:440). I think that hemsehrilik does have an important role to play in organising social relations in the homeland as well, particularly when the latter is not considered to be a closed social entity. Futhermore, Duben only concentrates on the social effects of hemsehrilik in providing aid, whereas my preoccupation is with social identity.

76. Since 1980, the government has also started adult literacy programmes, and many of the women in Tuz have attended.

77. Many of the village girls imitate the style of dress and housekeeping adopted by the teachers. The fact their style corresponds to what is shown on TV reinforces this tendency.

78. In 1984, about 18 individuals (14 men and 4 women) had undertaken higher education above the lycée level. Another 18 were lycée graduates and another 23 were in the process of completing their secondary education.

79. These families spend the months of December and January harvesting their crop and consequently forge economic relations with Bafa villages specialising in oil extraction.

80. It is the yeni yürük of the Siçmaz subgroup who marry the inhabitants of Tekeli, a village, south of Izmir. This is due to the fact that this village, as its name indicates, was founded by yürüks who belong to the same asiret as the Siçmazli of Tuz.

81. Exceptions are also important. Many of the girls want to marry out to villages that are closer to town. Therefore, very few Tuz girls marry into Dogan and few At girls marry into Tuz.

82. For example, an eski yürük found a bride for her elder son from the eski yürük village of öz. Her husband's sister (görümce), also a widow, had trouble finding a suitable bride for her son. The woman was a simpleton and authority within the household lay in the hands of her four daughters.

No bride wishes to submit to such unmitigated authority from age equals. The young man was finally able to marry the sister of the first bride only after the intervention of his father's brother's wife. It is very possible that in the future, one of his four sisters marries into the village of öz.

CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE VILLAGE

In the previous chapter, I tried to establish the position of the village with regard to the region and to the country as a whole. A consideration of ethnic differences within the village showed the extent to which Tuz is a community that has been recently established. In this chapter, I shall review some of the salient aspects of village social organisation. I shall try to show that the village does constitute a relevant social grouping for a study of peasant production. Rather than natural categories such as kinship, I shall argue that exchanges within the village that reduce the circulation of money constitute the basis on which such a generalisation can be made. Ideas on which these exchanges are based may, in fact,produce what can be called a 'village' (as opposed to Harris' (1982) 'ethnic') economy. Within this economy, social interaction is based on principles that derive from two separate rationalities, that of a commodity economy and that of kinship and community. In subsequent chapters, I hope to show that the rationality of the market and that of kinship and community do not necessarily always contradict one another; on the contrary, it is the complementary nature of these two forms of calculation that allows the successful production of cotton.

3.1 The Economy

The economy of Tuz is almost totally integrated with that of the region. Cotton cultivation, the most important economic activity in the village, constitutes the strongest link that the latter possesses with the national economy. One hundred and seven out of a total of 170 households state that cotton production provides the basis of their income (Table 3.1). As I shall show in subsequent chapters, not only is the product fully commoditised, but so are many of its inputs. In order to obtain these, villagers have to contact various public as well as private institutions in Söke, including banks, tractor dealers, Taris (the State Cotton Purchasing Cooperative), and private merchants. As a result, all cotton producers in Tuz are familiar with the town and have, over the years, established lasting relationships with many individuals there.[1] Furthermore, many consumption items including food and clothing are purchased from Söke shops.

Nevertheless, there are certain goods that belong to what can be called the subsistence sphere which are produced and circulated outside the norms of a commodity economy.

Table 3.1 Number of Tuz Households According to Main Economic Activity

	Cotton Prod.	Fishing	Manual Labour	Trade	Artisans	Others*
EY	26	7	4	2	0	2
YY	28	4	3	2	0	4
M	52	11	8	0	0	9
Others	1	1	1	0	2	2

* Among household heads with different occupations, we can cite masons, sheep and goat herders, butchers, moneylenders, minibus operators, and teachers.

Apart from cotton, other productive activities have limited impact on the village economy. Among these, fishing, the cultivation of olive trees and the raising of milch cows are worth mentioning. Fishing is undertaken on the open sea or in the 75 000 decare natural fish pond created by the Meander delta. Open sea fishermen work individually, and need credit to obtain the boats and nets required. The fish-pond was until 1971, under the management of a large landowner of Söke who rented the area from the state. Since 1976, a cooperative of about 208 villagers from Tuz and Dogan has taken over. The cooperative produces today over 150 tonnes of fish and roe, the value of which exceeds fifty million T.L. per annum. The cooperative pays a monthly salary to its regular workers and a piece rate for fish delivered by the fishermen; it is also supposed to distribute among its 368 members any profit made during the course of a year.[2] The cooperative sells its produce to large buyers in Izmir, while individual operators sell to small-scale merchants (kayyaf) in Söke. Occasionally, fish will be sold in the vilage square. Rather than being a long-term occupation, fishing is only a stop-gap measure undertaken by the newly married until such time as they are able to enter into cotton production. Only three households in Tuz have been relying on fishing as their main source of income for more than twenty years.

Other activities, such as olive growing, possess a larger subsistence component. In Tuz, the number of olive trees owned per household is rather limited. About ten households have more than fifty trees, the rest having about five to ten.[3] In general, the yürük produced their own olive groves by grafting on the wild variety (bot.: olea europea) found in the Samsun ranges. Since this land is state-owned, at present many have lost access to these trees and have bought trees from muhacir. The agricultural schedule of olive cultivation fits very well with that of cotton. In the spring, the trees are pruned and the area under them cleaned of thorn and brush. Harvesting does not start until early December and lasts for a period of two months, depending on the size of the harvest. Households whose labour power is insufficient to undertake the tasks involved, often cultivate their trees through sharecropping arrangements. Sharecroppers collect the fruit, and in return, receive half of the harvest, both as oil and as fruit. An alternative way of securing sufficient labour to harvest olives is to invite neighbours and relatives to the harvest. These people take home whatever they have collected. In order to undertake major-scale pruning, a task carried out every twenty years or so, households in need of labour may engage the labour of others in return for the dry wood. Olives are sold to village store owners who then sell it to Söke oil presses. Since olive oil is the basic cooking oil, village production does not meet the demand, and many households have buy oil in town. Very little olive oil is sold within the village: producers prefer to exchange it for cash at the shop, or for an item needed in the sphere of cotton production. Like subsistence gardens, olive groves can bought and sold, harvested through sharecropping arrangements, but they are never rented out. Thus, compared to the sphere of cotton production, commoditisation in the sphere of subsistence production is limited.

The raising of milch cows is a fairly recent activity in the village. The government, in an attempt to increase milk production, extends credit on favourable terms to prospective dairy farmers. In Tuz, about three households have invested in this activity, buying between ten and fifteen milch cows; but only one has met with any success. Producers maintained that the price of milk was too low to cover the cost of feeding the animals. Another three households raise cattle for slaughter and find it to

be a more lucrative business. The numbers involved are much smaller: two cows and a bull being the maximum. After fattening the animal for a year, it is sold to Söke butchers. One cotton farmer maintained that he was able to cover the cost of his yearly fuel supply in this fashion.

The majority of village households own a few cows and a few sheep in order to meet household consumption needs.[4] These animals are raised mainly for their milk, out of which yoghurt, cheese and butter are made. In the spring, many households sell their surplus milk to a well-known national milk company (Pinar Süt), whose buyers make daily rounds to villages in the area. The animals are taken to pasture during the spring and summer, but during the winter they are fed in their stalls. Many households have to purchase animal feed, as the amount of cereal production in the village is minimal. Pasturing domestic animals is undertaken on a household basis, and the task often falls to young boys or to elderly women.[5]

In spite of important variations between households, the amount of agricultural subsistence production is, in general, minimal, and the basic foodstuffs, including wheat, are bought in the market.[6] In the hill-side gardens to the north, beans, cereals (wheat, maize, oats and barley), onions and potatoes are grown on small plots of about three to ten decares. Kitchen gardens are even smaller, at most one decare, and are used to grow green vegetables such as tomatoes, courgettes, okra, aubergines and green peppers. These gardens are tended by women, except for the spring ploughing which is undertaken by men on ground where tractors or horse drawn ploughs can be used.[7] There are many fruit trees in the village, in particular, oranges, tangerines, pomegrenates, prunes and apricots.[8] Women often 'help' one another in executing horticultural tasks. Although a general reciprocity is the norm, there is no strict calculation of labour; payment of any fee is out of the question. At the end of each work party, refreshments or a meal are served by the owner of the garden. The same type of cooperative labour can be observed in the execution of other 'domestic' tasks such as the preparation of bulgur (cracked wheat), pasta, tomato and pepper paste. Furthermore, women borrow freely from each other small items of consumption such as a few onions, tomatoes or fruit.

3.1.1 The Circulation of Products

Exchange of subsistence products within the village is limited. Few households produce any of the subsistence goods in quantities large enough to be exchanged. Among the subsistence goods produced within the village, dry beans, wheat and olive oil are the only ones subject to this limited exchange. These items are not sold for cash within the village. People argue that it is shameful (ayip) to sell these items for cash to neighbours and co-villagers. This holds true for all subsistence goods the production of which does not require cash expenditure. Peasants argue that in such cases the produce 'belongs' to the household whose members produced it.[9] On the other hand what belongs to a person cannot be sold to another with whom one has close social ties, but can only be given. These 'gifts' are of course, reciprocated in the long run, since, as Mauss has so well demonstrated, to give gifts repeatedly to someone who cannot reciprocate is to introduce inequality into the relationship.

Some people, of course can only reciprocate by offering their labour power in return. For example, Meryem regularly 'helps' Ali, her husband's brother collect his olive harvest. In return she obtains her yearly supply of olive oil. She did not grow sufficient quantities of any other subsistence item to use as counter gifts. By contrast, Emine's husband Sefer who is a fisherman, regularly uses the unsaleable small fish as return gifts. Thus, it is only by looking at the context within which people 'help' one other another or extend 'gifts' that the meaning of these transactions can be understood.

The grocers to whom surplus milk, olives, or beans are sold, occupy the point at which cash enters into the village subsistence economy. Selling produce to grocers is still an activity that peasants rarely discuss in public. It is similar to discussing one's debts, they say. This task is delegated to children who are sent out early in the morning when few people are about. In fact, grocers also act as money-lenders as well as offering purchase on credit. As a result, villagers selling produce may well be indebted to the grocer in question. The goods sold by grocers include everyday consumption items such as bread, sugar, tea, cigarettes,

biscuits, margarine and aspirin. The circulation of cash within the village is, however, not limited to transactions with the grocer. Cotton production involves a whole series of such transactions, which I shall analyse in subsequent chapters. The coffeeshops and the one restaurant constitute the other nodes for the circulation of cash.[10] Many travelling salesmen also come to the village to market their wares, which range from machine-woven carpets to tomatoes.

In contrast to the way in which products circulate within the village, a direct return is sought when non-villagers and non-kin are concerned. Only 'strangers', with whom by definition, no social tie exists, can be asked to pay for subsistence goods.[11] Similarly, very little barter goes on in the village. Excess production of any one subsistence good is either sold to the grocer or, in an effort to reduce cash expenditures, is exchanged for the rental of machinery in cotton production. In both cases, the item is taken out of the subsistence sphere. Some goods are bartered with people from other villages. Even in these cases, the exchange is often undertaken in the guise of a gift, with the full knowledge that the required item will be presented as a return gift when the time comes.

The exchange of subsistence products between kin living in different villages approximates that between 'strangers' if the interaction between the two parties concerned is not frequent. When, however, two related households living in different villages cooperate in some economic activity such as olive production or sharecropping in cotton, the exchange pattern, approximating that obtaining between co-villagers, is based on an ideology of the gift. Moreover, the same also holds for households which are not related through a kinship tie but are engaged in sustained cooperation; the partners in suchg an enterprise become almost 'honourary fellow villagers' through frequent interaction. The nature of inter-household exchange, is dependent on frequency of interaction, which itself is largely a product of common residence rather than kinship or any other factor.

It is thus possible to argue that the village constitutes an important unit of analysis with regard to something that may be called the subsistence sphere. Although this sphere is dominated by commodity

relations prevalent in the wider economy, the goods and services produced within it are nevertheless important for the reproduction of the peasant household.[12] There are distinct discontinuities in the way subsistence products circulate within this unit: a direct return is not sought and the purchasing power of money is severely limited. Outside the village boundary, on the other hand, cash can be widely used as a medium of exchange.[13] In other words, it may be possible to talk of a 'moral' or 'village' economy that defines the circulation of produce within the community. The fact that kin ties, unless activated by close economic cooperation, are not able to generate this system of exchange strengthens the argument made here. At the same time, the importance of being fellow-villagers should not be exaggerated, for close economic cooperation between people who reside in different villages creates a density of social interaction analogous to that which obtains within a village.

Another sphere where important exchange takes place is the ceremonial gift-giving that accompanies festive occasions. Births, circumcisions, marriages, and religious festivals provide the setting for these exchanges. An instance of ceremonial exchange involves the distribution of meat after the slaughter of animals during the Kurban Bayrami, the Feast of the Sacrifice. This explicitly is an unequal form of gift giving since it falls within the Koranic prescription of alms giving (zekât). Although meat should be given to poor households who can not slaughter animals, Tuz villagers use this occasion to enter into reciprocal exchanges with equals, by giving meat to neighbours and friends regardless of their economic condition. These gifts are therefore reciprocated.

Ceremonies marking changes in the individual's life cycle provide the only form of organised entertainment within the village. They also provide an opportunity for fellow-villagers to activate reciprocal relationships. In order to invite people, small sweets called okuntu are distributed to all the houses within the village. Guests reciprocate by bringing appropriate gifts also called okuntu, in an effort to indicate the restored equality.[14] Cash is also given as a gift at these occasions, usually by villagers who do not have a special relationship to the household involved. The cash is publically pinned to the clothes of the bride and groom or the circumcised

boy during the ceremonies. Everyone notices the kinds of gifts and the amount of money given. Although outsiders, often close kin, are also invited to these occasions, they are mainly village affairs.

3.1.2 The Circulation of Labour

From the point of view of labour expenditure, it is subsistence activities that account for the bulk of labour time at least where the women of the village are concerned.[15] Although many consumption items are bought on the market, they are bought in such forms that they require the additional expenditure of labour before they can be consumed. Thus, villagers buy cloth rather than ready-to-wear clothing, flour rather than bread, tomatoes rather than tomato paste. The daily domestic labour time for a woman of a small household (comprising at most four individuals), varies between six and eight hours. Apart from the preparation of food, washing, cleaning, tending domestic animals and kitchen gardens, as well as collecting firewood constitute the most time-consuming activities. Women also make the bulk of house furnishings, such as matresses, covers, pillows, and reed mats, as well as everyday clothing. Aside from refrigerators and sewing-machines, there are no labour-saving domestic appliances. By contrast, male labour in the subsistence sphere is small, being limited to occasional tasks such as house repairs, harvesting various food crops, and wood-cutting.[16]

The 'moral economy' that can be detected with regard to the circulation of subsistence products within the village, is less apparent when the circulation of labour is concerned. The labour that does circulate between households is more or less restricted to the sphere of horticulture, and is limited to the women's 'helping' parties described above. In general, everyday domestic tasks are undertaken by members of the household only. Even so, however, women who are close neighbours will often lend each other a hand to finish a particular chore. This form of assistance is mutualistic and constitutes an important medium through which women's social networks are constituted and sustained. Men also develop similar networks of mutual assistance as a result of which tractors are lent for short periods, earth shifted, small repairs executed, and fruit trees

sprayed. Children are often asked to perform small tasks for a grandparent living on his/her own: granddaughters cook and clean and grandsons collect wood or mind animals. Some yürük families also'lend' their daughters to paternal grandparents for longer periods of time. In these cases the girls in question live and sleep with their grandparents and perform everyday chores, ranging from tending the animals to cooking and cleaning. The return of these girls to their parent's household is often a difficult process which may lead to the deterioration of relations between the households involved.

Ceremonial occasions described above provide the setting for another form of labour circulation. On these occasions, large numbers of people have to be accomodated and fed. The whole village is invited, but food is prepared only for visitors from other villages. This distinction also serves to emphasize the fact that the whole village is seen as acting as the host. Organising the events, preparing food, serving guests, and keeping the peace becomes a major task on these occasions.[17] Without the labour of neighbours and kin, it would be quite impossible to entertain on such a major scale. The labour of neighbours and kin is offered freely, and is only reciprocated in the same fashion when need arises. As with domestic and gardening tasks, these exchanges of labour are an indication of the nature of the relationship between the individuals concerned.

Thus, the village constitutes a unit within which a number of goods and services are produced and exchanged outside the sphere of commodity production. Village boundaries mark the outer limits within which these activities take place. Inside this limit, the use of money is restricted, and labour and produce circulate as reciprocated gifts. The social domain defined by these exchanges rarely encompasses all the inhabitants of the village at the same time. In general, the flow of goods and services takes place with any significant frequency between smaller numbers of people only, and is premised on the existence of variegated social ties between the individuals concerned. Kinship, neighbourhood and various forms of friendship are the main links that are activated to constitute these smaller sets.

3.2 Social Relations: Kin and Neighbours

In Tuz, the most important social grouping of any permanence that confers identity is the household. The life-chances of the individual, his/her positioning within village social structure, and his/her assessment of events around him/her are all coloured by membership within this group. It is within the household that the circulation of goods and labour is at its most dense. The individuals that compose households are tied to one another through a multiplicity of social relations that span a number of areas of life. These include common residence, property, sexuality, kinship, concern with children and generational reproduction, daily reproduction and recreation. But at the same time, very similar ties are also forged between individuals who do not share the same household: property and the joint exploitation of resources (as in sharecropping) can link two separate households together, as can kinship, concern over children and sexuality, mutual support and recreation. Households and individuals are also tied to one another through negative relations such as competition and slander. These ties provide the basis on which social relations are formed within the village, and they give rise to ego-centered networks whose composition changes frequently. The sum total of these relations and these networks produces the village as a social unit, or a community. This community is above all constituted by what Bailey (1971) has called 'the politics of reputation' according to which knowledge of others and comparison with self are the main means of self-definiton.

3.2.1 Kinship

Kinship is one of the social relations through which extra-household ties are forged. Many individuals within the village are linked to one another through ties of kinship. Kin (akraba) are those people to whom one can trace consanguinial and affinal ties.[18] Since genealogies are in general shallow, at most links through the third ascending generation are known (see Appendix 3). Kinship and inheritance are bilaterally reckoned but, in terms of conferring social identity, agnation is clearly the dominant principle. People are born into paternal households, take their father's name, and are inserted into village social networks on the basis of

their father's position. The dominance of the agnatic tie is reinforced by the fact that men are considered to be heads of households and that women, on marriage, come to live in their husband's house, which is often built in the husband's father's compound.[19] Nevertheless, cognative and affinal kin ties are by no means peripheral. Kin ties through mothers and sisters are considered very important for the identity of the individual and are traced with as much attention as agnatic ties are. As is the case with many Mediterranean and Middle Eastern examples, character and honour are inherited through mothers as well as through fathers, a fact acknowledged by ethnic stereotyping patterns described above. People of mixed parentage are not necessarily ascribed to the father's ethnicity; ethnic ascription also depends on personal characteristics.[20] For yürük as well as for muhacir, the importance of agnatic as well as cogantic ties is dependent on frequency of interaction, a factor which is closely linked to residential proximity.

Close agnatic relations play an important role in mens' lives. Since marriage is patrilocal, men live for most of their lives in the company of their agnates. For women, on the other hand, neighbourhood relations established by the individual herself become the most relevant social ties in spite of the fact that many women live in close proximity with their own agnates. The practices of reckoning kinship bilaterally and the high incidence of intra-village marriage forge a series of cris-crossing ties of kinship between almost all Tuz households. Except for outsiders recently settled in the village, there is not a single household that cannot trace kin links with at least one other Tuz household.[21] It could even be argued that cognatic relations are the dominant kin relations in the village, since it is these that link the most number of people together.

Since Tuz is not a closed community, kinship relations outside the village are also important in constructing social identity as well as in carrying out everyday activities. Visits by geographically distant kin serve to enhance one's reputation as a respected person, but they also expand the network of personal ties through which 'business' can be conducted. [22] Furthermore, it is through the intermediary of geographically distant kin that many of the marriages in Tuz are contracted. Marriage

preferences account for this situation both where yürük and muhacir are concerned, but in different ways. Yürük prefer marrying kin, and possess as a result of the population movements described above, agnates who are potential affines in many parts of the Söke plain (and some even further afield). By contrast, muhacir prefer to marry strangers and are therefore forced to search for brides by using the links established by Tuz girls marrying out. Agnatic ties among the muhacir are therefore more localised, extending at most as far as Dogan, and kin ties to the outside are primarily cognatic and affinal ties.

Since everyone in the village has kinship ties to many other villagers, interaction between kin becomes an important aspect of intra-village social relations. This interaction covers many aspects of daily life, from recreation to economic cooperation. What marks interaction between kin is variety rather than uniformity. At best, one can say that compared to the muhacir, yürük kinship is more oriented towards the maintenance of agnatic ties, which, due to marriage preferences, are also cognatic relations. But the effect of sedenterisation on yürük kinship practices is reducing the differences between the two groups. It is therefore difficult to generalise about the content of kinship or about its behavioural correlates. Rather than producing tightly bound corporate groups, kin relations describe an open-ended set of people who recognise the existence of ascribed relations between them. Social interaction among this set of people is not necessarily more frequent than interaction between non-kin. [23] But all kin are interested in and are knowledgeable about each other's affairs since these have a bearing on each individual's own reputation. On religious festivals, kin visit one another, even if this means undertaking trips to distant villages. An individual's total range of kinsmen/women (or any other subset such as agnates) very rarely comes together.[24] Among kin, certain individuals may interact more frequently and closely, regardless of the nature of the kin tie. In some cases, affines are seen to cooperate, while in others, the MB-ZS dyad may be the one most frequently activated. The formation of these close ties depends on the history of the set of people concerned, on the nature of the conflicts that may exist between given individuals and the kinds of alliances formed as a result of the conflict.

The most important agnatic ties are those between father and son and between siblings.[25] This agnatic tie embodies many relations that Wolf has called 'strategic' (Wolf 1966:2). To share agnatic ties means at the same time to share property, life chances, a name and a reputation.[26] As long as they share common residence, close agnates are supposed to cooperate in all economic activities. Relations of authority based on age are supposed to be the main guidelines governing agnatic ties.[27] Sons should obey their fathers and show them deference throughout their lives, even after they obtain economic independence. Married brothers who do not share the same household are also supposed to maintain, at least outwardly, relations of authority and deference. They should ideally have each others' well-being at heart and assist one another in every way possible. Men should help their younger brothers find wives and set up a house. Economic and financial assistance should be provided to agnates in need. For example, a man should rent out his land (or enter into a sharecropping contract) with a son or a younger brother in need of land; agricultural implements should be freely lent and labour within the households concerned should be used cooperatively. Agnates should take care of, and protect (and control) each others wives and daughters.[28]

But, conflict between close agnates is much too widespread for these ideals to frequently conform to actual practice. Structural as well as psychological reasons account for this. Establishing a separate household means establishing an independent social identity as well as a separate economic base.[29] It is at this point that interests diverge and social networks proliferate in different directions. Each man is supposed to provide as best he can for his own family, but agnates, especially brothers, must share the fund from which the initial capital is drawn. The period of common residence and cooperative labour leads to claims and counterclaims over the various assets owned by the original household.[30] Frustrated

expectations between the parties concerned, accusations of favouritism on the part of the parents, and the different loyalties engendered by marriage brings all play a part in producing conflict.

The dispute between Isa and Mehmet, who at present are not on speaking terms, involves some of these frustrations and conflicting loyalties. During the period when Meryem was alone in the village, she was verbally molested by a Tuz man married to Isa's wife's sister. As a woman without a husband, Meryem immediately turned to Isa for protection and asked for all relations to be severed between Isa and his bacanak (WZH), which after all, is an affinal relationship (see Appendix IV). Isa tried to appease Meryem instead of 'protecting her (and by extension his own) honour' by cutting off all ties to his bacanak, Hasan, who, at the time was looking after Isa's cows. Meryem never forgot this incident and has been using it against Isa and his wife Sevim whenever relations between the two households soured.

Since, in general, close economic cooperation ends with the separation of residence, it is the particular nature of inter-personal relations that determines how agnatically related households will deal with one another. In general, the agnatic tie does not create a group capable of taking joint action. Contrary to the Sakaltutan case described by Stirling (1965:155), individuals cannot even rely on brothers for unconditional support in case of conflict with third parties. People are linked to agnates through necessity, but these links can either be activated or not. Aganatic ties exist and cannot be ignored. They can be turned into positive ties of mutual support, but they often take a negative form involving conflict. Ironically, it is as a result of trying to cope with this conflict that individuals turn for economic and moral support to others, kin as well as non-kin.[31]

Under conditions of village life, no one can live alone nor limit his/her social world to the members of the his/her household, even though it is to the members of every individual's household that primary loyalty is owed. Households are built upon the conjugal tie as the basic kinship tie. By definition, the relation between husband and wife implies

complementarity rather than convergence of social relations. The division of labour, interest, and space along gender lines means that men and women have to create their own networks of cooperation in the economic as well as the social sphere.[32] Kinship ties further separate husband and wife. Each owes allegiance to (or has conflicting relations with) his/her own set of agnatic kin. Furthermore, relations between a woman and her husband's agnates are always strained and involve greater displays of the authority-respect pattern. The strains of this relationship are borne by the woman rather than the man and this state of affairs creates a very important source of conflict between husband and wife. A bride has to face stressful relationships involving other women with whom her husband has an emotionally fulfilling bond: her husband's mother (analik), his sisters (görümce, and his brothers' wives (elti).[33] Sons or brothers are reproached for being too soft on their wives, or being too easily influenced by them. The wife, referred to and addressed as gelin (meaning the one who comes), is always considered a stranger even among yürük who marry close kin.[34]

Men find it convenient to concur with their agnates in blaming the stranger (the gelin) for what are structural conflicts. In this way, the ideology of agnatic solidarity can be preserved.[35] Compared to men, women are therefore in a weaker structural position. Another aspect of the affinal tie also reinforces this structural weakness. As also argued by Meeker (1976), upon marriage the control of a woman is totally transferred to her husband and his family. This puts a strain on the affinal tie since any intervention by the bride's parents in the running of everyday affairs is immediately translated into a public statement about the reputation of the groom's family.[36] As a result of these conflicting positions within the household, the latter is rarely the locus of harmonious relations.

3.2.2 Personal Networks

Rather than relying on a given set of kin, whether agnates, cognates or affines, individuals construct their own social networks in order to find support as well as recreation. The people among whom such networks are constructed are, given the nature of the village, kin, neighbours or co-villagers. Although both men and women need to forge relations of support

and cooperation outside the household, the structural weakness of the position of the woman makes her the most aggressively gregarious person within the household. Furthermore, women avoid being alone as much as they can: loneliness is considered to be evil (Stirling 1965:173) and it certainly demonstrates a deficiency in status and reputation. A woman who is alone is never alone out of choice but because others have deserted her. Women turn first and foremost to other women in the neighbourhood (mahalle) in order to establish cooperative relations. In general, they choose their support networks among women who have similar needs: thus newly-married women will find other gelin whose houses are close enough to enable constant visiting. Informality marks interaction between neighbours (komşu). Neighbours request assistance in many day-to-day activities, undertake together more formal visits that might involve walking to other neighbourhoods, attend ceremonial gatherings, leave their children in each other's care when needed, and spend a lot of time in each other's company. These women and their children form the basis of labour teams needed during the cotton harvest. Above all, these women talk, exchanging many personal experiences, sharing worries; in this way, women muster the support they need in facing the conflicts of every-day life.[37]

Since women also inherit property, relations between them and their agnates continue after marriage. Although both the father-daughter and the sister-brother relationship are emotionally quite charged, interaction is relatively infrequent and often is restricted to the formal visits paid to each other by dünür (in-laws that is, the fathers of the groom and bride). The ties between married women and their female kin are more intimate and small gifts including daily needs such as milk, oil, or yeast are mutually exchanged. But, especially during the first years of marriage, assistance is provided in a not too conspicuous fashion in order to avoid disrupting the daughter's relations with her husband's kin.[38] Many women, in fact, deny extending any help to married daughters: "once out of this door, she is no longer my daughter," they say. But the mother-daughter relation, or that between sisters, may also be conflict-ridden as a result of disputes over the division of property, or long-standing personal antagonisms, so that the severance of ties to a married daughter may be caused less by a structural necessity than by these more incidental reasons. For example,

Meryem maintains that her in-laws have been closer and more supportive than her own parents, in spite of the conflicts described above. She rarely visits her mother and her brothers. Unmarried sisters are closer to their married sisters than the mother, since their intimacy does not pose a similar threat to the marriage alliance. They visit freely, help with household chores and make up the constant elements of the labour pool which women need to draw on for agricultural activities.

The fact that women have to rely for support on achieved rather than ascribed relations is implicitly recognised, as demonstrated by the existence of a form of fictive kinship ceremoniously established between unmarried girls. Close friendship between unmarried girls is often viewed with suspicion for girl friends, through their brothers, may provide the opportunity for 'illicit', that is uncontrolled contact between unrelated boys and girls. In general, contact between unrelated individuals of the opposite sex are thought to lead to relations involving sexuality. Moreover, a girl who associates with male age-mates earns the reputation of husband-seeker and her chances of contracting a good marriage decline. However, rather than preventing close friendships between girls (probably because of the impossibility of doing so), parents attempt to control such associations. To this end a special relation called ahretlik is established between the two friends: lengths of salvar (the baggy trousers worn by women) cloth of the same material are bought and exchanged. Clothing for the girls' mothers, and other small gifts are also mutually presented. Girls proclaim their newly established relationship by socialising together, by wearing identical clothes, and by assuming duties of helper in each other's daily chores. Visiting relations are established between the parents of those who have become ahretlik, the girls' brothers are turned into close kinsmen, and in this way, the relation between the girls is brought under control.[39]

The name of this relationship provides some indication as to the manner in which it is perceived by the villagers: ahret is the word used for the hereafter, and the bond that is thus established between the two girls is supposed to be eternal. In other words, it is not simply a worldly relationship even though it may have originated in the here and

now. It is a mutualistic bond, entered into voluntarily and carried well into married life. Untainted by interested motives, the ahretlik relation becomes the embodiment of sisterly affection.

In contrast to the stress on the emotional content of relations between women, voluntary ties between men are generally based on economic cooperation. Individuals of similar status and outlook often closely cooperate in cotton production: they lend each other money and implements; they jointly undertake trips to banks and to Taris, the cotton marketing cooperative; they exchange information and may even enter into short-term joint ventures.[40] What characterises these ties is that they are perceived to take place between social equals and that they are based on the expectations that a more or less balanced reciprocity will be approximated at least in the long term. Accordingly, large cotton cultivators cooperate with other large cotton cultivators, fishermen cooperate with other fishermen; the latters' relations with cotton cultivators are restricted to formal agreements where the terms of the exchange are set in advance: sharecropping, renting, or paid labour. As in the case of women, the importance of ascribed relations such as kinship or ethnicity are not important in determining patterns of cooperation among men. Men whose cotton fields are contiguous seem to cooperate on a more regular basis than others. They often undertake trips to their fields together, and help one another during the processes of irrigation and spraying of insecticide. Secondly, affines, who are often chosen on the basis of social equivalence, end up cooperating more frequently than any other kin.

Unequal relations between men are not restricted to those between agnates. As Isa's relationship with his brother-in-law (WZH) demonstrates, there are also ways in which men associate with individuals who are in a better social position than themselves.[41] Although kinship is often an important component of these relations, the element of choice and personal obligation is paramount. Furthermore, it is difficult to generalise on the category of kin who enter into unequal relationships. The WZH tie is often used in this way; other examples include elder brother-younger brother, MB-ZS, MBS-FZS. In all of these the first-mentioned individual is the one extending assistance. Unequal relations do not in general become overtly

exploitative, although the man in the stronger position may attempt to derive some benefit. At most, the 'senior man' may be assured of a stable labour force for his cotton harvest. These relations are often of short duration, since the subordinate person may turn to others for assistance if he finds the present relationship too degrading. Debts incurred in these types of unequal relationships are never openly acknowledged; relations of subordination are expressed with extreme caution in order not to further reduce the debtor's status. The debts in question are often paid back by offering loyalty and assistance as well as respect. Respect is often shown by asking for advice, imparting intimate information, visits on religious occasions, and showing respect behaviour.[42] The existence of a difference in social age, calculated according to factors such a marriage and establishment of a separate household, is the one factor that makes unequal relationships socially acceptable.

Relations of cooperation between men are not very stable whether they are established between equals or not. As a result, men attempt to diffuse these cooperative ties: an individual may thus be sharecropping cotton with one man, but harvesting his olives in cooperation with another; he may borrow money from one person, but exchange information with someone else. The higher mobility of men compared to women facilitates the construction by the former of wider social and economic networks. Since the house is the female domain, men socialise in the coffeshops, where they have the opportunity of meeting almost all of the village male population. This spatial separation reinforces the social distance between men's and women's networks.[43] Men rarely conduct their social life in the company of their wives. Occasionally, neighbours or kinsmen may visit each other in the evenings, accompanied by their wives and daughters, Grown sons are never part of these outings.[44]

Bonds between men that go beyond economic cooperation are rare and often restricted to the relation established between individuals who have spent their military service together. This allows the development of a special type of friendship (askerlik arkadasi) which involves close visiting relations including wives and daughters.[45] Whether these friendships between men include close economic cooperation depends on the

compatibility of their respective economic positions. In general, men are competitors, and therefore relations between them are based on distance rather than intimacy. Men strive for the respect of their peers which they can earn by being adequate providers within their own households. This is primarily contingent on establishing an independent economic base so as to raise children and marry them off adequately. In order to achieve this end, the men of the village need help from as many people as possible without giving them cause for criticism; and this necessary distance constitutes a bar to intimacy.

3.3 The Village as a Community

The village is a collection of individuals who are linked to one another through a multiplicity of social and economic ties. As I explain in subsequent chapters, the fact of living within such a collectivity has important consequences with respect to the long-term viability of the petty commodity producer in the sphere of cotton cultivation. And yet, the foregoing has not established any immediately identifiable basis for labelling Tuz a community. Villagers have no shared history to speak of, nor do they have common attitudes with regard to kinship or marriage. There is almost no occasion that brings together all the inhabitants of the village, who interact on the basis of households and neighbourhoods. It certainly is not homogeneous in terms of occupation, income levels, or access to land and other means of production. Moreover, the ease and frequency with which ties with individuals outside the village are maintained, also puts the notion of the village as a community into question. I would argue that the village forms an open-ended community; it is the sphere within which reality is socially constructed. More specifically, the village is a special collection of individuals who have continuous social contact with one another, and as such, form each other's set of significant others with reference to whom social identity is constructed.

Equality between all household heads is the basic premise on which social interaction rests. All married men are equal in the sense that they

are members of a moral community, that is a set of people among whom moral claims can be made.[46] As heads of their households, they are all responsible individuals in the process of raising a family, and as such are moral persons deserving a measure of respect. Yet at a pragmatic level, inequalities in wealth, in power, and in civil status are recognised. The whole tenor of social interaction is based on how and when people recognise the superiority of others, what they can do to diminish social distance between self and others. As Bailey (1971) has so aptly put it, the inhabitants of Tuz end up by competing to remain equal. Stirling has labelled a similar situation in central Anatolia as a 'chip-on-the-shoulder' society where "no one is willing to admit anyone else's superiority, let alone an inherited right to issue orders" (Stirling 1965:223).

The pattern of cooperation and alliance described above can only have meaning in terms of strategies for equality. Competition and cooperation are the two opposing axes that describe the social boundaries of the village. These boundaries are flexible, allowing, on occasion the inclusion of inhabitants of other villages. Increasing one's cotton fields, one's family and one's reputation are the basic spheres within which this competition takes place. What is needed to compete is information about others' standing in all these spheres. For this reason, I describe Tuz as a community primarily constituted by the density of information possessed by its members about each other's lives. Information about one another's affairs makes up the contect of daily conversation, a situation which has led many anthropologists to concentrate on gossip and the lie (Bailey 1971; Pitt-Rivers 1971). On the other hand, knowledge brings familiarity and the possibility of constant social obligation which, in turn, breed a moral commitment as well. Thus, competition has to allow for the moral claims made by others as members of the community. The exchange of goods and produce described above, as well as the system of labour exchange within cotton production can only be understood within the framework provided by the contradictory demands of competition and cooperation engendered by membership in the community.[47]

Tuz is primarily a farming community: irrespective of actual occupation, most inhabitants of the community (including women) define

themselves as farmers. Thus, being a successful farmer is the single most important activity that confers status as well as identity. Everyone is supposed to know the most intricate aspects of cotton cultivation and is judged according to his/her performance as a cotton farmer. Competition is an important aspect of cotton farming. Advice regarding cotton cultivation is rarely given or accepted unless specifically solicited. Since everyone is trying to do better than his neighbour, people are suspicious of freely given advice.[48] Since it is with respect to this sphere that individuals are most clearly differentiated, cotton cultivation becomes the arena where competition is most apparent.

Apart from farming, age and married status are the two most important factors conferring social position within the village for another example where age appears to be a very important factor for social differentiation.[49] It is only heads of independent households who can compete for status. The more wealthy a person is, the better can he peform his duties vis-à-vis his household, and the more assured will his independence be. But wealth without a reputation means nothing, and reputation is something that cannot be controlled since it depends on the opinions of others who are often competitors. It is by comparing themselves to others and by seeing themselves mirrored in their reputation, that individuals acquire their social identity. The measure of one's good standing in the village is the number of people who 'call on one's door', that is, pay their respects by visiting and by asking for advice. For a man, a good reputation depends on his wealth as well as the nature of his relationships with his kin and neighbours, and the behaviour of his wife and children. Men who talk too little or too much, who drink too little or too much, whose wife is too outspoken in public, whose children are not well-behaved are criticised.[50]

Reputation is also the main means through which women compete and forge alliances. The opinion of others is of crucial importance for a woman who is in conflict with a close kinswoman or neighbour.[51] She, like a man, needs people to knock on her door, to listen to her side of a dispute and to share the chores of everyday life.[52] As in the case of men, age, position within the household, and farming status, are the basic

criteria used to differentiate between women. Personal characteristics such as sociability, industriousness, helpfulness, good housekeeping also count towards one's reputation. In spite of the similarity of the criteria that make up a good reputation, women are only compared to other women, their status by definition being lower than male status.[53] Although the social networks forged by husband and wife are usually separate, they nevertheless have a bearing on each other's reputation. As a result people end up by competing on the basis of the household, which then emerges as the most significant element in the structure of the village community.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Close clientelist relations between peasants and townsmen of the sort described by Kiray (1964) seem to have disappeared. Merchants in Söke asserted that in the fifties and even in the sixties peasants had been quite dependent on particular individuals for favours and credit. "Now", they say, "their eyes have been opened." In all areas of the economy, from credit to consumer markets, the sheer number of competing firms in Söke largely accounts for the change in peasant-townsmen relations.

2. Until 1984, such a distribution of profits could not take place, due to the large debts the cooperative had to pay off. The volume of work in the cooperative is quite large, and the agricultural interests of many of its members mean that the amount of labour that can be obtained from Tuz and Dogan is limited. In an effort to reduce the numbers of outside workers it has to hire, the cooperative tries to exclude from membership individuals who do not provide physical labour.

3. A forest fire in 1980 destroyed many of these trees which were all planted by Greeks and given to muhacir by the Turkish government.

4. Four households raise larger numbers of sheep and/or goats as a means of accumulating cash. Lack of pastures, however, has seriously undermined animal husbandry.

5. In many Turkish villages, as was the case in Tuz in the past, animals are confided to a village shepherd, who receives an annual salary. Younger girls, particularly the unmarried, are rarely sent to graze animals, as the desolate reed ponds and the pathways between the fields are considered to be 'unsafe' for unchaperoned women.

6. Villagers, including women go to the Wednesday market in Söke at least once a month. Purchases include clothing, vegetables, household utensils and furnishing material.

7. There are only five horse-drawn ploughs in the village. Smaller gardens are turned over with a hand hoe. See Appendix V for the agricultural calender in Tuz.

8. Only one yeni yürük household produces enough tangerines to be able to market the produce.

9. Thus, almost in a Marxist fashion, the villagers feel that something belongs to them only if it is the product of their own labour. Although this argument would seem to falter in the case of land (since land is not 'produced' in the same way that wheat is), peasants quite consciously argue that land without improvement is not worth very much.

10. Cash is restricted to men only: very few women carry cash with them within the village.

11. The fact that after a few months, I was not considered a stranger any more was made clear to me when I began to experience difficulties in buying

olives, olive oil, milk, yoghurt, eggs, and beans from villagers. In the end, I had to do all my shopping in Söke. For the same reason my one bid to buy a kilim failed dismally: the woman who had woven it preferred to sell it to a trader rather than to make me pay money which she needed badly.

12. I have unfortunately not been able to determine the exact proportion of daily consumption that is accounted for by items directly produced by the members of the household.

13. I am adapting to Tuz the argument developed by Harris (1982) in defining an 'ethnic economy' in an Andean setting.

14. At marriages cloth, pots and pans are brought as gifts, while at circumcisions, cloth, toys, clothing and other items such as watches, fountain pens that mark the manhood of the child are preferred. Although the value of the sweet and the gift is obviously not equivalent, the intention of reciprocating at an appropriate date is always present. Okuntu literally means something that has been read over. The implication is that the object has been sanctified by the reading of a Koranic verse. No one actually does this.

15. In this context, I include in the meaning of subsistence sphere all activities needed to reproduce the household on a day to day basis and which are undertaken outside commodity relations. Generational reproduction and the reproduction of social relations are at the moment excluded from the analysis. Cf. Edholm, Harris and Young (1977) for a summary of these distinctions.

16. House-building always necessitates the labour of a specialist but all members of the household assist in order to keep cash expenditures at a minimum.

17. There are a few paid specialists whose services are required: a sünnetçi who performs the circumcision, a hoca (a religious learned man who is often the imam, a government-appointed official in charge of the mosque and who leads the faithful in prayer) who recites appropriate verses from the Koran, and in the case of weddings (and sometimes circumcisions), a band of musicians. One Tuz woman who is known for her skills in organising large scale cooking performs her services free of charge.

18. The distinction between akraba and hisim, whereby the latter only refers to affines, does not exist in Tuz. See Yalçin 1986:239.

19. Thus marriage is generally patrilocal, but any dispute may lead to the severing of ties and neolocal marriages ensue. The first years of marriage are often spent in the husband's father's household and economic independence is only obtained at the end of a complicated process of separation.

20. See the case of Güllü described in the previous chapter.

21. For some of the muhacir who have emigated from Dogan, kin ties within Tuz are restricted to cognatic and affinal ties.

22. Villagers describe all contacts regarding cotton planting or relations with various officials as business (is). They argue (often correctly) that unless one manages to find a personal link (tanidik) with the official concerned, business cannot be conducted effectively.

23. In this context, I am reminded of Bloch's attempt at defining kinship relations in terms of their moral significance "... and their irreducibility to perceived economic or political reward... (1973:77). In this argument, the higher moral load of relations between kin is shown to produce long-term relations of generalised reciprocity, relations that do not have to be activated constantly to be sustained over time. In Tuz, on the other hand, relations between kin are of shorter duration and depend on being activated. Thus,, contrary to Bloch's examples, kin ties do lapse if not activated. Furthermore, as Bloch himself points out (ibid.), morality is just as important a component of relations between non-kin.

24. These rare occasions are at marriages and at Koranic readings following death (mevlut). But, these gatherings include more than kin: friends, neighbours, co-villagers participate as well. In fact, there is not a single occasion which brings together kin to the exclusion of other people.

25. More distant agnates such as FB's (amca) or FBS's (amcaoglu) are much less significant since the property bond is weaker and there are too many affinal and cognatic links that produce divergent kin networks. The FB is not distinguished sharply from MB or any other elder kinsman; respect and authority are embedded in all relations between elder and younger people. See also Stirling (1965:170).

26. Shared property includes land, buildings and agricultural implements. Women also inherit and as a result mothers and sisters are also important with regard to these strategic resources. It is this factor which reduces the difference between all three kin categories: an individual shares property with his agnates, his cognates as well as his affines. But, as a result of inheritance practices and household authority structures, it is between men, brothers in particular, that property becomes more frequently contested.

27. In many ways, personal characteristics affect the extent to which authority is exercised in this fashion. Moreover, authority patterns are less strict among the muhacir than they are among the yürük.

28. In 1971, Mehmet, Meryem's husband went to Germany to work, and entrusted his wife and son to Isa, his elder brother. A year later, Mehmet arranged for Meryem to join him. It was Isa who took her to Istanbul and escorted her until she boarded the plane. Their son was left in Isa's care.

29. According to Kiray, conflicts between close agnates especially between fathers and sons are related to the disintegration of the extended family as a result of changes in agrarian structures (Kiray 1976; Hinderink and Kiray 1970:183-197). However, it is very difficult to substantiate this proposition in view of the limited number of studies of household fission in pre-industrial contexts in Turkey.

30. There was even a case of fratricide in the village in 1985. In a dispute over the allocation of funds, a man saving up for his imminent marriage killed his elder married brother. The latter wanted to use the income from the previous year's cotton crop to rent more cotton land while the younger wanted to use it to build his house. Villagers blamed the father for not exerting his authority and for leaving his elder son in control of household finances.

31. Many writers have stressed the atomism of the Mediterranean household/family which provides the only cooperative relations in an otherwise hostile environment. The best known of course is Banfield's concept of 'Amoral Familism'. See also Gilmore (1982:189). One correlate of this assertion, that is the harmony that is supposed to exist with the household/family unit has been criticised in a number of case studies (Gilmore op. cit.). The Tuz case also indicates that especially due to problems engendered by partible inheritance, relations between close agnates are competitive rather than a cooperative.

32. See also Fallers and Fallers (1976).

33. The case of Isa and Mehmet described above is a case in point. All conflicts between agnates are blamed on women, who are by definition strangers (el).

34. See also Bates (1973:92-5) for the contradictory position of the yürük bride in a nomadic context. Analik in standard Turkish means step-mother and the term connotes all the negative imagery that it carries in English. Similarly, the father-in-law is called babalik, step-father. These are of course terms of address. The terms of reference in both cases are mother (ana) and father (baba). These terms of address and reference are the same for men and for women.

35. This contradiction is actually openly recognised by villagers in the context of 'theoretical' discussions. It is when turning to an explanation of a specific case that the 'lapse' takes place. In line with her emphasis on the role of economic transformation in shaping family relationships, Kiray argues that the HM-SW conflict has only recently become an important reason for a man to seek separation from his parent's household (1976:264).

36. For this reason, a young bride will often be advised not to pass information between her mother's and her mother-in-law's house.

37. Women do not directly support each other against their in-laws. In most cases, the very fact that they can have other people to associate with is enough.

38. Women cannot assist their daughters, even at childbirth. These comments are especially relevant for the first years of marriage when husband and wife are still in the process of adjusting to one another. In the case of disputes, a woman's parents will in fact try to refrain from interceding on their daughter's behalf. Rather than being offered support, women are urged by their mothers (and fathers) to comply with the situation they are faced with. Women say that marriage is difficult and

that one should not run home with complaints. Divorce is not a good thing according to women since it reflects badly on the personality of the woman involved. People argue that since marriage is the same regardless of the character of the man, a woman who could not manage (geçinmek) in one household will not be able to do so in any other.

39. The social identity of the persons who become ahretlik was made clearer to me after the death at the age of fifteen of Güllü's daughter, Fadime. On many of the ceremonial occasions involving Güllü's family, her daughter's ahretlik Saliha subsituted for Fadime, assuming her duties.

40. For example, close associates may fatten slaughter animals jointly.

41. Isa was helping his brother-in-law, Hasan, a landless young man who, as the head of a newly established household, was trying to find a means of earning a livelihood. Hasan's father was still alive and had opposed the marriage, and therefore refused to extend any help. In an attempt to provide the new couple with some income, Isa had lent them a cow and was also employing Hasan and his wife as olive pickers.

42. By respect behaviour, I mean observances such as not smoking in the other person's presence, not speaking too much, not interrupting, minding seating positions, and so on.

43. The separate networks established by husbands and wives has led Olson to consider Turkish families in general as having a 'duofocal' structure (1982:36-7).

44. There is a conspicuous difference in this respect between yürük and muhacir. The former bring home to dinner unrelated men more readily than the latter and frequent the coffeeshop less regularly.

45. There is also another recognised form of close friendship between men called kardaslik, which litteraly means 'like siblings' or 'step-brother'. Contrary to the ahretlik relation, there are no formal exchanges that accompany the kardaslik tie. Furthermore, I only heard one man in the village use this term, and I am not aware of its social ramifications.

46. See Codd (1971:191).

47. Disputes which become public and of long duration are strongly disapproved of since they threaten the image of the village as a peaceful and harmonious community which is often asserted, especially to outsiders. To be dargin with too many people and for too long results in an unfavourable reputation. After a series of conflicts with his brother, some of which I have related above, Mehmet has cut off all relations with his agnatic kin. This very fact has cost him a serious loss of prestige within the village, particularly among other yürük for whom agnation has a strong ideological meaning.

48. "Would others wish anyone to do well?" (Alem iyi olmani ister mi? is a rhetorical question often asked to express this suspicion regarding the intentions of other people.

49. See also Stirling 1965. To the extent that lineages have lost their former importance even among the yeni yürük, there is no position of seniority within any structure larger than the household.

50. Ability to cope with state officials or private merchants in town, knowledge in religious matters, and education also confer prestige. I have argued elsewhere that men compete for manhood, and that the latter can best be conceptualised as a representative (Sirman, forthcoming).

51. The word used to refer to this ubiquitous judge, others, is alem which literally means 'the universe'. I think this usage originates with the muhacir and has been adopted by the yürük as they adapted themselves to settled village life, and as the importance of their lineage organisation diminished.

52. This need is also clearly stated by both men and women: "we are villagers," they say, "we need people" (biz köylüyüz, bize insan lazim).

53. Some women who, as widows, are forced to undertake cotton cultivation on their own are nevetheless praised for acting like a man. If, on the other hand, a married woman were to do the same, her husband would have to sustain considerable loss of face; the woman would not necessarily share this fate.

CHAPTER 4: THE STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS

The household has proven to be a form of social grouping difficult to delineate on a-priori grounds. While some researchers have given priority to residence as the basic criterion for defining a household (Bender 1967), others have stressed various economic relations such as the joint ownership of property (Goody 1976), or the nature of certain economic exchanges called sharing' or 'pooling' (Sahlins 1974, Wallerstein et. al. 1982) as constituting the basic bonds which structure households. These efforts are linked with attempts to provide a meaningful explanation of the historical and geographical variation found in households types the world over. For example, Fortes and Goody have stressed the importance of demographic factors in explaining diversity. The editors of a recent volume which specifically attempts to deal with variation in households, distinguish three separate dimensions along which households are to be compared: morphological (shape and size), behavioural (activities performed by the household), and cognitive (household defined as a symbolic entity, "as a normative or cognized system" (Netting, Wilk and Arnould 1984:xxix) But, as Yanagisako skillfully argues, an undefined notion of domesticity informs all of the various conceptualisations of the household unit (1979:166).[1] Thus, the household is conceived of as the locus of domestic activities, eating, sleeping, and so on, activities, which, as argued by Harris, are "deeply imbued with naturalistic assumptions" (1981:63). These naturalistic assumptions have the effect of universalising the household by reducing it to its overt (and often reproductory) functions.

In Tuz, there can be anything between 160 and 200 households, depending on the criteria used to define them. There are 195 married couples and a further 39 widows and widowers, 210 entries in the electricity register, 180 separate eating and sleeping units, and about 160 units which have independent access to means of production (whether land or fishing nets and boats). Moreover, the villagers themselves are often undecided when pushed to provide a definition for hane, households. The term itself is an imposition by the state, which carries out censuses and extends medical services on the basis of domestic units called hane. Instead of this, the term ev, which in standard Turkish means 'house' is

widely used in the village to designate a distinct domestic unit, the separate rooms of a house, and the married couples who occupy them. The yürük use the term tayfa to indicate the group which occupies the same ev, and ocak (hearth) is used by both yürük and muhacir to refer to the kind of ties that bind the members of a house together.

It is also very difficult to prioritise at an empirical level any single criterion (or a special combination of a number of criteria) that can subsume all the domestic units found in the village. In some cases, all domestic tasks, including even subsistence gardens may be separate, but the joint exploitation of land results in a pooling of cash resources in a way that would satisfy Wallerstein's criterion of 'householding' . (Wallerstein et. al. 1982)[2] In other cases, on the other hand, a married couple may share the husband father's courtyard but have completely separate production and consumption budgets. Common residence, joint access to resources, sharing income, the execution of everyday domestic tasks as well as the performance of generational reproduction (including organisation of marriages, biological reproduction, and socialisation) are only some of the criteria that may or may not be taken into account in the constitution of Tuz households. But, rather than looking at what households do, I would argue that households in Tuz are best defined according to the nature of the social relationship that binds its constituent members together.

Relations of authority and subordination are the most important way of identifying Tuz households as a group of individuals linked through specific relationships. An example of the role of power relations in identifying distinct household units was graphically provided in the course of a discussion about the status of one particular household headed by a young man. Yasin had been married for three years and was living in a separate room of his father's house with his wife and two-year-old son. He maintained that he and his father were part of the same household since they were farming and 'eating' together. A third man, a neighbour, argued that they already formed two separate households, since Yasin had been able to buy a tractor and had been renting land on his own account. This meant, according to the neighbour, that the purse was already divided and that the son was merely 'looking after' his father. Yasin, after considering these

arguments, insisted that they still were one household. The problem here was that Yasin wanted to outwardly maintain the myth that it was his father who gave the orders and thus headed the household. In other words, the existence or not of separate households had come down to a question of who exercised authority and to what extent. The neighbour was indicating that Yasin had already obtained his independence, since he could already keep separate accounts and plan his own path for accumulating wealth and prestige. The authority of his father over Yasin was already severely limited.

In effect, households can only be understood within a framework that takes account of the patterns of competition and assertions of equality described in the previous chapter. It is not simply men who enter in a competition to remain equal, but men as heads of households. As argued by Yanagisako, households are more than simply domestic groups: "domestic relationships are part and parcel of the political structure of society". (1979:191). It is on the basis of their being authoritative people, that is men, that individuals are able to enter into competition in the 'public' sphere. Household heads are individuals who do not easily accept orders or advice from anyone else, and households are units structured by relations of inequality that are modeled on kinship relations and justified by kinship ideology.[3] The father occupies the central position of household head, and his wife and children are relegated to subordinate positions. Age and gender are the main criteria that define who is subordinate to whom; thus, girls are subordinate to boys, children are subordinate to parents, and the wife is subordinate to her husband.[4] On the basis of the definition provided above, a total of 170 households can be identified in Tuz.[5]

4.1 Morphological Aspects of Households

In terms of composition, the majority of Tuz households approximate the nuclear family. 58 % of the total are composed of a man, his wife and his children, and a further 6 % composed of a childless couple.[6] Kinship, particularly marriage and relations of filiation are among the most important bonds that link members of households to one another. Over 10 %

Table 4.1 Population According to Kinship Relations Within the Household

Types of Households	No. of HHs	No. of People	Ave. HH Size
HHs with One Married Couple			
H+W	10	20	2
H+W+children (ch)*	99	484	4.9
H+W[+ch]+HM/WM	13	82	6.3
H+W[+ch]+HF	5	33	6.6
H+W[+ch]+siblings (sib)	2	11	5.5
H+W[+ch]+HM+sib	5	33	6.6
H+W[+ch]+HF+sib	1	5	5
H+W+ch+other kin	3	17	5.6
Total	**138 (81.2 %)**	**685**	**5.0**
HHs With One or More Married Couples			
H+W+S+SW+ch	6	39	6.5
H+W+S+SW+ch+S's ch	9	69	7.7
H+W+S+SW+S's ch	2	12	6.0
H+W+S_1+S_1W+S_2+S_2W+ch	1	8	8
H+W+S_1+S_1W+S_2+S_2W+ch+S's ch	1	14	14
H+W+HM+ch+B+BW+B's ch	2	17	8.5
H+W+HM+CH+B+BW+B's ch+sib	1	9	9
H+W+B+BW+ch	1	6	6
Total	**23 (13.5 %)**	**174**	**7.6**
HHs With No Married Couples			
B+B	1	2	2
widow+ch	4	21	5.3
widower+ch	1	2	2
widow alone	2	2	1
widow+HF+M+ch	1	7	7
Total	9 (5.3 %)	34	3.8
TOTAL	170	893	5.3

* This includes two households where the children are from the previous marriage of one of the spouses.
The table has been adapted from the one provided by Stirling 1965:38. Because of the confusions surrounding them, I have omitted the terms 'simple', 'joint', and 'fragmentary' used by Stirling .

of the households include the widowed parent of one of the spouses. As a result of the age difference between married couples, there is a greater number of widows in the village, the majority of whom live with one of their married sons. Only five out of 170 households include the widowed father of the household head. Married siblings sharing the same household comprise only 5 % of the total. In cases where the father is still alive, the incidence of married siblings sharing a household increases to 11 %. In 3 out of 170 households, it is the widowed mother who is able to keep married siblings together.

Contrary to Stirling's findings in Sakaltutan, a husbandless woman and her children, whether the latter are married or not, do form autonomous domestic as well as farming units in Tuz (Stirling 1965:36). Consequently, the rate of remarriage for widows is not too high.[7] Independent access to land is an important factor mitigating against remarriage for both widows and widowers and is usually opposed by the children. Although divorce is relatively uncommon in the village, elder couples unable to cohabit were able to reside with the different domestic units of their married children.[8]

The majority of Tuz villagers marry over the age of twenty, and women marry slightly earlier than men. The marriage of man requires the accumulation of considerable wealth, a factor which delays the age at which men marry. In general, only very slight differences can be discerned between the ethnic groups with regard to age at marriage. Muhacir men marry later than men of the other ethnic groups. The greater authority and the larger amount of accumulated wealth within yürük families explains this difference to some extent.

Table 4.2. Average Age of Marriage in Tuz According to Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Men	Women
ey	22.9	20.6
yy	23	21.3
m	24.3	20.3
others	21.6	19.5

Tuz households are not unduly large, as can be seen from Table 4.1. The average number of individuals per household is 5.3 for the whole village; this number decreases to 4.9 in 'nuclear' households, and rises to 14 in those composed of more than one married couple. Fertility patterns are also comparable between ethnic groups. There is a recent trend to limit the number of children in spite of the fact that the latter form an important supply of labour during the cotton harvests.[9] As a result of the availability of contraceptives in the village, many of the younger women are able to limit family size. The easiest way to demonstrate this trend is to correlate number of children with number of married years, even though it should be kept in mind that many of the younger couples may not have reached the end of their reproductive carriers:[10]

Table 4.3 Average Number of Children According to Years of Marriage

Years Married	ey	yy	m	others
5-10	1.6	2.2	1.8	1.3
11-15	2.6	2.2	2.6	3
16-20	2.7	2.8	3.5	2
21-30	4.2	4.7	4.1	2
30+	5.7	6.3	4.9	6.5

As can be seen from the table, the yeni yürük have a slightly higher fertility rate than the other ethnic groups in the village. This can partially be explained by the fact that, until recently, they were dependent for subsistence on animal husbandry which favours higher fertility rates.[11] For all ethnic groups, children are valuable for continuing the family name, or as the villagers say, for keeping the hearth alight (ocagi tüttürmek için).[12] Since girls marry into their husband's households, this leads to a slight preference for boys. Nevertheless, the value of daughters as cotton hands is also important as a balancing factor.[13] To have children irrespective of gender is to leave an imprint on this world and childlessness is thought of as the greatest of misfortunes.

4.2 Constitution of Households and the Developmental Cycle

4.2.1 Marriage

The constitution of households in Tuz can only be understood as a long-term process involving the acquisiton of a number of statuses and resources. In general, marriage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the constitution of households and should be viewed as only the beginning of the process of household formation. After marriage, the process of household fission and the death of the parents of either of the spouses constitute other critical stages of what has been called the developmental cycle of the household. It is marriage and death that crystallise the process through which wealth, status, reputation and identity are transmitted from one generation to the next.

A separate economic base and autonomy from other kin are also necessary for the establishment of a household. Access to means of farming, cash and/or land, which constitute the basis of economic autonomy, can only be acquired over a certain period of time. The acquisition of these means of production is intricately linked to the developmental cycle of the household and the timing of household fission. Thus, household size and composition are strongly correlated with the farming status of the parental household. In cases where the latter is economically strong, the propensity to delay separation is high; as a result, marriage does not automatically lead to the establishment of separate households. As the table below indicates, only 26 % of the men married within the last five years were able to form their own households:

Table 4.4. Number of Households According to Length of Marriage of HHH

Years Married	ey	yy	m	others	Total HHH	Married Men
1-5	1	3	3	2	9	35
6-10	6	2	7	1	16	28
11-20	11	8	19	2	40	44
21-30	7	13	18	1	39	37
30+	14	14	36	2	66	48

The table shows that the majority (60 %) of the heads of households are older people who have been married for more than twenty years. Not all these heads of households are men. Out of a total of 170 households, 16 are headed by women. These women are not necessarily the decision-makers, although some are actually able to exert considerable power. It is through the existence of widowed mothers that the economic resources of the household are kept intact; otherwise the resources would have to be divided between the heirs. Another four households are headed by men who, having no other siblings, were able to take over the resources, especially the land and agricultural implements, of the parental household without sustaining division as a result of inheritance.

Marriage is one of the most critical stages of the development of the household, as well as being one of the most important social events of village life. It is a long, drawn-out process which involves the management of power relations within the household, the accumulation of the necessary funds, and the establishment of relations of equality with a number of other households. As I showed in the previous chapter, knowledge of the social identity of the spouse's family is crucial in marriage arrangements. The ethnic affiliation, economic standing and the reputation of the families concerned are investigated by the two parties before an arrangement can be reached.[14] In general, parity in social standing emerges as the most important principle that guides choice of spouse.[15] This standing is a mixture of social, personal and economic attributes and the balance struck is a combination of all these different attributes. A relatively well-off but older man may marry a divorcee even though virginity is highly prised for a bride, a poor villager will look for a bride among yerli, or Kurds, or gypsies, and a man with a physical handicap may marry an orphan (öksüz). Personal attributes, particularly those of the bride also affect the choice of spouse.[16] Thus an effort is made to match the personality of the bride with the social as well as economic requirements of the household she will marry into. For example, a large household may need a docile and submissive woman able to get along well with people, while another may look for an efficient person capable of managing the house and the fields.

Most of the marriages in the village are arranged by women who are able to supply information and mediate marriage transactions between the two parties. Marriage negotiations are initiated by the groom's parents, who, having decided that the time is ripe for undertaking this long and costly process, let their friends, kin and neighbours know that they are ready to seek a bride.[17] Contracting a marriage is a process composed of two distinct parts. The first is the relatively secretive efforts of locating a suitable bride. The process of bride-seeking is the time at which women's networks are at their most active, and every woman can display the breadth of her sphere of action. The prospective mother-in-law hears about possible candidates through other women in the company of whom she tries to arrange a visit to 'see' the girl.[18] Once the future mother-in-law approves of the bride, the intermediary (elçi) lets the latter and her family know of the intentions of the 'visitor' and tries to gauge from their formalised responses whether or not they view the match favourably. The intermediary tries to give a more or less realistic picture of groom's situation.[19] Moreover, it is through the mediation of the go-between that the financial arrangements are agreed upon. These arrangements include the stipulation of the number of gold pieces required by the bride, the time at which they are to be presented, and the provision of 'luxury' items such as televisions, refrigerators, and furniture. These negotiations take the form of bargaining (pazarlik) and are referred to as such. The girl's as well as the boy's consent are also sought and it is thought that without such consent, the marriage will not materialise. Usually a clandestine meeting is arranged between the future bride and groom so that they can see one another.[20] If the bride's family agrees to the match, the more public part of the negotiations can begin; if not, other candidates will be sought.

The 'public' aspect of marriage negotiations begins with a formal visit to the girl's father by a group of men representing the groom. It is in the course of this occasion that the bride's hand in marriage is formally requested. As is the case with the Sarakatsani (Campbell 1964:125-6), the men rarely undertake this visit unless they are convinced that the reply will be positive. The date and procedure for betrothal is agreed upon during this first visit, after which regular formal visiting between the two families begins. The time period between betrothal and the

actual wedding may last from six months to more than three years depending on the time it takes for both sides to accumulate enough wealth to undertake the wedding expenses. This period of time is full of tensions since equality needs to be established through a variety of exchanges between the two families. The smallest misunderstanding, a default on promised transactions, or an evil piece of gossip may disrupt and even terminate the proceedings. Depending on the agreement between the two parties, there will be at most two ceremonies before the wedding proper, the 'small' betrothal (söz nisani) and the 'big' betrothal (büyük nisan). These occasions, as well as the wedding proper, often take the form of formal musical gatherings in the bride's house.[21] The bride and groom are able to dance together in full view of all the guests, who, in recognition of the new social unit being created, pin small sums of money on the couple's clothes.

As I have already mentioned, a series of transactions between the households of bride and groom accompanies each stage of marriage negotiations. In most of the Söke plain, bride price (baslik) is not formally paid. However, the bride's family demands a sum of gold coins (besyüzlük), a gold chain of varying length, and a number of gold bracelets before agreeing to the marriage. These pieces, which represent an important sum of money, are provided by the groom's parents and given to the bride herself and not to her family. Once the wedding is consummated, this gold becomes the property of the new couple; it is often the husband who decides what to do with the gold.[22] The transmission of this gold represents the first stage at which the wealth accumulated by the groom's household is passed on to the next generation. This wealth is in fact the product of the labour of the groom's entire household, his own included. For this reason, his brothers and his sisters have a say in how much he receives and when. Usually, weddings are planned in a strict order according to primogeniture, but, since marrying off daughters is less expensive compared to marrying sons, this order may often be upset. The strain marriage puts on family resources often creates serious conflicts which lie at the roots of subsequent disputes between siblings over inheritance.

The second major investment that the marriage of a son necessitates is the construction of a separate dwelling for the new couple. Unless the groom is an only child, most brides now stipulate a separate house before agreeing to the marriage.[23] Usually these houses are built inside the parental compound and this facilitates close cooperation between the two 'houses' in the execution of daily tasks. Nevertheless, a separate house does allow the couple some independence from parental control, and moreover usually reduces the tensions that may arise between the bride and her new kin. It takes the average farmer about two to three years to earn the cash needed to construct a new house.[24] Returns from the sale of one year's cotton crop are immediately ploughed into house construction, provided that some unforseen debt does not arise. The gold is bought and the house is constructed in this piecemeal way.

The betrothal period is marked by a series of prestations and counter-prestations between the affinal households. When the marriage is agreed to, the groom's kin visit the bride's house bringing small gifts to the groom and his immediate kin.[25] The visit, including the gifts are reciprocated within a week or two. As a sign of the continuing wish of the families to go through with the marriage, these visits are repeated on religious holidays (bayram) for as long as the betrothal period (nisanlilik) lasts. The clothes to be worn by the bride and the groom on their betrothal and their wedding are also provided by their respective affines. The strict balance in this series of gift-exchanges is nevertheless tilted against the groom's family, especially if asked to present the bride a ram at the Feast of Sacrifice.[26] Needless to say, defaults or attempted defaults on these exchanges cause serious conflicts between affines that may turn out to be difficult to overcome.

Compared to the groom, the bride's contribution to the wedding is relatively small. She has to provide almost all the soft furnishing, the bedding, the kitchen implements, as well as some appliances that will be indispensable to her: a sewing-machine and a refrigerator. The groom is recently being asked to provide some of the wooden furniture such as a living-room suite (koltuk takimi). Since girls begin to prepare their trousseau (çeyiz) at about the age of twelve, they have a longer period over

which to spread cash expenditures. Young men, by contrast, have to spend large sums of money over a period of two to three years. In 1984, an average wedding cost a man more than 1 million TL., while the bride could get away with as little as a third of this sum. The high cost of the arranged marriage and the necessity to wait for the marriage of elder siblings leads to frequent elopements.

Personal preference has to be taken into account in the arrangement of marriages. This necessity stems from the fact a girl can always 'bring shame' on her parents by eloping (kaçma).[27] Love as a bond linking two individuals is recognised as a legitimate feeling, against which no parental pressure can prevail. Most elopements are explained in these terms, in spite of the fact that many young girls personally known to me eloped in order to secure better living conditions for themselves.[28] Usually, the parents of the groom do not have much cause to complain in case of elopements since they are in this way spared the costs of marrying off a son. The parents of the bride, on the other hand, feel dishonoured since the act shows that they have not been able to raise a dutiful daughter. The strongest sanction that her parents can bring to bear on a girl who has eloped is to cut off all relations with her and refuse to handover her trousseau.[29] This sanction is not very effective, since considerable pressure to restore relations is put on the parents by kin and friends after a suitable period has elapsed. Nevertheless, a bride who arrives out of her own volition can face additional problems in her new home to which she had not been 'invited'. Having run away, she is 'naked' (çulsuz): she brings nothing with her, no trousseau, no clothes, and no social relations.

The constitution of a household through an arranged marriage provides the new couple with a fund of accumulated wealth to start them on their path to independence. Without this fund, it takes much longer to start farming. For example, Ibrahim, married in 1984, has continued to farm the family's 60-decare cotton farm together with his father and his younger single brother. In 1987, he was able to buy 15 decares of cotton land with the 1.600.000 TL. he obtained from the sale of his wife's gold ornaments. By contrast, Hüseyin who eloped with a girl his parents had already rejected has had to work as a salaried tractor driver for fifteen years

before he could put together the necessary capital to rent land. Seventeen years after his marriage, he is only able to rent 25 decares of land as well as marry his daughter off (kiz çikarma) without contracting debts. The longer a newly married couple can stay with the parental household, the greater their chance of founding a viable farming enterprise later on. However, in spite of this obvious advantage, there are many pressures forcing the new couple apart from the husband's kin, as I shall show below.

4.2.2 Household Fission

Many factors combine to determine the timing of household fission, which, in most cases, turns out to be a traumatic event leading to the temporary suspension of social relations between the two households concerned. Centrifugal pressures originate from the necessity of marrying younger siblings, the inability of households to support a growing population, and the divergence of the interests of the newly married couple as they begin to face the need of accumulating wealth and prestige in their own right.[30] Household fission is often preceded by frequent conflicts over the allocation of resources within the group. Young women begin to express resentment towards the mother-in-law's supervision and intervention in the execution of daily tasks; men's efforts to limit the authority of their father intensify. Counter-pressures to keep the unit intact also exist. These range from the parental household's need for labour and the newly founded unit's inability to find alternative sources of subsistence, to the generally positive value attached to father-son cooperation. The actual time of separation is determined by the particular circumstances of the households concerned, which influence the way in which these contradictory tendencies are acted out and the ultimate decisions made.

The strains introduced by the marriage of a son begin to be felt well before the wedding date. As soon as a man returns from his military service, the search for a suitable bride begins in earnest. This search is accompanied by efforts to intensify productive activities so that the cash needed for the gold, the house and wedding expenses can be accumulated. At this point, many households need to rent more land than they actually own

in order to expand the scale of production. This is a risky business since it often involves taking on much larger debts to pay for the rented land as well as the extra agricultural inputs. The probability of failure is quite high, since cotton production depends on many factors that the peasant cannot control, rains, pests, and prices being the most obvious. Moreover, the added land put under production can stretch the labour resources of the household. The increased work load may cause tensions between the members of the household, especially between siblings, in spite of the fact that everyone within the household has a stake in staging a memorable wedding. The scale of the wedding, the amount of gold given to the bride, the number of animals slaughtered in the course of the celebrations are all part and parcel of the reputation of the household and of everyone one of its members.[31] Younger siblings have an added stake in working for their elders' marriage, since this gives them the right to expect the same, even if the married brother has already set up a separate household.

In order to allow the household time to recover, a period of two to three years has to elapse between the marriage of each successive offspring. The newly married couple spends at least part if not all of this time within the large household. During this period, the new couple and the members of the original household 'eat from the same pot'. Although this does not necessarily mean that they all sleep under the same roof, there is only one purse and the father (or the widowed mother) retains the final say in the allocation of resources. The married son and his bride work on household land along with his brothers and sisters. However, the structure of authority and the nature of cooperation between the members of the housheold alters as the married son attempts to gain more control over the daily running of the household. This attempt at control, if resented by the unmarried (usually male siblings), can lead to unsurmountable tensions within the household. By now, a younger brother will also be preparing for his own marriage and demand the channeling of household resources towards securing the necessary preconditions.[32] Moreover, depending on the economic condition of the household, the burden of feeding more people (especially after the birth of children) may outweigh the contribution of the son and his wife to the maintenance of the household.

Fission primarily means the severing of all financial ties to the paternal household. The new household is left to its own devices where securing income and subsistence is concerned; labour power is not freely made available and all household chores are separated even when residence is contiguous. Nevertheless, financial assistance is often extended by the senior household to the junior one, especially if the former is relatively wealthy and if the separation has not led to a total breakdown of relations.[33] Household fission is expressed by the term ayriyiz (we are separate); but there are also ways of further delineating the process of fission: ayrildim (I have separated) indicates that the junior couple instigated the separation, while the term ayirdi shows that the senior couple undertook the step themselves at a time that did not suit the younger one. At the point of fission, the parental household is supposed to give the junior couple the necessary provisions (flour, rice, tea, sugar, and oil) to tide them over one agricultural year. No further transmission of wealth occurs between marriage and the death of one of the parents. Agricultural implements, household appliances, or any other form of accumulated wealth remain with the senior household in spite of the separating son's material contribution towards their purchase.

In general, Tuz men stay with their parents for about four years after their marriage.[34] Not everyone, however, is in a position to expect to be provided with a wife and a means of livelihood. Parents can die, living under the domination of an elder brother may prove difficult and an individual may then have to fend for himself. This kind of situation has occurred more frequently in the life histories of individuals over the age of fifty, and has become rather more rare today.[35] Today, the death of the father does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of the household, which, under the unifying presence of the widowed mother, may be able to provide proper marriages for all its members.

As table 4.5 shows, quite a few married men still live in the parental household and have not yet formed a separate establishment. The sixty-three men who have not separated from the parental household are not necessarily young men married over the last five years. Quite to the contrary, these men have, on average, been married for thirteen years or

more, a fact that indicates that at least a certain proportion of Tuz men never separate from parental households.[36]

Table 4.5. Average Number of Households According to Time of Fission

Years After Marriage	ey	yy	m	o
0-1	14	14	22	4
2-5	13	5	13	3
6-10	2	9	13	2
11-15	3	3	1	0
16-20	0	2	0	0
21-30	1	0	1	0
Not sep.	13	14	36	0
Before M.	2	4	6	0
Orphan	3	4	10	0

In many ways, an 'unseparated' son is in an advantageous position. A joint household provides the possiblity of accumulating wealth without having to construct from scratch a viable agricultural enterprise. Many of the expensive farming implements such as tractors, ploughs, harrows, seed planters, trailers, and fuel tanks, as well as land, the most important agricultural asset, can be obtained from the parental household as long as one of the parents is still alive. By the time the property has to be divided between heirs, the 'unseparated' son is often economically strong enough not to be unduly hurt by the division. This advantage is clearly illustrated by the fact that married men who have not separated are on average able to farm, although not necessaily own, larger tracts of land. Table 4.6. indicates the close correlation between area sown and timing of household fission:

Table 4.6. Average Area Owned and Area Sown Per Household According to Number of Years Spent With Parental Household After Marriage

No. of Years	Area Owned (da.)			Area Sown (da.)		
	ey	yy	m	ey	yy	m
0-1	23	34	16	45	34	26
2-5	48	20	26	92	30	51
6-10	59	71	27	109	87	51
11-20	56	29	45	28	13	90
Not sep.	31	63	56	100	83	63
Orphans	35	43	38	36	60	22

In general, men who separate within the first year of marriage own and farm less land than other men. Those who never separate are often among the better-off farmers.[37] Most households try to keep at least one of their sons within the household as insurance against old age. The economic advantages obtained from delayed separation lead to jockeying among brothers for the right to remain with the senior household. There is no rule nor even a slight preference in terms of seniority or any other criterion regarding the choice of the remaining son.[38] Brothers who have had to establish their own agricultural base themselves always feel hard done by, and attempt to redress the imbalance at the point of the division of the property. In spite of the fact that inheritance rules to equal division of all property are clearly recognised, claims to settle old scores often transform inheritance into yet another process that pulls siblings even further apart.

4.2.3 Inheritance

Property is fully transmitted to the following generation only at the death of its owner. Older people hold on to their land and other registered property such as tractors and houses until the very last, as a way of ensuring proper care when needed.[39] Selling property (or even the threat of doing so) is the ultimate sanction that parents can use to discipline their adult children.[40] Usually this measure is rarely resorted to, and people in general try to pass on as much property as possible to the following generation.

Children regardless of gender inherit equally three fourths of a dead parent's property, and the remaining one-fourth accrues to the surviving spouse.[41] Brothers and sisters can inherit only from childless siblings. Since all property has to be divided equally, the process of dividing the patrimony is often lengthy and involves the assessment of all land parcels, houses, olive trees, animals, and other valuables possessed by the deceased. A court order is necessary to finalise the division before the new owners can register their land deeds in their own name. In many cases, disputes over the division of property lead to long court cases. But it is equally possible for siblings to agree among themselves as to how to divide

property which is not equivalent. Most property can be valued in cash and each heir may obtain his or her share in the form that best suits the needs of each individual. Thus, a sister may relinquish her right to a share of the house in return for a larger portion of the kitchen gardens, or a brother who has been provided with an education and therefore a secure civil service job, may be made to donate his share of the patrimony to his more needy siblings. Sisters married far away may sell their share to one of their siblings, or rent the land to a brother for a favourable price after the division of property has taken place.

Rules of inheritance can lead to a considerable fragmentation and parcellization of land. Arrangements between siblings of the kind mentioned above are also entered into with a view towards preventing undue fragmentation of land. Even so, unifying distant land parcels of different quality usually proves to be an almost impossible undertaking. Along with the development of a rental market in land, flexible farming arrangements such as sharecropping or rotating the land among siblings, help farmers overcome some of these difficulties. Houses, gardens, and other property are more easily divided compared to cotton land.

The strict equality according to which the patrimony is divided has the effect of reinforcing the nuclear family, particularly the unity of the conjugal pair.[42] Often, it is through the unification of the patrimony of the wife and the husband, that households are able to have access to sufficient farming land. Thus, the interests of the husband and the wife override any moral obligation towards siblings.[43] An oft-repeated saying illustrates the dominance of the bonds that link individuals to their family of procreation rather than that of orientation: 'my house is separate, my path is separate' (evim ayri, yolum ayri). Inheritance is seen as only forming a part- but a very important one- of the economic base on which the independence and autonomy of the household unit rests. But inheritance also underscores the separate social identity and genealogy of husband and wife; a woman who inherits her father's or mother's land can stress her contribution to the household and talk about her own ancestry with pride. In general, owning land in their own right allows women a certain degree of autonomy and power within the household.[44]

With the settlement of the patrimony, the developmental cycle of the household is completed. The particular stages through which each household will pass certainly change according to economic and demographic circumstances. But in general, one can identify three major stages: a 'joint' household immediately after marriage, a nuclear stage followed by the addition of a widowed parent, and another 'joint' stage as the children begin to marry. A final return to a household composed only of the conjugal couple after the separation of all chidren is also possible. At each point of the developmental cycle, the household is faced with a different set of problems, which affect the economic organisation of the household. Conversely, the agricultural capabilities of the households also change according to the availability of labour and land within the household: as the number of adult children increases, more labourers become available to the household and through inheritance or the inclusion of an aged parent, more land also becomes available to it. In general, area sown increases with married years:

Table 4.7 Average Area of Land (da.) Sown According To Number of Years HHH Has Been Married

Years	ey	yy	m	o	average
1-5	0	7.3	23.3	0	10.2
6-10	65.8*	15	16.4	0	33.3
11-20	37.2	37.8	53.1	17	42.7
21-30	66.4	56.7	46.8	0	56.6
30+	94.5	78.7	42.8	15	72

*This exceptionally high figure is caused by one farmer who, in association with his father and brother, rented 600 da. of land for the period of one year. This farmer's father is the second wealthiest peson in the village and is able to extend considerable assistance to his married sons.

The effect of inheritance means that, in economic terms, no household can be the exact replica of the parental household. Similarly, newly founded households cannot occupy the same social position as the parental household: children do not inherit the reputation of their parents as a totality, but only acquire certain attributes that might be traced either to the father or to the mother. Ethnicity and the set of bilateral kin are the two most obvious attributes that children inherit from their parents.

These provide the individual with a personal/familial history and a sense of belonging to the region (or the village). Personal traits such as industriousness, dependability and even honour (namus) are also seen to be inherited bilaterally from both parents. All these attributes form part of individual reputation and serve to distinguish people not only from their father and or mother but also from their siblings. For example, Sefer, Emine's husband is a fifty-four-year-old muhacir fisherman; he is generally regarded as a boisterous, talkative (geveze) man who likes to flatter himself and who is therefore not entirely dependable. The fact that he drinks too much and that he is not able to farm his twenty-decare field and prefers to fish instead is seen as evidence for his laziness and loose morals. He has two sons, Orhan and Mehmet who, as a result of a lack of accumulated cash are not able to marry. In spite of Sefer's dubious reputation and their inability to build a separate house, Emine was able to muster the support of her women neighbours in her search for a bride for Orhan, but not for Mehmet. In contrast to Sefer (and Mehmet), Orhan, a quiet and industrious person like his mother, was thought to have sufficient good qualities for other women to risk their own reputation in acting as go-betweens.

4.3 Relations Within the Household: The Circulation of Labour and Goods

The household in Tuz is perceived as providing the material and symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977) needed to engage in the competitive struggle for position and identity. The material and the symbolic fund created by the household are perceived to be common funds, which according to the villagers, are shared more or less equally by all members of the household. This composite common household fund is defined by the nature and scale of subsistence and commodity production, and by the density of social interactions with fellow villagers. However, as I have tried to argue above, individuals are also engaged in building up their own separate symbolic as well as material fund. Women as wives have their own social networks, reputations, and identities. Children, both male and female, struggle to define their own autonomy and individuality with a view towards preparing the conditions of establishing their separate households. Nevertheless, all the members of the household are dependent for their

personal identities on the economic and human capital that exists within the households to which they belong at any specific moment in time. The tensions between identification with and separation from the household provide the clue for an understanding of the nature of intra-household relations.

In Tuz, the majority of households undertake productive activities as well as organising consumption and biological reproduction. As a result of marriage and inheritance practices, the household is also the unit that regulates the constitution of new households. As argued by Whitehead (1981:88), the functioning of the household as a structured collectivity capable of undertaking these activities depends on the existence of a set of accepted procedures according to which goods and labour are produced and circulated within the unit. Whitehead refers to these procedures as the 'conjugal contract'.[45] Since, in Tuz, households are founded on the basis of marriage rather than filiation, the conjugal contract determines to a large extent the nature of social relations within the household. The production and circulation of goods within the household unit also presuppose the existence of certain patterns of control over these processes. In other words, the conjugal contract also sets out the structure of authority within the household, and the terms under which power relations are constituted.

The conjugal contract in Tuz is based on the idea of sharing the common material and symbolic fund created within the household. In order to be able to qualify for a share of the goods produced within the household, individuals are supposed to offer any asset they may independently control: land, labour, social ties, and reputations. However, important distinctions with regard to gender render the villagers' assertion stressing the communalistic aspect of household relations untenable. As I have shown in the previous section, the material capital brought into marriage is heavily weighted in favour of the man: he provides the house and the cash with which an autonomous economic unit is to be constituted. This places him in a position of superiority with regard to the allocation of resources within the household. Patrilocal residence even in cases of endogamous marriages, also puts a woman in an unfavourable position with regard to social ties.[46] In effect, the household is known to

the outside world as the man's household, who in turn, represents it and its members to the outside world. Thus, households are centralised units within which the (usually male) household head occupies the position of dominance and authority. The setting up of the husband in this position of centrality is one of the most important aspects of the conjugal contract.[47]

The husband, according to the terms of the conjugal contract, is supposed to provide the conditions through which subsistence is procured, but he is not necessarily seen as the principal breadwinner. Every member of the household has to participate in income-generating activities according to a social division of labour based on age and gender.[48] Women are in charge of all domestic activities: food processing and cooking, washing cleaning, childcare, gathering kindling, looking after domestic animals (fowl, sheep, and cows), and kitchen gardens. Above all, they are responsible for the day-to-day provisioning, making sure that there is enough food for all the members of the household. But, since commodity production is intimately tied to the household, the category of 'domestic' work in Tuz, also includes agricultural labour performed on cotton fields.[49] Men, on the other hand, are responsible primarily for commodity relations and all activities that involve the circulation of cash. In Tuz, commodity relations are closely tied to the production of cotton, and managing the productive enterprise is a complex operation that involves frequent contact with townspeople, either state functionaries or private merchants. Men also have to provide those provisions such as flour, sugar, oil, tea, and clothing which can only be bought for cash.[50]

The allocation of resources within the households follows closely along the lines of the sexual division of labour. Women control subsistence products, while men control cash. These forms of control are closely tied to status within the household: only households heads have the ultimate control over cash. Similarly, only women who are the mistress of the household (that is the wife or mother of the oldest active male of the household), decide how to allocate any food item that is brought into the stores of the household.[51]

In most of the households of Tuz, cash income is linked to the production of cotton and is obtained once a year at the end of the cotton harvest. The household head, as manager of the cotton-producing enterprise, has immediate access to this cash. Other forms of cash income derive from the sale of any additional commodities that the household may produce: animals, olive oil, fish, or labour. Again, the cash obtained from the sale of these goods also accrues directly to the household head who, in most cases, is the active negotiator in these sales. The sale of labour power constitutes an important exception to which more attention must be devoted.

The sale of labour power found within the household is by and large limited to the activities associated with cotton production. As a result of the inclusion of the household within the cotton-producing process, the wage received by its members who provide labour to other households is converted into a 'household wage'. Many mechanisms account for this conversion. Firstly, the assignment of cash to men means that a woman who works in someone else's field rarely gets paid directly; rather, her wage is often paid to a man of her household, often in the coffeehouse, thereby placing the cash immediately under the control of the household head.[52] Secondly, the practice of delaying payments in cotton production until the end of the harvesting season results in the aggregation of all the wages due to one household, thus again placing the entire sum of money under the control of the household head.[53] Thirdly, labour in cotton fields is often remunerated in kind, leading to the disappearance of cash payments altogether. As a result of these mechanisms, individual labour is transformed into a collective 'household' cash income which then is allocated within the household.

Cash earned outside the sphere of cotton production is often controlled by the earner, but subject to the approval of the household head. Unmarried men often keep the small cash they earn in return for the performance of odd jobs. Young girls may sometimes be allowed to convert their cotton wages into a gold bracelet and thus control some form of money independently from their father.[54] But an urgent cash need within the household always has precedence over individual control, and then cash (or the bracelet) earned by members of the household will be turned over to

the household head. Since it is the household head who manages the cash economy within the household and since he has more contact with town life and therefore more opportunities to spend money, it is his actions which often define the nature of the 'urgent need'. These processes are linked to the nature of decision-making within the household and to the recognised patterns of consumption that vary according according to gender.

In spite of this rather neat division of control which assigns men to the commodity and women to the subsistence activities of the household, the lack of any clear division between the subsistence and the commodity economy and the joint interest of men and women in the well-being of the household lead to considerable intervention of the partners in each other's accepted sphere of dominance. Many of the subsistence items needed by a household are bought for cash and many of the subsistence items produced by the household can be sold in return for cash.[55] Thus, women can intervene in the allocation of cash by demanding the provision of necessary consumption items. Since, according to the terms of the conjugal contract, men are supposed to bring in the goods that the household purchases with money, women have a legitimate base for entering into arguments with their husbands on this issue. Conversely, men can also intervene in the production of many of the consumption goods destined for the household, especially of olive oil, dried beans and milk, since these in turn, can readily be sold for cash. Women, in an effort to obtain a minimum degree of independence from their husbands (and as a form of security especially in households such as Sefer's and Mehmet's where the men are prone to spending money in gambling and drinking), attempt to keep control of the cash obtained from the sale of subsistence goods.[56] But, the cash involved in these transactions is often small and may only allow a woman to purchase a few clothes for her children, or a month's supply of cooking oil or flour.

Decision-making is a negotiated process in which the married partners (and their adult children) participate according to their (unequal) status within the household. What allows the participation of women as well as of adult children in decisions regarding cotton production is the dependence of the household on this form of production for its generational as well as

daily reproduction. As I have already explained, individual status and well-being is intimately tied to the manner in which a person can execute the tasks required of him/her. A head of a household and his wife as mother and father have to marry off their children in a manner that will reflect their (real but often aspired) standing within the village community. Major decisions such as entering into debt in order to enlarge the scale of cotton production, to purchase a tractor, or to construct a house for a son are the product of various pressures. Some of the latter emanate from attitudes held in the society at large and others from the needs of the individuals that make-up the household.[57] As a result, the male prerogative of controlling cash flows in and out of the household is undermined by the socially accepted intervention of the other members of the household. His dominant position is nevertheless maintained since he is often the one person who physically has access to cash. This physical access is itself the product of beliefs and practices which make male households heads the representatives of their households within the community and the nation.

Consumption patterns serve to reinforce the close association of men with the cash economy. As I have already mentioned, men spend most of their time in the coffeehouses of the village or in town, where they not only socialise but also acquire valuable information with regard to productive activities and establish contacts with creditors or merchants. These activities necessitate the expenditure of cash on a larger scale compared to that of a woman who stays within the village neighbourhood most of the time. The cash spent in smoking, drinking, sitting in coffee houses, eating out, and frequent travel to town often amounts to considerable sums. The extra-household contacts that men are constantly engaged in, and their identity as representatives of the household unit, mean that their dress and manner of spending has to reflect the position of the household.[58] Forms of conspicuous consumption are even practiced by the unmarried sons of the household, since, they, too share the world of the coffeehouse. Therefore, men have access to money not only as managers of the activities that bring in cash, but also as a result of their socially necessary expenditure patterns. Fathers have to make sure that their sons

have adequate pocket-money; sons try to earn spending-money independently of the household budget in order to increase expenditure. And disputes over the allocation of cash become another area of conflict that draws father and son apart.

The consumption pattern of women by contrast is much more restricted, because areas of legitimate 'personal' consumption are limited. Women, particularly as wives, are perceived as having very few personal needs and it is thought that a woman's main efforts should concentrate on the provisioning of the members of her household. Most of the subsistence items needed by the household are bought in bulk by the men of the household, and processed by the women themselves. This fact serves to restrict the need for women to have access to cash. Even so, certain needs remain. Married women in the village need cash in order to travel out of the village (in order to visit relatives in other villages or to go shopping in Söke), to visit healers and ritual specialists (and for their relatively small fees), to buy clothing, knitting wool, vegetables, or lime (used to whitewash walls) sold by travelling merchants, or to give to others on ceremonial occasions (such as births, circumsicions, weddings and deaths). The fact that they need to ask their husbands for this cash means that the latter can to a large extent control the social activities of their wives.[59]

Preparing a trousseau (çeyiz) is the only legitimate form of personal consumption allowed to unmarried women. A trousseau is made up of embroidered materials needed to furnish a house such as bedding, cushions, kilims, any number of scarves, cooking utensils, cups and glasses, and decorative items. These are purchased and/or made over a long period of time and mothers preside over the building up of their daughters' trousseaux.[60] A few days before her wedding, a bride lays out all her trousseau in a room set apart for the purpose and all of the women in the village come to inspect its contents. This public viewing of the trousseau makes it an important component of the status and reputation of a particular household. The part played by the trousseau in the competitive and/or cooperative relations between women and between households puts into question the extent to which the preparation of the trousseau should be regarded as strictly personal consumption.

The principles according to which goods circulate within the household are therefore based on a number of social criteria that define the nature of the conjugal contract as well as the role of the children. Members of the household are defined and ranked according to definitions of gender, age and kinship, and it is these definitions which delimit individual access to the material wealth produced. These definitions not only provide recognised norms of consumption, but they also prescribe the nature and conditions under which individuals expend labour.

The central position of the household head and the fact that this position is largely occupied by the husband/father lead to the emergence of inequalities within the household. As argued by Harris (1981:57), it is misleading to gloss over these social determinations and assume that concepts such as 'sharing' or 'pooling' provide adequate descriptions of these relations.[61] A number of conditions set the economic context within which Tuz households are constituted and reproduced: most (but not all) Tuz households are important units in the process of cotton production, almost none can produce all the means of subsistence, commodity relations are part and parcel of the productive and reproductive cycles of these households. The dominance of cash in this commoditised economy and the concentration of money in the hands of men as household heads are the main factors that define intra-household relations of circulation.

4.4 Conclusion

Tuz households are social units that provide the individual with the material and symbolic capital which s/he needs in order to participate in the social relations that constitute the village community. Although the composition of households varies, kinship provides the main criterion for membership. Relations between husbands and wives and between parents and children delimit the nature of the social interaction that exists between the members of the household. But households cannot be regarded as isolated social units. Their structure stems from and is reinforced by norms and values emanating from the wider society. The structure of authority that places the household head in a dominant position can only exist within a larger social and cultural framework that reproduces those

gender relations that constitute households. Kinship relations, the constitution of the village community itself and state bureaucracies place men in the position of representing the women and children of their households.

The reproduction of households on an annual basis is based on the productive labour spent by its members in the spheres of subsistence production as well as in the larger commodity economy of which the village is a part. At various points within the developmental cycle of the household, yearly reproduction comes into conflict with generational reproduction, as the children of the household attempt to establish their own separate households. Villagers often maintain that raising children and providing them with the conditions for contracting a good marriage are the basic aims of every individual. Ironically, it is often with the marriage of children that the dissolution process of the original household unit begins. The income required by the household, as well as its productive capacity is intricately linked to processes affecting household constitution. The following chapters will clarify this issue.

Establishing a separate household depends on having access to independent means of economic subsistence and independent budgeting. The production of cotton as a commodity provides the material basis for the existence and reproduction of the majority of Tuz households. Cotton production is organised on a household basis, and each household has to have access to at least some of the factors necessary to undertake cotton production: land, labour and cash. With regard to the production of commodities, inter-household relations are largely regulated by a combination of market and community relations. People can 'borrow', 'help', 'cooperate' and 'share' with members of different households which nevertheless are still considered by the villagers as autonomous and independent. In the following chapters, I shall try to show the extent to which households as distinct units of production rely on the existence of multiple ties to similar units in their efforts to establish and reproduce themselves as cotton producers. Just as the constitution of the household can only be understood in terms of wider social structures, explanations of the so-called viability of peasant production must consider variables other

than those that can immediately be defined as 'economic'. Thus, the structure of the household, as well as that of the 'community' have to be taken into account in the study of peasant-based commodity production.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Goody's influencial book in which household forms are ultimately linked to types of agricultural production is subtitled 'A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domain'. The volume edited by Netting, Wilk and Arnould bears a similar subtitle: 'Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group'.

2. Wallerstein and his associates have coined the term householding to, mean "a set of practices that ensure the sharing of resources drawn from a multiplicity of labour forms." (1982:21).

3. But see previous chapter for an analysis of the recognition of inequalities between households.

4. The problem with this neat scheme is with regard to the relation between mother and son after the latter has become an adult, ie. married.

5. I have counted Yasin's household separately, but included Süleyman, who lives in a separate house but farms with his married brother and father, within the latter's joint household.

6. I do not want to label this unit the nuclear family because of the evolutionary overtones of this concept, which, moreover, presupposes an isolated unit headed by a breadwinner husband and including a full-time nurturing wife. See especially Thorne (1982).

7. Of widows still at a child-bearing age, only a landless one remarried within the last ten years. The remarriage of widows seems to have been more frequent in the past, both among the yürük and the muhacir.

8. Only two divorce cases were known to me.

9. According to Kâgitçibasi, economic utility is not the only factor that affects the value given to the child, not even in rural Turkey. Social and normative as well as psychological conditions affect this value. More importantly, with socio-economic development, it is the latter values which increase at the expense of the former (1982:151-180). Apart from the increasing cost of looking after children, Tuz women mentioned the difficulties of childbirth, and the restricting effect of large numbers of children on the mother as reasons for limiting family size.

10. For this reason, I have excluded from the table, couples that were married in the last five years.

11. The problems associated with land fragmentation in the case of settled agricultural populations, were probably are absent when the yürük were still pastoral nomads since wealth was accumulated in animals which can increase at considerable rates.

12. See also Delaney (1987).

13. Thus, although a few couples had more than eight children in the hope 'of finding a son', the opposite is also true. In both cases, the net effect is to increase fertility rates.

14. Since Tuz villagers are ethnicity-conscious, they are suspicious of people who do not belong to any one of the ethnic groups known to them. Therefore, marriage to a yerli is not considered very proper.

15. This aim at parity is graphically pictured in an oft-repeated phrase to the effect that only similar drums produce similar sounds: "Davul dengi dengine".

16. According to women, men are more or less the same and their personalities matter very little in the success or failure of the marriage.

17. According to villagers, those who have daughters can afford to sit home and wait for a knock on their door, but it is up to the mother of a young man to look around in order to find him a suitable bride.

18. These visits are necessary in cases where the prospective bride lives in another village. Although, the purpose of these visits are usually kept secret from the girl's family and neighbours, many people are able to guess the real reason for these visits. In Tuz, such unexpected guests are given a rather derogatory name, kasap, meaning butcher. The best way to poke fun at an unmarried girl is to tell her that a butcher is coming to visit her. Similarly, the young men of Tuz who complain that the best girls in the village seem to marry outsiders are often quite angered by these bride-seeking visitors on whom they even play practical jokes. Where the two parties are from the same village, some of these intermediary steps are omitted and the more 'public' part of the marriage process become more relevant.

19. The intermediary also informs the bride's family of the amount of gold the groom's parents will be able to provide and the amount of time it will take the latter to complete wedding preparations. Although the woman who mediates is on the groom's side, she has to be as realistic as possible in order not to lose her credibility with the bride's family who also have their own independent network of information.

20. These meetings are supervised by the intermediaries, and consist only of the opportunity to literally see one another. Bride and groom rarely exchange words before the wedding.

21. A wedding salon in some of the villages and in the town may also be used on these occasions. I was told that in the old days, the groom could not attend these gatherings which were smaller affairs in the course of which the groom's parents gave their prospective bride some of the promised gold. The wedding ceremony (düğün) is comparable to these betrothals, but often lasts two or three days. A wedding usually means dancing to music. The bride and the groom undertake each their own wedding, with dancing and food distribution. They each invite their own guests to their own compounds; usually, the groom and his close neighbours are not meant to go to the bride's wedding. The night before the girl is taken away to her new home, a henna ceremony marks her final segregation from her family. The taking of the bride (kiz alma) often takes place at around midday. The groom's side comes to the girl's house accompanied by musicians and large numbers of villagers and almost 'wrench' the girl away away from her kin. Unfortunately, lack of space does not allow me to go into the details or

the symbolism of these complex occasions. See also Stirling (1965: 178-185). Segregating the dancers according to gender is no longer practiced in Tuz. Young men attend these occasions regularly since they provide a unique opportunity of 'seeing' eligible young girls.

22. New brides display their gold at public occasions for as long as they can after their wedding. But inevitably, the sum has to be used for some productive purpose. In 1984, an average bride's gold amounted to about 500.000 TL. a sum large enough to cover the first installment of a tractor bought through government agencies.

23. This requirement is a fairly recent innovation, one that can be linked to the increase in the general standards of living in the area. In some cases, the youngest son of a large family may bring his wife to live with his widowed mother, in which case the house is made over to the groom.

24. The cost of a house can vary between 300.000 TL. to more than 1.500.000 TL. depending on size and construction materials used. In 1987, a certain farmer had already spent 3 million TL. building his son a large two-story house, and he estimated that he would have to spend another 2 million. The official inflation rate was over 40 % per annum over the last three years.

25. These gifts which include a set of clothing for the bride, cloth for the mother-in-law, eau de cologne, scarves and other assorted pieces, are carried on large tin trays borne by the young girls of the groom's household. The number of trays are often counted by the viewers and taken note of.

26. Ideally two gold bracelets should adorn the horns of the ram. A girl who receives such a gift is envied by her peers and the act brings honour to both of the families involved. Many households refuse this obligation, since it puts an extra financial burden on the groom's finances. Nowadays, some brides stipulate a colour television instead of the sacrificial ram.

27. Out of a total of 270 women whose circumstances of marriages were known to me, 68 had eloped. 25 of these were muhacir, while 17 were yürük. The majority of these women (62 %) had run away to marry men from within the village.

28. Running away with a townsman who can provide them with a steady income seems to be an option favoured generally by the daughters of the poorer households. In this way, they hope to become 'housewives' (evimin kadini, which, in this context means to be spared the dirt and grime (rezillik) of village life and agricultural labour.

29. Elopements disturb normal social intercourse within the village since it is believed that girls run away because they have been influenced by some malevolent person. It is thought that the detailed plans necessary to elope could not be elaborated without the help of such a guide who has to be someone close enough to the family to be able to talk to the girl without being overheard by her close kin. Çaça or rehber are derogatory words used to refer to unsolicited go-betweens.

30. In spite of the fact that Tuz kinship and inheritance can be labelled as bilateral (more in the case of the muhacir than the yürük), it is not necessary to explain this divergeance of interests in terms of the logic of the bilateral kinship system as is done by Campbell (1964:71).

31. Weddings are remembered in the village for a long time and, in fact, serve as a way of marking time. "Ayse quarrelled with Fatma at Hasan's wedding", or "the cotton crop failed dismally the year Hüseyin had his wedding" are phrases often heard in the village. Many men whose brides have eloped also hold weddings.

32. The relatively smaller burden brought by the marriage of a daughter on family resources, as well as the gendered nature of authority relations reduces the chances of a serious conflict developing between brothers and sisters.

33. There are cases where a father and a separated son are said to 'sharecrop' on terms particularly advantegeous to the latter. However, this can only occur if there are no other adult sons in the parental household.

34. The yeni yürük on average take a longer time to establish separate households (4.9 years) compared to the eski yürük and the muhacir (3.7 years).

35. Before the 1950s the higher mortality rate and the dislocation of populations caused by the long wars produced a larger number of orphans. Since land was not as productive and valuable as it is today, many of the widows and widowers remarried. As a result, boys were often forced to look after themselves at a much earlier age, a fact which was made easier by the fact that what they could expect to inherit from their parents was rather limited.

36. Among eski yürük, non-separated men have on average been married for 8 years, among yeni yürük, 12 years, and among muhacir 16.5 years.

37. Moreover, the yürük are marginally better-off than the muhacir.

38. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the son who stays with his father will not decide to separate households at some later date.

39. Although villagers maintain that looking after aged parents is part of filial duty and that defaulting from this duty brings shame, many admit that this added incentive is often necessary. Sons as well as daughters try to get their aged parents to live with them so as to be able to farm their land. See chapter 7.

40. A man whose daughter, his last unmarried child, ran away to marry, sold all his land and is now trying to make a living herding the six goats he still owns. The disowned children tried without success to prove in court that their father was not fit to manage his own affairs and thus reverse the sale. Starr, writing of a village 100 kilometres south of Tuz, reports similar accusations of insanity in a case where a woman was disputing the sale of land to her siblings by her aged parent (1984:107).

41. See also Starr (1984) for a description of similar practices.

42. In Sakaltutan, where in the 1950s female inheritance was only a rare occurance, the decline of the power of lineages as well as the influence of urban values was beginning to make it possible for women to demand and receive their patrimony (Stirling 1965:131). As suggested by Scott (1986:101), transformation in the structure of production may account for change in the transmission of productive resources.

43. Starr documents a case of a woman, with the help of her husband, successfully sueing her brother for her share of the patrimony (1978:213-23). Similar cases were also related to me in Tuz.

44. Conversely, lack of inheritance does have a negative effect upon the position of women within the household.

45. Whitehead defines the 'conjugal contract' as "the terms on which husbands and wives exchange goods, incomes, and services, including labour within the household" (1981:88). Thus, it is within the terms of the conjugal contract that she locates the sexual division of labour, which she defines as "a system of allocating the labour of the sexes to activities, and highly importantly, a system of distributing the product of these activities" (1981:90).

46. Having to live within the household or the compound of her husband's father, the bride is immediately brought under the surveilance of women related to her affinally. Her contact with women in other households can and often is controlled by her HM and HZ's.

47. The Turkish Civil Code which states that the husband is the head of the household and that women have to live where their husbands reside and can enter into gainful employment only with the husband's consent, provides the legal backdrop of this conjugal contract and reinforces the dominant position of the male household head.

48. By contrast, the Turkish Civil Code does expressly state that the husband should be the main provider. In Tuz, households which do not farm are more dependent on the breadwinning activities of the man, but even then, the other members of the household cannot expect to provide nothing towards the common subsistence fund.

49. As I explain in Chapter 9 the reciprocal exchange mechanisms through which labour is recruited for the cotton harvest means that many women work on fields owned by other households as an extension of 'domestic' tasks.

50. As argued by Whitehead, the fact that women are responsible for feeding members of the household, particularly the children, means that she has to compensate through her own labour for any default by her husband in carrying out his share of the contract. For example, Meryem was often forced to work in the cotton fields of the village shop owner in order to pay for debts contracted during Mehmet's long illness.

51. In fact, it is only this woman who can take out the flour needed to make the daily bread and the oil used. According to Yalçin who reports a similar situation among the Kurds of Hakkâri, a recognised title distinguishes the mistress of the Kurdish household from the other women (1986:95-9). No such title is found among the villagers of Tuz.

52. Villagers often found it difficult to pay my wages: I did not have a male representative to whom payment could be made.

53. Men, as managers of cotton enterprises, record the amount of work performed by hired labourers according to the name of the household to which the latter belong. Men do not often know the names of the younger boys and the women of a household and may simply note them down in their ledgers according to their social status within their household: girl (kiz), bride (gelin), small boy (küçük oglan).

54. Married women are rarely able to keep cash earnings from cotton production since they often only work in cotton fields (their own or not) when it is strictly necessary for the reproduction of the household. Married women also have access to very small amounts of cash received from the occasional sale of home-produced dairy products (milk, yoghurt, eggs) or from the sale of an item of clothing. Many women are specialised embroiderers and some are known for their skill as dress-makers. These services can be rendered either in return for cash, or may be paid in kind.

55. Olive oil production is a case in point, illustrating the latter possibility.

56. Often by keeping the transaction secret for as long as possible.

57. Women in general have detailed knowledge regarding the cash flows required within the process of production. They know current input prices and the amount of cash borrowed from various sources. The farm survey that I carried out in 1984 is in fact based largely on information provided by the women of the household.

58. Thus men often wear ready made clothing which are more expensive than the home-made baggy trousers that women wear; in public, rather than smoking the cheaper Turkish brands, they carry Marlboro cigarettes in order to impress people. See Kiray (1979:364-8) for a similar account of patterns of consumption in a small Black Sea town.

59. It is interesting that men oppose the expenditure of cash on ritual specialists. Conflict among women is usually accompanied by accusations of witchcraft. Misfortunes or unresolved conflicts between members of the household are thought to arise from black magic (etki or magiya according to the muhacir) performed by a specialist at the instigation of an enemy (düsman). Women resort to the services of a specialist, usually someone who can read the Arabic script, to find out the culprit and to protect themselves and their kin. Men give the impression that they only tolerate these activities which are 'backward' and useless.

60. Discussion of patterns for the various embroidered items of the trousseau is one of the main topics of conversation among women and

unmarried girls. Women are always busy knitting, crocheting and embroidering, and the exchange of the various patterns used constitutes an important aspect of social interaction among women.

61. The fact that villagers use these terms to describe intra-household exchange relations should not be accepted as an adequate description of reality.

CHAPTER 5: PRODUCTION OF COTTON IN SöKE: CONDITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

The production of cotton constitutes the principal source of income for the majority of the inhabitants of the Söke region today, whether they work as self-employed independent producers, agricultural labourers, or workers in cotton-related industries. Agricultural production is still the most important sector of production in the Söke district and the main form of income for the village dwellers who make up 60 % of the area's population (DIE 1983a:3). Cotton occupies a privileged place in Söke's agriculture with more than half of the total arable land cropped to cotton. The share of land under cotton shows minor yearly fluctuations (see Köseli 1975:64) and has registered a net decrease in the past five years as other crops have been able to compete with cotton more successfully. However, the producers who are able to effect the switch away from cotton are large capitalist landowners who use hired labour for all the operations needed in cotton production. Parallel to this dominance of cotton, the major portion of all agricultural income (75% in 1973) was generated through cotton production (Köseli 1975:57).

Cotton production in Söke is undertaken by a number of different types of agricultural enterprises which vary according to their organisation of production: 1) amount of land under production which to a large extent determines output, 2) 'type' of labour employed (by which I mean the extent to which household labour is used for various labour processes), and 3) cropping patterns. The most important difference between the different enterprises is with regard to what I call the strategy of production: the extent to which capital as opposed to labour constitutes the major factor of production in the organisation of the entreprise.

The most important similarity among producers of all kinds is with respect to the productive forces. In other words, all kinds of productive units employ (with slight variations) similar cultivation technologies and use labour in comparable ways. This means that all producers cultivate land with a tractor and none of them use any form of mechanical harvesting and hoeing. The flexible substitution of mechanisation for labour or vice versa to suit the needs of particular enterprises is not possible beyond

certain limits. Within these limits, it is possible to increase yield by increasing labour input, or by increasing capital input (in the form of added fertilisers, better irrigation, or the purchase of better land). But, it is the similarity in production techniques rather than the difference which is the most striking aspect of cotton production in the Söke plain.

In this chapter, I aim to delineate the economic setting and technological constraints of cotton cultivation, thus concentrating on the similarities of the cotton producing process. In the subsequent chapters, I shall discuss organisation of work and access to land, to labour and to money capital in order to indicate the variability in the way these different factors are combined in the production process. I shall try to show why it is that larger production units, to the extent that their dependence on household labour diminishes, are forced to switch away from cotton production. At this point, I shall demonstrate firstly that production of cotton requires considerable levels of technological inputs which are purchased on the market. I shall argue that state intervention in agricultural production is responsible for the availability of these inputs to the small producer. Secondly, I shall show that labour availibility, under conditions of partial commoditisation, constitutes an important factor limiting area cropped to cotton. Thus the availability of cash and labour to a large extent determines both the extent of the area under cultivation and the size of yields (in terms of kilogrammes per hectare).

5.1 The Commoditisation of Cotton Cultivation in Turkey

Cotton is produced in Turkey today both as an export commodity and as an important raw material for the most developed sector of Turkish industry, namely textiles. As such it has been at the forefront of two types of development strategy promoted by successive governments: import substitution industrialisation and export promotion. Although the effects of these policies on the direct producer are different in many respects (particularly in terms of prices received by the producer), both necessitated an extension and commoditisation of cotton production.

Today 98% of cotton production is marketed. The produce is categorised into nationally-recognised grades on the basis of the colour, moisture and length of the lint. All land suitable for cotton production is now being utilised so that any increase in production now depends on intensification of production. State intervention in the production process has beeen greatly responsible for this increase in production. State intervention has mainly affected the producer through pricing policies, although state subsidisation of input markets was also important and widespread. State subsidies in inputs were mainly geared to increasing fixed capital assets (such as mechanisation and irrigation) and extending the use of 'modern' inputs such as chemical fertilisers and insecticides and above all improved cotton seed.

The commoditisation of inputs varies according to the type of production unit involved. The majority of cotton producers increasingly have to purchase the 'modern' (as opposed to 'traditional' land and labour) factors of production thus augmenting the proportion of commoditised inputs. Nevertheless, the extent to which land and labour are commoditised vary according to the nature of the production unit. In peasant farms, land and labour are by and large less commoditised than the other inputs. The extension of state credit and price supports have been identified as the most important factors responsible for the increasing involvement of peasant producers in commodity cycles (Keyder 1983a; Margulies 1985). In this section I shall briefly trace the developments of cotton production in Turkey from an export-oriented crop produced by large landowners, to one primarily intended for domestic industry and largely produced by 'small' enterprises.[1]

Although cotton and cotton textiles had been produced commercially in Turkey since at least the middle ages (cf. Faroqhi 1979; 1984)[2], it was not until the 'cotton famine' of the Lancashire mills during the American Civil War that technological improvements were introduced in order to transform the process of production. The cotton cultivated was of the Indian variety which produces a short lint unspinnable in factories. Until 1865, the production of this local (yerli) cotton in the Ottoman Empire had,as a result of competition from America, slumped dramatically from the high

levels it had achieved at the beginning of the century when Turkey had been one of the main suppliers for European textile factories (Novichev 1966:67). Largely through pressures from mercantile interests in Istanbul and Izmir, the government attempted to subsidize cotton production through a variety of measures in order to meet British demand (Quataert 1973:282). Improvements such as the dissemination of American and Egyptian cotton seed (both of which have long, mechanically spinnable lint), the encouragement of better production techniques and the importation of tools and machinery for growing as well as cleaning cotton were among those measures designed to increase production and improve quality. Free information on growing techniques and short courses to train farmers were part of the governments's efforts to encourage the production of cotton. These were furthermore accompanied by a number of tax exemptions and other privileges (Quataert 1973:273-295; Kurmus 1974:78).

The extent to which peasant producers on the one hand, and large landowners on the other, took advantage of these measures and became involved in the production of cotton as a cash crop is not very clear. According to one economic historian, both cotton cultivation and the production of textiles until the first world war was largely for domestic use, and hence (it is assumed) on a small scale (Pamuk 1984:106-7). Until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it seems that efforts to commoditise and extend cotton production responded to world cotton prices and were spearheaded by Izmir and Adana merchants (Quataert ibid:279-280). Although the main source of this production seems to have been the Adana region, where large scale production was prevalent (International Institute of Agriculture 1926:158; Novichev 1966:68)[3], it is possible that a certain proportion of smaller-scale cotton production, mainly by peasants, did also reach international markets. The national market in cotton textiles on the other hand, to the extent that can be inferred from indigenous textile production trends, contracted sharply during the course of the nineteenth century, from a postion of near self-sufficiency, to near total reliance on (primarily British) imports by 1914 (Pamuk 1984:114). Thus, during the last century, exports of raw cotton to some extent indicate the degree of commoditisation of cotton production: while the commoditisation of peasant

production was undergoing a decline, there was an increase in large scale production of cotton destined mainly for exports.[4]

Although the modernising effects of the American Civil War for Turkish cotton production (or indeed in establishing Ottoman Turkey as a main supplier of cotton for Europe) were rather limited, certain important long-term consequences did follow. The first and perhaps most crucial was in the direction of seed selection, especially through experiments to adapt American Upland cottons to local conditions. Secondly, it was primarily as a result of these efforts that Adana and Izmir began to specialize in the production of cotton (Quataert 1973:290; Kurmus 1974:90). In the Aegean region two commercial banks specialising in long-term loans to small farmers started to operate in order to encourage cotton production (Kurmus 1974:87).[5] Modern methods for ginning and pressing cotton introduced in this period were still in use in the early fifties (Dunn 1952:54).[6] Although the extent to which small farmers and peasants switched to the production of cotton is not known, there are indications that large farmers were increasingly doing so.[7] As a result of the destruction of the indigenous textile industry, until the establishment of the Republic cotton production was mainly for exportation, (Pamuk 1984:103-125; Quataert 1973:290).

Important transformations in the structure of Turkish agriculture did not take place until the changes in government and policies after 1950. This applies both to the rates of commoditisation of production and to technological improvements. Until then Turkish agriculture remained generally technologically backward. The majority of farmers produced wheat for their own consumption.[8] Cotton production, to the extent that one can surmise on the basis of rather scanty evidence, remained in the hands of export oriented large farmers. The area cropped to cotton increased steadily, but remained low in comparison to post-1950 developments. Between 1932 and 1983 area cropped to cotton increased by 76 % and yields increased by more than 80 %:

Table 5.1 Cotton Production in Turkey

Years	Area (000 ha.)*	Production** (000 mt***)	Yield ** kg./ha.
1932	158.1	20.2	128
1935	209.9	52.2	249
1940	324.6	77.1	239
1945	231.4	54.3	235
1950	448.4	118.4	264
1955	625.0	157.0	251
1960	621.0	192.0	309
1965	685.0	325.0	474
1970	527.7	400.0	758
1975	670.0	480.0	716
1980	671.6	500.0	744
1983	605.5	522.0	863

* ha.= hectare = 10 decare.
** According to lint rather than seed cotton
*** mt= metric tonnes
source: DIE selected years; Kaymak and Someren 1981: 980.

The major change that affected the marketing of cotton was the development of a domestic textile industry, which, replaced exports as the motor behind the expansion of cotton cultivation particularly after the depression (Singer 1977:66-7; Tezel 1982:218). [9] These developments have been largely explained by students of the Turkish economy prior to 1950 in terms of a switch in state economic policies from one based on exports of mainly agricultural commodities to one of import substitution industrialisation. Textiles held an important position in both strategies.

As a result of a change in state policy, evident in the mid-thirties, the increasing role of the state in the economy began to direct Turkey's development strategies. Direct intervention in the economy was becoming the basic principle of state regulation (Eralp 1983:126-140). By 1950, the state had become heavily involved in industrial production. This involvement largely took the form of state ownership and management of a number of important industries: textiles, iron, steel, sugar processing, mining and construction. The share of public (state) enterprises was substantial in all of these branches of industry, in which state and private enterprises collaborated to increase Turkey's output (ibid). To illustrate the position of the state in the late 1940's, it is interesting to

note that 46% of all workers in 'large' enterprises at that time were employed by the state (Tezel 1982:429).

Among the different industries mentioned above, textiles were the largest in terms of output as well as capital investment (Singer 1977:40-1; Dunn 1952:19; Tezel 1982:426). This was true of both the public and the private sectors (Singer 1977:66). Textiles, in particular cotton cloth and yarn, had been the single largest import item in the early years of the Republic and with diminishing foreign reserves (largely due to the world depression), Turkish industrialists attempted to exploit domestic raw materials and capital for an item which had an established demand. External trade figures between 1923 and 1950 show important reductions in the percentage of textiles in Turkey's total imports:

Table 5.2 Turkish Imports and Exports of Cotton as Percentage of Total Exports and Imports

Years	Exports (Lint)	Imports (Cloth*)	Imports (Yarn*)
1923-1929	6.6	31	3.0
1930-1938	6.0	21	7.5
1939-1945	4.0	10	6.6
1945-1949	4.0	11	10.5
1950	27.0	7	6.0

* These figures unfortunately include wool as well as cotton.
Source : Tezel (1982:108-9).

Therefore, although etatiste policies in general supported industry rather than agriculture (Tezel 1982:413; Birtek 1985), cotton production was nevertheless protected as a strategic raw material whose output had to be increased (Tezel 1982:232).

As mentioned above, state involvement in the encouragement of cotton production prior to 1932 remained largely indirect. The increases realized were due to favourable cotton prices in world markets; but more importantly, they were due to what Keyder calls an 'aggressive' policy on the part of cotton traders (1982:62). It is after 1932 that the state became more involved in the conditions of cotton production. During the

1930s and early 1940s, the Ministry of Agriculture commissioned a number of studies detailing the conditions under which cotton was produced and asked its experts to suggest ways of increasing quantity as well as improving quality. I shall briefly outline these conditions as a way of providing a basis to assess later developments. A number of problems delineated in these reports, especially those regarding the supply of labour, continue to persist today.

The reports presented to the Ministry of Agriculture on the state of cotton production focus not only on technological innovations designed to increase yield, but point to a number of economic policies that could be implemented by the state to make cotton production more attractive to the farmers so that they might increase the area under production (Ziraat Vekaleti (ZV) 1935 and Turgay and Bailleux 1940). The different experts reporting to the ministry approached the problem in terms of profitability and hence productivity. If cotton production could be made more productive in terms of return to area of land, then it would be more profitable in terms of return to invested capital and more farmers would undertake its production. Productivity, in turn, was mainly seen as a technical issue which nevertheless had economic and social corollaries that could be regulated by state intervention.

The main cause of low productivity singled out in these reports was the type of seed planted. This was the closed-boll Indian cotton which with its short lint made it unsuitable for the factories that were being planned. The bulk of Turkish cotton could therefore only be used to spin yarn for manual looms which produced coarser cotton fabrics. A number of factors, especially shortage of labour, mitigated against the wider acceptance of American strands (ZV 1935:38).[10] The technological aspect of this problem could be solved through the development of improved seeds adapted to local conditions. However, the economic and social problem of labour shortage was more serious. Increasing wage rates seemed one way to attract more seasonal labour for hoeing and harvesting, the two operations which could not be easily mechanised. Wages, however, could only be increased if the price received by farmers for the better quality cotton was set well above that received by the inferior product. Thus, farmers

would have the incentive not only to produce the better quality crop, but would also be able to pay harvesters a wage that could attract them in sufficient numbers (ZV 1935:38,42).[11] The report also urges the state to take a more active role in the organisation of the labour market in agriculture (ibid).

Another expert reporting in the same publication brings out a different structural problem to account for the small area under cotton production. In his opinion, it is the structure of land ownership in those regions most amenable to cotton production that should be transformed. As a result of large landownership, vast tracts of potentially fertile lands remained uncultivated. In Adana, where 1000-1500-decare holdings were not infrequent, sharecropping seems to have been the dominant form of land tenure (ZV 1935:118).[12] This, according to the writer, reduced the rate at which innovations and technical improvements were accepted, although it did solve the labour problem to a certain extent. Adana, even with its large proportion of unused land, still attracted thirty five to fourty thousand seasonal labourers during the cotton harvests (ZV 1935:145). The solution, according to this expert, lay in a large-scale redistribution of land that would break up the large estates thereby creating peasants who would produce cotton. The use of family labour would solve the labour problem and the income derived from cotton production would raise the standards of living of numerous families. Finally, this would result in a more efficient form of land use (ZV 1935:145-147).

Apart from problems relating to land and labour, the reports point to a number of 'technological' inputs that needed to be improved to achieve the output targets that were demanded by new industrialisation programmes. Seed selection and ways of preventing the degeneration of good quality seed were at the top of the agenda. In the Aegean and Adana regions, a number of state farms experimenting with breeding varieties adapted to local conditions were established at this time, but had not been in operation long enough to have a significant impact on production practices. Moreover, irrigation was rarely practiced in spite of the location of large rivers in areas of cotton production. It required an infrastructure that most farmers could either not provide by themselves, or would not provide on the basis

of existing cotton prices. Fertiliser use and pest control were virtually unknown.

On the marketing side, things did not look so good either. The standardisation of Turkish cottons was far from being achieved so that the quality of the crop could never be predicted. Furthermore, there was no national, let alone international standard of crop classification to facilitate marketing.

On the basis of these reports, it is plausible to conclude that although cotton might have been produced for a national and international market,[13] conditions of production and marketing indicate that in actuality, the crop was commoditised only to a limited extent. Inputs were not commoditised and markets were not uniform. It is interesting to note that these reports advocate different strategies with regard to the solution of the problem but they both see the state as the main agent in changing conditions of production and marketing. The first expert suggests the commoditisation of production on the basis of wage labour and 'capitalist' farmers while the second advocates the establishment of family labour farms. The predominance of small peasant farmers in Söke's cotton production can be explained in terms of state intervention in input and output markets. Credit extension to producers allowed them to purchase the necessary technology (at subsidised government prices) and price support policies created a stable product market.[14] By contrast the state did little with regard to land distribution[15] or the organisation of the agricultural labour market. I shall now turn to an examination of these policies.

Since the establishment of multi-party politics in 1950, agrarian policies have attained an increasingly political significance in a country where the population continued to be largely rural.[16] Regardless of the composition of the ruling party, growth in industry rather than agriculture has been the object of successive governments. Even during the 1950's, when large landowners constituted an important faction of the ruling party, growth in the rates of GNP shows that industry surpassed agriculture. This trend was enhanced after the setting up of a State Planning Organisation in

1962. Thus agriculture provided more than 80% of the GNP before 1950 compared to 36.5% in 1975. The rural sector has nevertheless not been allowed to stagnate for a number of often contradictory reasons. The creation of a home market for the expanding industries at times coincided with political calculations designed to attract votes resulting in large subsidies for agriculture. At other conjunctures, the need to keep down the price of raw materials and food produced opposite measures. Export products faced different constraints according to the item in question.[17] Whatever the reason, state intervention in agriculture has been substantial between 1963 and 1980.

Mechanisation has been the most important area of intervention with regard to inputs. In the early fifties, the government was greatly influenced by numerous American experts who arrived in Turkey in the wake of the extension of Marshall Aid to cover Turkey. These experts advocated a programme of increasing on-farm fixed capital assets in order to increase agricultural output. This, in the first instance, meant extending and facilitating the use of tractors which between 1950 and 1960 came to symbolise the capitalisation of Turkish agriculture (Singer 1977:199). The immediate impact of these tractors was to expand the area under cultivation. This expansion was mainly achieved through the opening up of new lands and pastures rather than by switching away from the wooden plough. The entry of tractors into Turkish agriculture immediately produced large increases in agricultural output (Margulies 1985:148-152). Other consequences, particularly with respect to structural features (such as land tenure) were also felt, although it is difficult to assess the importance of one factor on a process which is long-term and dependent on a number of different factors.[18] It was only after the mid sixties that tractors started to displace the wooden plough, thus altering productivity structures for the majority of farmers. It was also at this time that larger numbers of small peasants began to get access to tractors, mainly as a result of government credits.[19] Without corresponding measures to spread its adoption, the impact of the tractor remained limited to large landowners, as is shown by the fact that tractors for a long time were concentrated in the Adana and the Aegean regions (Margulies 1985:129)[20].

The state also attempted to make available to farmers commoditised yield increasing inputs such as improved seed, fertiliser and chemical pesticide. With regard to cotton, improved seed was already widespread by 1952, accounting for 90% of all planted cotton (Dunn 1952:38). The government prohibited the use of seed which had not been developed by the cotton breeding stations (ibid.). By 1980, 98% of cotton seed used was of the American Upland variety and government certified, an increase of 24% over a period of sixteen years (Kaymak and Someren 1981:984). Fertiliser use, which had been negligible in cotton production before 1950, became an integral part of the production process. Since 1963, government policies took the extension of fertiliser use in Turkish agriculture seriously; both imports and domestic production rose rapidly. Moreover, state subsidies kept the price of fertiliser well below cost price as well as world prices (Kepenek 1983:321). By 1971, government agencies such as the Agricultural Supply organisation and various credit and sales cooperatives, were responsible for 92% of total retail sales (Aresvik 1975:64,69). Government policy, according to Margulies, was the determining factor in the increased consumption of fertiliser (1985:245).[21]

It was also after the nineteen fifties that the state started to put more emphasis on irrigation, both large scale (involving the construction of large dams) and smaller projects. Private irrigation schemes were also stepped up, often involving substantial funds from the Agricultural Bank.[22]. However, progress in this area has been rather slow and by 1980 only 12% of the total land cultivated in Turkey was irrigated (DIE 1980:210). As with fertilisation, a substantial portion of irrigated land is cropped to cotton.[23] It has been suggested that fertilisation combined with irrigation increases yield per hectare by fifty percent (Dunn 1952:61-2). Statistics on yield improvements show that increases in cotton yields were accomplished at the same time as the wider adoption of the inputs mentioned above; by the end of the seventies, yields had increased more than 60% in relation to 1955 yields.[24] This period coincides with the spread of improved technology. It would thus appear that improved technology and increased yields are closely connected.

The increased use of commoditised inputs necessitates larger expenditures of cash prior to the harvest. This means that unless the producer has savings from the previous harvest, s/he will have to borrow the needed cash. It is in this area that state credits have been instrumental in the wider adoption of modern inputs. Since the early sixties, state intervention has allowed larger and larger numbers of producers to receive an important part of their investment needs in the shape of state-subsidised credit, although the state still only supplies a portion of total need (Margulies 1985:274-276).[25] Through various channels such as the agricultural banks and the credit and sales cooperatives, the state distributes three forms of credit: short term in cash and/or in kind (fertiliser, seed,etc.) to supply yearly inputs such as fertilisers, seed and pesticide, medium term credit given for a period of three to five years to purchase machinery including tractors and motor pumps for irrigation, or to set up irrigation sytems, and finally, long term credits of up to twenty years with which producers are supposed to be able to buy land. The majority of producers have largely been able to obtain only short-term credit. Assessments of the role of the state in agricultural credit markets vary. While some maintain that state credits have been instrumental in consolidating small independent family farming (Keyder 1983a), others argue that state intervention has benefitted only large farmers, especially where crops such as whaet are concerned (Aresvik 1975:82; Ulusan 1980:139; Singer 1977:205; Mann 1980:209). One study concentrating on the late 1960's has shown that 92.5 % of institutional (that is bank and state) credits were used for operating expenses and that non-institutional (private merchants and 'friends') loans were used for the bulk of fixed capital expenditures. On the basis of this data, it has been urged that middle and long term credits be expanded (Blalock 1969:32).[26]

Price support policies have been even more important than the distribution of credit in providing the incentive to adopt technological innovation. The state has subsidised wheat growers since the 1930s.[27] Other crops such as tobacco and tea were subjected to state monopoly purchasing at a government determined price during the 1940s. Export crops such as hazelnuts, figs raisins, and cotton were included in this policy only after the 1960s (Margulies 1985:297). Today, private merchants

are also able to purchase these crops. The government declares a floor price for the various crops, usually at harvest time, and designates its agents to purchase the product directly from farmers at the specified price. These prices have been instrumental in establishing a nationally uniform market for all major crops grown in the country (Margulies 1985:298). One of the other important aims of these policies has been to curtail the sale of agricultural produce to private merchants below the costs of production. This, in turn, depends on the extent to which merchants can be excluded from the credit market.

Although these pricing policies have repeatedly come under attack from various quarters/positions[28], they have to a large extent created a fifteen year period of expansion during which the agricultural producer has been protected from extreme fluctuations in product markets. Even today, it is still on the basis of these stable prices that producers are able to undertake investments that would otherwise have been imposssible. All crops and all farmers have not been affected in the same way and to the same extent. In general, those producers who have more to sell have become the main beneficiaries of state policies. Thus, cotton growers have had a better deal than wheat growers (since these, until recently were mainly producing for their own subsistence). Moreover, larger producers with more land to show as collateral and more produce with which to benefit from subsidies in kind, fared better than the small producer (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:17). According to the figures supplied by the State Planning Organisation cotton and cotton products' share of Turkish exports over a period of 10 years is as follows:

Table 5.3 Exports of Cotton

Years	Total exports (million TL)	Cotton Exports (million TL)	Cotton as % of total
1970	6313.2	2160.6	33.8
1971	9090.0	3008.3	33.0
1972	11875.9	3265.4	28.3
1973	18037.4	5417.7	29.4
1974	22197.3	4960.0	21.0
1975	20075.0	4742.0	23.6
1976	30755.4	9835.3	31.7
1977	31338.5	6757.9	21.6
1978	55357.8	13201.0	23.8
1979	75743.7	14709.9	19.4
1980	221498.1	39168.1	18.1

Source: Kaymak & Someren 1981:979.

Cotton price supports can only be understood in relation to the position cotton has come to occupy in the Turkish economy since the mid-sixties. Industrial production of cotton textiles and yarn is the largest and most developed branch of industry, employing the largest numbers of workers and accounting for 13% of total value added by industry (DIE 1983:261). Turkish cotton textiles are mainly aimed at the domestic market where 70-80% of all clothing is cotton (Kaymak and Someren 1981:978). Since the early 1970's exports of manufactured cotton products started to occupy an important position in total export earnings and have been subsidised by the state through significant tax deductions (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:15). Total cotton exports, including raw cotton, yarn and textiles, make up about 20% of total exports.[29] By contrast, importation of cotton textile and yarn is now negligible. About 35-40% of all raw cotton is exported, which shows that the major portion of production is now consumed by domestic manufacture, a reversal of the situation at the turn of the century (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:6).

Cotton therefore produces an income for labourers in all sectors of the economy: agriculture, manufacture, and- through sales -in services as well. But in addition, cotton constitutes a basic item of consumption. Moreover, it has increasingly begun to provide the raw material for two new areas of production: cotton seed provides cooking oil, and the seed after

the removal of its oil content serves as a nutritious animal feed. During the last years the latter has also been exported.

Table 5.4 Production, Consumption and Export of Turkish Cotton

Years	Production (mt)	Domestic Consumption (mt)	Exports (mt)
1970	400000	180000	309564
1975	480000	270000	241700
1976	474927	312000	380742
1977	574874	269000	150356
1978	475000	312000	277995
1979	476207	271500	150619
1980	446471	277000	181296

Source: Asena 1981:223.

State support prices for cotton reflect the increasing importance of the crop for the Turkish economy. Although since the 1950s government-backed sales cooperatives have been purchasing cotton at prices favourable to the producer, it was not until 1966 that governments started to fix prices. Until that date, domestic cotton prices had been comparable to world prices (Dunn 1952:58).[30] The stated aim of cotton support policies is to increase the producer's income and effect a balanced inter-sectoral redistribution of incomes as well as keeping consumer prices low (Ergüder 1980:171). The need to keep exports competitive and cotton manufacturers contented add to the pressures faced by governments in meeting these rather contradictory aims. Moreover, a number of powerful interest groups including the Agricultural Chambers' Association which is dominated by large farmers from the Aegean and Adana regions, lobby the government each year before prices are announced. In addition to the demands voiced by this important pressure group, the government considers world prices and stocks, as well as national and international levels of production (Berk 1980:259).[31] During the 1970's support prices were well above international prices, and at times, also above prices of production (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:11; DPT 1976:63). As a result, sales cooperatives which buy cotton at government-determined prices sustained heavy losses. This also dealt a blow to these cooperatives' resources and affected their ability to purchase the cotton offered by needy producers (Berk 1980:259).[32]

Table 5.5 Government and Market Prices for Seed Cotton

Years	Market (kg./TL.)	increase %	Government (kg./TL.)	increase %
1967	2.223		2.23	
1968	2.117	-4.8	2.33	04.5
1969	2.054	-3.0	2.33	00.0
1970	2.622	28.0	2.75	18.0
1971	3.626	38.0	3.29	20.0
1972	3.639	00.4	3.64	10.6
1973	6.320	74.0	5.80	59.0
1974	7.148	13.0	7.80	34.5
1975	6.945	-2.8	7.80	00.0

Source: Merkez Bankasi n.d.:11.

Cotton production has in general been rather responsive to changes in support prices (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:2; Kepenek 1983:339). This responsiveness has been accentuated by the development of a high-yield variety of wheat which has become a highly profitable alternative to cotton in many areas (Berk 1980:249). Thus, the years following a favourable cotton price have witnessed an increase in the area cropped to cotton, while in years of low prices, the area under cotton cultivation will contract. On the other hand, the ability of producers to respond to differences in price levels depends on a number of attending factors so that responses to changing prices have been anything but uniform. Apart from the possibility of cultivating another crop and amount of investment on the land itself, production strategies are the key variable affecting response to changing prices. Where productive activities mainly constitute a return to labour, cotton will continue to be produced even in the face of falling prices.[33]

Even small producers, have, however, been affected by pricing policies. Net income has increased for all producers (Berk 1980:260). This is clearly shown by the level of investment that has been undertaken: thus in years following good prices, in areas such as Tuz (that is where small-scale farming is dominant), farmers have been purchasing tractors and other machinery, undertaking land improvements, or extending area cropped to cotton (see chapter 10).

State agricultural policies have therefore been very effective in regulating and commoditising cotton cultivation. Particularly after 1962 when economic planning was instituted, the main changes in cotton cultivation have been with regard to increasing yields rather than extending area under production. Increased yields were primarily due to the increase in irrigated land and secondly to factors such as mechanisation and fertilisation. In all these areas, the state had a decisive impact (cf. Berk 1980). Apart from direct intervention in the form of distributions of fertiliser and seed and the construction of irrigation works, the main form of state intervention in agriculture was in the form of credit provision and the organisation of output markets. Other forms of intervention, such as tax exemptions, have also been important. Since 1945, agriculture has not been taxed significantly (Bulmus 1981).[34] Land distributions have also been effective in bringing empty state land under production, but have not led to an egalitarian distribution of land as was initially hoped. Nevertheless, in certain regions such as Söke, these distributions of state land created the conditions in which small household based commodity production could flourish. Thus, contrary to what has been argued by Birtek (1985) for the early fifties, from the 1960s onward, the state has been instrumental in making the small family farm able to compete with large landlords as producers of cotton.[35] Production of cotton has meant that the small farmer became totally integrated in input, cash, and output markets. Integration into labour and land markets, however, remains incomplete, and this largely accounts for the persistence of the family labour farm in the sphere of cotton production.[36]

5.2. Botany of Cotton

As I tried to show in the previous section, the 'Green Revolution' in Turkish cotton production started in the early sixties, and began to affect small-scale producers a decade later. Improved seeds have necessitated the adoption of a package of new inputs: irrigation, fertlisers, pesticides, as well as increased amounts of labour. The process of production is therefore strongly determined by the nature of the new cotton plant itself.

Cotton (genus Gossypium, family Malvacea) is a tropical and semi-tropical small subshrub or tree in appearance and habit. Although many of the thirty or more known species are perennials, the most widely cultivated commercial kinds are annuals or are treated as such. The fibres for which cotton is grown are produced on the surface of the seed coat, their length and quality depending on variety as well as environmental conditions and cultural practices. The lint and seed are in capsules which are called bolls. The aim of commercial cotton cultivation is to produce as many of these bolls as possible on a per hectare rather than per plant basis.

The plant itself is made up of a main body on which vegetative and fruit bearing branches develop. Soon after sowing, seed germination takes place, providing environmental conditions are favourable. A shoot first appears about 8 to 10 days after sowing. The plant grows through the elongation of the central stem. At each node of the stem two buds develop but only one grows out to give a lateral branch. In the lower part of the plant the developing buds are monopodial and purely vegetative, while in the upper part of the bush the buds that grow out form fruit-bearing branches (sympodia). In American Upland varieties (G. hirsutum L.) the numbers of vegetative branches are between one and four, the rest carry flowers. The nodes on these flowering branches produce flowers one at a time; this gradual process ultimately affects harvesting practices since the crop on even one cotton bush cannot mature simultaneously. Flowering occurs approximately 24 days after the first appearance of the flower bud. Flowering is a consecutive process, each bud opening about 6 days after the previous one and each successive branch flowering after the one below it. The number of flowers produced is a good indicator of yield since it is these flowers which produce the lint-bearing bolls.

Bolls begin to form immediately after fertilisation, a process which takes about 25 days for complete maturation. The opening of the boll needs another 30 to 40 days. However, not all buds produce flowers and not all flowers produce bolls. Flowering and fruitition is also under the control of an abscission mechanism whereby flowers and fruit are shed unopened. This is known as shedding in cotton cultivation and accounts for considerable loss in yields. It is most pronounced if the soil is too wet,

thus turning irrigation, necessary for branch growth, into a process which has to be constantly supervised. Other environmental conditions such as the presence of sunlight and activities of various pests also affect the rate of shedding.

The fruit consists of a dry capsule, the boll, which has three, four, or five loculi, each loculus containing about eight similar lint bearing seeds. Environmental conditions in the boll maturation period determine the ultimate lint length as well as the degree of maturity of the lint. Bolls may develop on the same plant at anything up to twelve weeks. When the boll opens the lint fluffs up, and, drying on exposure, becomes the white seed cotton lightly held by the dry carpels (longitudinal segment) of the boll. The lint is the spinnable unicellular outgrowth of the seed coat and can be up to 4 centimetres in length. The Upland cottons cultivated in Turkey produce middle length lint of about 24 to 28 millimetres, actual size depending on environmental conditions and cultivation practices, responding positively particularly to irrigation. The fuzz is the shorter hairs of the seed coat which are not spinnable; they can, however, be used as stuffing for upholstery or in the production of cellulose, applications which are not well developed in Turkey. The seeds are rich in edible oils and, after pressing, can be used as cattle cake. The production of both of these cotton products is becoming important as an area of investment.

To sum up: the cycle of cotton growth takes about 150 to 210 days to complete depending on strand and environment:

From sowing to emergence of the shoot.....8-10 days
Emergence to the appearance of flower buds.....40-50 days
First budding to flowering.....20-25 days
Flowering to fruititon.....50-60 days
Harvest.....30-60 days
Total.....148-210 days

Cotton is a delicate plant with a number of enemies. Many environmental conditions restrict the areas where cotton can be commercially cultivated. Humidity and high temperatures, the two most important factors for plant growth, limit the distribution of cotton

cultivation. In general, cotton can successfully be cultivated in areas where for a period of five to six months, temperatures do not fall below 18 degrees centigrade and where ground frost is absent. Furthermore, during the period of maturation, temperatures must be constantly rising, reaching 25 degrees centigrade at the period of plant growth, flowering and fruitition. Falling temperatures in the early autumn are beneficial since they stop plant growth and allow for the maturation of the fruit. Although cotton can be cultivated without irrigation in areas of high rainfall, rain distribution is rarely optimal and yields are therefore low. Too much rainfall causes plant growth but does not allow fruitition. Furthermore, the numerous cotton pests and diseases have a tendency to increase under over-moist conditions. Rainfall when the bolls are open damages the lint. Sunlight is also fundamental for the development of fruit branches, the maturation of the fruit and for the prevention of disease. Winds which are quite beneficial when they bear moisture, cause shedding when they are dry and strong. Thus, cotton cultivation is restricted to areas with a relatively long summer, where fields can be protected from strong winds and where irrigation can be practiced without much difficulty. In the Söke plain, although most of these conditions obtain, strong winds and unexpected early rain at harvest time can cause a drop in yields.

Cotton needs light soils, rich in nitrogen, phosphorous and potash. On sandy soils, widespread in the lower Söke plain, yields are much reduced and fertilisation and irrigation become imperative. The soil has to be frequently ventilated, thus necessitating repeated hoeing (mechanical as well as manual). Fertilisation allows for speedy plant growth and the full development of fruit bearing branches. About one half of the nitrogen and phosphorous and one fourth of the potash consumed by the plant is go to the lint and seed. The remainder of these nutrients are distributed into the branches, leaves and bolls. However, much care needs to be taken in the application of fertilisers and, ideally, each field has to be analysed before the exact amount needed can be ascertained, a process which is rarely undertaken by peasant producers. Too much nitrogen leads to the overgrowth of vegetative parts, hinders fruitition and retards maturation. Phosphorous speeds up maturation and increases yields and improves the quality of the lint. Potash is rarely applied in Turkey since most soils

are fairly rich in this nutrient. Irrigation which enhances germination and plant growth also impoverishes soils very quickly, thus making fertilisation imperative.

Yields are also affected by a number of cotton pests and diseases. These vary with the strand of cotton cultivated, the environmental conditions and cultivation techniques. Application of chemicals such as DDT and special cultivation techniques are used to limit the damage caused by these factors. In Söke, some cutworms (of the genus Agrotis) which destroy the roots of the young shoot, and the pinkboll worm (Pectinophora gossypiella),whose incidence increase with irrigation, cause important damage. Chemicals sprays, applied when and where the pest is encountered are used to fight the spread of these pests. Sterilization of seeds and cutting and burning the stalk after the harvest are among preventive measures which are now widely applied in Söke. Other pests such as the red spider have largely been eradicated through the activity of the State Agricultural Extension Office. As I shall show below, farmers have now been able to reduce their requirements of pesticides considerably. Weeds, however, are still an important problem. Rather than use chemical weed killers, farmers weed by hand, turning ventilation, weed control and spacing into one operation. Manual labour which is needed for spacing can, in this way, be made more productive. Wilting, due to a fungus (Verticulum Albo-artum) which propagates under cool and moist conditions is a root disease which can destroy the plant. At present, it still causes problems to cultivators in Söke. Farmers fight this disease by sowing strands which are resistant to the fungus as well as by changing methods of cultivation.

Due to the problems that I have attempted to outline above, cotton cultivation requires the constant attention of the farmer from the time it is first sown until all the harvest is collected. Moreover, under conditions of salinity such as found in Tuz, a second crop (nitrogen-bearing pulses are usually recommended in a program of crop rotation involving cotton since it consumes a lot of this nutrient) cannot be sown and fields have to be kept under supervision during the winter months as well. One of the largest landowners in Söke compared the cotton farmer to a worried parent: "cotton is like a sickly child: it can only reach maturity

with a lot of money and attention" (Usumi 1982). This statement was made in order to emphasize the need for abundant and cheap credits for the successful cultivation of cotton at a time when state-funded credits to agriculture were being reduced. The reduction of state credits has meant that producers have not been able to procure the necessary inputs, particularly fertilisers and pesticides, and consequently sustained considerable loss in yields. As a result, those farmers who were able to switch to other crops did so, and, after 1980, the overall cotton product in the Söke region decreased. Those unable to effect this switch are the peasant producers of the lower Meander plain who, due to the type of soils and to the structure of the entreprise, are locked into the production of cotton as a monocrop.

5.3 Stages of Cotton Cultivation

There are five major stages in the cultivation of cotton: 1) preparation of the field, 2) sowing, 3) spacing, hoeing and weeding, 4) irrigation, and 5) harvesting. These correspond to the five-stage life cycle of the cotton plant: germination, plant growth and flowering, fertilisation, fruition, and, finally, maturation. Each of these stages requires certain environmental conditions to be present so that maximum yields can be achieved. Apart from temperature which s/he cannot control, the cultivator has to supervise all the remaining environmental factors, that is, soil conditions, nutrients, moisture, pests and weeds. These activities begin before the crop is sown and continue until the beginning of the next cycle of production, even though the field is empty during the winter months (from the end of November to the following May). At present, both manual and mechanised processes, as well as 'traditional' (that is, land and labour) and 'modern' (artificial fertilisers and irrigation, improved seed, chemical insecticides,and mechanised cultivation) inputs are used in comparable combinations in all of the Söke farms. Thus, the complicated steps of cotton cultivation are undertaken by all farmers of the area in more or less the same fashion.

The aim of production is to produce as much good quality cotton from a particular field as possible. Quality is measured according to whether or

not the lint has been exposed to rain prior to the harvest. According to the amount of rain spots on it, cotton is classified in terms of four internationally recognised grades which are uniformly applied by government agencies as well as private buyers. Rain soiled cotton fetches a proportionately lower price in all markets. This makes time the most crucial factor determining production decisions. The crop needs about five months to reach full maturation, and in Western Turkey, the dry and hot summer suitable for cotton cultivation lasts about six and a half months. The winter rains stop towards the end of March, but farmers need to wait for the soil to dry before they can enter the fields. Preparation for planting takes at least fifteen days so that sowing can, under normal circumstances, not be undertaken before the first week in May. Harvesting can thus begin around the first of October; depending on the weather, it takes forty-five to sixty days. Autumn rains begin in November and therefore the third harvest is often rain-soiled. Any delay in this schedule may endanger the second and even sometimes the first harvest, causing the ruin of the farmer. Timeliness is the single most important and limiting constraint in the production of cotton under conditions prevalent in the Söke plain. Due to the precise time period required for each of the stages of plant growth, it is at harvest that producers become most pressed for time and labour. During the five months or so that the crop is in the field, cultivation activities follow one another without respite.

5.3.1 Preparing the Field

The valley floor on which most of the cotton cultivation takes place is composed of sandy and alluvial soils, the product of the Meander river which has filled up its delta over the centuries. In the lower reaches of the river, the quality of the soil deteriorates considerably, salinity being the main problem. As saline soils are detrimental to plant growth, fields have to kept under water prior to cultivation, in order to push the level of salt to where the roots of the plants cannot reach. This precaution produces viable fields for one season only, and the same time precludes doubble cropping. Before this 'washing' process, fields have to be carefully levelled and drainage ditches constructed. Failure to do this

reduces yields considerably, producing a plot with bare patches where the salt seeps to the surface. Levelling, an operation which constitutes a substantial investment, provides uniform plant growth in any one field since it also allows all plants to derive maximum benefit from fertilisation and irrigation. Uniform fields also make all other cultivation tasks, including harvesting easier and faster. Levellers, expensive tractor-drawn implements, have to be utilised the first time this operation is undertaken; in subsequent seasons, the relatively common and inexpensive plank roller can be used for minor adjustments. Canals of about 2 meters in depth are dug around the field to allow the salty water pushed down by the pressure of the sitting fresh water to escape without damaging other fields. These canals are later used as irrigation and drainage ditches. The water level has to be constantly checked to ensure evenness; these activities require frequent trips to the fields during the winter months.

At the end of a harvest, the cotton stalks remaining in the fields have to be burned to exterminate pests. Following necessary repairs to ditches and canals, the field is ploughed and, where possible, 'washed'. Preparations for sowing begin during April depending on the accessibility of the field. The subsoil has to be ventilated and dried out without losing any nutrients and without making the soil too dry or clumpy. Firstly, nitrogenous fertilisers are scatterred on the surface of the soil. The field is then ploughed, turning as much soil out to the surface as possible. Harrowing and raking pulverises big clumps of earth and allows quicker dessication of the soil. A plank roller is passed over the field in order to seal moisture and nutrients into the soil. The field is then ready for sowing.

Depending on weather conditions, these activities may take a week to ten days to accomplish. A 30-decare field of medium density soil can be ploughed in about six hours using a three-blade tractor-drawn metal plough. Harrowing, raking and sealing usually take less, about three to four hours. A few days must elapse between each activity, thus bringing the time necessary for the preparation of the field to a fortnight. Time, as I have indicated above, is a pressing factor and skill and experience are crucial

for these activities to be completed in time. An experienced tractor driver can, on his own, undertake all of these operations.

5.3.2 Sowing

Cotton seed is sown towards the last days of April or at the beginning of May, when the winter rains end. Rainfall within the first week after sowing prevents germination and makes it necessary to plough the field a second time and plant all over again, an eventuality that occurs frequently. This retards the harvest considerably and increases costs. Today most of the farmers use a tractor-drawn cotton seed planter where depth and frequency can be mechanically adjusted. Mechanised planting also produces even rows without which subsequent operations that require the use of a tractor cannot be undertaken without damaging plants. Nevertheless, farmers plant more seed than required to compensate for loss during germination or destruction of pests such as cutworms. It takes about seven to eight hours to sow a 30-decare field. Two workers are necessary, one to drive the tractor and the other to operate the planter. The pace of activities is feverish at this period; so much so that most of the planting is done at night. The whole of the Söke valley is then alight with tractor headlights. But all this haste may not suffice to guarantee a successful harvest.

5.3.3 Spacing, Hoeing and Weeding

A week after sowing the green cotton shoot begins to show in the fields. The plant can then develop, providing the temperature is not below 20 degrees Celsius and there are no freak rains. A fortnight after sowing the farmer can already gauge the amount of cotton s/he can expect at harvest. During the following 45 days before the beginning of irrigation, a number of activities to enhance plant growth have to be undertaken. Following a period of 25 days after sowing, soils have to be ventilated to ensure proper root growth, This is now done using a tractor-drawn interrow metal hoe. Although this implement can also be used for weeding, it can only be effective for those weeds that grow between the cotton rows. Weeds growing within each row have to be hand-hoed. Hand hoeing also

roughs the neat furrows made by the tractor during sowing. These furrows ironically make it easier for cutworms to get at the roots of the young shoots and this pest can easily destroy entire cotton rows. Hoers moreover have to space the shoots. As will be remembered, the latter are too many in number for any single row as a result of overcompensation at sowing time for possible losses.

Hand hoeing, the second largest labour consuming process of cotton production, is done by gangs of five to twenty usually female workers. An average plot of thirty decares can be hoed by 10 labourers in one day using a wooden handled metal hoe. The time required to complete this operation depends on the conditions of the field, on the weeds and on soil type. Weeding has to repeated at least three, usually four times since the fertilisers that are applied also benefit weeds, some of which can stick to the lint and thereby affect the quality of the final produce. Often a second application of a mixure of nitrogen and phosphate based fertilisers is necessary after the first hoeing, which, when applied with a cotton planter, takes about four hours on a thirty-decare field. Since the crop is constantly under inspection at this period, any pest that may appear will also be immediately dealt with. Both diseases and pests are counteracted according to their incidence rather than by an a priori application of insecticides. Spraying of various chemicals on the crop can take six to eight hours depending on the stage of development that the crop has reached at the time of application, as well as on the type of implement used.

5.3.4 Irrigation

Preparating the field for irrigation involves building ridges in a checker-board pattern so as to form smaller plots of 2.5 square meters. Water that is pumped to the field will thus be directed to each patch at a time and the ridges will ensure that the water is maintained at a uniform level throughout the field. These ridges may be built by hand in about four days or in three hours using tractor-drawn mechanical ridge-makers. Nevertheless the mechanised ridges can only be built in one direction since the motion of the tractor would destroy those that have already been built.

Thus, mechanised ridge-makers can only be used to construct those parallel to cotton rows and the rest must be built by hand.

Water is pumped to the fields from the main canals using two to three tractor-powered pumps to direct the water. The number of these pumps (and therefore the numbers of tractors necessary) varies according to the position of the field in relation to the water source. Iron pipes which help to set the direction of the water flow have to be laid out according to the number of pumps employed. Setting up the pumps and pipes usually takes three to four hours. Once the water begins to flow, it takes up to twelve hours to fill the ridges in a thirty-decare field. At least two, sometimes more workers are necessary to accomplish these tasks. While one person supervises the distribution of the water in the field and controls the strength of the ditches, another has to remain at the pump to check the flow of water. Laying down the heavy pipes is a task that requires at least two persons.

As with hoeing, irrigation has to be repeated two to three times at an interval of fifteen days, and each time, the process will take less time than the previous operation since the soil becomes more and more saturated. The whole process of irrigation may take about a month to complete. By the beginning of September at the latest, water is withdrawn to allow the bolls to mature.

5.3.5 Harvest

Harvesting is a manual process in all farms in the Söke area, although in other parts of Turkey, notably Adana, mechanised harvesting is practiced, albeit on a very small scale. Manual harvesting is found throughout the world in areas of cheap labour (Berrie 1977:139). As the bolls mature, the lint dries out and can be hand-picked, leaving the dry carpel on the stalk. Hand-picking can be carried out at intervals allowing for the different rates of maturation of the crops and therefore results in higher yields. Mechanical harvesting, on the other hand, is undertaken as a once-over operation. The crop is usually defoliated by chemical treatment to allow harvesting by stripping or spindle picking (ibid). This necessitates

different cultivation methods, using strands which can mature simultaneously. Mechanical harvesting is also possible in areas where time is not such a crucial factor, thus allowing all the crop to mature before harvesting. The fact that the dry season is longer in Adana compared to Söke has made experiments with mechanical harvesting possible in that region.[37]

In Söke as well as in all areas of Turkey the harvest is the bottleneck of the whole production process. Shortage of labour, made even more acute by the time factor, is the main reason for this bottleneck. As with hoeing, harvesting is undertaken by groups of workers whose numbers vary widely according to availability. This process requires approximately twice the amount of labour needed for hoeing. Depending on the condition of the crop and the skill of the pickers, it will, on average, take ten labourers about three to four days to collect the first harvest of a thirty-decare plot. Labourers can then work in another field until the first one is ready for a second harvest. Alternatively, a family comprising of five labourers cultivating thirty decares can harvest their own cotton by working for two months on their own fields only. Farmers cultivating large tracts of cotton employ numerous gangs of labourers for the entire harvest period. Successive harvests need at least an interval of fifteen days to allow the maximum number of bolls to open. Although progressively less cotton is picked at each successive harvest, the time needed is approximately the same since the cotton is less dense and the dry stalks of the previous harvest hamper activities. The larger the work group, the quicker the harvest and therefore the greater chance of a larger proportion of the harvest to be of the first quality.

Harvested cotton is hand-packed into jute sacks in which it is either sold or stored according to the circumstances of the producer. Cotton that is sold to the sales cooperatives has to be taken to the buying stations which entails the immobilisation of tractors and trailers as well as personnel for long periods of time. This is due to the long queues which form in front of the state buying agencies which, not having suffcient personnel, take a long time in buying up the cotton. Furthermore, formalities such as settling of accounts with the state cooperative are

undertaken at the same time, lengthening the whole process. Merchants buy the produce in the village but charge the producer for transport costs. Apart from indebtedness, considerations of time have been important in the sale of produce to merchants.

As the scale of production increases, so does the magnitude of the operations described above, necessitating proportionately more inputs of cash in order to purchase those means of production that are consumed within one production cycle. Changes in the scale of production also entail differences in the organisation of production, particularly in the organisation of labour. I shall now turn to a discussion of the different inputs in order to demonstrate that cash and labour are the most important factors limiting production.

Table 5.6 Time Schedule and Labour Time Required to Cultivate a 30-decare Cotton Field

Activity	**Labour Time** (Hours x no. of labourers	**Cotton Day**
I.Field Preparation		Day 1 to 15
Ploughing	6x1	
Fertilisation	2x2	
Harrowing	4x1	
Raking	3x1	
Sealing	2x1	
Total Labour Time:	**19 hours**	
II.Sowing	7-8x2	Day 15 to 16
Total Labour Time:	**16 hours**	
III.Plant Cultivation		Day 30 to 75
Hoeing	(10x10)3	
Fertilising (tractor)	4x2	
Ventilating	(1x3)x3	
Hand weeding	10-15x2-5	
Pesticide spraying	6-8x1	
Total Labour Time:	**343-370 hours**	
IV.Irrigation		Day 75 to 110-125
Pipe laying	(3-4x2)x3	
Irrigation	(12x2)x3	
Ridge-building (hand)	15x1	
Ridge-building (tractor)	3x1	
Total labour Time:	**99-111 hours**	
V.Harvesting	10x60-80*	Day 125-180
Total Labour Time:	**600-800 hours**	

* Harvesting has been calculated in the following way:
Labourers can pick about 60-100 kg. of seed cotton a day depending on the actual individual, the state of the crop and weather conditions. It is assumed that each working day comprises 8 hours, corresponding to the number of daylight hours at this season. Thus:

1st picking 4 days 10 labourers = 320 hours
2nd picking 3 days 10 labourers = 240 hours
3rd picking 1 day 10 labourers = 80 hours
Total = 640 hours (an approximate figure).

5.4 Agricultural Technology and Constraints

As in most forms of agricultural production, land, labour and cash (with which all of the commoditised inputs are purchased) are the principal factors of production. Of these factors, it is labour and cash, rather than land, which are the scarce factors that impose limits on the scale of production. A comparison of family labour enterprises (such as those in Tuz) and enterprises based on hired labour shows that, in the former, cash is the limiting constraint, while, in the latter, labour constraints limit the area cropped to cotton. Since the beginning of cotton production in Söke, cash has been gradually substituted for labour through the adoption of improved technology. This substitution is limited by the cash available to each production unit and the amount of credit its members can obtain. Consequently, it has been the large town-based producers who have been able to adopt improved technology more easily. As the improved technology becomes widely accepted, it also becomes cheaper and accessible to peasant producers. Under present conditions, a complete substitution of technology for labour is nevertheless impossible so that labour is still the single most important factor limiting production for all types of producers.

Among producers in Tuz, variations in output correlate significantly with area under production. This shows that most of the producers use comparable levels of investment per decare in land improvements, fertilisers, irrigation, labour and machinery. Such a conclusion is also consistent with my observations.[38] In order to increase output, it is therefore necessary to acquire more land, rather than to alter the combination of the factors of production. More land means a proportional increase in all inputs, except cash which rises more than proportionately. Some amount of extra cash, however small, is necessary to acquire more land; but more importantly, as area cropped to cotton increases, the labour required surpasses that provided by the household. Expenditure on wages increases with the amount of land cultivated. In the following chapters, I shall look into forms of access to these factors of production and the social relations that they entail. At present, I shall consider the technological implications of these inputs, particularly with regard to ways in which yields can be controlled.

5.4.1 Land

Land is the only factor of production that is relatively adundant. Large tracts of land that belong to the state are still waiting to be distributed, as are drained marshlands near the Meander delta. Peasants from nearby villages (including Tuz) are able to improve and cultivate these lands without too much interference from the state. They hope to gain legal ownership of the fields they cultivate in the event that the state sells or distributes this land. Land is also available through the rental market as well as through sharecropping mechanisms. The presence near Tuz of a large landholding (28.000 decares) whose owner is ready to take on sharecroppers or rent out land is an important factor that increases land availability. Land, however, to be productive must be improved, and therefore needs considerable inputs of labour and cash.

Soil conditions affect production in a number of important ways. To the extent that soils deviate from the ideal, more and more inputs of cash and labour are necessary to undertake production. In the lower reaches of the Meander where Tuz lands are situated, salinity increases costs of land improvements and prevents double cropping. Yearly crop rotation is the only way of allowing the soil to recover and to acquire needed nutrients. Although a few farmers will plant summer wheat for one year in five to six years, price structures result in the cultivation of cotton year after year.[39] This means that production can only be possible with more and more reliance on fertilisers.[40] Land improvements and other technological requirements make cotton production an expensive process. Costs of production have also risen but at a much slower rate making the application of fertilisers and other modern techniques desirable for most producers. According to a study conducted by the World Bank in the Adana region, land improvements led to a 53 % increase in yield (measured in kg./decare) (quoted in Berk 1980:253).

Soil density and access to water also affect the technology selectedas well as yields. Light soils are more easily cultivated, reducing the cost of fuel as well as labour time. Moreover, they lose moisture more quickly and can therefore be cultivated earlier in the cycle than dark, heavy soils.

This also implies that the harvest can begin earlier, with less risk of damage from rain. However, light soils contain less nutrients and therefore, produce smaller cotton bushes with fewer bolls: yields are therefore comparatively lower.

Access to water is very important for irrigation, without which cotton cannot be cultivated. The main source of irrigation is the Meander river and the draining canal constructed by the state in 1967 (Köseli 1975:31). Fields closer to sources of water can be irrigated for a lesser outlay of cash and labour than those situated further away.[41] On the whole, however, access to water is not very problematic in the region and does not constitute an important factor limiting production. This is also due to the fact that there is a high water table and wells can be constructed out of which water is drawn with electric pumps operated by tractor generators. Wells only constitute 5 % of all sources of irrigation in the plain (Köseli 1975:31) and only about five farmers in Tuz rely on this method.

The distribution of the various soil types is related to the activity of the Meander river and to proximity to the sea. Soils in the eastern parts of the valley are of better quality, yields are higher. In these parts, moreover, a state-built irrigation system which allows better water regulation makes cultivation more efficient and less costly. In the western parts, the main difference between soil types is in terms of light versus heavy soils and proximity to water, salinity being the constant problem faced by all producers to a greater or lesser degree. All these factors are taken into consideration in the evaluation of a particular field for various transactions such as sales or rentals.

5.4.2 Labour

The demand for labour in most farms in Söke has been considerably affected by the adoption of new technology. The most important effect of the new technology is to reduce the demand for unskilled labour employed in many stages of production, including hoeing and the preparation of the fields for irrigation. These trends have affected the demand of both male and female unskilled labourers. Labour for which demand has increased as a

result of improved technology is of two kinds. Firstly skilled labour needed to operate the tractor-drawn equipment is now needed in greater numbers, and young men have to learn these skills even if they do not have access to land. Secondly, to the extent that such technology has increased yields, demand for the manual labour to harvest it has proportionately risen. Consequently, the demand for female labour has increased in magnitude, adding to the already acute problem of labour supply.

Most of the activities in the cycle of cotton cultivation are mechanised and therefore require relatively small labour inputs (see Table 5.6). Time constraints make it impossible to cultivate cotton without a tractor. Whereas a team of horses could plough about one decare of land a day, a tractor reduces that time to about ten to fifteen minutes. Furthermore, while traditional ploughing necessitates the labour of two individuals, tractor ploughing only needs one person. Various tractor-drawn implements such as ridge makers and inter-row cultivators specifically designed in Söke for the purposes of cotton cultivation have gone a long way toward reducing labour demand. Inter-row cultivators and chemical weed killers reduce labour needs for hoeing. Mechanised ridge makers, levellers, land shifters, and electrical pumps have more than halved the labour needed for irrigation, while seed planters and mechanical sprayers have considerably facilitated sowing and the application of fertilisers. Labour needed to complete these tasks is therefore limited and availibility does not pose a problem. Depending on the organisation of the enterprise, household labour and/or hired labour can be found without great difficulty.

However, not all producers can purchase these labour-saving implements. This produces a complex pattern of exchange of tractor-drawn machinery between different households. Cash, labour, produce and other items having nothing to do with the process of cotton production can be used to acquire the services of the machine needed. Relations of cooperation and exchange based on kinship and residence as well as 'friendship' are also used to obtain machinery. Whether an equivalent is demanded during these transactions depends on the pattern of interaction that is part of the total social relationship between the households

concerned. It is the rationality of community relations rather than economic considerations that explains the nature of these transactions.

It is during the harvest, and, to a lesser extent, for hoeing, that there is a heavy demand for labour. Large quantities of labour are needed for a relatively short period of time in all parts of the plain simultaneously. Local recources are insufficient to supply labour especially for the cotton harvest and about 40,000 migrant labourers come to the plain each year to pick its cotton. Hoeing, which is partly mechanised, takes less time than harvesting: depending on the condition of the crop, one labourer can hoe about two to three decares in a day, while the best cotton picker can only average about half the yield of one decare of cotton (130 kg. per day). Therefore, only those landowners who have more than 100 decares cropped to cotton employ migrant labour for hoeing, and Tuz inhabitants can meet most of the demand for labour during the hoeing period.[42]

For village enterprises, there is a strong correlation between the amount of paid labour used by households and land under cultivation.[43] With increased land under cultivation, labour needed for hoeing and harvesting increases, while labour needed for the mechanised processes remains constant. In the case of town-based producers, labour demand increases even more, since, along with manual labourers for hoeing and harvesting, these producers also have to employ farm managers, tractor drivers, cooks and watchmen, and provide them with food and living quarters.[44]

In spite of the labour shortages outlined above, labour is still the factor of production that is the most easily available to peasant producers. The basis of peasant production rests on the possibility of substituting labour for other scarce resources, cash in particular. Peasant producers try to provide as much of the labour needed for hoeing and harvesting as possible from within the household, thus substituting money capital with 'unpaid' labour. Household labour is, moreover, more productive compared to 'paid' labour, thus making this substitution desirable. This way of

reducing cash costs is one of the main reasons that accounts for the prevalence of household-based producers in cotton cultivation.[45]

Labour can be substituted for machinery and therefore, and by extension, for money. This type of substitution is limited to the more expensive labour-saving tractor-drawn equipment that has been developed recently. Thus, the application of fertiliser can be accomplished with a cotton planter rather than a special implement which most of the producers in Tuz cannot afford to purchase. This increases the time necessary to accomplish the task, but is still within the limits posed by the schedule of cotton production. Rather than use mechanised ridge-makers, farmers can construct ditches with an axe and a shovel. Hand operations can be substituted for the mechanical application of insecticides and the chemical eradication of weeds. Nevertheless, some of the jobs performed by the more expensive machines cannot be done manually and farmers must then forego the benefits that may accrue through their use.[46]

The lack of sophisticated machinery can to some extent be compensated for through larger inputs of labour at the hoeing and particularly at the harvesting stages. Although repeated weeding can increase yields substantially, it is the pattern of harvesting that most significantly augments yields. Cotton bolls continue to mature as long as they are left standing in the field. Thus producers for whom labour has no money costs can continue harvesting beyond the point at which producers paying a wage leave off.

Another way through which labour can be substituted for machines is through the exchange system briefly mentioned above. Labourers of a cotton-producing household may work on a neighbour's fields without any remuneration in cash in return for the construction of ridges, or the ventilation of their own field. In these instances, the owner of the implement usually uses his own tractor. This is necessary where larger instruments are used, since they necessitate more horsepower than is needed for routine cultivation. In cases where tractors are not part of the exchange, the borrowing of the implement is done on the basis of a wider

pattern of exchange according to which any item of daily life is lent to one's neighbour, friend or relative (see chapter 3).

Land can also be acquired in return for labour, thus further reducing the money cost of production. To a certain extent, sharecropping can be seen as such a mechanism. A landless head of a household can get access to land through such a mechanism in return for the labour power that is at his/her disposal. This transaction is made easier when the household head is also a tractor owner. Thus with the much reduced outlay of capital required to purchase a tractor compared to the purchase of land, a landless household can enter into production. Certain types of 'rental' agreements also serve the same purpose. Many large landowners rent land in return for a specified amount of produce in kind, rather than asking for cash. Reliance on unpaid labour lies at the root of both of these ways of obtaining land.

There are however important limits to the extent to which labour can be substituted for other inputs. All households do end up paying a certain amount of wages. Inputs such as fertilisers, seed and insecticides have to be purchased with cash even though this involves the mediation of credit mechanisms. Fuel can only be purchased with cash and all producers have to pay for irrigation fees. This means that without access to a certain amount of cash, cotton production cannot be undertaken.

5.4.3 Cash

Within a generalised commodity economy, cash occupies a special place in production as well as in other spheres of life. To the extent that it is needed to purchase the means of production, it acts as capital. Cash is also the medium through which a large part of the means of consumption are purchased. In Söke, the extent to which production and consumption are commoditised varies according to each household, but no family is totally severed from commodity circuits and hence from the need to obtain money capital whether through sale of a commodity, or through credit mechanisms. This means that cash (or, in other words, accumulated capital and/or credit) will affect the quantity and quality of production in both peasant

and capitalist production. Thus, the situation that I describe for Söke, is one which deviates from the ideal-typical models of capitalist or peasant production, since in the former accumulated capital, and in the latter only land and labour determine limits of production.

Credit mechanisms are the major ways through which most of the producers in Söke obtain cash. The ability of the state to meet cotton producers' demands for cash has, in the past, been largely responsible for extending the area under production as well as increasing yields. Today, all inputs needed for cotton production can be purchased, making accumulated cash one of the most important prerequisites of production. State credit policies have reduced this amount by providing short-term credit with which to purchase seed and fertilisers. To a lesser extent, state credits have also provided for longer-term investments such as tractor purchases and land improvements.

To the extent that producers hold land through inheritance or land distributions (see chapter 7), cash is not required to get access to land. Nevertheless, in order for cotton production to be undertaken at all, investment in land improvements and irrigation makes the accumulation of a certain amount of capital indipensable. Tractors are the most important machines in cotton production. A number of other implements associated with tractors (ploughs, trailers, rakes, disk harrows, seed planters, inter-row cultivators, pipes and electrical pumps) are also part of the minimum investment. Other machinery, particularly the more expensive specialised equipment, can be rented for specific tasks. There is also a rental market in tractors where those producers who have recently purchased a tractor rent it out to meet payments. However, costs of renting, time constraints, and the fact that most tractor-owners are also cotton producers, renting a tractor can be a risky business. Most of the tractorless landowners prefer therefore to lease out land or to enter into sharecropping arrangements rather than rely on the rental market to undertake production themselves.

Circulating capital, that is inputs which are consumed within one production cycle, are also important sources of cash expenditure. Seed, fertilisers, fuel, insecticides, irrigation expenses, and labour are the main

items in this category. Credit is the basic source for these expenses and very few producers can complete a production cycle without incurring debts. The amount of debt is proportional to the area under production. Larger producers, to the extent that their production process is successful, have greater chances of paying back these debts after selling the produce. However, the amount of credit available through public institutions such as state cooperatives and banks, or else by private individuals is limited. Thus, the availability of credit can limit area under production. Credit shortages are most troublesome to those producers who have to pay a large amount of wages. Most of the credit necessary for the other inputs can be obtained in kind over a period of five months as the need arises (see chapter 8). But, labourers are required in large numbers over a relatively short period of time, and the system of advance payments without which migrant labour can not be procured, means that cash requirements for wages are immediate and large in amount; this applies particularly to the larger farms. Credit shortages can therefore limit production seriously for those producers who rely totally on wage labour, whereas those producers for whom labour is not fully commoditised have more chances of survival.

5.5 Conclusion

Conditions for producing cotton in the Söke region indicate that cash and labour are the main factors which limit production. A number of different types of enterprises compete in the production of cotton, and under conditions found between 1978 and 1984, family farms seemed to be the more successful competitors. The production of cotton requires a substantial investment of cash, a factor which, during the fifties and early sixties meant that cotton production could be undertaken mainly by large landowners who were able to capitalise their assets. During this period, capitalisation was made possible by transformations in the Turkish economy in the direction of the establishment of a home market and the commoditisation of land and labour. However, since then, state policies have been crucial in establishing family-labour farms as successful cotton producers. State intervention in the promotion of cotton production in the Söke region has taken four basic forms: extending peasant landownership through land distributions, improving yields through large scale irrigation

and drainage projects (which peasants cannot undertake on their own), supplying peasants with improved technology, and ensuring stable product prices by intervening in credit and product markets.

These policies have ironically contributed to the many factors that hinder the establishment of perfect markets in land and particularly in labour. In certain parts of Turkey such as Söke, peasants have remained tied to their land, creating regional shortages of labour. The relative immobility of labour means that such regional shortages cannot be easily alleviated. Cotton producers in Söke depending on wage labour have been adversely affected by the structure of the labour market. Labour demand in cotton production exacerbates these conditions: relatively little labour is required for much of the production cycle. However, for the period of one month in July and two months in October and in November, large numbers of workers are needed. Under these conditions, peasant farms for whom the supply of labour is less of a problem compared to capitalist farms, have an important advantage over the latter.

The structure of cotton production therefore depends on the conditions under which labour and credit are supplied to the farm, conditions which are largely determined by the structure of the Turkish economy. When credit is relatively cheap, as it was in the late seventies, peasant production of cotton increases. In spite of the withdrawal of state subsidies since then, the high international price of cotton has been able to sustain peasant production. To better understand the factors that allow peasants to produce such a capital-intensive crop, it is necessary to look at the structure of peasant production in more detail.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Aggregate statistics available in Turkey define a small enterprise in terms of land ownership as well as area cultivated (thus including rental and sharecropping contracts). A 'small' enterprise is thus one which has less than 500 decare under production. However, it is often difficult to identify differences in types of production on the basis of cultivated area alone. Therefore, the qualitative data supporting the contention that cotton production is increasingly being undertaken by small producers has been derived from fieldwork. In Söke, the second largest cotton production centre in Turkey, the use of household labour is the crucial factor differentiating between various types of cotton producers. Since, in Söke, household labour is utilised by producers cultivating farms smaller than 500 decares, aggregate statistics can provide a rough guide. It should be borne in mind, however, that conditions of production in other parts of Turkey may not conform to the pattern observed in Söke.

2. Braudel says that for pre-industrial societies, it is possible to find sources of information on trade but not on productive activities. The Ottoman Empire is no exception. Very little research has been undertaken with respect to the conditions under which different crops were produced in the Ottoman Empire, and the majority of existing studies is devoted to wheat since it was the basic of subsistence as well as export. Faroqhi's study, the only source I have been able to find, concerns itself with cotton production only in an indirect way. The aim of her study is to ascertain the role of trade and manufactures in the development of Anatolian towns and markets during the 16th and 17th centuries. In this context, cotton and textiles are two of the commodities she discusses. According to her findings, it seems that cotton textiles were not only exported to Europe (clandestinely during much of the 16th century since the exportation of cotton as well as cotton textiles was prohibited), but also were an important item of domestic trade. The Ottoman military establishment, which was one of the most important sources of demand, needed cotton cloth for clothing soldiers as well as for sails used by the navy. According to Faroqhi, until the first half of the 17th century, the Ottoman administration regarded cotton and cotton thread as war material (1986:373-4). Cotton produced by peasants could be sold on the market either directly by the producer or through the mediation of tax collectors and merchants who were able to appropriate cotton since a large proportion of taxes were paid in kind. According to Faroqhi's findings, Venetian merchants in the 17th century were able to venture in the countryside of Izmir and buy cotton directly from producers, a practice which allowed them to pay a lower purchase price as well as lower customs duty (1986:373). The volume of external and domestic trade in cotton varied greatly during the 17th and 18th centuries, mostly in response to governmental and European demand. Furthermore, Izmir's rise to prominence as a port during the 17th century seems to have been strongly related to the growth of agricultural exports, of which cotton was a major item (Faroqhi 1984: 120, 127; 1986:373-4). See also Issawi 1966: 311-2 for exports of raw cotton from Izmir).

3. According to a source quoted by Novichev, before the war, male and female wage labourers were used in both areas for cotton production. The low level of wages received by these labourers is also mentioned (1966:68).

4. According to a land survey carried out in 1912, 46 % of all agricultural enterprises in the Aydin and Adana regions were larger than 50 decares, while in the other provinces, the proportion was 25 %.

5. As an interesting aspect of these developments, one might mention the efforts of the British in the Aegean and later those of the Germans (in Adana, especially) to establish cotton plantations using wage labour. The British in Izmir also attempted to produce other export crops such as figs and raisins. However, these efforts failed, mainly due to the difficulty of finding wage labourers (Kurmus 1974:144-5).

6. Kurmus quotes the British diplomatic agent in Izmir reporting that there was not a single gin in the area prior to the involvement of British interests in Turkish cotton (1974:78). It was also at this time that agricultural machinery began to be imported, first by British landowners and subsequently, by the Turks (Pamuk 1984:97).

7. The 1912 land survey does not provide information with regard to land size according to crop cultivated. It is therefore difficult to know exactly how much cotton was produced on small-scale (peasant?) farms and how much was produced by large landowners using wage labour. It is also difficult to determine whether large farms in this period used primarily wage labour or else sharecropping arrangements for a labour-intensive crop such as cotton. Novichev, for example, refers to the use of wage labour for hoeing and harvesting cotton in both the Aegean and in Adana (1966:68). Pamuk, on the other hand, maintains that there were important differences between the two regions. In the Aegean, large and small farms operated side by side. Although Pamuk does not indicate what the small farmers were producing, the larger ones were primarily geared toward the cultivation of export crops on the basis of sharecropping contracts with 'free' peasants rather than on the basis of wage labour. The Adana region, however, had a very different history. This region became an important agricultural centre after 1870, when the excess water in the plain could be drained. However, this area was not affected by the 'cotton famine' as much as the Aegean primarily because of its very low population. As a result of political upheavals, the local Armenian population was forced to leave the region, and local grandees appropriated large tracts of abandoned land belonging to the Armenians. Forcible sedentarisation of pastoral nomads greatly alleviated the labour problem and, by 1913, Adana, where the greatest number of large holdings were to be found, became the most commoditised region in the whole of Turkey. See also Hinderink and Kiray (1970) and Soysal (1976) for a history of settlements in the Çukurova and Yüregir plains of Adana. The majority of farms on these plains were producing cotton for exportation (Pamuk 1984:96-100). See also footnote 4.

8. According to students of early Republican economic history in Turkey (Birtek 1985, Keyder 1982, Singer 1977, Tezel 1982), two different state strategies with respect to agriculture can be discerned. Between 1923 and 1929, the state tacitly supported large landowners who produced mainly export commodities (among which cotton had a very important place). This support took the form of indirect subsidies such as the abolition of the tithe in 1925 and easy terms for exporters of cotton and importers of agricultural machinery which, at this time, was purchased by large landowners only. The onset of the Big Depression altered this policy.

Self-sufficiency in food crops (which, in Turkey, comprise mainly of cereals, wheat being the most important) was actively promoted by the government. This meant that policies were now designed to encourage the commoditisation of the small peasant enterprise which was, by far, the dominant locus of cereal production in Turkey at this time. Thus, the peasant had to be induced not only to sell his produce, but also to produce more. New institutions, such as the Agricultural Bank (which gave short-term credit to wheat producers) and the State Agricultural Produce Office (responsible for purchasing cereals at government-set prices) were created to ensure stable input and output markets. The government steadily fixed cereal prices above the level of world prices. At the same time, a number of other institutions set up by the government were responsible for the creation of a political and ideological climate that favoured and indeed praised the virtues of the Anatolian peasant. These virtues, that is the prudence, diligence, and restraint of village life were propagated as a model for Turkish identity and economic policy. Thus, Turkey managed to stay out of the Second World War, curb inflation, and control spending, while engaging on a path of steady economic growth, and accumulating foreign reserves. The rate of economic growth was slow as the state undertook the 'modernisation' of the nation as a whole through various social reforms. Changes in social life, such as in education, and the rate of urbanisation were faster in pace compared to transformations in the economy. The rate of industrialisation in particular seemed to lag dangerously behind. Thus, the period between 1932 and 1948 is known in Turkish historiography as the étatiste period and is praised by many contemporary economists as the only time when Turkey ever experienced real 'independent' development (in A.G. Frank's sense). See Eralp 1983, for an assessment of these views. The majority of the Turkish rural and urban population, however, remember this period as a time of austerity and hardship, a view which largely explains the deposition of the ruling Republican Peoples Party in the first 'free' elections that took place in Turkey in 1950. By then, world politics and economics had also altered considerably so that a new set of policy alternatives faced the new government. See Stirling (1965:280-2) for the way a village in central Anatolia experienced these elections. See also Birtek and Keyder (1975) for an account of the agricultural policies during the period of étatism, and Trimberger 1978 for an evaluation of this period as exemplifying what she calls 'revolution from above'.

9. According to Keyder, increases in cotton output, largely encouraged by favourable export prices, were relatively high in the first years of the Republic when the level of cotton production was already 18 % over the highest pre-war levels (1982:60). Until 1932, 40 % of all cotton was still being exported (Keyder 1982:62). This rate is comparable to export rates obtaining today but under circumstances which are very different: while a high rate of export at the beginning of the twenties shows the relative backwardness of domestic textile industries, by the early seventies, when the textile industry was already well-established, they indicate high levels of domestic production. Before the 1930s, the cotton manufacturing sector was made up of largely small-scale enterprises and textiles (including silk and woollens) constituted 18 % of total industrial value added. During the same period, 18.7 % of the total work force was employed in textile manufacturing, the second largest branch of industry (Tezel 1982:256). The few large-scale textile factories in operation had to import cotton yarn

since the short-fibered indigenous cotton could not be machine-spun. Yarn manufacturers in Adana who used local cotton provided yarn for the numerous hand looms in operation in this region. The output of the Adana hand looms amounted to half of all the cotton cloth in use in Turkey (Hines et. al., cited by Keyder 1982:82)

10. As I discussed in the previous section, the American strands have an open boll which exposes the lint to the environment. The lint can thus be easily damaged by wind and rain. To percent this, the cotton has to be harvested as soon as the plant matures. This leads to repeated harvests. In the early thirties, 40 to 60 days were spent harvesting in the Adana region (ZV 1935: 17,18,37). This is still the case today. Local strands, called yerli, have closed bolls which have to be opened after the harvest in order to pull out the lint. For this reason, these varieties are more hardy and can be harvested all at once when the whole standing crop has matured. The labour necessary to open the bolls could be found locally since time was no longer crucial after the harvest was completed.

11. At this period the wages amounted to 10 % of the sale price of cotton,a ratio which is still roughly similar today (see chapter 8). Moreover, it seems that domestic cotton process were on average 30 to 35 % higher than world prices for comparable cotton (ZV 1935: 38,131).

12. In the Aegean, farms seem to have been smaller (between 300 and 400 decares) and labour problems less acute (ZV 1935:150,157).

13. Rates of marketing for cotton in this period are conjectural. Most studies assume that the bulk of cotton would be soiled (Tezel 1982:331). This is obviously logical for large landholders who produce large amounts of cotton. It has been argued that these large producers were the dominant forms of producing cotton before the nineteen-sixties (Birtek 1985:436-7). However, smaller landholdings on which cotton might have been grown mainly for household use may or may not have existed. Since very little is also known about non-market organisation of spinning and weaving, it is difficult to estimate the importance of non-commodity cotton production until the 1950'ies when statistical censuses were improved.

14. It has been argued that the state was the crucial agency responsible for the general commoditisation of Turkish agriculture after 1950. Margulies (1985) specifies three areas where the impact of the state was most felt: inputs, credits, and marketing of produce. Although my data does not allow me to validate this contention which applies to wheat producers in particular, it does show that cotton production has benefited from all these three areas of state intervention (see chapter 8).

15. As shown in chapter 7, the land distributions that took place in Söke as well as in other regions (see Tarakli 1976) involved only state lands. Large estates were usually left intact. This was partly the result of a policy by which the owners of large estates sold part of their property to members of their own families. Records in the land registry office in Söke reveal such 'sales' by the leading landowners of the district during the early sixties. Apart from such immediate reactions, large farmers organised effective campaigns against land reform programmes from the moment they were conceived during the late 1930s. Political conditions

during the fifties, particularly the reaction against étatism, made these campaigns largely successful. Nevertheless, land distributions in Söke were instrumental in the establishment of small peasant farming.

16. The urban population of Turkey has been steadily increasing since 1950. At that time 75% of the total population lived in settlements of less than 5000 (the figure which is used in Turkish statistics to define a village). The same figure in 1975 (the last census for which figures are available) was down to 58%. Although these figures can serve as a rough guide, they do not necessarily indicate the number of people who derived their livelihood from agriculture, since a number of rural crafts were and still are well-developed. Carpet weaving and construction- on a seasonal or permanent basis- are the most important of these non-agricultural rural occupations. See Stirling (1965), Aydin (1980), and Ayata (1982) for examples of regions where such non-agricultural occupations form an important part of rural incomes.

17. I do not propose to analyse the political economy of development strategies or to go into the numerous debates these strategies have generated among academics, intellectuals, planners and politicians in Turkey. It is necessary to point out that the major part of aggregate information with regard to macro-economic developments has been published by state institutions which are concerned with the politics of the various policies rather than with 'abstract, academic' concerns. Furthermore, all the groups mentioned above have had direct influence on planning at various political conjunctures. See METU 1981 for some of the issues in these debates and the professions of the different contributors.

18. For example, some authors such as Kiray argue that the tractor was the single factor which caused the consolidation of large estates hitherto cultivated through sharecropping, since its extensive adoption by large scale landowners led to the expulsion of the landless sharecroppers. Increases in urban population through in-migration are often used to substantiate this claim. Tekeli (1975) opposes this rather simplistic view but nevertheless sees the process of urbanisation in Turkey as largely shaped by transformations in agriculture, particularly as a result of increasing commoditisation of the countryside. Margulies, on the other hand, argues that the 'push factor' in urban growth has been over-emphasised in Turkish debates since the majority of migrants to the cities during the fifties were peasant landowners rather than the landless (1985:160).

19. The number of tractors in Turkey has increased from 2000 in 1948, to 42,000 in 1960 and 490,000 in 1983 (Singer 1977:200; Kepenek 1983:322; DIE 1983b:236). The largest concentration of tractors is found where crops such as cotton and sugarbeet are grown. It is also in these areas that small farmers are able to own tractors. In these areas, forty one percent of farmers cultivating between one and twenty decares, and 77 % of farmers cultivating between 21 and 50 decares of land own tractors (Varlier 1978:142).

20. See Robinson (1952) and Hinderink & Kiray (1970) for accounts of the impact of tractors in the cotton producing Adana region. As has been indicated above, some of their arguments, particularly those with regard to

the creation of a landless proletariat as a result of the penetration of tractors, have to be taken with a pinch of salt.

21. Between 1971 and 1976, the area cropped to cotton on which artificial fertilisers were applied increased from 56 % of the total to 90 % (Merkez Bankasi n.d.:22). Fertiliser consumption (in kilogramme per hectare) increased from 3 to 243 (Singer 1977:230; Kepenek 1983:322. See also Berk 1980:255-6). 44% of total area cultivated in 1980 was fertilised, industrial crops (of which cotton is one of the most important) showing the highest incidence of fertilisation (Varlier 1978:139).

22. Of the 22 million decares irrigated in 1975, 13 million were irrigated with government funds. Among these state irrigation schemes just over half were large-scale, involving the construction of dams (Hale 1981:182).

23. In 1967, cotton was cultivated on one fourth of the total irrigated area. This represented 56 % of the total area cropped to cotton. By 1970, almost half (48.5 %) of all irrigated acerage was cropped to cotton (Margulies 1985:244). Four years later, 78 % of all cotton was irrigated (93 % in the Aegean, see Merkez Bankasi n.d.:4).

24. Until the 1960s, growth in agricultural output in Turkey was accounted for by the extension of area cultivated, a process which was largely due to the increasing numbers of tractors used (Hale 1981:178; Aresvik 1975:77,192; Singer 1977:202). It is only in the 1970s that increases in yields become the main variable explaining increases in output. Increases in cotton yields become more marked after the mid-seventies (table 5.1), coinciding with the implementation of these state policies.

25. For example a survey carried out in 1954 by the Political Science Faculty of the University of Ankara shows that 93 % of farmers purchasing tractors had borrowed funds to achieve this investment. 95 % of these funds were provided by the Agricultural Bank (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi 1954:119,121). Farmers borrowed between 50 and 20 percent of the total cost of a tractor (ibid:120). Regional variations in these figures indicate that the Adana and Aegean farmers borrowed less than farmers in the rest of Turkey. The higher levels of self-funding are usually seen as indications of larger landownership and greater commoditisation in these areas (ibid). See chapter 8 for a discussion of various sources for funding tractor purchases in Söke.

26. The majority of cotton producers receive operating (short-term) loans in cash and in kind from agricultural credit and sales cooperatives. Sales cooperatives, as I show in chapter 8, are an important source of seed and fertiliser as well as providing some cash. Credit cooperatives, to a lesser extent provide cash to purchase agricultural machinery. Both of these institutions are organised according to principles laid down by the state and are funded by the Agricultural Bank. Direct loans by this bank to farmers have been mainly extended to cereal growers (Margulies 1985:260,270).

27. See Tezel (1982:361-363) and Birtek and Keyder (1975) for the impact of price support policies on wheat production prior to 1950.

28. Assessing the effects of these price policies on agriculture and on the economy in general has generated heated debates among those concerned with Turkey's economic development, particularly at a time when a number of these support schemes are being gradually withdrawn. In general, it is argued that these policies were detrimental to all sectors of the population including peasant producers because they were the main reason for creating inflation (Ergüder 1980:171; Bulmus 1981). According to the same arguments, support policies moreover exacerbated inequalities between agricultural producers (Bulmus 1981; Ulusan 1980:146). Among macro-economic indicators, intersectoral terms of trade have been used to indicate the extent to which these policies have benefited agriculture. In spite of the fact that economists disagree about the calculation of terms of trade indeces, these studies argue that prices were in favour of agriculture during the 1970s. See Ulusan (1980) and Margulies (1985) for various aspects of this controversy.

29. This reduction in total cotton exports is attributed to the increase in domestic demand as well as to problems with the EEC, the main purchasers of Turkish cotton products (ibid).

30. Birtek (1985:436-7) maintains that sales cooperatives after the change in government in 1950, purchased cotton at prices higher than world levels and sold it to cotton manufacturers at lower pices. The state thus bore the cost of the expansion of agriculture-based industralisation.

31. Berk shows that the prices demanded by the farmers are higher than the government price because of different estimates of production costs. The State Planning Organisation (SPO) maintains that the prices officially set each year more than cover the costs of production. According to Berk, the difference between the two calculations stems from the fact that farmers include land rent as a cost of production while the SPO calculate rent as a return on investment rather than cost. It should be noted that the farmers who are able to make these demands are organised within the framework of the Chamber of Agriculture and are predominantly 'large' landowners who do not employ any family labour. The ways in which they calculate costs do not necessarily apply to those producers with which this thesis is concerned.

32. Government prices for seed cotton stabilised fluctuations in the market price which to a large extent reflect international price movements. In some years, the increase in the government declared floor price was far above changes in the market. Such divergences have been interpreted as indicating the influences of non-economic (that is political) factors in the setting of floor prices (Ergüder 1980; Hale 1981:188; Aresvik 1975:100-1). Many commentators agree that, until the mid-seventies, agricultural subsidies have not been effective in redistributing income between sectors of production, or between different classes of producers within the agricultural sector (Ulusan 1980:143-4). According to these writers, inflated prices may have even been one of the main factors accountiung for the high rates of inflation obtaining during the second half of the seventies (Ulusan 1980:134). See also Ergüder (1980:171-2) and Kepenek (1983:332-7).

33. Smaller producers can have access to only small credits and therefore have to rely on merchants. Delays in payments made by the cooperatives or pressing debts cause the producer in difficulties to sell to a merchant at the current market price. Larger producers, on the other hand, can stock their cotton and thereby take advantage of changing market conditions. They can sell to cooperatives when the price is right and therefore are in a better position to take advantage of state support. Under certain exceptional circumstances, villagers may also benefit from the normal increase in prices a few months after the harvest. In 1983, high market prices led most of the villagers to pay back their yearly debts on time. After the following year's harvest, a large proportion of villagers were able to withold cotton sales until January 1984, thus receiving more than 50 % over the floor price.

34. In 1984, a sales tax of 7 % was imposed.

35. According to the 1980 Agricultural Survey, 1 % of total landholdings producing cotton are large (that is larger than 500 decares). This proportion is slightly larger than average in Adana (1.5 %) and slightly smaller in the Aegean (0.7 %). Noticeable is a continuity in the relative predominance of larger holdings in Adana, a trend which was set at the beginning of the century.

36. Both are also largely but not entirely commoditised as I shall show in subsequent chapters.

37. Soviet-built harvesters better adapted to the row width prevalent in Turkey and which can havest the same field repeatedly using an aspiration method may, in the future, alter cotton production dramatically. For the time being, the high cost of the machines means that they are only used in limited numbers by state farms. Increasing labour scarcity and cost, may result in the use of these machines on a rental basis similar to the one now in operation for combine harvesters to harvest wheat. For the development of a rental market in agricultural machines, see Margulies (1985:137-8).

38. I should make clear that my data is not detailed enough to allow me to correlate each of the factors of production with output.

39. One farmer who decided to plant wheat in what turned out to be an election year, calculated that he made a loss of four million Turkish Liras.

40. Application of fertilisers is difficult and each application has to be fitted to the soil conditions found in one particular field. In many parts of Turkey, producers over-fertilise. According to one suggestion, the added nutrients benefit the crop that is planted after cotton so that productivity increases have to be calculated for the total production cycle (see Berk 1980:253). In Söke, where such crop rotation is not practiced, agricultural extension officers complained often that producers used fertilisers randomly and therefore increases in productivity remained low. Nevertheless, the impact of fertilisation on cotton production is very important: in many instances, yields have increased by more than 20% (Dunn 1952:62; Berk 1980:252,255).

41. The costs of irrigation on distant fields can be so high that some fields which can only be irrigated with the help of four pumps may not be cropped to cotton.

42. Until recently, all farmers in Tuz were able to undertake hoeing without depending on migrant labour. The extension of area cropped to cotton in Tuz over the last eight years explains the increasing use of migrant labour for hoeing as well as harvesting.

43. Correlation between paid labour employed and amount of land under cultivation gave an r^2 value of 0.85.

44. It is generally calculated that one tractor can plough 500 decares of cotton but no farm of that size could undertake operations with only one tractor: tractors are used for transportation as well. The large landowners whom I interviewed also maintained that they paid the insurance contributions of all their labourers, thus adding considerably to their labour costs. See chapter 9. I doubt very much that this is true in the case of migrant labourers, although it may be valid with respect to permanent employees. Evidence on this matter is very difficult to come by.

45. This labour does of course have costs other than money as shown by Chayanov. In chapter 4, I have argued that these costs cannot simply be measured in terms of 'drudgery' but have to be considered in the context of the totality of the relations that make up 'the household'.

46. Thus, a sub-soil ventilator, which cuts furrows of almost one metre in length, cannot be substituted for by any other more labour intensive operation. Most of the producers do not use this ventilator, and those who do, maintain that they improve yields substantially.

CHAPTER 6: ORGANISATION OF WORK

In this chapter, I shall consider the way labour is organised in the process of cotton production. In any system of production, labour demand is a function of the labour process and the organisation of work. Theories regarding the structure of petty commodity production have, to a large extent, ignored the problem of labour demand. This omission is largely a result of attempts to construct a universal theory of petty commodity production (G. Smith 1986). As I argued earlier, such attempts have led to a rejection of the category of peasantry and are informed by a reaction to the 'subjectivism' of Chayanovian approaches which conceive of the determinants of labour use as a function of the degree of drudgery producers are willing to accept (Ennew, Hirst and Tribe, 1977; Littlejohn, 1977). In order to stress the structural aspects of petty commodity production, the role of macro economic variables in determining the structure of production has been given priority at the expense of other variables, even at the level of the entreprise. Concepts such as 'simple reproduction squeeze' and 'disguised proletarian' have been formulated in order to show that it is commodity circuits rather than personal preferences, or indeed, any other variable at the level of the entreprise, which determine the magnitude and organisation of the labour input.

Implicit in these formulations is the assumption that the agents of production are owner/producers, that is, small producers who supply their own labour in order to produce commodities the sale of which will allow them to reproduce their conditions of existence. These approaches do not take into consideration the fact that many forms of petty commodity production require labour inputs of different magnitude and quality at different points of the productive process. In other words, often more people than simply the owner take part in the process of production. The conditions under which this 'other' labour is supplied varies greatly, and access to labour involves the deployment of market as well as non-market principles and networks. In many parts of the world, petty commodity producers need to regularly mobilise labour that is outside the boundaries of the household and/or the family (Smith 1984b; Friedmann 1980). Moreover, presently existing theories of petty commodity production cannot

conceptualise the conditions under which labour is supplied to the entreprise; they merely assume that such labour is unproblematically drawn from the household. As a result, the household becomes the privileged unit of labour supply, but a unit which has to remain beyond the theory, a black box.

The problem of the organisation and supply of labour in Söke farms shows that household and community structures have to be taken into account. Cotton production requires the cooperation of varying numbers of workers with varying qualifications. Therefore, the organisation of work in cotton production is a process that has to be carefully planned and executed and cannot be treated as a natural extension of the level of technology available to the producers. In Söke, where at harvest-time temporary shortages of labour are widespread, it is by adapting the organisation of work to the structure of the household and the community that small scale producers are able to survive. The careful management of the labour available to any given household, and the ability to substitute it for cash, are complex processes that pre-suppose the existence of a set of social relations. In order to understand the dynamics of the production system, it is therefore important to analyse the organisation of work and structure of labour demand that it generates at the level of the entreprise.

As I showed in chapter 5, the nature of cotton production dictates the performance of a number of specified tasks without which current varieties of cotton cannot be grown. However, the fact that many variations are possible means that many different types of entreprises can undertake cotton production, each with their specific form of organising the process of production. In any form of production, the technical features of the labour process are to a large extent dominated by the social context created by the dominant form of production. While in capitalist production, this context is determined by the separation of the workers from the means of production, petty commodity (or peasant) production is characterised by an absence of this separation. This distinction results in different combinations of labour and technology and different relations between the workers and the owners. The structuring of labour demand therefore depends on the type of entreprise under consideration.

In petty commodity production, the owner of the means of production is the head of a household from the ranks of which a considerable portion of the labour power is drawn. Thus, the conditions under which agricultural labour is performed are largely governed by relations that obtain between members of the household and the community. These relations which are not a product of the production process, have to be taken into account in order to understand the quantity and the nature of the work force required as well as the relations between the owner/manager and the rest of the labourers. In capitalist entreprises, on the other hand, the separation between capital and labour creates very different forms of control and supervision and thus structures the labour force differently: the existence of intermediary levels of control produces a different hierarchy of workers. The same factors also determine the structure of labour supply which I shall consider in chapter 9.

Both in capitalist and petty commodity production, the nature of the social division of labour, a key aspect of the organisation of work, cannot be reduced to economic necessities and has to be accounted for separately. This is particularly the case when we consider the division of labour based on age and gender. Social meanings, differentials in power, and particularly gender definitions, are attached to particular tasks, and therefore shape the kind of labour that is required for the different operations (Wallman 1979). Thus relations that individuals hold vis-a-vis each other within social structures such as the household and the community are transferred to the process of production. In other words, in petty commodity production, labour (and produce, as I argued in chapter 4) is allocated according to rights and obligations defined as much by status as contribution to and position within the labour process.' I shall therefore pay special attention to the social definitions of and implications for social identity of the different forms of labour required during the process of production. As I shall argue in subsequent chapters, through the various social mechanisms at their disposal, peasant producers are able to redefine the nature and meaning of wage labour; and it is this ability that largely explains their relative success in securing the necessary work force.

In this chapter, I shall argue that the major distinction between types of entreprises can be identified in terms of the relationship of the labour force (in particular of manual labour) to the total production process and therefore, to the final product. Social rights and obligations established between the labourers and the owners of the means of production are important in determining organisation of work, particularly in structuring forms of control and supervision. The social distance that exists between these two positions within the labour process has important consequences for the organisation and control of the labour process. It is to a discussion of these technological as well as social components of the organisation of labour in the different entreprises that I shall now turn.

6.1 Types of Entreprises

An initial attempt at categorising the production units encountered in the Söke plain is now necessary. As I shall show in this chapter, many of the aspects of the structure of production show important variations according to type of entreprise involved. However, the differences between units of production are not immediately apparent to the casual observer. As I have argued in the previous chapter, due to the nature of cotton production, the technology used by the different enterprises engaged in it is so similar that a distinction on this basis does not exist. It is only through a consideration of strategies of production that enables us to construct such a typology. These strategies of production can be examined through a consideration of contrasting forms of organising production and the ensuing differences in division of labour. Such considerations will also lead us to an analysis of the structure of labour demand generated by each type of enterprise and therefore help us in answering questions regarding the long-term viability of each type, in particular, of the peasant family farm.

Another variable that I shall consider in order to distinguish between types of enterprise is the degree of reliance on non-market exchanges and networks for access to means of production, labour in particular. On this basis, two polar types can be hypothesised: on the one hand, the family labour farm which derives all the inputs from within the household (or

through non-market exchanges within the community) and, on the other hand, the capitalist producer who obtains land, labour and credit mainly through commodity circuits. In terms of this dichotomy, labour will emerge as the problematic factor for 'capitalist' enterprises (under conditions of an imperfect national market for labour), while, for peasants, cash becomes the factor of production most difficult to obtain. None of the actual production units conform to what must be an ideal typology: in reality, all units obtain means of production through a combination in various proportions of market and non-market circuits. Below, I shall construct a typology of the actual units of production in the Söke plain on the basis of production strategies and the extent to which inputs are commoditised.

6.1.1 Village Based Family Farms

These units, which I call peasant farmers, petty commodity producers as well as family farmers, are owned and operated by individuals whose lives and by extension, agricultural practices, are inscribed within a network of social relations that create a village community. They operate within a largely capitalist economy that is characteristic of the Turkish social formation and therefore are subject to the laws of operation that dominate this economic system. They produce commodities, largely on the basis of family labour, on land which is their property, using commoditised inputs obtained through market as well as non-market relationships. As has been argued by Bernstein (1979) for peasants and by Friedmann (1980) for petty commodity producers, such cultivators are enmeshed not only in output markets, but also in factor markets. Subsistence production is undertaken at a very minimum level so that producers are also tied to the market for items of their own consumption, including wheat, the basis of the Turkish diet.

It is important to note that peasant farms are not a homogeneous category: they differ in terms of area under production, extent of dependence on wage labour (as opposed to family labour), access to credit and cash, magnitude of cash accumulated in instruments of production, and income derived (see chapter 10). The feature characteristic of these enterprises is the fact that the family/household members of the owner of

the land provide the core of the labour force. Depending on the task and on the particularities of the individual household concerned, all members of the household including the women, act, in varying degrees, as decision makers and organisers of labour as well as performing other supervisory roles required by the labour process. Such units need non-household labour for the manual processes of hoeing and harvesting according to household size and area under production. It is the profusion of mechanisms used to procure such labour which will show the extent to which community relations are a precondition for the existence of these production units.

As I have already argued, the amount of cash producers are able to control, determines extent of mechanisation, and ability to utilise modern inputs, factors which influence inputs of labour and output per decare of land. Consequently, many of these peasant farms are locked into capital markets. Farms with less than 25 or 30 decares under cultivation approach the 'pure' family farm type since they may manage with household labour only; but they are often unable to provide the socially necessary level of subsistence. The upper limit is the 350-400 decare mark after which a number of social as well as purely economic or technical factors make household based production impossible. As the level of cash necessary for the running of the enterprise increases, the farmer has to become involved in the social as well as the economic life of the town. Constant contact with merchants and bankers means that the farmer begins to spend more time cultivating those ties at the expense of those that tie him to the village. This results in the loss of those community ties which characterise a peasant enterprise, a process which finally leads to the migration of the whole family to town, the farmer's greater involvement in mercantile activities, and, through schooling, the separation of his children from agriculture (see chapter 10).

Most of the peasant farms are tied to the production of cotton as a monocrop. The amount of cash available to these farms does not enable them to undertake, on their own, land improvements which would allow double cropping or crop rotation. It is the income derived from the high price of cotton that allows the reproduction of these units. The cultivation of other crops, such as wheat or sunflowers, yields a lower level of net

income (disregarding labour costs) in terms of money per decare of land.[2] More importantly, the salty soils in the lower Meander plain does not allow the successful cultivation of any other crop apart from cotton. This land is not very productive, and the only way of increasing output is to invest more labour in the construction of irrigation canals, and in the hoeing and harvesting, as well as more supervision in monitoring the progress of the plant, the condition of the land, and the labour of the workers.

Although household labour characterises peasant households, the technology of the cotton harvest requires the mobilisation of labour that is beyond the boundaries of the household. The type of labour utilised in the manual stages of the production process is usually a function of the area under production. Smaller farms use household and village labour exclusively, while the larger units have to resort to migrant labour in the face of the shortage of seasonal labour that is characteristic of the area. Furthermore, the smaller the amount of land under production, the greater the likelihood of gaining access to forms of 'unpaid' labour. Access to unpaid labour requires the deployment of household labour so as to participate in as many of the exchange mechanisms available within the village as possible, and the activation of ties that derive from areas of life that are outside the production process: in other words, to participate fully in the community life that defines the village. Paid labour is not totally excluded from peasant production and many of the medium sized farmers employ migrant workers for at least a part of their harvests alongside labour recruited from the household and the village. To the extent that the larger farms operate on the basis of paid as opposed to unpaid labour, they resemble 'capitalist' farms. Consequently, the difference between the two types of production increasingly becomes located in the structures of management and the form of mechanised labour utilised.

The last area where distinctions can be drawn between types of enterprise is with regard to the strategies of production and the forms of calculation that guide production activities. Peasant farms aim to produce as much cotton per decare as possible. In this way, they hope to utilise 'unpaid' labour to its maximum limits. They rarely engage in capitalist

cost accounting, since a large portion of the labour input has no cash cost. Very few of these producers calculate costs of production, even excluding labour. They enter into production on the basis of aggregate costs calculated in terms of net revenue.

6.1.2 Capitalist Farming

The distinguishing feature of 'capitalist' farms is that none of the manual, mechanical and supervisory tasks are performed by members of the landowning household. On all capitalist farms, waged employees of varying status are employed for the execution of these tasks. Capitalist farms show great diversity with regard to their history, relations with village populations and involvement of the landowner within the labour process. The landowner may be an absentee, or may be living in the town of Söke where other business interests keep him occupied. Some of these large farms are located on land under the jurisdiction of a single village, with which the owners often have a history of complex relationships. Others are not attached to any particular community. Farms also differ in terms of their origin.[3] A number of large farms in Söke are the remnants of large estates dating from the Ottoman period. These large estates have diminished in size as a result of inheritance practices and land sales. For the families who hold title to these farms, agricultural activity has become a side occupation as many of them have invested in industrial or trading ventures. Other capitalist farms have been constituted as a result of the investment in land of merchant capital. This process, characteristic of the late fifties and early sixties, has now, slowed down considerably since agriculture, especially the cultivation of cotton, does not allow the realisation of profits possible in other sectors of the economy.

The majority of these farms are situated far away from any settlement. Their owners therefore have to construct sleeping areas for their permanent labourers, and separate farm buildings to store equipment and produce. Thus, it is possible to identify these farms just by looking at the physical lay-out of the plain: large stretches of fields with at most one wooden shack indicate the incidence of peasant farms, while a cluster of a few

concrete buildings, sometimes enclosed by a concrete wall, signal a 'capitalist' farm.

Land size and cropping patterns on these farms, although quite diverse in themselves, show marked differences from the peasant farm. The area under production in these farms ranges between 500-2000 decares. Cultivation of cotton is undertaken only on a portion of this land, the rest being devoted to wheat or to fodder plants such as sorghum and vetch, or cropped to sunflowers. A systematic rotation of these crops, followed in order to maintain the productivity of the soil, results in cotton being cultivated only in alternate years. This form of rotation is possible because most of these holdings are located in areas that are protected from the winter floods created by the Meander river. Land improvements, including the construction of flood walls and the proper draining of the fields, are systematically undertaken, since access to cash does not pose the same problems as it does for peasant farms.

Organisation of labour and the consequent structure of labour demand varies very little in capitalist farms. The basic characteristic of these farms is that absolutely no labour in whatever capacity is drawn from the family or household of the landowner. The latter acts as a coordinator of operations on a yearly basis and supplies the financial input necessary to undertake cultivation. The more specific planning and execution of activities is left to a manager-cum-overseer. The wage is the main structure through which both mechanised and manual labour is recruited. However, due to the fact that a uniform market in labour is not established in rural Turkey, the offer of wages is often not sufficient to recruit all the manual workers needed for the cotton harvest. Farms which are historically linked to a settled village are somewhat at an advantage in securing all categories of workers, but they too face a shortage of manual labour for the harvest. Given the situation, even capitalist farms have to deploy non-market mechanisms in order to obtain the necessary wage labour.

The basic advantage that these farms hold over peasant enterprises is their relative ease in getting access to cash. Profits accumulated in agriculture as well as in other economic activities constitute the main

source of this cash. Many of these landowners have invested in sectors such as tourism and transportation, as well as in industry, not only in Söke, but in many industrial areas of Turkey, including Izmir and Istanbul. In Söke alone, there are two large flour mills, a modern cotton spinning factory exporting cotton yarn, numerous cotton gins and olive presses which are owned by such farmers. Many landowners have moved into the professions and work as lawyers, doctors, and pharmacists. Furthermore, the owners of these farms have a better chance of obtaining credits from the state as well as the private sector since they have large tracts of land as well as other assets to show as collateral. The fact that they reside in town also helps them in forging social links with members of the bureaucracy and the mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie. Many of them are also involved in politics, both at the national and the local level.

In contrast to peasant farms, the strategy of production in capitalist farms is based on profit making. Costs of production on a per decare basis are calculated for each period of production. Labour has a monetary cost, since there is no 'unpaid' labour and therefore profit calculation is possible. It is as a result of such calculations that a number of these large farms have, in the past six years, switched away from cotton production and into areas of agricultural production which require much less manual labour.

Continuing to invest in agriculture in the face of a decrease in profits is nevertheless not uncommon among these farmers who explain this 'irrational' behaviour in terms of the pull of the land and other particularistic excuses. Often, those who give these excuses are the descendents of the large land-owning families of the region, who as a result of increasing commoditisation, have had to rationalise their holdings. These people are thus recent recruits into the class of capitalist farmers, with a background in operating farms of a rather different nature. It is to a consideration of these non-capitalist large farms that I shall now turn.

6.1.3 Non-Capitalist Large Farms

The last type of enterprise that can be encountered in the Söke plain is the extensive holding (çiftlik) which, in the period before 1950, made up almost 80% of the total arable land. This area used to be cultivated only on the basis of sharecropping arrangements with dependent landless peasants. Through a variety of mechanisms, of which state intervention is the most important, landless peasants have largely dissappeared (see chapter 2). Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult for the owners of these large holdings to keep land under production. Furthermore, the development of a market for land has enabled landholding families to sell land for a good price and invest their proceeds in more profitable sectors such as trade and industry. It is the presence and importance of one of the largest of these near Tuz village that makes a consideration of such holdings imperative.

The most important characteristic of such enterprises is that they control land that is too extensive to be farmed as a single enterprise. Unproductive land, lakes, and sometimes whole villages, lie within their boundaries. Consequently, the part that is directly cultivated by the landowner amounts to only a small portion of the holding. The rest either lies untilled, or is cultivated by villagers on the basis of various sharecropping and tenancy arrangements. Often half of the arable land is left fallow, for technological as well as economic reasons. The sheer size of the holding necessitates forms of management and calculation that differ from the two other types of enterprises discussed above. On the portion that is directly cultivated by the landlord, organisation of work, division of labour and structure of labour demand are comparable to forms exhibited by capitalist farms. Similarly, the part of the estate cultivated by peasants is organised according to principles applicable to family farms. It is the combination of these different labour processes that gives these holdings their distinctive character. Through relations of dependence established between the landlord and the peasants, the former obtain labour for their own enterprises and help the latter by sharing some of the monetary costs of production.

The existence of non-market exchanges between the owners of large holdings and villagers with little or no access to land provides the former with certain advantages in terms of access to labour. Links with villages make the landlord part of a village community and therefore situates him/her within a system of reciprocal rights and obligations that have a rationality other than that of commodity relations. Furthermore, most of these large landholders have, during the sixties, sold land parcels to villagers and helped them to acquire tractors and other agricultural implements. This aid has created permanent ties to the recipients. As a result, the landlords are able to obtain their permanent labour force (tractor driver, guard, cook etc.) as well as their managers through non-monetary obligations which bind certain families to them. The fact that landlords have multi-stranded relationships with their employees (who often may also be involved in sharecropping arrangements with their boss) means that there is an extra element of trust between the respective parties. Nevertheless, under present-day conditions, short-term labour demand for the hoeing and the harvesting of cotton often exceeds the labour which can be provided by villagers. The latter, it should be remembered, also are after all also in need of labour at the same time as the landlord. Thus, these landlords often have to resort to migrant labour in order to undertake the manual tasks of cotton production.[4] Today, they are restricting their own cultivation of cotton and encouraging peasants to cultivate cotton on a renting or sharecropping basis. Alternatively, the holding is being cut down in size through sales and inheritance and the owners are losing interest in agricultural production.

The basic strategy that is followed by large non-capitalist farming enterprises is therefore correspondingly different to the two types of farm. This strategy can be understood as an effort to maximise land under cultivation rather than return on invested capital, or the use of 'unpaid' labour. The best way to do this, is to rent land out to peasant producers, who on the basis of the labour power they control, cultivate cotton on smaller tracts of land. The landlord demands that the rent be paid in kind, an arrangement that suits cash-poor peasants as well as the landowner. Apart from providing a return on land that would otherwise remain unproductive, this allows the landlord to appropriate surplus labour

as well as rent. It is by setting a higher than normal rent, or what Friedmann has called "'precapitalist' rent" (1980:172) that the landlord is able to effect this appropriation. The land rented out to peasants in this fashion is often marginal land that requires a lot of labour in order to provide satisfactory yields. The only limiting factor faced by such a strategy is the willingness of peasants to submit to these conditions.

Sharecropping does not produce the same level of return per unit of land. Firstly, the landowner has to share the peasants' risks and bear the burden of any loss in yields. To minimise such risks, land of better quality, suitable for sunflower production, is more often handed over to sharecroppers. Secondly, the landholder has to share in the costs of production and therefore invest a certain amount of cash which of course has alternative uses. Two factors explain the persistence of this form of sharecropping. Firstly, in economic terms, it is often more profitable to invest a certain amount of money and to have access to cotton, than to let land lie idle. Landowners undertake direct production of cotton to the extent that is feasible, given the structure of labour demand. Where landowners are left with land that they cannot cultivate with the labour available to them, they are faced with two alternatives. They can either leave it untilled, or they can decide to take the risk of letting it to sharecroppers. The main reason why they are willing to take this risk is the nature of the market for cotton. The price of cotton often rises considerably during the months following the harvest and these landowners can take advantage of higher prices, since indebtedness does not force them to sell the product immediately after the harvest as is the case for peasants. This also explains why rents in kind are demanded of tenants. Thus, profits derived from cotton speculation makes cropping land to cotton under whatever arrangement a risk worth taking.

The second factor which explains the persistence of sharecropping, is the nature of the extra-economic relationships that obtain between the landlord and the sharecropper. Often, the former is obliged to provide sharecropping land as a function of historical ties, the rationality of which has to be sought in those community ties rather than in considerations of profit. Tan, the landholder near Tuz, enters into tenancy

relations only with members of villages other than Batnos where he, himself, lives. To those Batnos villagers with whom he has established long standing rights and duties, Tan is obliged to provide land on a sharecropping basis. A series of non-economic exchanges often lubricate the exchange that accompany the sharecropping contract. An ideology of mutual dependence, close to patron-client ties is part of this 'precapitalist' enterprise. Tan's wife, for example, is called 'mother' by the women of Batnos families that are close to Tan, and she often participates, however briefly, in important family occasions, such as births, deaths and marriages.

The agricultural units of the Söke plain thus show marked differences. For the moment, I have roughly designated them as small scale commodity producers, capitalist and pre-capitalist enterprises. The point to note is that within a largely capitalist context, where land and labour are largely commoditised, and where an extensive credit market subsidised by state policies operates relatively uniformly, more than one type of enterprise is able to operate. The differences in strategies of production are a reflection of the characteristics of each of these enterprises. Furthermore, an interesting symbiosis exists between peasant farms and pre-capitalist holdings.

Table 6.1 Typology of Enterprises on the Meander Plain

Type of Entreprise	Medium Peasant	Large Peasant	Capitalist Farms	Non-Cap. Farms
Size (da.)	50-150	150-500	200-3000	1000+
Crop	cotton	cotton	cotton, vetch sunflowers, wheat, sorghum	cotton, sunflowers, olives
Cropping system	monocrop single crop no fallow	monocrop single crop no fallow	crop rotation double crop no fallow	single crop, half of area left fallow
Permanent Labour	household labour	waged driver	waged manager, drivers, cook, guards	waged manager servants, drivers, cook, guards sharecroppers & tenants
Seasonal Labour	household, community	household, community, migrants	migrants, local landless labourers	migrants, sharecroppers dependents
Strategy of prod.	Maximising unpaid labour	Maximising unpaid labour	Maximising capital	Maximising land under production
Limiting Factor	Cash	Cash	Labour	Labour

6.2 Social and Technological Aspects of Labour Demand

There is a three-fold division of labour within the process of cotton production: manager (çiftçi/kâhya, tractor driver (sofor), and labourer (amale). This division corresponds to different degrees of skill, use of machinery, control, and access to the final product. In other words, implicit in this division of labour, is a hierarchy of status as well as labour. The structure of this labour hierarchy and the demand for skilled as well as for manual labour differ according to the type of enterprise involved. Each has a particular way of combining these functions, this giving rise to a distinct and separate division of labour. While village based farmers often merge into one the roles of driver, planter, mechanic, supervisor and manager, thus reducing the number of workers, town-based capitalist poducers employ different individuals to undertake these different tasks.[5] Peasant producers operating on a large scale often combine the role of manager and driver in the person of the latter. The manager-driver-supervisor of the peasant production unit is also the head of the household while in capitalist farms, he is often a trained employee who represents and is responsible to the owner of the farm, an individual whom the majority of the workers rarely see. Such differences in the social division of labour alters the nature of labour demand and authority relations within the labour process as well as the division of the final product.

Scale of operation, as well as type of enterprise, affects this division of labour. As the area under production increases, even village based producers may require additional drivers, especially during the initial stages of cotton cultivation. Magnitude of operations also affects the number of manual labourers needed to hoe and harvest as well as the structure of supervision for which additional labour has to be employed. The most important variable that affects the organisation of manual labour is the nature of the labour force: migrant labour requires a structured form of supervision and record keeping which can be dispensed with if village labour is employed. For the medium-sized family based farm, the main form of labour required is manual labour and one (sometimes two) coordinator(s) of activities. Notwithstanding the added labour needed for organising

migrant labour, large scale peasant producers are able to undertake production by simply hiring additional drivers on a seasonal or permanent basis. Town-based capitalist cotton production, on the other hand, requires a manager, a number of permanent workers (drivers, mechanics, cooks, guards) as well as seasonally employed manual workers and their supervisors.

As described in the previous chapter, the process of cotton production involves the use of both mechanised and non-mechanised labour. Tractors undertake most of the stages of production from the preparation of the soil to irrigation as well as the transportation of workers and produce. This extensive utilisation of the tractor has, on the one hand, led to a demand for skilled tractor drivers and mechanics who are able to operate the heavy equipment. On the other hand, the increase in yield resulting from mechanised and irrigated cultivation, has also increased the amount of manual labour required for the harvesting of the cotton plant, while reducing the demand for non-mechanised labour in other stages of the production process.[6] Time is the most important factor that structures the demand of both mechanised and non-mechanised labour in all enterprises. Timely inputs of labour particularly during the sowing, irrigation and harvest determine the quantity of output. The level of experience, expertise and knowledge of environmental conditions on the part of manual labourers as well as of tractor operators also affect yield considerably. Such skills are also a necessary component of farm management, which involves the planning and coordination of numerous agricultural activities as well as supervision. In addition, a farm manager has to negotiate with state bureaucrats, merchants, fellow-villagers and labourers.

6.2.1 Farm Management

The farm manager plans and organises the various processes of cotton production. His/her main task is to be able to meet the many requirements of the cotton plant, using the market and non-market mechanisms available to him/her. Seed has to be purchased and transported to the field, fertiliser has to be obtained, tractor drivers found and sufficient fuel made ready. This involves contacts with a series of individuals with whom

the farmer has diverse, often multi-stranded relationships. Thus, s/he has to buy seed from the village merchant, his/her neighbour, as well as from the state cooperative, Taris, where the official in charge may also be his/her close or remote kinsman/neighbour. S/he has to purchase fuel, often on credit and make sure s/he has access to all the various tractor-drawn implements necessary. These tasks require frequent visits to town and a wide network of contacts ranging from bank managers and state institutions to neighbours and friends. It is also through such constant contacts that managers learn about new implements, improved fertilisers and insecticides, explore their potential contribution to the process of production, and assess modes of adoption.

Above all, farm management means close contact with the process of production and the making of all production decisions. The manager has to be attuned to the particular needs of his/her field and provide for them without jeopardising the overall success of the enterprise. Thus, s/he has to make frequent trips to the field and observe the growth of the cotton plant in order to make correct assessments. For example, insecticides, a very expensive item, may or may not be applied, depending on the conditions of his/her field as well as the neighbouring fields. The process of irrigation has to be be under constant surveillance since, as I explained earlier, too much water can delay the harvest while too little water causes a drop in yield. Thus, experience of cotton cultivation, and knowledge of soil conditions are indispensable assets that managers must possess. Even the simplest variation in production practices, for example, a change in the frequency of ventilation, or in the amount of seed or the timing of sowing, may have grave consequences.

Apart from being responsible for all production decisions, managers also have to keep track of the financial aspect of production. Keeping the books, paying wages, recording the amount and price of the various inputs utilised, and settling debts are among the routine activities of farm managing. This requires at least a modicum of literacy, and the ability to deal with figures. However, many managers do without knowledge of sophisticated mathematics or economics, since, as I shall argue elsewhere, very few of them engage in detailed profitability calculations.

In the majority of village-based farms, the owner of the field (or the tenant) acts as manager. In cases of sharecropping, the functions of management are shared beteween the owner of the field and the sharecropper according to the particular relationship between the individuals involved. Often it is the tractor owner, rather than the landowner, who makes the major decisions and controls production. Landowners who live in town and who do not rely on family labour, usually hire as manager (kâhya) an experienced and trustworthy person and entrust him with the bulk of the operations. It is the manager who then hires the remaining labour force, assesses the needs of the farm, and supervises productive activities, while the owner effects the financial and bureaucratic arrangements. The owner's contribution to the running of the operations depends on his/her involvement in other economic activities, and also vary according to place of residence, gender, training, and inclination.

Farm management is in general a male job. The only female farmers that can be encountered both in town and in the villages are widows who still attract a lot of attention when they go about their business in town. It is thought that contact with officials, usually men, as well as the constant supervision required in the fields makes the job inappropriate for women. The job takes women out of the female sphere, into the town and the fields at any time of the day and the night: they have negotiate with officials, offer them drinks, and in the fields they have to be present during the sowing, ploughing and the irrigation, activities often undertaken at night when it is cooler. However, the main reason for the association of farming with men is that, far from being merely a job, farming is a gender-specific status, and one which is still highly ranked and respected. The influential and respected individuals of Söke are the descendants of the old large land-owning families and it is also these people who hold important economic and political positions. Farming involves the ownership of land, which, until recently, was the source of all wealth in the region; it confers on its owner the power to give orders to others. It is the latter aspect of the definition of the status that is most incompatible with prevalent notions of womanhood and a woman will rarely call herself çiftçi, farmer, even if this is what she actually does. Farming is in fact one of the most important components of male gender identification.

The status of farmer has lost a lot of its former importance in Söke itself as a result of the spread of commerce and industrial activities. Wealth as well as status are no longer seen as a function of landownership as they used to be; formerly, merchants and traders bought land not only as a profitable investment but also as a means of acquiring status within the town. To the extent that Söke is no longer a community of farmers, the term itself has lost some of its former significance and is now increasingly being applied to the overseer-cum-managers who are in charge of these large farms, the kâhya. The term kâhya denotes an employed person, unable to take independent action. It is this independence that is really defines the status of çiftçi. Thus, rather than being an ascribed status, training, experience and connections with landowners are now sufficient to secure the position of kâhya. Many of the retired state agricultural extension officers work as managers for large landowners. Villagers with little or no land can also find such jobs, employing their wives as cooks and children as tractor drivers.

By contrast, it is in the villages that the older meaning and status is still attached to the occupation of 'farmer'. As I argue in chapter 2, inhabitants of Söke villages now call themselves çiftçi, and the community itself is seen by its members as a community of farmers. This is very interesting in view of the fact that not long ago, these people saw themselves as peasants, köylü, implying a much lower status and a general inferiority to town dwellers (cf. Stirling 1965:283-4). To become a farmer, one needs to own land or to have enough savings to rent land or buy a tractor. To the extent that farming operations are successful, the individual will be defined as a farmer by himself and by his co-villagers. The status of farming, thus, becomes one of the axes along which competition between men in the village is waged. Therefore, the position of manager is not simply an aspect of the occupational differentiation that accompanies specialisation in a particular branch of production; in other words it is not a position created only by the social division of labour. One cannot hire a çiftçi; one is a çiftçi who may hire a driver.

6.2.2 Mechanised Labour

Today, the basic steps of cotton cultivation consist of mechanised processes which require the utilisation of a tractor to which a number of specialised implements are attached. Tractors are also the main means of transport, whether of implements, labourers, or produce. Furthermore, they provide the source of power for the pumps used to irrigate fields. The area that can be cultivated using one tractor only, can vary from 200 to 500 decares according to the lay-out and location of the fields. This means that one experienced tractor driver can undertake most of the process of cultivation, except for sowing and the application of fertilisers, tasks which require another person to operate the tractor-drawn seed drill. As the area under production increases, it is the tight schedule under which cotton producers operate which necessitates the use of additional tractors.

The task of tractor driver incorporates the performance of all these operations and therefore is a skilled job which requires training and experience. A driver has to work in close cooperation not only with the labourers, but also with the manager whom he represents to the rest of the work force. As I shall show below, drivers often act as supervisors of manual labour and almost never perform manual labour. They are often responsible for the maintenance of the tractor and the tractor-drawn equipment. The preparation of the field and the sowing is a tiring job, and it is the conditions of the field and the schedule that dictate the hours of work rather than any other arrangement. Depending on the area cultivated, the driver may have to work for two or three days and nights in order to complete the task on time. Between the planting and the irrigation, the pace of work slackens: drivers then transport hoers to the field, provide them with water, supervise the workers, ventilate the soil, and control the condition of the irrigation canals and drainage ditches. Work picks up as the crop grows, needing water, fertilisers and insecticides, which it is again the driver's job to provide. When the harvest begins, the driver's main occupation consists of the transportation and supervision of the workers. His job does not end with the harvest: he has to transport the produce to town and wait in long queues to deliver the crop to the state cooperative and plough the field for the last time. Unless there are other

agricultural activities, this period marks the end of work for the driver until the next season, four to five months later.

Thus, the main farming tasks are actually carried out by the driver under the constant supervision of the manager, who, in relation to the driver, represents (or is) the landowner. Thus, a relation which requires the greatest cooperation becomes also a relation of subordination; the driver has to ultimately submit to the authority of the manager. This relation creates considerable antagonism between the two, an antagonism which expresses itself differently in the different entreprises. In family farms, the manager-driver relation is subsumed within the father-son relation. Many of the smaller farmers who can do with the labour of one adult male (his own), nevertheless employ their son(s) within the labour process in the position of driver. This is more a function of the definition of household head/farmer, than a situation that arises from the nature of the labour process. As I argued above, to be a farmer is part of the identity of the household head; a driver (sofor), on the other hand, is someone who has not attained this position, but is in the process of doing so. The occupation of tractor driving is as much tied to a particular status position within the household and the community as that of farmer. Married men who have no means of organising production independently have to accept this lower status when they work as drivers for other people. Women, by definition, are excluded from mechanised labour.[7] If the status of çiftçi corresponds to 'mature, independent man', driver means 'dependent young man'. The former status precludes the performance of any form of labour, the latter, manual labour. In fact, many unmarried youths identify closely with their tractors which they care for, decorate, and even use for courting their fiancée. They begin to learn the skills of tractor driving from the moment they are incorporated into the labour force, usually at the age of twelve when they leave primary school.

In large peasant farms (or in households where adult males are not available) drivers from outside the household have to be recruited. The nature and duration of this form of employment varies according to scale: while on medium sized farms, tractor drivers are hired for a particular task only, large farms have to employ them on a permanent basis. If they

are not forced to rent or share their land out, landowners without access to the labour of young men engage in production by renting tractors along with their drivers; if they own tractors, they employ individuals for specific tasks only. On large peasant holdings, usually one hired driver who also acts as manager (kâhya) is employed on a permanent basis, the rest being hired whenever the farmer is pressed for time. While the owner attends to financial aspects, the manager/driver is responsible for the coordination of most farming operations, and therefore must be an experienced cotton planter. Supervision by the owner varies according to the qualifications of the driver, length of the contract, and the nature of the relationship between the particular individuals concerned.

On these farms, the relationship betweeen the owner and the driver is in fact less strained than that between father and son. There is much less reason for conflict: quarrels over inheritance or over the establishment of an independent household do not arise, and if the parties are not content with the relationship, they can always break their contract. Driving jobs, as well as drivers themselves, can be found in the area with relative ease. Therefore, to the extent that the owner-driver relationship is regulated by market forces rather than by kinship ties, the structure of authority inherent in it does not lead to serious conflicts. This does not, of course, mean that non-market considerations are absent from the relationship which, in some ways, can be compared to a form of patronage. This aspect is somewhat reflected in the terms of address used by the individuals concerned. The owner is called aga, a term of respect which means elder brother, as well as important or influential person (Benedict 1974:76-8; Meeker 1972:238; Stirling 1965:105,136,174).[e] The aga, who, according to Meeker, represents the ideal model of authority of Ottoman as opposed to Republican Turkey, ideally is a paternalistic benefactor who demands service in return for favours. Although the wage nexus dominates the relations between owner and driver, these implications are not totally absent in the Söke setting either.

In capitalist farms where the owner and the manager are two different people, the driver is directly under the authority of the latter. It is the manager rather than the driver who represents the owner: the driver has no

other position than that of a salaried employee. Therefore relations between manager and driver are strained: the driver has little direct contact with the landowner and often becomes the scapegoat for an incompetent manager. Often, more than one driver is employed, the number depending on the scale of the enterprise. There is a frequent turnover of drivers on these farms and the length of employment is, on average, two or three years. Drivers are employed on the basis of verbal contracts, with little or no guarantee of duration of employment. Tractor driving on capitalist farms is nonetheless seen as secure job, since drivers are among the few agricultural labourers who are formally registered as workers at the labour exchange, and can thus have their social security contributions paid by their employers. Drivers are only in charge of the execution of mechanised operations, for which they need to have the necessary skill, but they carry no decision-making responsibility. They do little or no manual work; some supervision of manual workers is required of them, as is the distribution of water to hoers. They form a part of the permanent farm staff, often eating and sleeping on the farm compound. Their families are usually left in their own villages where they may have land of their own and to which they return during slack periods.

6.3 Manual Labour on Peasant Farms

Despite increasing mechanisation, manual labour is still the most crucial factor determining the process of cotton production. The main task for which labour is needed is harvesting. As I have shown in the previous chapter, cotton is still manually harvested regardless of scale and type of entreprise not only in Söke, but in all areas of Turkey where cotton is planted. Manual labour is also required for other procceses in the production of cotton. In decreasing magnitude of amount of labour required, these are: hoeing, weeding, digging irrigation canals, contsructing earthen irrigation dams and transporting and setting up irrigation pipes. As I have indicated earlier, improved technology increases the amount of manual labour required for the harvest, while simultaneously reducing that needed for the other tasks mentioned.

Compared to the other processes of production, the organisation and supervision of manual tasks is more complicated since it requires the coordination of activities performed by a larger number of people. Workers have to be recruited and transported to the fields on tractor-drawn trailers, a journey which takes at least half an hour. Food is never given to the workers but water carried in tanks is regularly distributed. Depending on the nature of the task and the size of the fields, gangs of three to fifteen young men are employed for the construction of canals and dams. Work parties for the weeding, hoeing and harvesting are larger and require more detailed supervision and coordination. Harvesting is a manual process, the only implements needed being cloth aprons and sheets with which to collect and transport the picked cotton. Some workers, especially those who come from other regions as migrant workers, use straw baskets. These items are provided by the labourers themselves, as are the picks and shovels used in digging canals and the wooden handled metal hoes used for spacing and ventilation.

The organisation of the labour process for the various manual tasks mentioned shows certain variations to which I shall now turn. The task of constructing canals and dams for irrigation is strictly a male job. It demands considerable physical strength and the expenditure of energy for long periods of time under a blazing sun. Young men work under the supervision of one of the representatives of the landowner with a pick and shovel, shifting earth for about ten hours a day. The task does not usually take more than a couple of days to accomplish. Fewer people are needed to lay out the pipes to carry water from the canals and into the fields. Consequently, labour is often not hired specifically for this task, since one or two men will suffice: on non-peasant farms this is the job of the driver(s) and maybe one other permanent employee, while on peasant farms, it is carried out by the owner of the field and/or his sons and neighbours. Contrary to canal digging, this is an activity closely associated with the management of the entreprise, and therefore not perceived by the farmers as 'manual labour'. It is seen as involving skill and experience, since it is important to know when the field is satiated and when it needs more water.

The tasks of harvesting, hoeing and weeding make up the bulk of the manual labour required for the whole of the process of cotton cultivation. The sheer number of workers employed requires quite a different scale of organisation, control and supervision, a scale which nevertheless varies in proportion to the area cropped to cotton. It is in this process that the various advantages of the peasant farm over other types of entreprises most clearly emerge. For this reason, I shall describe these processes in detail starting from the organisation of manual labour on peasant farms, and indicating where appropriate the differences observed in the other types of entreprises.

The process of hoeing is more carefully organised and supervised than harvesting: in the former instance, workers are paid a daily wage, while in the latter remuneration is in terms of a piece rate. After having transported the labourers on tractor-drawn trailers, the owner of the field or his/her representative remain in the field for the whole day, in order to control the quality and the pace of the work and to distribute drinking water to the workers. The labourers are assigned cotton rows by the supervisor; about three or four hoers work side by side adjusting and regulating each other's speed. Co-workers as well as supervisors make sure that the spacing is adequate and that the roots are well-ventilated. Every individual worker is encouraged in different ways to keep up with the majority of the workers, and slackers are reprimanded as much by co-workers as by the supervisor.

The working day is long and marked by a series of breaks. Including the journey, the working day lasts from dawn to dusk, a period of ten to twelve hours in July and about six to eight hours in October and November when the harvest takes place. The five rest periods vary from fifteen minutes to an hour and a half. The longest break is taken at lunch time, when the sun is at the zenith and the heat too strong. The breaks are organised in the following way:

8:30 a.m. food break, thirty minutes
11:15 a.m. rest, fifteen minutes
1:00 p.m. lunch break, ninety minutes
3:15 p.m. rest, fifteen minutes

5:15 p.m. rest, fifteen minutes

At the signal of the supervisor, all workers stop and then resume work simultaneously. It seems that the working day in Adana is structured in approximately the same way as in Söke, except for the fact that workers receive food from the landowners, a practice which is absent in Söke (Soysal 1976:110; Seker 1986:119-120). With slight variations, the structuring of the breaks is the same in the two regions. According to Soysal, the Adana customs having been established in the 1830'ies, remain largely unchanged down to the present day. There is no other legislation in Turkey that regulates working hours, or even wage rates when it comes to seasonal agricultural work.[9] The regulation of the working day, which according to Soysal and Seker, also encompasses the wage rate and the timing and form of payment, had been originally been established by Ibrahim Pasa, son of Mohammed Ali of Egypt, who for a period of eight years, occupied the Çukurova region. Thus, informal mechanisms originating in the distant past and in forms of social organisation which have largely dissapeared, still regulate the conditions under which 'outside' labour is employed.

Contrary to the organisation of hoeing, the harvesting day is not divided into similar formal breaks. The workers often have to provide their own drinking water. The labourer is left to his/her own pace, with occasional control of the quality of work. It is the piece rate that fixes the pace of work: the fastest workers average about 120 kg. of cotton per day. The quicker the workers, the less time it takes to complete the harvest and ensure the highest possible yield. Too much haste, however, results in considerable waste. Skill and experience also improve the quality of the harvest considerably: the better workers know which boll is ready to be harvested and which is diseased. Moreover, a good harvester is able to pick all the cotton that is on one boll without dropping part of it on the ground where it gets soiled. A well picked cotton field is the colour of dried wood, whereas a badly picked one is littered with white dots. Supervisors also make sure that the cotton picked in the morning and still heavy with dew is well dried before it is taken to be weighed. The owner/supervisor works at harvesting himself until the first of the cotton is checked in. At this point, he begins packing the cotton delivered by the

harvesters into jute sacks, ready to be sold or stored, a job which usually extends well into the night.

As with hoeing, each labourer is assigned one or two rows, and workers pick the cotton in groups of four or five working at their respective rows. The work is hard and painful: workers are often bent over the plants and the dry carpals of the bolls scratch hands and fingers.[10] Each labourer has an apron into which the harvested lint is gathered. When the apron becomes too heavy, its contents is emptied into a large sheet which belongs to each individual worker. If groups of people, for example, members of one family cooperate, they often put their harvest on the same sheet, which when full, is taken to the weighing station where the owner/supervisor records the amount of cotton delivered by each worker or group of workers. These sheets, when full, take more than 100 kg. of cotton, which the worker herself is supposed to transport to the weighing point, causing loss of working time as well as damaging health.

6.3.1 Social Aspects of Manual Labour

To the extent that manual labour is equal to female labour, it has an ambiguous position within the labour process of peasant farms. On the one hand, manual tasks are said to be the most difficult and their critical contribution to the total production process is recognised. Consequently, the work of women is positively valued, with men praising them for their skill, speed and stamina. On the other hand, women's contribution to the labour process is also devalued by being classified as an extension of 'domestic labour'. Compared to the knowledge required to control a tractor, or the shrewdness needed to handle prospective creditors, it appears as 'unskilled' job. But this definition does not rest on purely technical factors. Men argue that women are by far better pickers than they themselves, because their fingers are small and can 'naturally' work fast. Men from the village, in fact, often pick much less cotton in a day compared to women, a fact which interestingly enough cannot be observed among migrant workers. Migrant men and women pick about the same quantity of cotton in one day, a quantity which amounts to thirty to fifty percent less than that picked by local workers. In other words, picking cotton

well is a product of long years of training as well as position within the labour process. As I shall argue below, local labourers do not even need close supervision, and work in the fields proceeds as part of the social relations that exist within the vilage. But the training necessary to make good cotton pickers becomes, as argued by Elson and Pearson, socially invisible, and skill is attributed to 'nimble fingers' (Elson and Pearson 1981:151). In contrast to the situation in harvesting, it is generally accepted that men are better hoers than women. This superiority is attributed to men's greater physical strength, which allows them to hoe faster and deeper than women. Consequently, hoeing teams are formed according to sex, men forming separate hoeing parties and receiving a higher wage.[11]

However, manual labour, particularly that of harvesting, is more than just an extension of domestic labour: it is in fact closely linked to the gender definitions of womanhood, and especially of the unmarried young girl. Although most of the members of landowning middle peasant households, including the male household head, spend at least some time harvesting and hoeing, this identification is so strong that many of the young men of the family deny having ever picked cotton. Contrary to work at home, work in the fields is performed publicly and as such it can be judged by others. The manner in which a girl works reveals to villagers quite important information about her personality. In fact, future mother-in-laws are often only interested in the working habits of a prospective bride. To be hard working (or lazy) and compliant to authority (or else refractory) are the two very important components of a girl's identity, and, until she as a married woman lives in her own household, not many other aspects of her identity are revealed or are indeed considered to be of any consequence. Being under public gaze also engenders considerable competition between girls of similar age and status; to finish the hoeing of three rows while your friends can only tackle two is an important element of prestige, as is of course picking the largest amount of cotton in a day.

Work in the fields, from the point of view of the young girls, can be seen as an occasion to exhibit their virtues. But it is also a time when

all women can escape the strict rules of conduct that they have to observe within the boundaries of the village. Considerable freedom of expression is allowed even to unmarried girls: they can laugh and shout in public, sing songs and choose friends with whom they can work side by side. Joking and taunting, which may have serious implications in terms of social relationships, is a permanent aspect of work in the fields. It is a time when women, particularly younger ones, are spared the authority of senior members of their own households, the most bothersome of which are brothers or sons. On the basis of shared secrets as well as shared work, they can form friendships which may last a lifetime (ahretlik). The close association of two young girls is usually viewed with suspicion, especially if one of them has an eligible brother. Elopements are in fact often arranged through the mediation of women, after negotiations that take place in the fields where one can talk without being disturbed or overheard. Working in groups of age-mates is also common among older married women, so that in the fields, it is people of similar age and status that cooperate. Rather than reflecting group relations organised in terms of kinship, in the fields, it is individual relations on the basis of equality that flourish and, when transferred to the social space of the village, may often become relations of mutual help and solidarity.

The identity of of Söke girls as cotton pickers is one which is widely recognised. In a similar way that in another region, girls may be known for excellence in weaving or dancing, the girls in Söke villages are associated with cotton picking throughout in the whole Aegean region. They define themselves and are seen by others as being 'cotton girls' (pamukçu kizlar). There is in fact a statue in Aydin, the capital of the province, depicting girls picking cotton with their characteristic aprons tied to their waists. The statue is next to that of Yürük Ali, the legendary hero of the province who, being a sort of Robin Hood figure, proved his loyalty to the new Turkish state by fighting against the Greeks in 1922. The edifice, whose counterparts can be found in most of Turkey's provincial capitals, reflects the identity of the region, by explaining to the visitor something about the character and history of the province, of the Aydinli identity. The girls are aware of this identity and proud of their reputation.

The attitude of the women themselves to work in the fields is contradictory. On the one hand, they enjoy the atmosphere of freedom as well as the knowledge that this work gives them of the production process.[12] Participation in the work process also helps in the power struggles within the household, since women are not only labourers, but are also providers of other labour: manual labour is recruited on the basis of women-centered networks. Women are proud of their expertise, a fact which they often stress when comparing themselves to migrant labourers. This pride is also reflected in their comportment in the fields: girls have a particular way of tieing their scarves that identifies them as local cotton pickers, and a particular way of relaxing on the handle of their hoes during breaks. Moreover, all unmarried girls make a point of crocheting during rest periods, thus showing their confidence in themselves, and their ability to do two things at once. Crocheting also emphasises the gender definition of the hoer. These almost ritualistic forms of behaviour are exhibited on a much smaller scale by married women.[13]

On the other hand, the work is hard and all the domestic tasks at home still have to be done after a ten hour working day. Many of the unmarried girls resent having to work in the fields for most of the summer. When field work is undertaken for the young girl's household, the opportunity of working with different people decreases and the pleasure of working away from parental authority is foregone. Working for one's own household also reduces the opportunity of earning or controlling money. In this sense, agricultural work on household fields appears to the worker to be an extension of domestic labour and a duty attached to a particular position within the household. Furthermore, work outside the home denotes low status, and agricultural labour is widely associated with being a peasant (köylü). It can immediately be noticed from the colour of one's face and hands. Most of the girls wish to marry out of the village and out of cotton picking so that they can be housewives (ev kadini).

6.3.2 Forms of Supervision and Labour Control

In the absence of established legislative or economic sanctions, the structure of supervision that can be observed is largely dependent on social relations between the labourers as well as the immediate relations of authority and control that emerge within the process of production. Members of the household and the village are obviously tied to one another through multiple links, while often only economic relations that last for the duration of one harvesting season are established with migrant labourers. Thus, the relation of supervision in peasant farms employing village labour is mediated by relations that constitute the village as a community. This relation is binding on both sides: the landowner/supervisor cannot demand too much from his/her workers, who, in turn have to perform according to village norms that define 'good' work. In other words, on both sides, judgements have to made 'in the round', that is, by taking into account the total personality of the person being judged, rather than judge the worker 'instrumentally', that is, only in terms of the work performed (Bailey 1971:7). The landowner thus cannot increase the pace or extend the hours of work without the prior consent of his/her workers. This consent, however, can be obtained with relative ease. Thus, if the hoeing of a field needs an extra hour for completion, the workers are often willing to stay without asking for extra pay. Conversely, the farmer whose plot is hoed before the end of the working day, pays for the whole day. Since the workers are often themselves members of cotton producing households, they will have to behave in the same manner when it is their own field being hoed. A team of especially hard-working labourers, are, moreover treated to various beverages as a way of expressing thanks. The group that is seen receiving such 'treats' is noted in the village and is often specifically preferred by prospective employerss.

On peasant farms, the function of supervision is widely distributed among the workers according to the degree of closeness to the owner of the land. This is as much the consequence of the nature of gender relationships that obtain within the village, as of the rights and duties that govern inter-household relations. Where the owner is a man, his wife and daughter(s) who are part of the labour force, often encourage and/or

reprimand others, and by working harder, try to set the pace of work. Other female relations, such as the owner's sisters, brothers' wives and children, as well as neighbours' daughters may also assume this role, depending on circumstances and the nature of the relationship between their respective households. According to the intensity of cooperation that exists between different households, these women act as if the final product were theirs. Hard work and this assumption of responsibilty is also a means of establishing alliances between women, as well as being a way of declaring publicly to others the existence of such an alliance.[14] By virtue of the fact that the women in supervisory positions are themselves participating in the work process, they are physically closer to the other labourers and can keep track of their performance more easily. Furthermore, they can also be more outspoken in their criticisms of other female workers. Men, according to rules of decorum, cannot be seen to watch unrelated women too closely and, by virtue of gender relations prevalent in the village, cannot assume authority over women who are not members of their own household: this behaviour would indicate a closeness that cannot exist between them. Thus, in his relations with women workers, the owner of a field has to operate through the agency of his wife and daughters who, as a result, share the functions of management.

Sanctions to work well emanate from other directions as well. Work patterns and interaction with fellow labourers form part of the social relations that obtain within the community. Concern for a good reputation and the competitive atmosphere that exists between young girls of marriageable age, produce a labour force that requires relatively little supervision: self-regulation of working practices is the norm. Thus, the assessment of other workers, whether these latter assume the responsibility of supervision or not, also regulates the quality and pace of work of the individual labourer. The groups of four or five workers who hoe or harvest together often help one another to keep up by working on each other's row. People will avoid working together with anyone who falls behind consistently. In this way, the slow are forced to work harder on pain of being ostracized: no one likes working alone without anyone to talk to. The way work is performed in cotton fields is an important component of the total social identity of the individual. Opinions formed in the fields

about individual workers circulate widely within the village and become a permanent feature of the person's identity.

The fact that many of the labourers come from households which are also cultivating cotton, is another factor that reduces the amount of supervision required. There are two ways in which this factor operates. Firstly, being owners of the same means of production themselves, these labourers know the whole process of cotton production and are aware of the importance of the work in a way that a migrant labourer cannot be. They can assess the damage caused by incompetent hoer, or by sloppy pickers; they know how delicate the cotton plant is, and they appreciate the effort, the money and the hope that each field is invested with. Secondly, as a result of the importance in peasant farming of labour exchange mechanisms, hard work on other people's fields ensures an equivalent return. Thus working with co-villagers and fellow cotton planters produces structures of authority and supervision which differ considerably from those obtaining in the other entreprises of Söke.

6.4 Migrant Labour: Comparisons

It is the use of migrant labourers that largely accounts for the divergences observed in the organisation of work on large farms. These divergences become most pronounced on capitalist farms, whose forms of labour organisation I shall now describe. Forms of organisation on farms using migrant labour are affected by the social distance that separates the manual labourer from the owner of the means of production. Many factors such as residence in different communities, ethnic identity, geographical separation, and the absence or presence of intermediaries in recruitment create this distance. Thus, when labourers from Eastern Turkey are recruited through the mediation of a middleman, the distance between owner and labourer is at its greatest. In the section above, I have argued that gender definitions as well as rights and obligations that originate in intra- and inter-household relationships, help to structure and control a labour force consisting mainly of fellow villagers. Consequently formally recognised intermediary positions of supervision are not necessary to structure the labour force. By contrast, with the use of migrant labour,

intermediary positions of organisation and supervision become indispensable due to the lack of mechanisms that ensure auto-control.

The most important aspect of the migrant labour force is that it is recruited and organised by a middleman (dayibasi) rather than by an agent of the owner of the means of production. The middleman is in an intermediary position between capital and labour. In his relationship with the landowner, he represents the labourers, and, vis-a-vis the labourers, he is more an agent of the former. The large numbers of workers needed to hoe and harvest farms over one hundred decares necessitate the division of the work force into smaller teams (posta) of ten to fifteen labourers who are under the supervision of an agent of the middleman. This man, called postabasi (team leader), assigns cotton rows to each labourer and controls the pace and the quality of the work. The postabasi who is directly responsible to the middleman, his employer, performs little manual labour, but distributes water to the labourers during the hoeing. At harvest time he walks around making sure that waste is kept at the minimum level possible. Workers carry their harvest to the weighing point at the end of the day, where the postabasi, and sometimes a weigher (tartici) assesses and records the amount of cotton delivered. Special labourers are also hired to pack the harvested cotton into jute bags. These labourers, the balyaci (packers), like the postabasi, are also employed by the middleman rather than the landowner. The latter's only represenative is the tractor driver, who transports the workers to the fields and stands by the weighing station to make sure the records are in order. In this way, a number of specialised jobs are created within the labour process, considerably increasing costs of production as well as distance between the labourers and the owner.

The work performed by migrant labour is of a lesser quality than that performed by local labourers: they are more sloppy hoers and harvesters, and in terms of yields, they can reduce the productivity of land by one fifth compared to what it would be if local labour were used. One migrant labourer can pick at most 75 kg. of cotton per day, while the locals average 120 kg.. Many of the factors that account for the high standard of work among local labourers are absent in the case of migrant workers. As I

have already argued, relation to the labour process is the most important factor that explains this discrepancy. Migrant workers are only involved as 'unskilled' manual labourers in a process of production which they have no other interest in or knowledge about. Therefore, they occupy the lowest status within the whole production process.

For many of the migrant workers who come to Söke, cotton hoeing and harvesting is devoid of the social content I described above. Many of them describe themselves as peasants rather than agricultural labourers. This characterisation is based on the fact that they also own means of agricultural production in their own villages, although on a scale which does not allow reproduction of the household without the added income wages provide.[15] Having other means of livelihood which they define as their primary source of income (whether fictitiously or not), means that their personal identity is not intertwined with work in the cotton fields.[16] If anything, the constant pressure, reprimands and criticisms that are levelled at the workers by their supervisors serves to eliminate the hierarchy of age and gender that exists within the group of migrant workers, a factor which causes a loss of identity. Although the majority of migrant workers are also women, migrant labour is not thought of as being women's work as work in the cotton fields is regarded in the case of local labourers. There is an absence of gender specification in the attitudes of the migrant labourers with regard to the tasks of cotton picking or hoeing. Pride in their own work is markedly absent, as is the competition that characterises manual labour among locals.

Rather than being seen as an extension of social life, for these labourers the time spent in the cotton fields is a time of exile, (gurbet) when normal social interaction is suspended. Living conditions and the rhythm of daily life is altered to such an extent that this feeling of a separate existence is quite justified. Often labourers are housed in tents or in large garages or storehouses, where overcrowding does not allow the privacy that people are used to. They have to eat and sleep in large groups under conditions which are far from healthy: they sleep on the damp earth, and have to drink stale and scarce water. It is ironic that their capacity to endure these conditions which are themselves a product of the

organisation of work in Söke, is in turn used by local townspeople to prove the migrant labourers' inferiority as human beings: they can live in such conditions because they are naturally dirty, promiscuous and untrustworthy. Migrant labourers are isolated from any other social group in the region both physically and often in terms of ethnic identity as well, since many of the labourers are Kurds from the East or gypsies çingene from the South.

This feeling of social isolation and marginality is somewhat alleviated when migrant labourers are hired to work on peasant farms. Rather than work for townspeople who are their social superiors in every aspect (wealth, way of life, education, etc.), working for peasant producers means working for people with whom one has many beliefs and values in common, and with whom one shares the experience of living in a village. On peasant farms, migrants are housed within the village of the landowner rather than close to the fields and are often invited to participate in the social events that go on in the village. In this way, they are re-integrated into a community, even though this is not their own village; after all, births, deaths, marriages and religious holidays are celebrated in comaparable or at least understandable ways in many villages all over Turkey. Establishing such ties with the owners of the means of production and the members of his/her community goes a long way to improve the work standards in the fields. Cotton is picked and hoed at a quicker pace, and more care is taken to accomplish the job well. In other words, the quality of the work approximates that of local labourers.

Apart from the impersonal pressure exerted by the middleman and the supervisors, structures of authority that correspond to community and household statuses are also operative in controlling work among migrants. But the ways this control functions are different from the forms of control that household and community ties produce among local labourers. Contrary to the pattern of work among the locals, the organisation of work teams (posta) follows closely along lines ~~the~~ of family and kinship. These teams are composed of people who either live within the same household, or people who are related through a close kinship tie. They not only work together, but they also share food and sleeping quarters. Members of the same household often pool the product of their labour so that they receive a

collective wage at the end of the season. These groups are headed by an adult male who is responsible to the supervisors for the whole group. He is also responsible for the workers vis-a-vis the head of their household if the latter is not present.[17]

Within these work teams, cooperation is accompanied by considerable coercion. The existence of such groups means that the individual labourer does not have to face the supervisor too frequently, whose harsh words to a slow worker may either be cushioned or avoided altogether by different members of the group covering up for mistakes or for lost time. But at the same time, these groups are organised along the same patterns of hierarchy and authority that structure normal social existence. Members of the household still work under the authority of the father (or his representative) who disciplines the members of his family, so that the freedom from parental authority that village labourers experience during agricultural labour is absent. The postabasi, who in terms of kinship relationships, may often be a 'stranger', is forced to use the mediation of the household head in dealing with individual workers. In other words, the structures that control the migrant labour force emanate from two distinct spheres: the 'private' sphere that comprises household/family relations, and the 'public' forms of authority that accompany the structure of the labour market. The combination of these forms of supervision does not, as I have tried to explain, produce as efficient and well-disciplined a labour force as do the social factors operative in the case of local labourers.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to show that most of the farms on the Söke plain use comparable forms of organising productive activities, a fact that results from the comparable level of technology used. The greatest difference between the farms emerges at the point where manual labourers must be employed. The utilisation of migrant labour for hoeing and harvesting considerably alters the structures of labour organisation and supervision. On the other hand, the use of local, especially village labour, reduces the need for supervision, thus helping to lower costs, and at the same time, improves the productivity of the soil by reducing waste. A

difference in the status of the two types of manual labour accompanies these distinctions. On peasant farms, manual labour is associated with women and its value, being closely tied to the gender identity of women is, at most, ambiguous. In the case of manual migrant labour, however, the ambiguity dissapears and the work is devalued in economic as well as in social terms.

The organisation of work on peasant farms collapses some of the forms of labour required in town-based capitalist production. The owner/manager/supervisor is one and the same person. The division of labour on peasant farms corresponds to structures of authority within the families which own these farms. The manager/supervisor corresponds to the role of father/head of household. The position of driver is filled by the unmarried son(s), while the manual labourers are found among the women and children of the household.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. The opposite, that is the transfer of status positions acquired in the process of production to other areas of life, has been already described and elaborated upon see the literature pertaining to the effect of commoditisation on the position of women in society (Wellesley editorial Comittee 1977).

2. I have made this statement on the basis if an interview with the local agricultural extension officer and I do not possess data to prove it.

3. See Akçay 1985 for a description of the history of different large farms in the south and east of Turkey.

4. Before the extension of cotton production to peasants, a process which dates to the early seventies, these landlords were able to undertake cotton production with locally available labour. Tan, the large landholder near Tuz, did not until 1975 need migrant labour to harvest his cotton: the labour power necessary was available to him within the village of Batnos. Until 1971, Tan was the sole owner of all the arable area surrounding Batnos whose inhabitants were totally dependent on him for access to land.

5. In households where the head is a woman, it is her adult son who usually performs all these tasks.

6. These activities include hoeing, ridge-making, canal construction, land levelling and so on; hoeing is interesting in that new machinery has further reduced the numbers required even in the last two years.

7. There was no case in the village of a woman cultivating her own fields. Once however, two sisters whose brother was away on military service started to drive their father's tractor in the village, transporting produce from the fields home, but were unable to continue in view of the very strong criticism voiced especially by other women: their parents had in fact been the main target of the criticism.

8. The term is applied to a wide set of relationships, ranging from the large landlords of the East who control not only the land but also the inhabitants of large numbers of villagers, to leaders found along the Black Sea Coast, to settlers of disputes in southern Turkey or simply to traders as in the western Black Sea coast (Meeker, ibid).

9. Since 1973, a minimum wage is declared and, at least in Söke, is more or less adhered to (see chapter 9).

10. Girls wear gloves that leave their fingers bare with the aim of protecting their hands from the sun rather than the carpals: white hands are a sign if status, since they indicate absence of field work.

11. This practice is also observed in in the Çukurova region (Seker 1986:121).

12. In fact many widows are able to continue cultivating on the basis of their experience and expertise as manual labourers.

13. Yalcin reports similar behaviour among women in Hakkâri, who negotiate sharp slopes carrying milk in pouches on their backs and knitting socks all at the same time (personal communication).

14. Many women feel the same responsibility towards people who are not their social equals, and particularly disadvantaged households enjoy this attention from a wide range of women. For example, Cavit, who had been orphaned at an early age, and who,by virtue of his diligence and good behaviour, had earned the compassion of many of the village women, is a case in point. Women hoeing or harvesting the twenty-five decares that he had rented would constantly urge each other to work harder and better. Young girls who worked more slowly were reprimanded much more severely than was normal; in this case, hard work was almost a religious duty, an act which would earn divine recognition, (sevap). Conversely, failure to do one's best was concieved as ayip, shameful.

15. See Aydin (1980) and Bazoglu (1984) for a description of some of the conditions of existence and reproduction of peasants who work as seasonal labourers on cotton farms in Adana and Hatay.

16. In fact, I would imagine that even in cases where income derived from seasonal labour outstrips that derived from their own agricultural activities, it is this identification as peasants which prevents them from recognising their dependence on wages.

17. Many young people come to work in Söke attached to a group with whom they have close kin ties: a married sister may come with her brother, or with her husband's brother, or an unmarried young woman may attach herself to her married brother's household. Women workers are never found alone and, although socially more acceptable, it is also rare to find men who work on their own.

CHAPTER 7: CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO LAND

Land, one of the three most important factors of agricultural production, is increasingly losing its dominant position in the process of cotton cultivation to accumulated cash. Nevertheless, access to land, whether in the form of landownership or not, still constitutes the basis of independent household formation. For this reason everyone in the village strives to achieve access to land. As I shall show below, the major change that has accompanied increased commoditisation is the greater availability of land for sale or rent. The penetration of cash has produced a number of different renting and sharecropping arrangements which facilitate access to land. Frequent changes in farmed plots have produced greater interaction between cultivators both within and between villages, broadening the scope of social networks peasants are involved in. Cash has also intervened in disputes regarding inheritance, making possible certain solutions such as the division of proceeds from the sale of assets. At the same time, the availability of cash has also raised new problems.

The majority of households in Tuz have direct access to land in the form of private ownership. The distribution of land among Tuz households is uneven, pointing to the inadequacy of models which conceive of peasants as relatively homogeneous social strata (Tables 7.2 and 7.9). Land is acquired through inheritance, purchase, government distributions and usufruct (zilyedlik). Land ownership is individualised and recognised legally through the acquisition of a title deed which is registered in the Town Hall. Land can also be owned in shares, for example when, after the division of a small estate, or one which includes land of different qualities, it is not practical for individuals to own separate plots. Ownership established on the basis of deeds drawn up by a notary public is recognised in courts; such deeds, however, cannot be registered officially. Lastly, ownership can be established in courts by proving usufruct rights. For this the testimony of knowledgeable villagers who can testify to continuous cultivation for a period of twenty years is needed. The incidence of this form of access to land is insignificant with regard to cotton land

but quite important in the case of olive groves situated in the mountains. All unused and unclaimed land belongs by law to the state. Some land is legally owned and administered by the village as a corporate body. The village also owns pasture land which it can rent out, but contrary to arable land, such pastures cannot be sold to individuals.

The majority of land transactions, however, are not carried out officially, and the records in the Town Hall are far from reflecting the actual patterns of ownership. Many individuals have socially recognised access to land which they farm without having a legal title to it and many others hold titles to land which they do not and cannot farm. Land distributed by the government which is not supposed to be sold, is often 'transferred' from one individual to another on the basis of deeds drawn by a notary public. In cases where land is disputed by legal heirs, sales also take place through such informal channels. Often sales or divisions of land after inheritance settlements are undertaken in the presence of two witnesses from the village only. The difficulties and cost of travelling to town repeatedly and of obtaining official papers often lead individuals to rely on the force of 'common knowledge' to sustain claims to land. The fact that, until 1984, no cadastral survey of the Söke plain had been undertaken, added to the problems of obtaining legal titles as well as obviating the necessity to do so.

In Tuz both women and men hold individual titles to land. The concept of private property is quite an established principle, but it does not necessarily lead to the individualisation of property. The household as a social and economic force intervenes in the relation between an individual and his/her property. Individual ownership of land contradicts the oft-stated principle that all resources are jointly exploited by the household as a whole. Current views concerning the unity of the household serve to increase the tensions between individual property and the indivisibility of the joint household fund. Furthermore, gender ideologies also affect patterns of landownership. Thus, while privately owned land in Tuz can be acquired by inheritance, government distribution or sale, women obtain land mainly as a result of

inheritance. For men, on the other hand, government distributions and purchases are the main channels of access to a land title.

Table 7.1: Land Ownership According to Form of Acquisition Among Married Men and Women in Tuz

	Government	Inheritance	Purchase	Landless
Men	81	67	61	57
Area (Da.)	2913	1086	2107	-
Women	7	79	11	117
Area (Da)	60	1297	82	--

Note: Any one individual man or woman may own land from more than one source.

In this chapter I shall discuss these various forms of access to land in order to show the extent to which commoditised and non-commoditised forms of access to land are intertwined. I shall also argue that access to land through these various channels allows a large number of farmers with different assets to engage in cotton production. After analysing conditions of ownership, I shall discuss the way sharecropping and renting operates to widen access to land.

7.1 Individual and Joint Access to Land

Although occupations other than farming are by now available in the Söke region, land still constitutes the basis of independent household formation in Tuz in social as well as material terms. Every man aims to contract a marriage and establish a new social unit, the members of which will be his 'dependents', that is, individuals who will ultimately have to recognise and submit to his authority. One of the most important prerequisites of the formation of such a unit is the immediate or future availability of an income generating asset such as land. Through sharecropping and renting mechanisms, the ownership of land guarantees income even when there is no labour or capital available. Moreover, despite important differences stemming from disparities in size of landholding, ownership provides an equality of status. Each land owning head of a household describes himself as a

farmer and considers himself the social equal of all the men of similar description. Those household heads whose main income derives from other sources, are not seen as belonging to the same league as it were, and cannot therefore take part in the same ranking system.

Although ownership is individualised, that is only one person holds the legal title and can theoretically dispose of land independently of any other person, it is in practice the members of the immediate nuclear family and/or members of the household that have joint rights over it. Action without the consensus of this group leads to serious disjunction in the normal flow of social relations and everyday activities.[1] It is more usual for men who are heads of households to hold titles to land. Within any one household, the (often male) household head will try to have monopoly on land titles as an all important adjunct to his authority. However, it is also quite common that other members, particularly the wife, mother or sister of the household head, own land of their own. The land owned by the individuals within a household is farmed jointly under the management of the head of the household. The act of living within a particular household means that its owner has to offer the usufruct of personal property to the household as a unit; assets owned by the members of the household become part of the household fund in return for a right to subsistence.[2]

In spite of the fact that land is seen as the prerequisite for independence, there is no relation of identification between a particular plot of land and one household, family or larger kin group. The relatively short history of settlement in the region precludes the formation of strong links with the land.[3] Integration with the national commodity economy has also made for a faster turnover of plots in the hands of any one producer, weakening any association of land to a social grouping. Lastly, inheritance practices lead to the fragmentation of estates and to considerable exchanges of particular plots in order to divide the patrimony equitably. Thus, although land is an important factor for the constructon of the household, it does not necessarily define it or symbolise it.[4]

The head of a newly created household has to create for himself the conditions of land ownership. Although inheritance is important, it can only provide the basis for further enlargement of the cultivated area, except for a few cases where the inheritance is large and not divided among many children. Thus access to land (or landlessness) is not determined by inheritance alone, but is perceived to be the result of a longer process shaped by individual action. If by the time a third child is born, or by the tenth marriage anniversary, the household head is still not farming, he will not become a full-fledged member of the community of farmers that makes up the village.

Access to land in the form of ownership is the only form allowing total independence, since no other individual, apart from 'dependents' living within the household, can have any say in the administration of the land. Compared with sharecroppers and, to a lesser extent, with tenants, landholders are much freer in making decisions regarding cultivation. This does not mean of course that total freedom is ever possible. Pressures from others in the form of criticism and gossip are quite effective in shaping decisions. There are also important pressures from within the household: these come from children as they grow up as well as from wives and elderly parents living within the household.

In spite of the centrality of farming in the social ranking of the village community, in 1984 18 % of all households did not own land and 22 % did not farm any land:

Table 7.2: Number and Percentage of Households According to Land Owned in Tuz, 1984

Area (da.)	Households no.	%	Area Owned da.	%	Average (da/hh) (da.)
0	30	17.6	0	0	0
1-10	10	5.9	70	1.1	7
11-30	49	28.8	1137	17.4	23.2
31-60	54	31.8	2514	38.4	46.5
61-90	15	8.8	1104	16.8	73.6
91-120	8	4.7	830	12.7	103.7
121-150	1	0.6	130	2.0	130
150+	3	1.8	766	11.7	255.3
TOTAL	170	100	6551	100	38.5

About a third of village households (37.8 %) have a source of income other than cotton cultivation.[5] A large number depend on fishing and construction work for their livelihood, while still hoping to be able one day to enter into independent cotton production. Thus, they rent land to cultivate cotton and aim for a return large enough to allow them to continue renting land; ultimately they hope to purchase a tractor. The latter is a decisive step towards becoming a farmer, for it allows more flexibility in action and the future possibility of buying land. The trend can however be reversed at any moment. Failure or success depends on a number of factors which I shall analyse in chapter 10. In Tuz, 18 % of the non-farming households have been established during the last ten years and are in the process of acquiring land, while 23 % are composed of elderly couples who rent out and/or lease out land due to unavailability of labour and inability to manage. The final 13 % are families who have migrated to the region from Central Anatolian provinces in the hope of finding work. Some of them have a specialised occupation such as electrician, house builder and carpenter, while others work as labourers in fishing and in cotton production.

Table 7.2 represents the distribution of land in 1984; it is important to realise that this is not a stable situation. Firstly, individuals themselves are not fixed in their position of owner/non-owner. As I have argued above, non-ownership has to be seen in the long-term in order to become a permanent characteristic. Ownership, on

the other hand, does not always correspond with being a farmer, since many landowners rent and/or share their land out. However, the fact of owning land is a more permanent status fixer than non-ownership. Secondly, land pressure on the Söke plain is still relatively insignificant and Tuz villagers can easily extend the land which they cultivate through mechanisms of sharecropping and renting.[6] The possibility of expansion means that everyone in Tuz can ultimately be a farmer and, to a lesser extent, a landowner. Furthermore, access to land does not always involve the mediation of money capital, and non-market relationships are also responsible in facilitating access to land that is not owned. Comparing the pattern of land cultivation in 1984 with that of 1978, we can see that such an expansion has taken place.

Table 7.3 : Comparison of Land Cultivation in Tuz: 1978 and 1984

	1978		1984		Difference	
Area	hh	da.	hh	da.	hh	da.
1-10	10	63	8	61.5	-2	-1.5
11-30	45	993	41	941	-4	-52
31-60	39	1822	36	1655	-3	-167
61-90	10	795	17	1269	+7	+474
91-120	6	630	11	1157	+5	+527
121-150	4	547	11	1562	+7	+1015
150+	4	1090	7	1667	+3	+577
Total	**158**	**5940**	**170**	**8312.5**	**+12**	**+2372.5**

Within the six years covered, twelve new households have been established and more than 2000 decares of land have been put under cultivation by Tuz villagers. Since it is not very probable that the newly established households have been able to farm 200 decares each, it is clear that the expansion of cultivated land id due mainly to the activities of established farmers. The table moreover shows that it is the number of middle and large cultivators that have increased in number, while the number of households cultivating less than 60 decares has decreased. There has been an expansion in cotton production in spite of the immigration of a few households of labourers. I shall show in chapter 10 that this expansion was largely due to the favourable conditions of the cotton market during the years under discussion and

that, under different circumstances, the trend could very well be reversed. The possibility of becoming a farmer and indeed of increasing the scale of one's farming operations, is therefore an expectation that up to 1984 largely corresponded with reality.

Despite the expansion of land under cultivation, about 36 % of all Tuz households (62 households) do not own, and 38 % (65 households) do not farm sufficient land (at least 20 decares), making other forms of income-generating activities indispensable. Not all of these households hope to ever produce cotton in significant quantities. In fact, some sow cotton as a supplementary form of income, one that will allow them to receive state credit, while earning a livelihood from other sources. Several grocers and fishermen are in this position. Conversely, those that live off cotton cultivation have other income-generating activities, of which fishing is the most important. However, it can still be argued that cotton farming is the most prestigious activity and the one that dominates village life and social structure, making land the single most important asset people desire. Almost everyone in the village has planted cotton (or has attempted to) at some point in their lives whether in their father's household or independently. While some, especially the women, hope never to see a cotton field again, others struggle hard to succeed as cotton farmers. Therefore, everyone 'knows' how to cultivate cotton and villagers are 'at heart' farmers.

7.2 Inheritance

Inheritance, following government distributions, is the second most important source of landownership among married men and the single source of landownership for women in Tuz. Contrary to other case studies discussing inheritance in Turkey (Stirling 1965:120-5; Aswad 1978:475), the tenets of Turkey's Civil Code are broadly followed in the Söke region. In chapter 2, I have argued that this system of inheritance has certain advantages from the nuclear family's point of view, namely the possibility of enlarging the household's patrimony by the addition of the wife's inheritance. I have also attempted to show that the inheritance system has made the nuclear family the dominant

household unit even for those villagers who, as nomadic pastoralists, had, until recently, lived within very different social groupings.

The smooth transmission of the family patrimony, including its name, reputation as well as material assets, to at least one successive unit is the goal of every household. There exist no practices indicating that any single one of the children is ever designated as the 'real' successor to the original household. However, personal characteristics and the history of intra-family/household struggle can and often do determine a 'favoured' child. Nevertheless, discrimination between children is not socially or legally condoned. As a result, every child expects and believes that s/he has a right to an equal division of this patrimony, particularly of the land. This right is often expressed in terms of the contribution, especially in the form of labour, of every child to the increase of the material well-being of the parental household. Certain mechanisms do exist whereby parents can disinherit all or some of their children. Registering a plot of land in the name of a favourite son or daughter, and selling one's land, can effectively be used by an individual to control the process of inheritance (see chapter 4). A large number of land sales and purchases are therefore the result of calculations that have nothing to do with the logic of cotton production. Rather, they are based on the dynamics of kinship and household formation.

Unless some arrangement is reached between the interested parties, siblings in general obtain equal shares of the available land. The division of the inherited estate in most cases is a negotiated process. Women acquire land if they live in Tuz or in neighbouring villages and if their husbands are also interested in farming; if not, they receive some payment in cash. The legalisation of the settlement often takes a long time, but people start to farm land that is due to them without waiting for official confirmation. As a result, the titles of ownership rarely reflect the actual state of affairs and, in the case of a dispute, proof of legal ownership through inheritance is often difficult to establish in court. Furthermore, individuals will have often farmed a plot before the death of its legal owner whenever the latter resides in

the former's household. This makes it difficult for an emigrant sibling to construct a good case for him/herself, since public opinion in the village, which usually is the only form of proof available, often sides with the person who has cultivated the land and/or looked after the deceased. Due to virilocal marriages, women usually, but not exclusively, find themselves in this position. Thus although women are thought to have an equal claim on land, in practice, it may be more difficult for them to sustain this claim. Women married within the village have a much higher chance of getting land rather than a money equivalent if they so wish.

Women's access to land is a difficult issue to investigate. Unless questioned and unless they have a special reason, women will not specify whether the land owned by the household is registered in their own name or that of their husbands'. In general, the only land registered in their name is that which they have inherited from their own family. Land bought in the course of a marriage is usually registered in the husband's name. However, many women try to own land which they see as a form of insurance. Living in a daughter-in-law's household becomes more tolerable when the older parent feels s/he is contributing to the household in material terms. In fact, siblings of either sex frequently compete for the care of an elderly land-owning parent in spite of the fact that such three-generational households are commonly seen as a nest of trouble. Thus land-owning women emphasize their landownership only when it has become an important aspect of their existence and when they have waged a struggle to obtain such land. Otherwise, talking in the general idiom of the unity of the household, individual titles to land are rarely specified.

Women inherit mainly from their parents (usually the father since before the present prevalence of cotton cultivation, land was not such an important asset and female land ownership was not an issue) and from their husbands. In the course of these processes of inheritance, they enter into conflict with their siblings and their children. A woman who marries far away from the village of her parents finds it more difficult to assert her rights to her father's inheritance than in cases where she

and her husband live close by, and can fight for their rights. Brothers often try to buy their sister's share; failing that, they aim to rent it from her for a nominal sum, hoping that they will be able to buy it in the long run. The final sale or purchase will depend on the fortunes of the households involved, so that a sister, married into a better-faring household, may end up by buying most of her parents' lands. Renting and/or sharecropping a sibling's share of the land is a frequent occurrence in Tuz. An option much less favoured is dividing the income generated from fields over which even an informal agreement has not been reached. In certain instances, siblings take turns in farming such undivided patrimonies. The risks involved in cotton farming and the necessity of entering into long-term yield-increasing land improvements force producers to seek security and permanence in their relation to land.[7]

Children may also try to deprive their mothers of their legal share of land. They may attempt to reduce their mother's patrimony in the course of the official procedure or openly ask her to renounce her share. Often this is the result of a conflict over land between siblings rather than one between mother and child. Since the lands of all individuals living within one household are farmed as a joint enterprise under the management of the head of the household, the land of a resident mother will automatically be under the effective control of only one of her children. The greatest fear of the remaining children is the possibility of the mother (and/or father) registering the land in the name of the child looking after her/him without the knowledge and consent of her other children. Every child has to watch out for this possibility; and the mother has to decide whether or not she will be better looked after with or without her own land. These problems befall elderly women rather than men as women frequently survive their husbands, the latter in general being considerably older than their spouses.[8]

Widows do not necessarily relinquish their status within the household at the death of their husbands. There were 14 households in Tuz in 1984 which were headed by women. The other widows had gone to

live under the authority of a son who already had a viable farm and an established household. Women often become heads of households as a result of the death of their husbands at an early stage of the developmental cycle of the family/household: that is, at the point when there are grown sons who are not yet married. In such cases, the presence of the mother and the absence of points of fission act to keep the household together as a functioning unit. The father's patrimony is often kept intact until the eldest son has married and sometimes beyond, until the marriage of all the children in the family. Without adolescent or adult sons, however, it is very difficult to keep the household as a viable cotton-producing unit. The actual authority wielded by a female household head depends to a large extent on her personality and not simply on her structural position. Thus of the fourteen women who were heads of households, only four were involved in most decision-making processes while the remainder relied on their eldest sons, intervening only when conflicts between brothers threatened the unity of the household.

From the data available, it is clear that Tuz women inherit amounts of land comaparable to those inherited by men:

Table 7.4 *Numbers of Tuz Men and Women According to the Amount of Land They Inherit*

Land (da.)	1-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	Total
Women	22	26	8	8	4	2	2	2	74
Men	26	18	13	5	3	1	-	1	67

Total land inherited by 74 women: 1297 da. (Average: 17.5 da.)
Total land inherited by 67 men: 1086 da. (Average: 16.2 da.)

The gender-based disparity between the incidence of landownership (see Table 7.1.) is due to the fact men acquire land through other mechanisms than inheritance. In fact, the latter accounts only for one-third of the land owned by men. By contrast, 80 % of female landownership derives from inheritance. In general, inherited land accounts for a little more than a third of all individually owned Tuz lands (2383 out of a total of 6551 decares). The amounts inherited are

often small and are not sufficient to provide adequate subsistence.[9] But, in a context where the average landholding is just over 35 decares, inheritance is important enough to fight for, since it can provide the basis for entering into cotton production and of becoming a fully-fledged farmer.

7.3 Land and the Role of the State

The state has played a major role with regard to Tuz patterns of landholding, to a certain extent determining the quantity as well as the quality of land owned by peasants. The distribution of land by the government to various categories of villagers and efforts towards land improvements have already been mentioned in chapter 5. Both of these measures have been quite effective in the Söke plain and in Tuz itself. As shown in table 7.1, government distributions account for 38 % of all the privately owned land in Tuz.[10] Land distributions in Tuz have been the result of two different state policies: the settlement of Turkish emigrants from the Balkans during the twenties and the attempts during the fifties and sixties to create a stable peasantry. The effects of the manner in which land distributions were undertaken has added to the tension between individual versus group ownership: the first resulted in the increase of individually held titles, while the second reinforced the unity of the household.

Attempts by the state to improve land in the Söke plain have concentrated upon efforts to regulate the Meander by building dams and flood walls, constructing irrigation and drainage canals, draining marshlands created by the yearly floods, and combating salinity in the lower reaches of the river.[11] As for the villagers of Tuz and the surrounding area concerned, the most important among these projects has been the construction a large drainage canal in 1967. This canal not only prevents flooding, but it also provides the main channel of irrigation for the majority of Tuz fields. Pumps and small reservoirs also help to regulate the flow of water in the Meander as well as in the canal. With the construction of this canal, a total of sixty-one thousand decares of land, including fields owned by Tuz villagers, can be irrigated (Köseli

1975:39-40). A large swamp to the east of the village was also drained in the fifties, and distributed to villagers in 1960.[12]

Land distributions have been a continuous feature of the Turkish Republic since its establishment in 1923.[13] The movement of population between Greece and Turkey after the war of 1921-1923 still constitutes one of the largest land distributions undertaken by the Turkish state. The agreements regarding the exchange of populations as part of the Lausanne convention signed by Turkey and Greece in 1923 stipulated the appraisal of all immovable property of those individuals who had been displaced as a result of the war. Equivalent grants of land and property were to be made in the new country. But as Ladas argues, appraising the property of over four hundred thousand small landholders was not a task that the Turkish government could undertake with the limited resources at its disposal and only large landowners were able to benefit from the clauses of the Lausanne convention (1932:457,714). Between 1923 and 1934 a total of 99,709 families received 122,937 decares of land according to the terms of the Lausanne Convention (Barkan 1946:455).[14]

A number of laws promulgated in 1924, 1929, and 1934 also contained clauses allowing the distribution of land to recently settled nomads and refugees, as well as making the sale of state owned land to needy farmers possible.[15] Since the establishment of the Republic, attempts had been made to prepare a comprehensive land reform programme with a view towards rationalising the distribution of land in the country as well as making it more equitable.[16] In 1945, amid much controversy and public debate, a Land Reform Bill (Çiftçiyi Topraklandirma Kanunu) was finally passed in Parliament. This law was supposed to provide 'land to the tiller' by distributing state land to peasants and also by limiting the land of large holdings. According to a number of observers, the effect of the law, rather than execute a land reform, was to bring under production wide tracts of unused state-owned land and therefore increase gross agricultural output (Cohn 1970:1,4; Tarakli 1976:275).[17] Until the law was repealed in 1972, more than twenty-two million decares of land, the majority of which had been state-owned, was distributed to 432,000 families (Tarakli 1976:110, 118).[18] After 1960, land distributions were stopped, at first to carry out

surveys to see if there was more land to be distributed. However, the political situation had changed, the drafting of a new law was begun but was never completed, and finally the 1945 law was repealed in 1972.

The 1945 Land Reform Bill was implemented by commissions that visited villages, surveying land use and ownership, establishing titles, and processing applications for land. Recipients were required to cultivate the land for a period of twenty-five years, during which they were prohibited to sell or sharecrop.[19] Heirs could not divide the land, but had to farm it jointly (Tarakli 1976:95). The distributed land was meant to provide for the subsistence of a family (Tarakli 1976:67). Subsistence was defined in terms of the amount of wheat a family of five needed to produce or purchase over one agricultural year in order to assure its reproduction. Peasant families farming in excess of this amount could be dispossessed if the amount of state land was not sufficient to cater for all the applications. The Land Comissions had to adapt these general rulings to particular conditions, depending on crop produced and quality of land.[20] The village headmen (muhtar) were often put in a decisive position, since the commissions often dealt with them rather than talk with a large number of villagers. Thus, local power relations must have influenced the manner of distribution considerably.

Land distributed by the Commission was registered in the name of the household head (hane reisi) (Tarakli 1976:57). Married children living with parents were also considered to be a separate household, but in many instances (Tuz included), local beliefs influenced the process of distribution so that the latter did not receive land. Although the household head was, on paper, the owner of the land, it was on the basis of households that the distributions took place. These measures as well as the prohibition to sell or divide the land, served to further reinforce the joint ownership of land and isolate the household as the basic unit of agricultural production.

By contrast, the government officials who devised the land grants following the settlement of population in the early twenties, based their calculations on the individual rather than the group. Every person,

regardless of age or gender, was granted a fixed amount of land deemed to cover minimum subsistence needs. In Tuz, this amount was fixed at 12-15 decares of land, depending on quality.[21] This amount was considered to be the individual's property, and household heads could not dispose of the right (hak) to land of their dependents.[22] These measures reinforced the individual right to own property and, in the case of women, allowed them the first chance to own property separately from any male kin, whether brother, father, or husband.[23]

In spite of the large numbers of emigrants settled in villages formarly inhabited by Greeks, today, the significance of muhacir land grants in Tuz has decreased as a result of inheritance and sales.[24] Many of the original settlers sold their land to yürük families in order to join kin settled in other parts of the country, or as a result of problems of adaptation to the hot climate. In Tuz 69 individuals living in 54 households still hold a total of about 1500 decares (20 % of total owned land) granted to them or their parents following migration.[25]

Land that accrued to Tuz villagers as a result of the Land Reform bill constitutes a larger portion of the land owned by Tuz farmers. Two separate land commissions, one in 1952 and one in 1960, distributed land in the lower Söke plain. According to the records of the Aydin Land Commission, 601 decares were distributed in Tuz by the first commission, and the second one distributed another 1276 decares to a total of 100 households. A further 4000 decares of land were registered as common pasture land. A few eski yürük families who had been cultivating state lands were dispossessed and their fields made over to needy villagers.[26] The 1960 commission calculated that 30-35 decares were sufficient to provide subsistence and each household received land totalling that amount (including land already owned).[27] As a result of these successive distributions, households established prior to 1960 were made the owner of at least 30 decares of land per household. On average, 21-30 decares each were received by 76 households in the period 1948-1960.

The net effect of government intervention in the ownership of land has been to create a rough equality of landownership, at least for the time in

which the distributions took place. Although this equality no longer holds, state policy has nevertheless played a crucial role in establishing landholding patterns. Even today, eighteen Tuz households own only the land once distributed by the government. Moreover, many others have accumulated cash on the basis of the land they received as a result of the distribution programmes, and have used these resources to purchase further land.

Table 7.5 Size of Land Distributed to Tuz Villagers Between 1948 and 1960

Area (da)	**No. of hh**	**Total Land (da)**
1-10	13	92
11-20	18	295
21-30	25	702
31-40	18	660
41-50	2	95
Total	76	1844

7.4 Land Sales and Purchases

In the Söke area land has been a commodity ever since the middle of the nineteenth century. Until the nineteen-fifties, however, most of the land sold belonged to large landowners who were divesting themselves of their estates in favour of merchants and traders. With the increase of cotton production, smaller amounts of land began to yield large incomes and the increase in costs of production has led to the 'rationalisation' of land sizes.[28] The commoditisation of land owned by peasants is, by contrast, a more recent phenomenon and can be traced to the expansion of the production of cotton as a commodity. The total amount of land bought or sold in Tuz before 1950 is minimal compared to the numbers of transactions and amounts of land involved in exchanges after that date:[29]

Table 7.6. Amount of Land Bought and Sold and Number of Transactions Involved

Years	Bought (da.)	Trans. (no.)	Average (da.)	Sold (da.)	Trans. (no.)	Average (da.)
pre-1950	797*	?	?	623*	?	?
1951-60	945	?	?	146	8	18
1961-70	392	20	20	393	13	30
1971-80	587	31	19	126	6	21
1981-84	393	19	21	85	6	14
Total	3114			1373		

* The amount of land sold and bought by Tuz villagers is not equivalent. This is a result of the fact that transactions in land are not necessarily carried out exclusively with fellow villagers.

The limited extent to which land was commoditised before the nineteen-fifties is also made clear from the fact that the eski yürük of Tuz, when they settled in the area, had been able to obtain access to land without having to purchase it. The land was often barren and the property of the state. When the Land Commission arrived in 1952, these yürük were able to register at least a portion of it in their own names as a result of the usufruct law. In Tuz, two of the original eski yürük families who had settled in the village sometime during the last century were able to accumulate considerable amounts of land on the basis of usufruct. One of these householders, Mehmet Ali Akilli, had about 600 decares which he 'sold' to his two sons at a nominal price.[30] Another five eski yürük had acquired in the same manner about 90-100 decares each. Before 1950, the bulk of the land sold in the village was in general alienated by muhacir, who were either trying to leave the district, or who did not have the necessary means of production.[31]

Since the sixties, the land market in Tuz has been quite active. Table 7.6 shows that in general the amount of land changing hands in any individual transaction has been relatively small (about 25 decares on average).[32] Nevertheless, a total of 2188 decares of land owned by Tuz villagers have been purchased. The bulk of this land has been bought by yeni yürük, who, since they had sold off their herds of sheep and goats, had access to the cash necessary to buy land. Thus, land purchases account for 37.5 % of the land owned by eski yürük, 67.6 % of the land owned by

yeni yürük, and only 16.1 % of the land owned by the muhacir. Buying agricultural land is still one of the most important forms of investment in the area, and surplus cash is transformed into land whenever possible, regardless of the size of the plot purchased.

Apart from considerations related to processes of inheritance, Tuz villagers sell land either because they lack the means (cash or labour) to turn it to productive use, or as a result of some urgent need. Selling small parcels with a view towards purchasing a tractor, or paying debts contracted as a result of marriage expenses, are among the reasons for sale explicitly mentioned by Tuz villagers. Conversely, attempts to ensure a larger income and provide children with a bigger estate constitute the main impetus to buy more land. Farmers who buy land often do so in order to cultivate it themselves, rather than rent it out or engage in land speculation. As long as labour costs are born by the producer, the production of cotton is the greatest income-generating activity in the area. Moreover, in a context where the status of farmer is still the most highly valued, buying land also has implications with regard to the social identity of the individual.[33]

As a result of the commoditisation of agriculture, both land prices and the activity of buying and selling are closely related to the specific conditions of cotton production and the economic climate dominant on a national level. The rate of inflation is often reflected in land prices. Between 1973 and 1983, land prices in the Söke area have increased more than ten-fold, while prices have shown a rise of more than fifteen-fold. Moreover, the prices of cotton fields in the Söke and Adana regions show parallel increases.[34] The market price of cotton also affects the price of land. When cotton fetches a good price and when the villagers' harvests are abundant (as was the case in 1987), demand for land increases, and prices rise accordingly. Furthermore, the prices of particular plots vary according to yield.[35]

7.5 Access to Land Through Sharecropping and Renting

As shown in table 7.3, Tuz villagers own a total of 6551 decares of land. A look at the amount of land they farm shows the extent to which land is appropriated through mechanisms other than ownership:

Table 7.7 Amount and Percentage of Land Farmed by Tuz Households

Area (da.)	Households no.	%	Area da.	%	Average (da/hh)
0	39	22.9	0	0	0
1-10	8	4.7	61.5	0.7	7.7
11-30	41	24.1	941	13.3	22.9
31-60	36	21.2	1655	19.9	46
61-90	17	10.0	1269	15.3	74.6
91-120	11	6.5	1157	13.9	105.2
121-150	11	6.5	1562	18.8	142
150+	7	4.1	1667	20.1	238.1
TOTAL	170	100	8312.5	100	48.9

In each land category, the amount of land owned differs considerably from that farmed. Renting and sharecropping are the two mechanisms used to obtain access to land, and they account for about 44 % of land cultivated in Tuz. Contrary to the forms of land appropriation discussed above, renting and sharecropping are not based on the legal ownership of land but depend on a contract between the legal owner and another person. Both renting and sharecropping contracts allow an individual to farm land that s/he does not own. In the case of sharecropping, the cultivator pays for the use of the land by offering his/her labour power, while cash is used to effect the return in the case of renting. Sharecropping moreover involves the owner of the land in the risks of the process of cultivation, and the returns to land are unpredictable. By contrast, renting involves the setting up of a fixed return to land at the outset; the owner of the land is totally separated from the process of production. However, a closer look at the ways contracts are drawn up shows that, in fact, the distinctions between these two forms of land appropriation are not as great as it seems at first glance.

Sharecropping (ortakçilik) contracts in Tuz are often verbal agreements which define the terms according to which the costs of production and the product are to be distributed. Generally, the landowner provides the land and the seed, while the sharecropper is held responsible for the implements, especially the tractor, and the labour needed for the mechanised processes of cultivation.[36] All other cash costs arising from irrigation, fertilisation, pest control, hoeing and harvesting are shared equally between the partners (ortak).[37] At the end of the harvest, the product (or sometimes the cash) is divided equally. The terms of this contract often vary according to the particular needs of the two partners, the conditions of production on the farm, the length of the contract, and most importantly, the nature of the relationship that exists between the two partners.[38] The contract is the result of a process of negotiation and each cost-incurring item is considered separately. In some cases, the landowner may undertake to share the fuel costs, in others irrigation costs are borne by the sharecopper alone (ortakçi). Household labour provided by the sharecropper may, at times, be considered as part of the sharecropper's labour contribution, while at other times, all hoeing and harvesting labour costs may be split equally. Although the landowner is involved in the costs of production, the extent of his/her control over the process of production depends on the structure of the landowning household itself.

By contrast, renting (kiracilik) removes the landowner from the actual production process. The landowner transfers the use of his/her land in return for a fixed sum over a specified period of time. The majority of rent agreements are entered into for a short period, usually one, but at most three years. The landowner gets his/her rent before the beginning of the production process. The level of rents varies according to fluctuations in the market price of cotton and is usually set at a little less than a tenth of the gross income derived from the land.[39] But, as with sharecropping, variations on the leasing contract do occur. Payment of cash in advance, encompassing all or part of the rent constitutes the most common arrangement. In this case, the contract is subject to revision each year and the rent fixed according to changes in price levels. A second form of leasing land consists of a longer-term relationship involving

hitherto unproductive land. The tenant accepts to improve the land in return for a fixed rent and the use of the land for four to five consecutive years. Rent levels in these contracts are considerably below the market level of rents for already improved land, and the landowner cannot increase the rent for the duration of the contract.[40] Lastly, payments in kind are also possible. The landowner asks for cotton the amount of which is set in advance, and the tenant has to deliver this fixed amount at the end of the harvest regardless of the total amount of cotton produced.

These variations in sharecropping and leasing contracts show that the distinctions between the two forms of appropriating land can be explained in terms of the contribution of the two parties to the process of production. In the most extreme form of sharecropping, all costs (except those connected with the land itself) and all income are shared equally. As the contribution of the landowner decreases and a fixed return per decare is expected, the return expected by the landowner also decreases and arrangement takes on the form of leasing.[41] The actual form that the contract takes depends on the power relations between the parties to the contract. As the landowner becomes more powerful, s/he obtains the stipulated half of the product in return for less in the way of material contribution. Thus landowners in general, in order to maximise their return from the land, prefer to sharecrop.[42] Sharecoppers and/or tenants, on the other hand, prefer to rent land, because of the greater income as well as the freedom of action that this brings.[43]

Apart from purely economic considerations, demands and obligations arising from kinship and community relations also determine the nature of the leasing and/or sharecropping contract. A son in need of income may rent his mother's land for a nominal sum of money, or, if the economic situation of the son allows it, he may 'sharecrop' the land, but in actual fact, turn over to his mother a bigger proportion of the income compared to prevalent rent levels. Conversely, the pressure of sons and/or daughters established in separate and poor households, may force a person to 'rent' them his/her land, thus foregoing the higher income s/he would receive if s/he were to sharecrop it to an established farmer.[44] Villagers try to

establish good relations with their tenant and/or sharecropper in order to control the management of their land. For this reason, fellow-villagers and/or kin are often preferred. As a result of kinship and community ties, the negative effect of sharecropping and renting on the productivity of the land is minimised.[45]

With a few exceptions I shall discuss below, sharecropping contracts in Tuz are established between equals. This equality is a product of the fact that in spite of differences in wealth, there is no class difference between the two partners.[46] Both are involved in the contract as owners of means of production, and divide the product according to their contributions to the process of production. Most importantly, both parties are peasants, often kinsmen/women who at the same time, can exercise a considerable amount of choice in determining partners and are not necessarily obliged to let their relatives use their land. The power that each party can wield over the terms of the contract varies in each case. The head of a large household who owns a tractor and farming equipment is often in a very good position to set the terms of the contract. Conversely, an old man with no adult son who owns a lower-quality piece of land often has to accept the terms set by his sharecropper.[47] In many cases, the ownership of tractors provides greater advantage compared to the ownership of land.[48] However, there is considerable variation, for the wider economic context, as well as demographic (position in the developmental cycle, availability of labour power) and economic (amount of accumulated cash) circumstances within which households may find themselves, together determine the over-all balance of power between landowners and tractor owners.[49] But, most importantly, there is no class of landowners in Tuz who are able to live on the basis of land rents. The majority of the individuals who share or rent land out own between 30 and 80 decares of land and they only have a single tenant or sharecropper. The amounts of land rented and sharecropped in Tuz are therefore small, and landowners interact with their sharecroppers and tenants on the basis of equality.

Table 7.8 Leasing and Sharecropping in 1984 According to Number of Household and Size of Land

Area (da)	Rented in		Rented out		Shared in		Shared out	
	hhs	da.	hhs	da.	hhs	da.	hhs	da.
1-10	4	31	3	19	1	8	1	10
11-20	14	231	3	48	5	66	1	12
21-30	14	383	5	127	-	-	3	99
31-40	6	195	3	111	4	156	3	116
41-50	3	142	2	96	2	95	-	-
51-100	5	467	1	53	5	370	3	240
100-150	7	950	-	-	-	-	-	-
150+	3	600	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	56	2999	17	454	17	695	11	477

The table above shows that Tuz villagers are able to rent, on average, 53 decares and sharecrop about 40 decares. Much of the rented land above 100 decares is farmed jointly by two and in one case three households, in a way that resembles sharecropping contracts: all costs and all income are shared according to a specified arrangement. Furthermore, the table also demonstrates the overwhelming predominance of renting over sharecropping. But most rented land is obtained from individuals outside the village, since only 454 out of a total of 2999 decares of rented land belongs to Tuz villagers. Tuz landowners are able keep control over their land and usually manage to employ sharecroppers rather than rent it out.[50]

A large portion of the land obtained from outside the village through renting and sharecropping contracts belongs to three large landowners in the area. The nature of the contract and the conditions under which these contracts are drawn up shows that in these cases, the peasants are confronted with a class of landowners. In these instances the equality inherent in contracts between peasants is distorted in favour of the landowner. Tan's 32,000-decare estate to the south of Tuz is a major source of land for villagers in the area.[51] The large amount of land available to Tan allows him to enforce terms of sharecropping and renting that are clearly to his advantage. The majority of his sharecroppers come from the village of Batnos where his land is situated. In the contracts with these villagers, Tan provides a considerable proportion of the inputs and shares the costs of hoeing and harvesting. He stipulates the time and

manner of ploughing and planting and determines when the fields are to be irrigated. His main advantage in using sharecroppers is to reduce the costs of management and above all, the costs of securing and controlling labour.[52] The contracts Tan makes with other villagers differ considerably and depend on the pre-existing relationship between Tan and the villager. Tan's material or managerial contribution to the production decreases according to the personal relations between him and the villager.[53] The usual form of contract established with villagers from distant localities is a form of leasing, where Tan provides the seed and in return demands a fixed amount of cotton per decare sown.[54]

To summarise the observations set out so far, we can roughly divide leasing and sharecropping contracts into three forms, using power relations between landowner and cultivator as a basis:

1. The landowner is powerless and the tractor-owner can determine the terms of the contract. In these cases the former often owns a small amount of land (at most 30 decares) and is not able to farm it due to lack of cash or lack of labour. Elderly couples and/or widow(er)s are often in this position. Contracts are often leasing contracts.
2. The landowner and the cultivator are equal in status and economic power. The majority of Tuz landowners are in this position, and the main reason for employing a sharecropper is lack of mechanised labour within the household. Cash by contrast is usually available and allows the landowner to stipulate the terms of the contract, which often takes the form of sharecropping.
3. A small peasant producer enters into a contract with one of the large owners mentioned above. These contracts approximate the cases described for Turkey by Keyder (1983a) and Aydin (1980).[55] The nature of the contract depends on the economic circumstances and the social distance between the two parties. Rent in kind is the most widespread form of contract. As argued by Pearce, in these cases surplus is appropriated by the landowner in the form of his share or else of rent (1983:53).

7.6 Inequalities in Access to Land

As a result of the processes of commoditisation, landownership is no longer the most important precondition determining production capability. Accumulated cash (needed to rent or buy land) provides one of the important means through which land is allocated among farmers. The households that take in land through sharecropping and leasing contracts own between 4 and 196 decares of land, fact which shows that ownership of land is not a significant factor affecting ability to enter into production. Nevertheless, in a community where farming is the most highly valued occupation and where identity is intricately bound up with scale of farming, land ownership is still an important factor differentiating between individuals (and households) within the community. In tables 7.2 and 7.7, I had shown that slightly less than one fifth of the households in Tuz are landless, but that slightly more than this number do not farm any land. A consideration of the amounts of land owned by Tuz households shows that great inequalities do not prevail.[56] The majority of villagers own between 31-60 decares: 38.4 % of the land is owned by 31.8 % of the households. Tuz land is concentrated in the three middle brackets (11-90 decares) and those brackets comprise 69.4 % of the households in the village.

Nevertheless, the number of landless households (17.6 %) and the fact that 1.8 % of the households own more than 10 % of the land (each household owns more than 150 decares) point to a certain level of land polarization. These inequalitites will, to a certain extent, be leveled off as a result of the developmental cycle of these land-owning households. Inheritance will serve to break up some of the large estates.[57] However, fictive land sales to sons may also serve to transfer at least part of these large estates to a few chosen heirs. The final outcome is, as I have already explained, a product of relations between parents and children. Conversely, many of the landless will inherit (albeit small portions of) land on the basis of which they may in the future engage in cotton production. Of the thirty landless Tuz households, only ten do not stand to inherit any land, five of them being emigrants from other parts of Turkey.

The addition of land through sharecropping and renting alters this distribution of land considerably. Many of the small owners are not able to farm land while the larger landholders can extend the area they cultivate. Except for the smaller brackets and the very largest owners (11-60 and 150+), renting and sharecropping serve to increase the average size of the holding in each land bracket.[58] The numbers of farmers in the largest brackets increase and the land that they farm increases correspondingly. Twenty percent of the total farmed land as opposed to 11.7 % of the land owned is now in the 150+-decare bracket.) The result is a more unequal pattern of access to land:

Table 7.9 Cumulative Percentage of Land Owned and Farmed by Tuz Households

Area Sown (da.)	Land Owned		Land Farmed	
	% hhs	% land	% hhs	% land
0	17.6	0	22.9	0
1-10	23.5	1.1	27.6	0.7
11-30	52.3	18.5	51.7	12.0
31-60	84.1	56.9	72.9	31.9
61-90	92.9	73.7	82.9	47.2
61-120	97.6	86.4	89.4	61.1
121-150	98.2	88.4	95.9	79.9
150+	100	100.1	100	100

We can see from the table that small owners (less than 90 decares) make-up about 93 % of Tuz households and these hold 73.7 % of Tuz property. By contrast, producers farming less than 90 decares make-up 83 % of Tuz households and these in total have access to only 47 % of the land farmed in Tuz. As a result of sharecropping and renting, it is the medium to large landowners who are able to increase the scale of their operations.

7.7 Conclusion

A consideration of the patterns of landownership and cultivation in Tuz shows that although the majority of the farmers are owner-cultivators, more than 44 % of the total land cultivated is obtained on the basis of sharecropping and leasing contracts. Land is largely commoditised and rental and sales markets allow a frequent redistribution of land between producers. The high incidence of land purchases and sales, especially

within the last ten years, also indicates the extent to which land is regarded as an alienable commodity. In spite of this, concepts of individual property are often overshadowed by ideas regarding the solidarity of the household as a land-owning unit of production. Government distributions and the idea of a common subsistence fund have made these attitudes towards the joint exploitation and ownership of land endure in the face of increasing commoditisation. As a result of these pressures, the sale of land has ramifications beyond the economic realm narrowly defined, and affects the nature of social interaction within the village.

The pattern of land distribution indicates that the majority of Tuz cotton growers are small-to-medium farmers cultivating between 30 and 100 decares. The area cropped to cotton by each Tuz household shows variations over time, as I have shown in Table 7.3. Since access to land is not restricted to individualised ownership, farmers have the possibility of adapting the scale of their production and hence their income to the needs of the individuals within the household. A combination of market and kinship/community relations allows flexibility in the allocation of land. The strategic inclusion of individuals (parents, siblings) within the household, the careful determination of household fission, the activation of kinship and community ties to obtain favourable contracts of tenancy and/or sharecropping make up the basic mechanisms through which households are able to obtain land. This flexibility is nevertheless dependent on the broad limits of cotton farming imposed by the economy at large, and especially on the intervention of the state. By affecting land productivity through its irrigation policy and by subsidising credit and sales markets, the state is able to influence the income levels derived from cotton production.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. For example, when Meryem's father sold all his property including his land, house and shops, his wife and all his children cut off all relations with him. Meryem maintains that, by acting without his family's consent, her father had broken up the family and had renounced his right to be looked after and respected.

2. Exceptions do occur. An elderly woman was able to rent her land in return for cash while her son and his wife were looking after her. They did not have the means to put her land under production. The son turned the cash income from the rent over to his mother, but it was understood that she would give him back a large portion of it.

3. As nomadic pastoralists, the yürük have a very different relationship to land even after they settle.

4. Silverman (1968) shows the exact opposite to be the case among Central Italian peasants where the same family may cultivate a farm for generations. Du Boulay describes a case where the land and the house are part and parcel of a farmer's social identity in spite of land fregmentation caused by inheritance (1974:32-40).

5. Apart from the 22 % of village households which do not cultivate any land, a further 15.8 % farmed less than 20 decares, and needed income from a supplementary source in order to meet subsistence needs.

6. For a comparison of land owned and land cultivated, see table 10.1

7. In cases of sharecropping and renting arrangements, knowledge of the limit of the contract makes such long-term planning decisions easier to arrive at.

8. It is mistakenly thought that since a man is used to managing his holding and since he has much greater authority than a woman, he will not allow his son total control. The elderly mother is seen to be more easily manipulated by a 'favourite' child than the elderly father. In fact, elderly women know how to protect their own interests and look after them quite well.

9. The two men who inherited more than 50 decares have no siblings and of the women involved, six were widows whose husband's estates had not yet been divided.

10. Considering the fact that inherited land is also largely government-given, the state accounts for about two thirds (4330 decares) of all individually held land in Tuz.

11. See öney (1975:245-56) for a detailed account of some of these efforts. Similar efforts are reported by Soysal (1976) for the Adana plain.

12. many other projects are either being completed or still waiting to be approved. The construction of irrigation canals in a checker-board pattern covering the whole plain has progressed quite far, but these canals have

not yet reached the Tuz area. Combatting salinity on a larger scale is a more difficult problem and needs large scale investment that has as yet not been forthcoming.

13. Distributions of land in order to regulate the settlement of various sectors of the population have been a major policy of the Ottoman Empire as well. While this method was a major component in the conquest and colonisation of the Balkans in the early years of the Empire, it later became a way of controlling production for tax purposes, particularly where the settlement of nomads was concerned. See Barkan (1949-1950). Forced movements of population and resettlement were also used to suppress political unrest (Orhonlu 1963).

14. At this same period another fifty-eight thousand refugee families not covered by the Lausanne Convention received over four million decares of land (ibid.).

15. The sale price was calculated according to the market value of the land, but payments would be made over a period of ten years (Barkan 1946:455; Aktan 1966:319).

16. Barkan (1946:455) states that until 1945, eleven to twelve million decares of land, about 8% of all the cultivated area, had been distributed to peasants as a result of the various laws passed.

17. Very few large landholders were actually dispossed as a result of the law, which had already lost some of its more radical implications by the time it was promulgated. See Barkan (1946). Margulies (1985:230) argues that land distributions amounted to a consolidation, if not a creation of a class of small peasants. An American observer for AID is more explicit and maintains that this was the overtly stated aim of the Land Reform legislation (Cohn 1970:3). By contrast, Tarakli argues that the main goal of this law as implemented by successive governments was to increase total agricultural production.

18. Common pasture land in excess of the needs of a particular village was also given to villagers. A quarter of Turkey's pasture land was converted into private property in this fashion.

19. Many in fact did both, using deeds drawn up by notary publics.

20. Farmers already possessing land were also included in the distributions provided that their income fell below the specified limit. Farms producing crops other than wheat were assessed in terms of the amount of cash the sale of the produce would bring.

21. I do not know the reasoning by which officials arrived at this figure.

22. Thus, in some households today, the wife and husband are administering their own hak separately.

23. Older muhacir women in Tuz often mention how important it was for them to become landholders in their own right, and many have defended their property from encroachments by other household members. One woman of

sixty, has stopped performing domestic labour for her husband, who sold her land without consulting her. The man pays for a neighbour to cook and clean.

24. A total of 6630 families were settled in the Aydin province immediately after the end of the war; the majority concentrated in the Söke plain.

25. Only 21 were direct recipients. Olive groves are not included in these calculations. At present, the majority of these holdings are quite small:

Area (da)	1-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	60+
Individuals	18	33	7	3	5	2	1

26. Expropriations of large landowners were very limited in the Söke plain. One large farmer lost 7438 decares in the course of the 1952 land survey.

27. Earlier, when more land was available, up to 50 decares per household had been distributed.

28. Other considerations have also led large landowners to sell land. Investment in commercial activities, moves to large cities, and adjustments resulting from inheritance are among the most important reasons for selling land. The sale of land to peasants or to family members in an effort to minimise the effects of the land reform bill also accounts for a substantial portion of land transactions. See chapter 2, section 2.

29. Data regarding land sales and purchases have been compiled from the transactions recorded in the Land Registry and the answers given by villagers to questions in the 1984 survey. These figures may not reflect all land transactions in the village since a large proportion of the land involved is government-distributed land which villagers were not supposed to sell.

30. At his death, the man still owned 100 decares and his three sons and three daughters inherited 12.5 decares of land each, the remaining 25 decares going to the young wife he had married a few years before his death. This example also demonstrates the thin line that separates the inheritance and sale of land.

31. In order to establish the settlers as self-sufficient agricultural producers, the state was also supposed to provide seed and draught animals. In the majority of cases, however, this aid did not materialise and migrants were left to their own devices.

32. Even the largest landowner of Tuz, a yeni yürük, over a period of twenty years, bought a total of 350 decares of land from a number of different sellers in parcels of about 10-20 decares.

33. Villagers often express a feeling of special attachment to land in general though not to any specific field or holding. One villager stated that a visit to his fields made him feel good and that as a person working the land (rençber), he could not imagine selling his land and moving to the city.

34. Between 1979 and 1985, land prices in Adana rose from 30,000 TL/da to over 300,000 TL/da (Seker 1986:20-1). The Tuz prices were, respectively, 20,000 TL/da and 200,000 TL/da. The difference in value is largely explained by the fact that the Adana plain is better irrigated than the Söke plain.

35. Many of the barren fields in the southern parts of the plain even in 1985 only fetched a price of 50,000 TL/da, when the average selling price of one decare of good land fluctuated around the 150,000-200,000 TL/da mark. In 1986, the state irrigation system was extended to cover the southernmost portion of the plain and land values rose. These same plots were valued at 600,000-700,000 TL/da in 1987, an increase which was also exacerbated by the high selling price of raw cotton.

36. The increase of cash costs in recent years, resulting from greater use of pesticides and fertilisers, has led to the equal sharing of all cash expenditures, including the cost of seed.

37. In Tuz, as well as in Turkey generally, the term ortak is used for all sorts of partnership, including business ventures.

38. The conditions of production are considered in detail before parties reach a final agreement. If the land has to be ploughed many times before the seed can be planted, the sharecropper may demand that the landowner meet fuel costs. Or, if more than one tractor is needed to pump water into the field, the second or third tractor often has to be provided by the landowner.

39. In 1984, rents fluctuated between 4000 and 8000 TL/da., while the 1979 levels were around 1000 TL/da. By 1985, they had risen above the 10,000 TL/da. mark. The 1985 Adana figure provided by Seker (1986:20-1) is 12,000 TL/da. On average, land rents are about 10 % of the price of land.

40. In many of these cases the tenant ultimately ends up buying the land.

41. Somewhere in the middle of these two extremes is the possibility of sharing the costs of the hoeing and harvesting of the first picking and leaving the cost as well as the income of the second and third pickings to the sharecropper.

42. In cases where the landowner also has access to unpaid labour within his/her household, sharecropping becomes even more advantageous.

43. Sharecroppers in Tuz argue that they end up by working for the landowner. When asked why they did not rent land, 72 % of Tuz sharecroppers stated that they could not get the landowner to agree to a leasing contract, and the rest said they did not have the cash needed to enter into a leasing arrangement. A saying illustrates the attitude of sharecroppers: Ortak eti köpek bile yemez, not even a dog eats shared meat!

44. The 'separateness' of households does allow the owner to choose a sharecropper and/or tenant. One man, for example, refused to lease his 30-decare plot to his son-in-law because he did not want to risk losing a good sharecropper. But these refusals do lead to serious disruptions in

social relationships. A few years after this incident the man in question lost his wife and his daughter refused to look after him.

45. See Robertson (1980:412) and Pearce (1983:47) for discussions of the reduced incentive to undertake land improvements on land that is leased or sharecropped.

46. The differences in wealth and status between the parties of a leasing contract are more pronounced than in the case of sharecropping, since ability to farm is a function of accumulated cash. Only those landowners who do not have accumulated cash to contribute to the production process, and who, therefore cannot stipulate a sharecropping contract agree to rent it out.

47. In fact, he will often have to lease his land out.

48. Most of the sharecroppers in Tuz are tractor owners and the majority of the landowners involved in sharecropping contracts (20 out of 28) entered into these contracts because they did not own tractors.

49. For example, the price of cotton may determine the number of individuals able to buy tractors and therefore the extent of the competition for land between tractor owners; this competition may tip the contract in favour of landowners.

50. Tuz landowners do not necessarily lease or share their land out exclusively to Tuz villagers. Kin and friends living in nearby villagers act as landowners and tenants/sharecroppers to Tuz villagers.

51. A 2000-decare farm owned by a sheep merchant and a 1000-decare farm owned by an At man involved in business in Izmir are the two other sources of land in the region. Under the technical conditions prevalent in the Söke plain, the impossibility of planting more than 3000 decares of cotton forces Tan to rent or sharecrop about 10,000 decares of his land every year. Similar cases of sharecropping of cotton land on the large estates of the Adana region have been reported by Hinderink and Kiray (1970:29) prior to mechanisation. These authors argue that mechanisation in Adana has led to the disappearance of the sharecropper. In Söke, by contrast, sharecropping between large landowners and small peasants has continued up to the present.

52. Not all the inhabitants of Batnos enjoy good relations with Tan. During the sixties, some of them had claimed his land and forced him to turn a part of his estate over to the villagers. These individuals as well as their descendants are not able to receive any land from Tan.

53. Tuz villagers who marry a girl from from Batnos, for example, are often provided with better contracts compared to other Tuz villagers.

54. These contracts may leave the peasant in grave difficulties. Any unforeseen loss during the production process is borne by him/her, while the landowner receives the specified sum whatever the circumstances.

55. See also Pearce (1983) for a discussion of sharecropping in other Asian contexts.

56. The gini coefficient for land owned in 1984 equals 0.489. See Appendix VIa and VIb for Lorenz curves illustrating the extent of inequality with regard to access to land and landowneship among Tuz farmers in 1984.

57. One of these large farmers has eleven children and owns 196 decares of land. Two of his (male) children may give up their claims since one is a schoolteacher and the other is an established shop owner in Söke. Even so, after deducting their mother's share, the remaining nine children can only inherit 5.4 decares each (196×0.25÷9).

58. See the sixth column of Tables 7.2 and 7.7. Looking at the inequalities in land farmed, as opposed to land owned, the Gini coefficient rises to 0.571.

CHAPTER 8: ACCESS TO AND CIRCULATION OF CASH

In a an economy relatively well integrated into commodity circuits the importance of cash cannot be overlooked. As I have shown in chapter 5,many of the means of production needed in the process of cotton growing have long become commoditised, and can be purchased on the national market. These means of production can be considered in two categories: those which represent a longer-term investment and which can be used in more than one production cycle, and those that are consumed in a single cycle of production. I have prefered to label this investment 'cash' rather than 'capital' because of the descriptive level at which the discussion is carried. To the extent that cotton production by peasant households is undertaken in a commodity economy, this cash functions as capital.[1] Tractors and other tractor-drawn equipment make up the bulk of the first category, while the latter consists of inputs such as seed, fertiliser, pesticide and fuel.

In practice however, this distinction between long-term and short-term investments proves to be difficult to draw in the context of a peasant economy where many of the inputs are obtained through a combination of market and non-market mechanisms. A host of bonds linking peasants creates a series of 'lending' and 'helping' networks through which inputs can be obtained without expending cash. Furthermore, the intervention of the state in input and output markets also affects the conditions under which peasants obtain tractors, fertilisers as well as cash itself. Moreover, many of the inputs that at first glance seem to be annual needs, such as fertilisers and pesticide actually can be used over a period of two to three years; others can be used outside the process of cotton production. Tractors are a good case in point. They are means of transportation (of goods as well as people), of power (as when irrigation pumps are attached to tractor engines), and also symbols of prestige and identity.[2]

Cash is also an indispensible aspect of the reproduction of peasant producers. As pointed out in chapter 3, subsistence production in the village is rather limited and many of the items of daily consumption have to be purchased on the market. The extent to which Tuz households have to

spend cash in order to ensure daily reproduction varies from case to case, but none is totally self-sufficient. Generational reproduction adds a considerable burden to the cash requirements of the household. To sponsor weddings and to prepare the conditions for marriage is, as explained in chapter 4, a long and costly process, especially for men. To the extent that the reproduction of the peasant household (including its personnel and the relations that structure their interaction), can also be considered as the reproduction of the unit of production, many of these expenditures have to be seen as productive expenditures.[3]

The village producers of Söke have a number of alternative sources of cash at their disposal. The bulk of this cash is obtained in the form of credit from state institutions, from the numerous private banks and merchants of Söke and from neighbours and kins(wo)men. The sale of cotton, and other agricultural commodities (olive oil, meat on the hoof) as well as the sale of labour power provides the remaining source of cash available to village producers. The cash obtained from these various sources forms the capital required in the production of cotton. This capital is used to finance productive activities: land, labour, and the instruments of production are obtained (at least in part) through the investment of capital. Through the availability of kinship and neighbourhood-based networks of exchange labour, at least a portion of the cash input needed can be subsituted with labour. In this chapter, I shall examine the way peasants obtain access to cash and the way they utilise it in the process of cotton production.

8.1 Cash Requirements in Cotton Production

Apart from land and labour, the bulk of cash investments for long-term use are connected with the purchase of implements and the improvement of land. The monetary costs of these inputs are often so high that peasant producers are unable to obtain the necesary cash. However, the rental market, the system of lending/borrowing equipment among friends and neighbours, hire-purchase deals offered by the manufacturers and merchants of Söke, and long-term credit systems provide these producers the means of access to needed implements. Among all the instruments of production, the

tractor, which, under present technological conditions, is indispensible to cotton production, represents the single largest item of cost. Although the cost of a tractor varies according to its horse-power, its age and make, the average cost of a new tractor in 1984 was about 1,000,000 TL. ($2500 approx.), or the gross income obtained from twenty five decares of cotton.[4] The equipment needed to accompany the tractor can be divided into two categories: items that are used continuously and that have to be purchased by producers and those that are used sporadically and can be hired. Steel-bladed ploughs, disk-harrows, inter-row cultivators, seed planters, electrical water pumps, and trailers must be counted among the former and amount to a total expenditure of 150,000 TL.[5]

The second type of equipment is used less frequently in the production process and is also more expensive: land levellers (180,000 TL.), ridge builders used in preparing the field for irrigation (310,000 TL.), land rollers (200,000 TL.), modern seed-planters (90,000 TL.) and pesticide sprayers (150,000 TL.) belong into this group. Compared to the implements listed above, few farmers own these larger machines. Most of these more expensive implements are time- and labour-saving devices which have been developed and introduced among Söke farmers within the last seven years. Every year, new advances in the design of these implements are made and these are promptly adopted by the peasant farmers of Söke.[6] The most important effect of technological improvement is to alter the labour-cash balance of the peasant farm. Once these improvements are made available, peasants have the option of subsituting cash for labour or labour for cash depending on their specific needs. However, since for peasants cash rather than labour is the scarce resource, these improvements do represent a load to the poorer farmers who are forced by competitive conditions into large cash outlays.

Costs incurred for improving the land are also considerable. Digging draining canals on the perimeter of a thirty-decare field requires the labour of five men for a period of seven days and represents a cost of 61,250 TL. The cost of hiring a leveller (including the tractor) amounts to

90,000 TL. (3000 TL/da.), the total coming to more than 150,000 TL. which equals the total cost of the more 'traditional' tractor-drawn implements referred to above.

The establishment of a new household through marriage represents another form of long-term cost. This cost is partly of an economic nature, in the sense that the obligation to marry off children is the precondition for the availability of the latters' labour to the household enterprise. It is through the staging of marriage ceremonies that the personnel of a household enterprise can increase and reproduce itself over time. The cost of marrying off a son amounts to more than 1,000,000 TL., a sum that cannot be covered by the income of a single year's production.[7] Even when spread over a period of two or three years, few Tuz households can shoulder such costs without borrowing.

For the majority of peasant producers in Tuz, circulating costs are composed of money spent for seed, fuel, pesticides, fertilisers, and labour. These costs vary greatly according to each particular case involved. Labour costs, as I explain in the following chapter, change according to the number of workers (male and female) available within the household. The amount spent for pesticides depends on the situation in each field; fuel expenses increase according to distance of the field from the village and the number of separate plots cultivated. Below is a hypothetical cost table for a tractor-owning producer who pays only for unmechanised labour:

Table 8.1 Expenditure Per Decare for Annual Inputs in Cotton Production

Item	TL/da.
Seed	1000
Fuel	3000
Fertiliser	2500
Pesticide	1000
Irrigation	550*
Labour	8000**
Total	**16050**

* This represents the cost of hiring an additional tractor required to pump water into the main irrigation canal. The landowner's tractor is used to divert the water from the canal into the field. Distance and position of the field may make a third tractor necessary.
**Labour costs include hoeing (3000 TL/da.) and harvesting (5000 TL/da.) costs on a field where yields average 200kg./da. The cost of harvesting would increase to 6250 TL./da. if the yields were to reach 250 kg./da.

The table indicates that labour costs (excluding mechanised labour) amount to one half of the costs of production. Supposing that all this cash is borrowed at current market rates, interest would account for an additional 12,800 TL. (16,000 × 80 %), bringing the total cash costs to 28,800 TL./da. Cash is in fact a larger cost than labour and accounts for about 44 % of total costs. Having to hire a tractor also doubles the monetary production costs.[8] According to these figures, a total of about 480,000 TL is required to cultivate a thirty-decare field. Thus, the fixed and circulating cash costs of an average cotton producer in Tuz who owns thirty decares of land are as follows:

Table 8.2 Total Fixed and Circulating Costs Needed to Cultivate 30 Decares of Cotton

Tractor	1,000,000 TL.
Implements (minimum)	150,000 TL.
Land Improvements	150,000 TL.
Circulating Costs	480,000 TL.
TOTAL	1,780,000 TL.

Farmers in Tuz often need to borrow in order to meet short-term cash requirements as well as long-term commitments. Small to medium-sized

farmers cultivate between 30 and 60 decares of cotton on land which in general yields 200-250 kilogrammes of cotton per decare. By 1984 sale prices, this amounts to a gross income of 34,000-42,500 TL. per decare. About 16,000 TL. per decare is required to meet circulating costs; this leaves a 'net' income of 18,000-26,500 TL. per decare, excluding rent, interest, the cost of machinery, and depreciation.[9] For a 30-decare field this would put the cash income to 540,000-795,000 TL. Out of this income, the producer must provide for daily reproduction; moreover, s/he needs money to buy new implements and begin the next agricultural cycle. With only 30 decares of land, this is clearly impossible. Yearly subsistence costs vary between 500,000 TL. and 800,000 TL. according to the degree of saving on consumption or subsistence production undertaken by each household.[10] A farmer planting 60 decares of land, can, on the other hand, meet consumption needs as well as circulating costs.[11] 11. 60 decares × 200 kg./da yield = 12,000 kg. × 170 TL./kg. = 2,040,000 TL. gross income - 960,000 (16,000 TL./da × 60 decares) TL. circulating costs = 1,000,000 TL. 'net' income. After consumption expenditures, 200,000-500,000 TL. will be available to this farmer for investment in land and machinery.) Whether such a farmer can invest in improved equipment depends primarily on the price that cotton fetches relative to the price of inputs.

Circulating costs may be covered by the income obtained from the sale of cotton. As I have shown above, cash inputs for the duration of one cycle of production constitute less than 50 % of the gross income. But producers rarely have that cash ready <u>before</u> they enter into the production process. Even the medium-sized farmer cultivating 60 decares of land needs 450,000-750,000 TL. before the harvest in order to meet production expenditures as they arise. Therefore, most farmers in Tuz are indebted by the time their crop is ready to be sold. As a result of these debts, farmers sell their produce immediately after the harvest, when the price is lowest. The following year, they need to borrow once again to begin cultivating.[12]

Since production decisions are closely related to conditions within the household, there is a great deal of variation in the amounts that peasants borrow each year. Attempts to enlarge the scale of production

depend on the needs of the household and new investments may be necessary. For example, in 1984, one farmer cultivating 70 decares stated that he had borrowed about 500,000 TL., while another planting 45 decares of cotton had borrowed one million. In the latter instance it was the first time that the farmer was undertaking land improvements. Chance factors such as an above-average yield, or a more than normal rise in the selling price of cotton may allow farmers to accumulate enough savings to enter into production without having to borrow. In 1987, after the declaration of an early general election in November, the government offered 600 TL./kg., a rise of over 100 %. A favourable international price and subsidies offered by the government to cotton exporters allowed merchants to raise the price by 100 TL. Thus, many farmers will be able to pay their debts and start the new cycle of production without having to borrow. Many farmers also use a 'good' year to enlarge their farming enterprise by buying (or renting) land and/or machines; they also profit from a good income to finalise marriage transactions. Thus, the extent of indebtedness may in fact increase at the end of a successful cycle of cultivation.

The relationship between the rate of investment in agriculture and the price of cotton shows that the two are interdependent. In table 8.3 below I show the effect of a good price for cotton (calculated as a more than average increase in the yearly price of raw cotton) on capital investment represented by the first tractor the farmer buys.[13] But, since the factors that influence the timing of the purchase are too numerous, the correlation is not perfect:

Table 8.3 Number of First-Ever Tractors Purchased According to Year of Purchase and Increase in the Price of Raw Cotton

Year	No. of Tractors	Price of Cotton (TL.)	% Increase
1971	2	3.30*	20*
1972	5	3.6	11
1973	7	5.8	59
1974	5	7.8	34
1975	10	7.8	0
1976	9	?	?
1977	4	11	?
1978	6	15	36
1979	10	28	87
1980	2	52	86
1981	5	65	25
1982	1	78	20
1983	3	120	54
1984	4	170	42

*The prices of cotton for the years 1971-1975 are the figures declared by the government (See Merkez Bankasi, n.d.) I have no information on the price received by Söke producers. The later figures, on the other hand, represent the price obtained by Söke producers.

8.2 Sources of Cash

The cost structures examined above indicate that cotton producers in Tuz require large sums of cash both for long-term investments and for the short-term inputs needed for one cycle of production. The majority of the producers in Tuz have to resort to borrowing in order to meet these cash requirements. While in a good year, it may be possible to enter production without contracting any debts for circulating costs, indebtedness for long-term fixed costs is usually inevitable. In the Söke region, there are various sources of credit available to village producers. These sources range from the state-backed Agricultural Marketing Cooperative (Taris), and the state-owned Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) to the various private banks and traders established in Söke and in Tuz itself. Borrowing from kin and neighbours is also possible. The basic strategy used by producers is to borrow in small quantities from as many different sources as possible. In other words, the cash required for each task is considered separately and the funds needed to undertake the task at hand are obtained as the need arises.

8.2.1 Sources of Cash for Long-Term Investments

In order to undertake long-term investments, the majority of small to medium farmers need to borrow money. There are a number of exceptions to this general statement which need to be considered. Firstly, as I have already indicated, the semi-nomadic yürük have had the possibility of using the income obtained from the sale of their flocks of sheep and goats to set up an agricultural enterprise. Thus, for example, the first tractor in Tuz was bought by a wealthy eski yürük family who had been raising more than 200 head of sheep. As I have shown in the previous chapter, it was the late-settling yeni yürük who obtained most of their land through purchase financed by the sale of their flocks. For the muhacir, on the other hand, olive groves and hill-side gardens received from the government constitute accumulated wealth which may be transformed into capital through sales. But since these gardens constitute means of saving cash by reducing cash expenditure on food, not too many farmers are prepared to take the risk of selling them to invest in the commodity sphere. In these different ways, assets accumulated through forms of production current in the past have been capitalised during the process of transition to cotton production:

Table 8.4 Land and Tractor Ownership According to Ethnicity

	ey	yy	m	o
No. of landowners	34	35	52	2
Amount owned (da.)	1743	1845	2899	64
No. of tractors owned	25	31	37	0

Secondly, capital accumulated in other branches of production can be transferred to agriculture. The transport sector has, in recent years, functioned as an important source of accumulation. Instead of buying land and tractors, newly married men have been buying minibuses which were available at relatively cheap prices. State banks, in particular the People's Bank (Halk Bankasi), have also been extending credit at relatively good terms to small investors in the transport sector. After working as minibus drivers for a few years, many of these men have sold their minibuses and invested in land and tractors.[14] Movement in the opposite

direction is also possible. A Tuz man who had attempted to enlarge his farm by renting land from Tan in 1984, lost his crop and had to sell his tractor and a twenty-decare plot. After settling his debts, he bought a minibus and has entered into an association with a firm of cloth manufacturers who sell door-to-door. For a fixed monthly salary (including the cost of the fuel), he now drives the travelling saleswomen who sell their wares to (female) customers.

Other income generating activities can be carried on in conjunction with cotton production. Raising cattle for sale as meat is one possible option, since it can be carried out during the winter months in the village and uses the labour available within the household. Women, usually older and married, tend the animals. The difficulties of finding grazing land in the winter and the increasing cost of animal fodder limit the extent to which this activity can be undertaken. Fishing (in the fish pond managed by the village cooperative, or on the open sea) is another alternative way of increasing income. The income generated in this way is not very large, and is often used to finance daily consumption, thus allowing producers to use the income derived from the sale of cotton for investment in agricultural production.

Savings can to some extent, be used in the purchase of tractors and other expensive implements, since these are often sold through hire-purchase arrangements. Thus, if the selling price of cotton yields an income above the amount of debt, producers immediately use the cash to buy a new machine (or to pay for its first installment). Another form of savings with which land and/or machines can be purchased is the gold received as part of the transfer of property from one generation to the next. In other words, marriage practices create a form of forced savings that can be used to acquire capital goods needed in cotton production.[15]

The state and local private merchants and banks are the two main sources of long-term credit. Due to the development of capital markets, there is no shortage of credit, although it is neither abundant nor cheap. The Agricultural Bank, has until recently, been the main source of credit needed to purchase tractors. Using his/her land as collateral, the small

producer has been able to borrow from the bank up to 75 % of the cost of a tractor. Tractors are purchased from private dealers who are the local agents of the manufacturers. The farmer pays the initial 25 % of the cost to the Agricultural Bank; the bank then pays the total cost to the dealer. As a result, the farmer becomes indebted to the bank which offers loans up to five years at a low interest rate.

Many of the Tuz farmers (84 %) , however, did not buy their tractors with funds supplied by the bank. Rather than buying new tractors, Tuz villagers first buy a second-hand tractor from someone they know in the district. The close social contact that can be established between villagers serves to adjust the terms of the purchase to the needs of the two parties involved. Modes of payment other than cash can also be used. For instance, in one case, a man gave a part of his olive grove in return for a relatively new tractor. After using it for a few years, farmers sell the out-dated tractor through a town dealer, who accepts the old tractor as a down-payment for a new one. Private dealers usually extend credit to producers through hire purchase arrangements. The extent of the initial down-payment, and the terms of the loan are negotiated; connections and other social mechanisms can always be activated. Although the interest rate paid to dealers is higher than the Bank's rate, many producers who can not show a land title have no choice but to use the dealers. Since 1985, a new manufacturer trying to capture a share of the market offered tractors to producers on very favourable terms.

Once the initial down-payment is made (whether to the Bank or to the dealer), the farmer is able to put the tractor to productive use immediately. His aim is to repay his debt over a few years by producing cotton. Under average conditions, this is possible by reducing monetary expenditure for labour. This can be achieved in two ways: by using unpaid labour and by reducing yearly cash expenditure for consumption. Moreover, in spite of the increased wear and tear sustained, many farmers in this situation rent their tractors out for cash in order to pay their debts. It is also in order to pay the debt for a new tractor that producers enlarge their scale of cultivation by renting and sharecropping more land than they own or normally farm. Thus even to cover the cost of a large investment,

farmers substitute labour for cash: by using their own and their family's labour, farmers are able to pay their debts. This strategy is not always successful. A bad harvest, undue increases in the costs of production, or a low cotton price may prevent farmers from meeting the yearly instalments and the tractor has to be returned to the dealer.

Other fixed investment goods are bought by producers in much the same fashion. Neighbours, friends, connections, local manufacturers and the state provide the money and/or the implement. As indicated above, the amount of cash necessary to buy these goods is substantially smaller than in the case of tractors, a fact which makes buying that much easier. The state agency that supports these purchases is also the Agricultural Bank. But rather than extend credit to producers directly, it provides funds to State Credit Cooperatives (Tarim Kredi Kooperatifi) established in various parts of the country.[16] Credit Cooperatives extend low-interest credit to its members to enable them to purchase agricultural equipment such as trailers, ploughs, seed-planters, and electric pumps. They also extend credit for fishing and animal husbandry. To become a member of the cooperative, producers have to buy shares and are then entitled to credit up to ten times the value of the share. Moreover, as with the Agricultural Bank, producers have to prove their farming status by showing land deeds or a two-year sharecropping or leasing contract. This limits the extent to which Tuz farmers with their complicated patterns of access to land can use this facility.[17]

Although there are institutionalised channels for obtaining credit to help farmers purchase tractors or other agricultural implements, obtaining long- or medium-term cash loans is more difficult. And yet, it is this type of loan that producers need in order to undertake land improvements and to marry off their children. It is easier to obtain these loans from within the village, whether through kin and neighbours or from moneylenders. The distinction between moneylenders in the village and friends is often not clear, since every long-term cash loan carries some from of interest with it. From the villager's point of view, the moneylender is as much a friend and a neighbour as the trader whose main income is derived from moneylending. Individuals who have accumulated cash

over and above their immediate needs frequently lend money.[18] Especially where small sums (eg. 50,000 TL.) are concerned,lending money yields a higher rate of return on capital compared to bank interest rates. Moreover, demands from neighbours and kin may create an obligation to lend money.[19] Transactions involving cash are therefore subject to the realities of the social intraction between the parties concerned. As the social relationship between the creditor and debtor decreases, the interest rate also falls regardless of the occupation of the creditor who may be a village trader/moneylender. Close kin and/or neighbours end up by borrowing from each other, sometimes for considerable lengths of time, without calculating any interest. Since established moneylenders in the village, like their counterparts in town, prefer to extend short-term circulating credit, producers resort to informal social ties to obtain loans of about fifty to one hundred thousand Turkish liras. For example, when Mehmet needed 80,000 TL. to set up a grocery shop in the village, it was to his elder brother Isa that he turned for a loan.

However it is very difficult to obtain information about the frequency and magnitude of cash transactions between villagers.[20] In many of these cases, previous relations of exchange and indebtedness further obscure the nature of the transaction. A loan may really be the settling of a previous debt, or (especially between close agnates) seen be to couched in the language of obligation and duty. In Isa and Mehmet's case discussed above, Mehmet later claimed that Isa had not been lending him money but paying for a 1.5-decare plot the former had sold to the latter. Isa, by contrast, claimed that the plot was really their mother's and therefore not Mehmet's to sell. The money, therefore, was a loan. In any case, Mehmet never paid back the money he had received from his elder brother.

Apart from labour and social obligations, land can also be used to obtain credit. The most frequent method used by Tuz villagers who do not have the necessary cash to undertake land improvements is to rent their land to individuals who have the means to improve the land. In these cases the landowner leases his/her land for a longer-than-average time period (usually four to five years). The rent is usually lower than the prevailing rates and increases only minimally over the period covering the contract.

This allows the tenant to recuperate some of his/her investment. Renting land at a cheap rate for a fixed period of time is also used by villagers to obtain cash for marriage. For example, in 1985, Ali, Isa's elder brother, rented his 15-decare plot for 600,000 TL. to Isa for a period of four years.[21] With this, and the sale of about fifty olive trees for a sum of 800,000 TL, Ali was able to finance his son Yakup's wedding. By using a combination of all these different ways of obtaining cash or goods, peasant producers short of cash are able to finance fixed capital investments.

As a result of these mechanisms, many of the smaller farmers in Tuz have been able to purchase tractors and other basic farming equipment. As table 8.2 indicates, tractors constitute the largest fixed expenditure item that is required from cotton producers in Tuz. For this reason, ownership of tractors can be used as an indication of accumulated cash. The limited effect of land ownership in this context is demonstrated by the fact that it is not an important determinant of tractor ownership: 26 households do not own any tractors nor any land, while 56 landowners do not own tractors. Fishermen and older couples with no labour available within the household make up the majority of these fifty-six landowners (see chapter 7). Their land is cultivated by tenants and/or sharecroppers. Four households hold joint ownership in tractors.[22] Land becomes important in determining tractor ownership only above the 100 decare mark. Farmers who own more than 100 decares own at least one tractor. Of the three farmers who own more than 150 decares of land, two own two tractors each and one owns five tractors.

The table below shows that most farmers try to buy at least one tractor regardless of the amount of land owned. As a result, the average area cultivated by one tractor is well below maximum tractor capacity. Moreover, it is worth noting that most of the small landowners seem to be able to purchase tractors.

Table 8.5 Distribution of Tractors According to Landownership

Area (da.)	HH no.	Land (da.)	Tractors owned	Area per tractor
0	30	0	3	0
1-10	10	70	2.5*	28
11-30	49	1137	21.5*	53
31-60	54	2514	33	76
61-90	15	1104	14	79
91-120	8	830	10	83
121-150	1	130	1	130
150+	3	766	8	96
Total	170	6551	93	70

* Halves indicate shared tractors.

The table indicates that a little over half of Tuz households have been able to accumulate enough cash to buy tractors and to engage in cotton production. About 42 % of families who do not own tractors cultivate cotton by renting tractors and hope to able to accumulate enough savings to buy tractors in the future.[23] The relative ease with which producers are able to find land through sharecropping and renting arrangements has meant that many newly married men have now the option of investing their gold either in land or in tractors. In both ways savings can be productively utilised and more savings can be generated.

8.2.2 Sources of Cash for Short-Term Circulating Capital

The role of state institutions in providing for the yearly cash needs of peasants is larger than their role in financing long-term needs. Nevertheless, Tuz villagers resort to private as well as state institutions in order to obtain the money needed to cover operating costs. In this instance as well, villagers meet cash needs in a piecemeal fashion and cast the net of borrowing as widely as possible. The three main sources of cash and credit, apart from neighbours and kin, are state institutions such as the state-backed Agricultural Bank, private merchants, banks and traders in Söke, and traders and moneylenders in the village itself. Farmers are provided with assistance both in cash and in kind. Seed, fertilisers and pesticides are, in general, received in kind; cash is used to pay for fuel, wages, and daily consumption.

The Agricultural Bank is able to help producers meet their short-term cash needs in two different ways. Firstly, direct cash loans in the form of yearly credits up to 50,000 TL. are extended to farmers who can produce a land deed. This cash is often far from sufficient to cover all expenses.[24] In Tuz, only 19 farmers (all cultivating more than 100 decares) are able to borrow regularly from the bank. The Agricultural Bank also provides assistance by subsidising other agencies which extend loans in cash and in kind. Marketing cooperatives, the Zirai Donatim Kurumu (Agricultural Supply Instititution), and Credit Cooperatives function as subsidiaries of the Agricultural Bank.

The state provides for the cash needed for circulating capital by backing credit cooperatives. As mentioned above, membership and degree of assistance received depend on the amount of shares owned (and therefore on the amount of savings a producer can accumulate). About half of the Tuz producers use the cooperative to obtain all or a portion of their cash requirements. Not all people who borrow from the cooperative are members. Borrowing is also possible by using a friend or kinsman's (or kinwoman's) membership, or simply by being on good terms with the cooperative officials. The amount of cash obtained from the cooperative depends on the amount of muscle the producer can muster and the funds available at the cooperative. The latter are rather limited due to insufficient backing from the agricultural bank and the small numbers of producers who can provide funds.[25] The cooperative also gives assistance in kind, and about thirty-five producers in Tuz state that they regularly use this channel to obtain fertilisers and pesticide.

The institutions that receive the largest support from the Agricultural Bank are the marketing cooperatives.[26] Although the main function of these institutions is to offer the producer a stable market price throughout the year, these cooperatives also act as the small farmers' main creditor. Instead of extending credit in cash, Taris supports farmers by providing them with the inputs (seed, fertiliser, and pesticide) they need.[27] To join the cooperative, farmers have to show a title deed, or a sharecropping contract. Each year, farmers declare the amount of cotton they hope to sell to the cooperative and receive loans in kind in

proportion to this amount. A farmer who consistently defaults on this pledge loses his/her membership (Soral 1981:24).[28] Debts accumulated during the process of production are deducted from the price of the cotton sold by the producer.

A number of structural features have hampered the ability of the marketing cooperatives to function adequately. The insufficiency of cash, bureaucratic procedures and bad management have produced deficits in the cooperative's budget and resulted in long delays in paying the producer. Many of the inputs have not been available on time and producers have had to obtain many of their inputs on the free market. Moreover, the cooperative which buys cotton at the price declared by the state has to compete with merchants. When the subsidy price is higher than market prices, producers try to sell most of their crop to the cooperative. This creates shortages of cash. By contrast, when the market is above the subsidy price, Taris is not able to make enough purchases to sustain itself. Since 1982, when the government began to subsidise cotton exporters, Taris prices have been substantially lower than market prices, and many producers have stopped using the cooperative altogether.[29]

Farmers in Tuz, in an effort to spread risks as widely as possible, borrow from and sell their crop to merchants as well as Taris. Because the cooperative does not extend cash loans, the producer always needs other sources of credit as well. The necessity to settle these (and other long-term) debts immediately after the harvest means that the farmer cannot afford to wait for Taris to effect payments. Thus, the majority of the farmers pledge only a portion of their crop to Taris. Since producers receive seed and fertiliser on the basis of this pledge, and since these loans carry a minimum of interest, many continue to maintain relations with the cooperative. If merchants offer a higher price, or immediate cash, they normally default on these pledges. In this way, producers try to make use of the low-interest loans in kind offered by the cooperative as much as possible, without jeopardising their chances of obtaining better prices on the free market. The table below indicates the relationship between amount of cotton pledged and amount produced:

Table 8.6 Amount of Pledges to Taris According to Amount of Cotton Produced

Average land (da.)	hh no.	Average yield.* (tonnes)	Pledge (tonnes)	Pledge/Yield %
350	1	87	30	34
247	1	62	40	64
220	1	55	15	27
150	1	37	2	5
110	1	27	7	26
105	13	26	10	38
100	1	25	20	80
90	2	22	9	41
80	5	20	8	40
79	18	19	6	31
78	13	19	5	26
77	4	19	4	21
62	5	15	3	20
38	1	9	4.5	50
20	2	5	1.5	30

*These figures do not reflect the actual amount of cotton produced by farmers but are only probable figures calculated on the basis of average yields (250 kg./da.) in the region.

Tuz farmers pledge anything between 20 and 80 % of their total produce to the cooperative. On average, all producers pledge about one third of their produce to Taris. There is no visible correspondence between amount of cotton produced and amount of cotton pledged to Taris. Scale of activities does not influence the proportion of cotton pledged to the cooperative either. Moreover, the table only shows the pledges, and not the amount of cotton actually delivered.[30] There is a high rate of default on the pledges, a fact that further reduces the amount of cotton received by Taris.

Nevertheless, the data indicate that the majority of small to medium farmers in Tuz do not pledge cotton to and therefore do not borrow from Taris at all:

Table 8.7 Use of Taris According to Amount of Land Cultivated

Area	No of farmers	Farmers Pledging	% of total	Total pledged (tonnes)	Average pledged (tonnes)
1-10	8	1	14	3	3
11-30	41	14	34	55	4
31-60	36	15	42	86	6
61-90	17	14	82	83	6
91-120	11	11	100	91	8
121-150	11	9	82	58	6
150+	7	6	86	104	17

Larger farmers all pledge a certain amount to Taris, but keep the bulk of their produce for merchants.[31] In this way, the larger farmers have the possibility of taking as much advantage as possible of the cheaper loans available at the state cooperative as well as enjoying the higher cotton prices offered by merchants. The smaller farmers, by contrast, are less likely to use Taris. The fact that many of these cannot produce land deeds is also an important factor that prevents them from using the cooperative.[32] Their dependence on merchants for credit as well as for marketing their crop is therefore proportionally higher.

Pledges indicate the amount of circulating credit farmers obtain from Taris. The tables show that, in spite of the higher rate of interest charged, all Tuz producers rely on merchants to a larger extent than they do on state institutions. The majority of the small cultivators in Tuz obtain credit from the merchants/moneylenders in the village. Larger producers, by contrast, have better access to private individuals as well as institutions in Söke. The greater volume of activity of these larger farmers links them to many traders in Söke. Furthermore, it is these producers who are able to buy the more expensive modern machines and who, by virtue of the amount of land at their disposal, own more than one tractor. The private agencies active in the area supply these producers with credit both in cash and in kind.

Many of the large banks have branches in Söke and provide credit to applicants with good collateral and sound references. These charge a yearly rate of interest that varies between 72 and 80 %.[33] Only the three

large producers of Tuz are able to use these sources of credit, since it is they who have the necessary contact and enough land to be credit-worthy. Owners of gin-mills, tractor dealers, and others trading in cotton, in agricultural inputs, or in machines in Söke make up the majority of the sources of credit for Tuz farmers. Good relations established as a result of trade over long periods of time provide the basis for confidence. Some of these traders allow producers to buy on credit and are paid after the harvest. Cotton traders, for example, also trade in seed and fertiliser: the producer buys the inputs s/he needs from the trader and pays back when s/he sells the produce. The interest charged by these traders varies considerably. The large numbers of individuals who set up as cotton traders serves to create a competitive market and keep interest rates in line with those obtaining in the economy at large.

Village moneylenders also have important links to town banks and merchants. Three individuals are operating as cotton traders in Tuz, providing farmers with cash, seed and fertiliser and buying the produce at harvest. These traders buy cotton produced in Tuz as well as in three other villages in the vicinity. They also extend cash loans that vary in size according to the capital at their disposal. The majority of these traders obtain seed on credit from various traders and gin-mill owners in Söke and distribute them to farmers. Interest on the amount of the loan (whether in cash or in kind) and transport costs are deducted when the producer sells his/her crop. As a result, the price at which producers sell their crop in the village may be lower than that prevalent in Söke. As with town merchants, competition between village merchants is an important factor that keeps interest rates below usurious levels.[34]

While the older, more established traders in the village are able to operate on their own capital, newcomers with limited capital act as agents of Söke traders.[35] The only profit that the latter can make is the commission that their bosses (patron) in Söke offer them. After a while, these individuals try to find credit in Söke which they distribute in the village at a slightly higher rate of interest. In this way, they hope to accumulate enough capital in order to set up as independent traders.[36] But villagers in Tuz prefer to deal with one of the more established merchants

since their trading practices are more reliable. The source of profit for these merchants is the higher selling price they can obtain by waiting and watching market trends. The larger capital stock they have accumulated allows these traders to obtain an average return on capital without engaging in usurious practices. Some of them sell directly to traders in Izmir and others can afford to wait for the highest bidder.[37] The demand for cash and the amount of cotton produced in the village exceed the capacities of the more established traders; this creates the space filled by the newly emerging moneylenders.[38]

The more established village traders also extend loans in cash and in kind needed to meet daily consumption needs. One of the traders is also the owner of a grocery store from which villagers can purchase goods on credit. As I showed in chapter 2, while some villagers are able to repay these debts after the cotton harvest, others have to settle their debt by working as cotton pickers on the shopowner's fields. Labour is the poor farmer's main form of payment for most of the circulating capital s/he needs. Between kin and neighbours, short-term credit is extended in the form of a loan in kind. These loans are part of the system of reciprocity that links the various households in the village to one another. Cash, an item which is part of the commodity sphere is not an integral part of these exchange mechanisms.[39] Thus, from a close neighbour a farmer can borrow a plough without having to make any payment. The only obligation contracted would be an unspoken agreement to return such a favour when needed. Items which are more capitalised require a direct return. Seed, fertilisers and tractors all have a price attached to them and the return can only be effected by advancing an equivalent. Thus a tractor can be rented in return for seed, for labour, or for cash. The close social relation between villagers means that interest on these loans is rarely calculated.[40]

In 1984, 19 producers in Tuz received all the cash they needed from village merchants, while another 23 farmers combined credit obtained from village merchants with other sources. About 40 farmers, most of whom cultivating less than 30 decares, received all their seed from village traders, and another 36 obtained seed from other sources as well.

Depending on the amount of cash at their disposal at the beginning of the cultivating season, producers decide who to borrow from and how much. On this basis, they revise their pledges to Taris and establish links with village traders. As the season progresses, new needs arise.[41] In general, an average farmer cultivating between 30 and 60 decares, will obtain the bulk of his/her seed, half of his/her fertilisers from Taris, pesticides and cash for fuel from the credit cooperative and cash for wages and other needs from an established village trader. Smaller farmers cannot be so flexible since they do not have enough accumulated cash. Therefore, they obtain all their requirements from one of the village traders to whom they subsequently sell all of their crop.

Large farmers, by contrast, receive the bulk of the credit they need from Söke banks, traders and gin-mill owners. These farmers need more cash than smaller producers since costs increase with area cultivated. The largest cash need of these farmers occurs during the harvest, for as the size of the farm increases, the possibility of using unpaid village labour decreases and wages become an important cash item. Most of the large farmers maintain links with Taris and other state institutions to whom they sell only a small portion of their harvest.[42] Due to the larger amount of land and capital available to them, these farmers have frequent contacts with the various town merchants and dealers, buying new equipment, spare parts and receiving repair services. This allows them to build up long-term business links and to establish their credit-worthiness. Thus, compared to small farmers, they are in a better position to obtain credit in town.

8.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to determine the role and magnitude of cash in peasant production in Tuz. Regardless of the scale of operations involved producers must have access to a certain amount of cash before they can begin cultivating cotton. They need to obtain cash regularly in order to reproduce themselves and their means of production. This necessity links them to capital markets in the region and in Turkey as a whole.

Capital markets in Turkey are composed of state-backed institutions which are supposed to extend credit to farmers at a relatively cheap rate and of private traders and banks trying to realise the normal rate of return to capital. The resulting structure of the market is an outcome of this co-existence. As long as state policy provided farmers with loans and credit on good terms, farmers could obtain cheap credit. Following new economic policies progressively adopted since 1983, the withdrawal of state assisstance had the effect of increasing the role of private institutions and individuals. At the moment, the recent dominance of private interests in the agricultural credit sector has not affected peasant production negatively because competition among the various private agencies keeps interest on credit within normal limits. In either case, the role of usury in the process of production has been quite minimal.[43]

The national economy, to a large extent, determines the rate of return on investment in various sectors of the economy. Tuz farmers, particularly those with small capital resources, are quite responsive to these changes: investment in the transport sector in the early nineteen-eighties and in the moneylending sector since 1985 attests to this mobility. Large farmers are able to accumulate enough cash to enable them to diversify: the three large landowners of Tuz have all invested in trading by setting up grocery shops in the village as well as investing in other agricultural pursuits such as raising milch cows. Nevertheless, the conditions of cotton production have remained such that many small landowners in Tuz and in the Söke plain as a whole still find it an acceptable form of making a living. Medium-sized farmers are able to invest in improved machinery and therefore keep abreast of developments that increase land productivity in spite of the additional cash burdens incurred. Many of the landowning fishermen in the village have been trying to find ways of switching to cotton production. In the last five years, many fields which in 1978 were lying idle have been turned over to cotton production.

To a considerable extent, these developments have been possible as credit is readily available in capital markets and mechanisms of exchange within the village by-pass the use of cash. Both long- and short-term cash needs can be met through careful management of these channels. The

interesting point is that village-based producers in Söke have in general been able to shoulder the financial burden caused by involvement in capital and commodity circuits, while many of the large-scale town-based producers have withdrawn from producing cotton. It is impossible to understand how village producers are able to operate under the conditions of production prevalent in the region unless the role of unpaid household labour is considered. I shall therefore turn now to the mechanisms by which Tuz producers secure a more or less dependable supply of labour without resorting to major outlays of cash.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. See Kahn (1980, chapters 5 and 7) for an analysis of the role of capital in peasant-based petty commodity production.

2. Land and labour can also be considered as representing both long-term and short term investments: wages are consumed within one cycle of production and yet household labour is a longer-term asset. Similarly land when purchased is a long-term investment but rent is not.

3. The distinction drawn between production and consumption in studies assessing the extension of credit by the state to agricultural producers in Turkey does not take into account the extent to which production and consumption are linked in household-based enterprises (Aydin 1980:331; Hale 1981:180). These studies argue in my view mistakenly that the extension of credit by the state has not been beneficial to the small farmer because s/he uses short-term credits to buy 'consumption' items.

4. In 1984 $ 1=TL. 400. 25 da. × 250 kg./da. × 170 TL./kg. = 1,062,500 TL. In 1986, new tractors cost more than six million TL, or the gross income obtained from 85 decares of cotton (85×250×285). Including interest, the total cost of a tractor in 1986 amounted to about 10 million TL. Unless indicated, all cash costs refer to 1984 prices.

5. The cost of hoes, harvesting aprons and jute sacks for packing cotton is minimal.

6. Since 1984, new inter-row cultivators have drastically reduced the amount of (mostly female) labour necessary to hoe cotton fields. Mechanical ridge makers cut the amount of male labour required in the construction of irrigation dams. See chapter 6.

7. About half of this sum is spent for building a new house and the other half is needed to purchase gold.

8. In 1984, a tractorless landowner paid 17,000 TL/da. to have his field ploughed and irrigated; as a result of this added expenditure, his cost per decare would amount to 29,500 TL. The rate for hiring tractors was 1000 TL/da. to plough the field and 1000 TL/da. to have it irrigated. Another producer who has to hire a tractor maintained that his net income would more than double if he were to buy his own tractor.

9. As indicated in chapter 6, small farmers do not include the latter in their costs of production nor do they calculate labour costs.

10. Because of the variation in consumption and subsistence production patterns, obtaining household budgets proved to be a very difficult task. Moreover, villagers do not like to discuss money unless it is to prove their largesse. The figures quoted above were provided by two household heads who apart from production costs, had also roughly calculated what they had spent in food, clothing and recreation in 1984. Both of these heads of households did not own hill-side gardens and olive groves and were therefore largely dependent on the market for food.

12. The difference in price obtained in October and in January of the following year can be staggering. For example, in 1985, most producers sold their crop for 285 TL./kg. Three months later, the price had gone up to 450 TL./kg.!

13. I chose to use the first tractor ever purchased by a farmer as an indication of capital investment since this constitutes an essential means of producing cotton under present conditions and since it constitutes, after land, the single largest cost item.

14. An emigrant from a village in the Söke district, has been able to buy 31 decares of land with the money he obtained from the sale of his minibus. He could not, however, buy a tractor until 1987.

15. In 1986, Isa bought 15 decares of land and registered it in the name of his married son, Ibrahim. He paid 1,600,000 TL, and to make available the money he needed, he sold the gold bracelets and chain he had bought for his daughter-in-law.

16. The Söke Credit Cooperative was established in 1931 with the financial backing of large landlords as well as the state. In 1960, another was established in Bahçe, a large village fifteen kilometres east of Tuz.

17. Nevertheless, at least ten farmers I knew had bought a part of their equipment through such loans. One of them was not even a member and had used 'connections' to obtain a loan. Since the officials at the cooperative proved as uncooperative as some of the Tuz farmers, I could not find out the exact number of transactions effected through the cooperative.

18. It is very difficult to find out the number of individuals who engage in this type of trade as a side activity.

19. For example when Sefer needed to buy gold for his son's marriage in 1985, he turned to Mesut, an elderly man without any children. Mesut owns 70 decares of cotton which he turns over to a sharecropper and the income he obtains is well above the needs of his two-person household. Sefer had the right to ask him for the loan because he and his children had been helping Mesut with small services. For example, it was Sefer who opened a well in Mesut's garden in 1978, and who also delivered him fish on a regular basis.

20. In spite of my close relation with both Isa and Mehmet, it was through mere chance that I found out about the loan.

21. This puts the yearly rent at 10,000 TL/da., at a time when land rents were a little above that 12,000-15,000. TL/da.

22. In only one of these cases does inheritance account for joint tractor ownership. In the other three, it was lack of sufficient cash and/or land that necessitated the joint purchase of a tractor. Households that invest in a joint tractor purchase are also involved in joint land cultivation and are often related through kinship ties. In one case, the men in question are father-and-son, in another case, the joint owners are brothers, and in the third instance, they are brothers-in-law (ZH-WB). Moreover, many of

the producers who now own tractors state having purchased their first tractor jointly with others.

23. 34 % rent their land or give it to sharecroppers and 23 % obtain their income from non-agricultural pursuits.

24. In certain circumstances, these loans can even work to the peasants' disadvantage. Aydin (1980:337-44) shows the ways in which big landlords and various merchants in the Ergani district of southeastern Turkey make use of these inadequate funds to enlarge their own capital fund as well as to further peasants' indebtedness.

25. As I shall explain below, competition from the private sector also limits the number of producers willing to depend on the credit cooperatives.

26. Between 1975 and 1982, over 50 % of all the new loans provided by the Agricultural Bank were distributed to producers via marketing cooperatives (DIE:1983b). These cooperatives were established in 1914 by merchants exporting agricultural produce. Since 1935, they have acquired the status of semi-state organisations that are supervised by the Ministry of Commerce. Their main function is to buy crops from the direct producer at the subsidy price which the government has declared every year since 1966. The cooperative is then supposed to process the raw product (e.g. gin cotton) and market it in Turkey or export it overseas. Profits are to be shared among members. Fourteen such cooperatives exist in various parts of Turkey and provide specialised assistance to the producers of various export crops such as figs, cotton, hazelnuts, olives, grapes and others (Soral 1981). The marketing cooperative active in the Aegean region is called Taris and subsidises olives, figs as well as cotton grown in the region.

27. The Agricultural Supply Institution also sells seed, pesticide and insecticide to producers at subsidised prices. There is no credit involved in these sales. The necessity to pay cash on purchase drastically hampers the ability of producers to take advantage of the lower prices it offers.

28. Taris also accepts cotton from non-members at a slightly lower price.

29. The imposition of a selling tax of 7 % has reduced considerably the amount of cotton sold by producers to Taris. The Taris General Director declared to a daily newspaper in 1988 that the cooperatives were able to purchase only 10 % of the total cotton crop in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 30.1.1988).

30. I do not have figures showing the rate of default. A few scattered examples show that it can be as much as 100 %.

31. Of the 29 producers cultivating more than 90 decares of cotton, only four have nothing to do with the cooperative.

32. Many farmers in the smaller brackets cultivate land via renting/sharecropping arrangements, or land that is disputed or held jointly.

33. In 1984, government efforts to tap the savings of the small earner resulted in these rather high rates of interest. Some banks, however, charged as low as 50 %.

34. By 1987, three more villagers have been able to set up as cotton traders, thus increasing the competition even further. As long as market prices for cotton are above those offered by the state, there is still room for more traders in the region, since the volume of cotton produced exceeds the buying capacity of all the traders taken together. The contraction of Taris activities in cotton production means that even members of the cooperative rely to some extent on village traders.

35. In 1983, a landless man set up as a cotton buying agent without any capital at all. Low cotton prices in 1984 forced him to leave trading. By 1987, however, he had reestablished himself as a respectable trader.

36. The interest rates charged by moneylenders can be as high as 100 %.

37. The majority of the villagers in fact preferred one of these traders because he consistently charged borrowers bank rates. Furthermore, he worked with a fixed profit margin and shared with the producer any unexpected increase in the selling price of cotton. Thus, when in one instance, he sold at 220 TL./kg. cotton which he bought at a rate of 92 TL./kg, he paid the producer an extra 110 TL./kg.

38. Since 1982, the private sector has been handling a larger portion of trade in cotton as a result of government policy. The increase in the cash costs of cotton production as a result of the introduction of new technology is another factor that makes the emergence of moneylenders and the increase in their numbers possible.

39. Cash is borrowed from other villagers, as I showed in the previous section. But, this cash is part of long-term borrowing structures and involves calculation of interest.

40. Usually such debts are settled by the end of the harvesting season. Individuals who consistently put off payments find that fewer people are prepared to help them out.

41. Farmers do not buy pesticide until they know how much they they will need. In some years, they may even not need to buy any. Similarly, they only borrow cash for wages when the harvest has already begun.

42. Other state institutions such as the credit cooperatives cannot usually provide the amount of credit needed by these producers, thus forcing them to rely on the private capital market.

43. Aydin shows that crops other than those destined to be exported overseas, notably wheat, receive little government subsidy and that in the East of Turkey, usury is still widespread in those branches of agricultural production (1980:348,369).

CHAPTER 9: ACCESS TO LABOUR

Forms of labour recruitment have constituted an important aspect of the debate on modes/forms of production in agriculture. Although the existence of wage labour has been identified as the characteristic distinctive of capitalist production, the complexity of such relationships in the agricultural sector has led many of the protagonists of the debate to reject the use of wage labour as a means of identifying the capitalist nature of rural production. However, in most of the theoretical approaches, the absence of wage labour still remains as one of the basic features characterising family labour farms, peasants, or petty commodity producers. Most approaches to the subject are based on the often implicit assumption that these producers meet their labour requirements from within the boundaries of the household. Although various theorists admit the prevalence of wage labour in peasant farms, they interpret it as a demographic corrector rather than a 'normal' (in the statistical as well as the structural sense) feature of these households (cf. Chayanov 1966, Friedmann 1978). Recently, Smith (1984d) has attempted to specify the characteristics of wage labour within petty commodity production. After noting the high incidence of wage labour in petty commodity forms of production, she argues that "the absence of a fully proletarianised, self-reproducing labour force," rather than a lack of wage labour should be seen as the "defining feature" of PCP (Smith 1984d:82).

An analysis of production systems in Söke shows that, under conditions of time constraints, use of hired labour can be a 'normal' aspect of household based production. However, as Smith argues, wage labour does not necessarily indicate the existence of a fully developed labour market, and the fragmentation of the labour force prevents the full mobility of labour. Although peasants in Söke produce commodities within a larger capitalist context, the wage relation is modified by a number of factors associated with systems of exchange inherent within a small peasant community, rather than determined by the logic of commodity exchange. In other words, under conditions of a non-capitalist production process, the

existence of a wage should not be taken as establishing a self-evident relationship between the parties concerned, nor to say anything about the nature of the production system under consideration.

In order to substantiate these claims, I shall analyse the conditions under which different forms of labour are supplied to the farming enterprise, the forms of recruitment and the patterns of remuneration. In Tuz, two basic sources provide the critical manual labour needed for hoeing and harvesting: village labour (including members of the landowning household), and migrant labour. As I already argued, the use of these two different forms of labour produces distinct structures of control and modes of labour organisation, which, in turn, have important consequences for cost structures. In other words, the type of labour used becomes one of the main variables that peasant producers can control in order to reduce cash costs. To understand the different mechanisms used to obtain labour at the lowest cash cost possible, it is necessary to consider the magnitude and determinants of the demand for manual labour on Tuz farms.

9.1. Peasant Production and Manual Labour

To a large extent, the technical requirements of cotton production set the limits for the demand for manual labour. Under conditions of manual hoeing and harvesting, the magnitude of output which is a function of area under production, determines the amount of labour necessary for these operations.[1] In other words, area under production is one of the most important variables that affects the amount of manual labour used by peasant farmers. A look at the amount of labour spent in the various farms of Tuz village will serve to demonstrate the extent to which the input of manual labour is linked to area sown. The figures showing the number of days of manual labour expended in any one farm were obtained in the course of an interview with all the farmers of Tuz (see Appendix 8). Farmers were asked the number of days spent in hoeing and in harvesting in the course of the previous season. Additional adjustments to the figures obtained were made on the basis of previous knowledge of the farm in question.

Table 9.1 Average Expenditure of Manual Labour Days According to Farm Size

Area Sown (da)	No. of farms	Ave. land (da.)	Total Labour (days)*	Average days/da.
1. 0	39	0	0	0
2. 1-10	8	7.69	23	3
3. 11-30	41	23.44	86.4	3.7
4. 31-60	36	45.94	220.3	4.8
5. 61-90	17	74.65	423.4	5.7
6. 91-120	11	105.18	560.1	5.3
7. 121-150	11	142	746.7	5.3
8. 150+	7	238.14	1495	6.3

* Total labour shows the number of days spent hoeing and harvesting in a particular farm. Labour spent on the manual processess of cotton production are for the duration of one cotton planting season only.

The need for manual labour on Tuz farms increases with area sown, but the increase is less than proportional as table 9.1 shows. Average labour spent per decare of land is, for all farms, 4.9 days. While large farmers spend more labour per decare than the average, small farmers spend less. It is nevertheless interesting to note that middle range farmers' needs are comparable regardless of area sown. The reason for the higher expenditure of labour per decare on the larger farms can largely be explained by the use of migrant labour in harvesting cotton on farms larger than 30 decares. These labourers, as argued in chapter 6, work more slowly and less efficiently than local labourers.

Peasant producers in Tuz are able to rely on two different sources of labour to meet these needs. The first of these resources, unpaid household labour, is ultimately limited by the labour power available within the household. However, through various forms of labour exchange mechanisms described below, neighbours and kinsmen within the village (or in neighbouring villages) are transformed into an important source of unpaid labour. In this way, the labour resources of the household are somewhat extended. The second type of labour used is based on paid labour and therefore necessitates the outlay of cash. Use of paid labour increases the monetised costs of production and the amount of accumulated capital and/or credit required by the enterprise. To the extent that peasant producers rely on paid labour, their production strategies approximate that of

capitalist producers. Although a certain proportion of village labour can also be obtained on the basis of a wage, the main source of this form of labour power is seasonal migrants. The use of these different sources of labour varies according to area under production, as the breakdown of the category 'total labour' used in table 9.1 shows:

Table 9.2 Type of Labour Used by Tuz Farms (in average number of days)

Farm Size	Total	HH	Exch.	Hired Vill	Hired Mig.	Total Hired Lab
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-10	23	15	5.2	1.5	1.2	2.7
11-30	86.4	27.1	21.9	25.4	11.9	37.3
31-60	220.3	35.6	28.6	55.9	100.2	156.1
61-90	423.4	61.9	30	137.9	193.6	331.5
91-120	560.1	64.5	38.7	147.3	309.5	456.8
121-150	746.7	83.6	23.1	159.1	481.8	640.9
150+	1495	268.6	22.8	414.3	789.3	1203.6

Except for exchange labour, the number of work days in all the categories of labour increases in absolute magnitude with area sown. Exchange labour, on the other hand, is most important for the middle categories of Tuz farms. The amount of land sown affects firstly the amount of hired labour utilised, particularly the use of migrant labour; the amount of labour provided from within the household is also affected , but to a lesser extent. Given these circumstances, farmers have to consider both the number of workers they will have access to and the amount of cash they can control, before they decide on the amount of land to cultivate. Households lacking both labour power and capital are obliged to find tenants for their land. In order to make the relationship between area sown and type of labour employed clearer, it is necessary to convert the absolute number of labour days worked on the different categories of Tuz farms into percentage values based upon the total of days worked on each category of farm:

Table 9.3. Type of Labour Used by Tuz Farms (as percentage of total farm labour)

Farm Size	% of Farms	HH %	Exch. %	Hired Vill %	Hired Mig %	Total Hired %
0	22.9	0	0	0	0	0
1-10	4.7	65.3	22.8	6.6	5.3	11.9
11-30	24.1	31.4	25.4	29.4	13.8	43.2
31-60	21.2	16.2	13	25.4	45.5	70.9
61-90	10	14.6	7.1	32.6	45.7	78.3
91-120	6.5	11.5	6.9	26.3	55.3	81.6
121-150	6.5	11.2	3.1	21.3	64.4	85.7
150+	4.1	18	1.5	27.7	52.8	80.5

The table shows that, with the exception of the largest farmers, the amount of hired labour utilised increases steadily as area sown increases. The main reason why farmers sowing more than 150 decares use less hired labour lies in the fact that they are able to employ a larger amount of household labour, a fact which shall be explained in the following section. Furthermore, the share of migrant labour in total hired labour also rises as area sown increases. It is interesting to note that on the smaller farms sowing less than 30 decares of cotton, labour provided from the household (hh + exch.) accounts for more than half of all labour employed. Over this limit, the need for hired labour both migrant and village-based is much greater, and the differences between the different categories become less important. In other words, beyond this limit, hired labour becomes a 'normal' aspect of cotton production.

The magnitude of wage labour employed by peasant producers is a function of area sown and number of workers in the household. Labour needed beyond the limit of the household (including labour that is obtained on the basis of exchange labour) can only be acquired by paying a wage.[2] As the figures in table 9.2 show, the larger farmers obtain more than half of their labour requirements from seasonal migrants rather than from the village itself. Compared to local labour, to employ migrant labour means higher cash costs. Farmers employing migrant labourers have to pay for the services of a middleman, cover half of the costs of transport, provide shelter, and advance an important sum of money to prospective workers

(proportional to the number of workers he employs). Certain factors limit the number of wage workers that can be locally obtained. Households which are not involved in cotton production do not rely for subsistence on agricultural wages. They, therefore, cannot be drawn into the agricultural labour force simply by offering them a wage. Cotton producing households, on the other hand, have their own harvest to consider. Therefore, only the promise of wage labour in return can be used to secure an adequate number of village workers. Moreover this offer is only attractive to households which are also farming cotton. Consequently, beyond a certain limit, the employment of migrant labour, that is of workers which are not involved in the production of cotton, becomes imperative despite the higher costs involved.

As can be seen from the tables, Tuz farmers only use a relatively small amount of exchange labour. The category of exchange labour includes only formal arrangements which last for at least one cotton planting season (see section 9.3) and therefore excludes occasional agreements to exchange labour. The important aspect of formal arrangements is the fact that records are kept in terms of kilogrammes of cotton (or days' labour for hoeing) rather than in money terms. Although any outstanding labour debt is settled in cash at the end of the harvest, the wage level adopted at that time is not affected by the daily fluctuations of the wage rate which may occur in between. Occasional exchange labour agreements, by contrast, are always reciprocated in kind and as quickly as possible. Cash payments are therefore totally excluded and many of the producers consider this labour as spent on their own fields.

Within labour arrangements among co-villagers, the boundaries between wage labour and exchange labour are quite fuzzy indeed. To obtain wage labour within the village, a farmer has to be prepared to offer wage labour in return. When cash is paid immediately after the completion of the task, peasants consider it to be wage labour. But, it is often possible to find that the same amount of money is exchanged in a reversed direction a few days after the first exchange when the original employer(s) now become(s) employed on the former employee's fields. During the harvest there often is a slight difference in the wages paid since, the price at which cotton is

picked steadily increases as the season wears on. Therefore, in order to calculate the labour bill of any enterprise, it is necessary to deduce from it the number of days the members of the farm spend working as wage labourers themselves. Formal exchange arrangements are undertaken on the basis of a system of shadow pricing, whereas waged work is predicated on a recuperation of the original wage expenditure. Thus, if we consider hired village labour as one of the non-market ways of obtaining labour, we find that, at most, 64.4 % of the labour is obtained through wage mechanisms alone:

Table 9.4 Percentage of Labour Obtained Through Village Mechanisms as Opposed to Through the Wage Labour Market

Farm Size	Exch+ Own+ Hired Vill. (%)	Hired Migrant. (%)
0	0	0
1-10	94.7	5.3
11-30	86.2	13.8
31-60	54.6	45.5
61-90	54.3	45.7
91-120	44.7	55.3
121-150	35.6	64.4
150+	47.2	52.8

In households where there are large numbers of workers, the use of wage labour in one's own field does not preclude an overall positive labour balance. Acar, who has two sons and five daughters of working age, is in such a position. In the summer of 1984, Acar hired 42 village workers and 86 migrant workers to undertake the manual tasks of his 70-decare farm. He was able to acquire a further 100 days' exchange labour, and his children worked on the household farm for 200 days. That season, the Acar household spent a total of 540 days doing manual labour. As a result, the Acars closed the 1984 cotton season with 112 days' work over and above their own requirements, a figure which represents the number of days for which the household received a wage (540 - (100+200+42+86) = 112). Looking at the same relationship in all Tuz households, we see that, on average, only non-farmers and the smallest farmers (cultivating at most 30 decares of cotton) have a positive labour balance and that households from all groups, depending on area sown and number of workers within the household, hire a certain amount of labour out to other village households:

Table 9.5 Balance of Labour Days Bought and Sold

Farm Size	no.* of workers in hh	total hh lab	total farm lab	balance (hh - farm)	Labour Hired out
0	1.9	66.8	0	+66.8	66.8
1-10	2.6	113.1	23	+90	92.9
11-30	2.8	127.4	86.4	+41.4	78.4
31-60	2.9	104	220.3	-116.4	39.7
61-90	3.4	152.2	423.4	-270.6	60.3
91-120	3.5	145.4	560.1	-414.6	42.2
121-150	3.3	134.9	746.7	-612.7	28.2
150+	4.3	334.3	1495	-1160.7	42.8

* All the figures represent the average for the said category of farmers.

It should be immediately noted that labour in cotton fields can, to some extent, be reciprocated with labour in other commoditised areas of life. On the other hand, labour spent on subsistence gardens or even in olive groves can not be used as a means of paying back for manual labour on cotton fields. However,labour spent in the production of commodities such as cotton and, to a lesser extent, olive oil can be used to pay for the rental of machinery such as tractors. For example, a man who had three unmarried daughters had his 30-decare field ploughed by his eldest duaghter's husband. In return, his unmarried daughters worked for two weeks collecting olives for their brother-in-law. In addition, they received forty kilogrammes of olive oil. Thus, a certain proportion of the labour hired by small farmers is in fact a return for renting tractors. Small farmers or even households who do not undertake the production of cotton can also pay back cash debts by performing labour on the creditor's farm. These mechanisms explain to a certain extent how large farmers can hire a large number of labour hired from within the village while providing only a very small amount of wage labour to their fellow villagers:

Table 9.6 Participation in the Village Labour Market According to Farm Size

Farm Size	Wage Lab. Hired (days)	Wage Lab. Provided (days)	Exch. Lab. Provided (days)
0	0	66.8	0
1-10	1.5	92.9	5.2
11-30	25.4	78.4	21.9
31-60	55.9	39.7	28.6
61-90	137.9	60.3	30
91-120	147.3	42.2	38.7
121-150	159.1	28.2	23.1
150+	414.3	42.8	22.8

9.2 Labour and Cash Costs on Peasant Farms

As the tables above show, labour supplied to Tuz farms is drawn from a variety of sources. The three basic sources are: the household itself, other households within the village, and migrant labourers who come to the region every summer to seek work. As I have already indicated, each type of labour employed necessitates a different way of organising the labour process (see chapter 5) and implies a different pattern of cash expenditure. The timing and magnitude of each payment are the two factors which vary according to the type of labour force employed. Labour drawn from within the household requires no immediate cash expenditure, although, as I show below, this does not mean that household labour has no 'cost'. Although village workers are paid in cash, the sums involved are often small, the timing of the payment can, to certain extent, be controlled, and finally equivalents other than money can be offered. Migrant labour, on the other hand, represents an absolute cash expenditure which cannot be transmuted into other terms and which has to paid in two large instalments. In order to guarantee the supply of migrant workers, a bulk sum of money has to be advanced. A second payment amounting to the total migrant labour minus the sum advanced has to be made at the end of the task, before the workers return to their villages. Thus, the employment of migrants necessitates the outlay of two large sums of money at specified dates. For these reasons, migrant labour can only be used by farmers who are able to control cash.

Table 9.7. The Structure of Labour Costs According to Forms of Labour

	HH Labour	Village Labour	Regional Labour	Migrant Labour
Duration of Contract	Variable, seasonal	Daily, at most one week	Daily, at most one week	Seasonal
Mode of payment	subsistence inheritance	lab. equiv. settlement of prior debts machinery	cash, settlement of prior debts	cash
Timing of payment	delayed	immediate & delayed	immediate	advanced & immediate
Cash exp. to farmer	none	variable cost variable wage levels	variable cost variable wage levels	absolute cost single wage level

Apart from village and migrant labour, there are also other people within the Söke region who regularly sell their labour power, particularly inhabitants of the mountainous areas surrounding the Meander plain and permanent settlers from other parts of Turkey, especially the East. Tuz villagers occasionally employ members of these different groups. Even though in 1978, only two farmers hired Kurds settled in the nearby village of At, Tuz farmers do enter into labour exchange relationships with locals living in villages around Tuz. The conditions under which these exchanges are made are so similar to those that obtain within the village, that I consider them under the category of village labour. It is the larger farmers settled in Söke who are able to make use of the labour power of permanent settlers or of mountain villagers.

9.2.1. The Labour Market and Wage Levels

As the table above shows, the pattern and magnitude of labour cost changes according to the type of labour used. These differences indicate that we are not dealing with a pure case of a labour market. The different wage levels that obtain in the region, the various modes of recruitment that prevail, and the manner in which wages are set indicate the imperfect

nature of this market. These differences are related to the type of enterprise, that is, to the extent to which producers are able to utilise non-market exchanges in obtaining labour power. For village-based producers, who rely on communal relations to recruit labour, the money paid in wages is a variable sum. Not only does the wage rate change from day to day, but these farmers are also able to retrieve a certain portion of the wage bill by having members of their own household work as wage labourers. Furthermore, through various exchange mechanisms, the effectivity of labour power available within the household is extended considerably. As a result, each year, the total wage bill depends on the state of village networks, that is on who owes whom what, and the state of the household, that is, on marriages, on the incidence of illness and child-birth, and a host of other factors which influence the availability of household labour. For town-based producers, on the other hand, the wage bill is known in advance since it is a function of the amount of cotton produced. This difference, as I have already argued, alters significantly the forms of calculation and the strategies of production pursued.

A number of different wage rates obtain in the Söke region at any one time. Moreover, there are two different ways according to which wages are calculated. Hoers receive a daily wage, while during the harvest a piece rate is applied. The hoeing wage is equivalent to the minimum daily wage that obtains for all agricultural labour in Söke (digging canals, irrigation, etc.). Women and children get about 25 to 30 % less than the male wage. The harvesting wage, on the other hand, is paid according to a piece rate which is the same regardless of age and gender. While the wage for hoeing is stable for the duration of a hoeing season, the piece rate received at harvest shows considerable variations over time as well as in any point in time. This results in different wages received by different groups of workers for the same amount of labour time expended. I shall now turn to consider the factors that produce these different wage levels.

A combination of local, national and international factors produce the different wage levels in cotton production since the average piece rate corresponds to the selling price of seed cotton.[3] This rate is often set at about fifteen percent of the average price received by farmers.

Fluctuations in this rate reflect government attempts to control wages, as can be seen in the substantial cut in wages after the military coup of 1980:

Table 9.8 Proportion of Wages to Price of Seed-Cotton

Years	Piece Rate (Average) (TL/kg.)	Price of Seed Cotton (Ave.) (TL/kg.)	Wage as Percent of Price of Cotton
1978	2.50	15	16.6
1979	4.00	28	14.1
1980	5.00	52	09.6
1981	7.00	65	10.1
1982	10.00	78	12.8
1983	14.00	120	11.7
1984	23.00	170	13.5
1986	43.00	285	15.1

In general, agricultural wages are below the minimum wage prevalent in the economy. However harvest wages are a special case: calculating the average amount of cotton picked per labourer per day at 80 kilogrammes, we find that wages paid to harvesters often considerably exceed the minimum wage rate:[4]

Table 9.9 Variation in Wage Rates: Agriculture and General

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
All Industries (incl. Agric.)	208	294	427	544	691
Agriculture (Average Turkey)	138	217	376	521	651
Söke: Male*	150	190	250	350	600
Söke Female	100	130	200	300	450
Harvesting	200	320	400	560	880

Source: State Statistics Institute, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
* The figures of agricultural labour provided are rough averages of the various rates received during the said year.

Apart from the market price of cotton and wage levels in the national economy, the level of labour supply and the conditions of work also

influence wage levels. At harvest, wages are set for two different categories of labourers: on the one hand, there are rates that apply to day workers. These rates increase as the cotton picking season proceeds. On the other hand, workers that are employed for the duration of the harvest are paid according to a single wage rate, the level of which is often an average of the varying daily rates:

Table 9.10 Approximate Wages Obtaining in the Cotton Harvest

Years	Early (TL)	Middle (TL)	Late (TL)	Seasonal (TL)
1978	1.50	2.50	4.00	3.50
1979	3.00	3.50	4.50	4.00
1980*	?	?	?	5.00
1981	5.50	6.00	9.00	7.50
1982*	8.00	10.00	12.00	11.00
1983*	11.00	14.00	18.00	17.00
1984	?	?	?	25.00
1986*	30.00	40.00	55.00	41.00

* The figures pertaining to these years are the result of enquiries made at a later date rather than the product of direct observation.

The seasonal wage is set by the Söke Chamber of Agriculture, a public institution dominated by local large landowners. Depending on the yearly supply of labour, assessed on the basis of advance contracts made with migrant workers, these producers are able to increase or decrease wage rates. The wage set by the Chamber of Agriculture is declared towards the end of the picking season, and workers and employers alike have only a rough idea of what it is going to be. Once the price is announced, the bigger landlords in the different parts of the valley also meet to decide what their wage rate is going to be. When asked who sets the wage rate, the family farmer in Tuz invariably replies: agalar, the landlords. As a result, within the plain, and sometimes even within one village, there are a number of different wage rates that obtain at any one time.[5]

The different rates that apply to the successive pickings also add to the diversity of wage rates. The increase in the daily wage rate is due to the fact that early in the season, labour is relatively plentiful and conditions of work in the fields relatively easy. Since soil conditions

influence rate of maturation considerably, the amount of labour needed at the beginning of the harvest period is relatively small. As the season progresses, however, all the fields become ready for the harvest so that competition for labour increases with time. The pressure set by imminent rainfall is another factor that encourages this competition. The productivity of labour in terms of kilogrammes picked per day decreases at each picking as a result of the progressive reduction in the number of mature bolls and the increasing impediments to the free movement of the workers. At the second picking, the workers are slowed down by the drying cotton bushes and the muddy terrain resulting from early rains. Thus, an experienced worker who can average 125 kg./day at the first harvest, is able to pick about half that amount at the last picking. The result is, of course, that take-home pay may even decrease in spite of the rise in the piece rate.

As a result of the progressively increasing wage rate, it becomes advantageous for the farmers to ensure an early maturing crop. Daily rates rise according to the growing scarcity of labour and the progressively more difficult conditions of work in the fields. But local variations are also due to the wage level prevalent in the region and the state of the particular field to be harvested. Therefore the formation of an unambiguous or uniform wage level becomes impossible. The variations in question allow room for bargaining and lead to frequent conflicts between workers and employers.[6] In this way, we can see that the wage rate depends on relations between employer and employee as much as it depends on national and international factors. The variable wage rate means that farmers with comparable amounts of land under production may end up with different wage bills. The existence of social ties between the parties concerned becomes the key factor that determines the difference in the amount of cash different producers pay for wages. I shall now turn to a consideration of these different types of labour according to the social ties that are used to recruit them.

9.3 Types of Labour and Modes of Recruitment

In the sections above, I tried to show that the category of 'wage' has to be considered carefully when we look at family farmers whose main strategy of production is the substitution of 'unpaid family labour' for cash. Under conditions where household labour does not suffice to undertake the manual tasks required by the production process, the mechanisms that are used to reduce cash costs are extremely complex. A system of shadow pricing linked to an ever-changing market price for labour and the formation of labour exchange systems are only possible within the context of a village community where labour is exchanged under the dominance of non-market principles. The importance of these non-market principles is further demonstrated by the fact that, in their efforts to reduce cash costs, village producers try to extend these principles even to migrant workers who are, by definition, situated outside the boundaries of this community and who, therefore, represent the most 'expensive' form of labour power.

The existence of social conventions regulating access to labour and its remuneration is the most important factor that allows village farmers the possibility of reducing cash costs. Under conditions of an imperfect labour market, different 'pools' of labour are created as a result of the operation of these social factors. As I showed in table 9.7, a different structure of payment corresponds to each of these different pools. As the social distance between labourer and employer increases, payment becomes immediate and requires the expenditure of cash. Social distance is a function of the importance of multi-stranded rights and obligations between worker and employer. Thus, this social distance which is at a minimum when household labour is concerned, steadily increases with geographical distance. Kinship, neighbourhood, and community ties are the main factors that reduce social distance. As geographical distance increases, the mediating role of community relations decreases and the importance of market mechanisms in determining labour availability increases. Nevertheless, factors such as common ethnic origin, language and religion can also be used to bridge the social gap between otherwise 'unrelated' people. The structure of labour supply can best be pictured as a series of

concentric circles ranging from household labour to migrant labour: the distance from the core to the outer periphery indicates the increasing dominance of the market, accompanied by an increase in the money cost of labour recruited, and a decrease in its productivity.

Each of the different groups of workers are recruited through the use of different mechanisms. The main problem for the producers is to ensure an adequate number of labourers at a specific time and without having to pay the costs fully in cash. The fact that a pure market for labour is not established means that the process of contacting sufficient numbers of workers and making sure they turn up at the promised time, is difficult and frought with uncertainty. But, an imperfect labour market also allows village producers to make use of non-market principles in the recruitment of labour, thereby reducing cash expenditures. I shall now consider the characteristics of each of the pools of labour mentioned above and describe the mechanisms through which they are recruited and remunerated.

9.3.1. Household Labour

Household labour is the most important characteristic that distinguishes peasants from other producers in the region and allows them to reduce money costs of labour. As I have argued in chapter 4, most of the mechanised processes of cotton cultivation are undertaken with 'unpaid' labour available within the household. The nature of these tasks and the use of the tractor allows a single individual to perform all the tasks required in the process of cultivation. The same is of course not true for manual labour. Although certain households cultivating small amounts of cotton are able to undertake manual tasks by themselves, the time-schedule of cotton farming forces the majority of households to find more workers than is available within the household.[7] Nevertheless, those households which can supply their own labour are clearly at an advantage. Therefore, a consideration of the exchange relations internal to the household is now called for, in order to understand the conditions under which household labour is made available, not only to the household entreprise itself, but also to the village as a whole.

The main factor which determines the amount of household labour available for agricultural work is the amount of land under production. Households which earn their income from activities other than cotton production (for example, fishing, truck-driving, small-scale trade, animal husbandry), do not, by any means, supply the bulk of the agricultural labour needed by the farming households of the village. The absolute amount of labour (in terms of days worked) provided from within the household increases as area under production grows. This labour is used in three possible ways: on one's own field, on someone else's field in return for a money wage, or on someone else's field in return for equivalent labour. The larger the area the household is able to put under production, the larger the proportion of household labour days spent on one's own field:

*Table 9.11 Average Use of Household Labour According to Farm Size Groups**

Area Sown (da.)	No. of hhs	Total Labour (days)	Labour on own field (days)	%	Exchange Labour (days)	%	Labour Hired out (days)	%
0	39	66.8	0	0	0	0	66.8	100
1-10	8	113.1	15	13.2	5.2	4.6	92.9	82.1
11-30	41	127.4	27.1	21.3	21.9	17.2	78.4	61.5
31-60	36	104	35.6	34.3	28.6	27.5	39.7	38.2
61-90	17	152.2	61.9	40.7	30	19.5	60.3	39.7
91-120	11	145.4	64.5	44.3	38.7	26.6	42.2	29
121-150	11	134.9	83.6	62.2	23.1	17.1	28.2	20.9
150+	7	334.3	268.6	80.3	22.8	6.8	42.8	12.8

* The labour days calculated in this table reflect the number of days both men and women of the household spend performing manual work on village fields. It excludes the number of days spent working with a tractor.[8]

The allocation of household labour is organised at the level of the household and at the level of the village. It is intra- and inter-household relations that determine the nature of the arrangement under which household labour will be supplied to other farms. The amount of labour spent on household fields, or on other fields as part of village exchange mechanisms, depends upon the amount of labour that the household enterprise needs for its own production, on the number of agricultural labourers available within the household, and on the amount of cash available to hire wage labour (usually from outside the village). In addition, obligations towards other households make it necessary to supply

fellow villagers with labour. The most important of these considerations is the absolute magnitude of the labour power needed to undertake the manual tasks on a given family farm. This magnitude will determine the number of labourers from outside the household the enterprise will need, and the amount of labour necessary to enter into reciprocal arrangements with other households. As table 9.11 clearly shows, the number of days a household works on cotton fields grows as the area sown increases.

Considerations such as indebtedness, or lack of any other means of earning a livelihood are much less important in determining the amount of labour a household supplies to other households. Of the 39 non-farming households, only five regularly worked for the large landowners of the village. In addition, these households worked for the two shop-owners of the village in order to pay debts accumulated during the winter. None of the 39 households in question depended for subsistence only on agricultural wages, which were a supplement to the other income generating activities. The total number of wage labour days expended by this category of households is less than that spent by middle farmers who need labour themselves (see column 6, table 9.11).

Compared to other forms of labour, household labour is the type of labour that is most easily available to the enterprise. This, however, should not be taken to mean that labour from within the household is automatically offered to the farming entreprise. Nevertheless, household labour has no immediate monetary cost. There is no question of paying wages to household members nor is an immediate return expected or calculated. This characteristic of the circulation of labour within the household is in marked contrast to the way it circulates outside this unit, be it within a kin or neighbourhood group or within the village. But neither is labour within the household simply 'pooled'. The labour of the incumbents of the different statuses within the household is only obtained on the basis of expectations in the long term as well as on notions of 'proper' behaviour. In other words, long-term self-interest (based on knowledge of what begets what) as well as structures of authority and ideologies of 'correct' behaviour (ideas that must be shared throughout the village in order for them to operate even within one household) constitute

the basis on which labour (as well as produce) circulates within the household. It is in this sense that we have to think of costs of household labour that cannot be measured on a monetised scale. It is also in this sense that we can understand how notions of fair and unfair remuneration can develop with regard to allocation of labour within the household.

Right to shelter and subsistence is the basic principle that makes the labour power within the household available to the household enterprise. The fact that members of the household derive their subsistence from activities where the household is collectively engaged (rather than where the individual works separately from the rest of the members) means that everyone's contribution to the labour process and therefore the degree of everyone's right to subsistence can be calculated.[9] This does not mean that everyone can only eat as much as s/he works. It simply means that the obligation to work at a common task is the argument put forward by people in order to extract labour from others within the household. This calculation is based on considerations that derive from the division of labour based on gender and age. The right to subsistence of a young child is unquestionable. But, by the time the child reaches the age of thirteen, it is no longer so unquestionable. Once out of primary school, children of both sexes are encouraged to contribute labour within the home and on the fields. By the time they reach the age of about fifteen, such contributions become compulsory. Older members of the household repeat this maxim often so that everyone learns it: one has to earn one's keep: (Çalismayana as yok = no food to the idle)

A very important consideration which makes the labour of sons and daughters available to the household enterprise is the question of inheritance. Although land is often divided equally between all the children, parents can deprive them of their inheritance by selling land. In this way, reticent children are encouraged to see the parental enterprise as their 'own' in a more immediate sense. Children receive a certain portion of their inheritance on marriage: boys in the form of gold and a house, and girls in the form of a trousseau (see chapter 3). Boys may also receive 'help' from their parental household with regard to cotton production: they may get access to their father's tractor, or use part of his seed and

fertiliser and so on.[10] Children of both sexes are aware of their input in the parental enterprise and often argue in these terms in cases of a dispute. Such disputes often arise as a result of unequal treatment between children, especially between sons who depend on their father's help in order to set up a proper household themselves.[11] In households where the amount of land to be inherited is insignificant, it becomes much more difficult to make children work as cotton hoers and pickers, even when the family has to repay debts (see table 9.11).

Short term calculations also affect the offer of labour within the household. Both male and female children need cash for a number of expenditures which have to do with 'keeping up with the Joneses'. Unmarried boys spend cash for clothing and entertainment, while girls spend it for their trousseaux. Both of these forms of expenditure amount to considerable sums, and a father who wants to live in a household where conflict is kept at a minimum has to be prepared to meet these demands. Children whose requests of cash are not met by their fathers are less willing to undertake farming tasks. The nature of the relationship between parents and children is an important factor determining the labour that sons and daughters will be willing to supply. The more sensitive parents are to childrens' demands, the more will the children be willing to work for them. For example, young girls prefer to work on other people's fields where they feel freer to joke and exchange information with close friends, than working in their own fields where they are under the constant surveillance of their mother or brother. They will work with more enthusiasm to the extent that their parents are able to accomodate this wish.

The division of labour according to age and gender regulates the distribution of household labour between the various agricultural tasks. As I have argued in chapter 6, the tasks required by the process of cotton production are associated with particular positions within the household, and the men and women in question perform many of these activities as a way of demonstrating (and achieving) status and identity. Gender-linked status operates to allocate the labour of the (usually male) household head, as well as that of his wife, his sons, and his daughters. The head of the

household (hane reisi) is the manager of the farming enterprise, his wife recruits and organises the manual labour force, his unmarried daughters are cotton pickers par excellence, and his son is the tractor driver. The labour of all the members of the household is thus necessary in the process of cotton production. A son (married or not) may stop driving and start giving orders to his younger brother(s) as a move to change his status within the household. Similarly, a woman, wife of the head of a household, may stop working in the fields as a means of expressing her authority within the household.

However this division of labour is by no means rigid, and context more than anything else determines which job is undertaken by which member of the household. Thus, for example, sons may be forced to pick cotton as labourers in other peoples' fields as well as their own, the head of the household may drive a tractor if he does not have an adult son, a woman may undertake the management of the farm if her husband is dead, and daughters may help the setting of irrigation pipes, or the spraying of insecticide if male labour is lacking. Two things never happen: a woman (or a young girl) never ploughs a field with a tractor and the head of a household never picks cotton for a wage in someone else's field. Not that to be seen picking cotton will necessarily demote a household head from his position, nor in the short term elicit a negative response from fellow villagers. But, a household head who is not able to feed his family properly, and picking cotton for a wage is seen as an indication of such a situation, will lose quite a bit of respect in the long run.

The difference between yörük and muhacir households illustrates the role played by intra-household authority structures in the allocation of labour. Yörük households, where agnatic kinship is more important have a more hierarchical structure. Therefore, the labour power of all the members is more easily controlled by the household head. In muhacir households, on the other hand, the bargaining between the household head and his children (both sons and daughters) is much more open and verbalised. For example, Sefer's (a muhacir) two sons had to almost plead before they were allowed to use their sisters' wages to purchase a TV set. Even their father's intervention did not rest on the 'normal' authority that he, as their father,

could exercise over them.[12] Compared to yörük girls, the muhacir work more often for wages and in groups that do not include their kin, and change employers more frequently, another indicator of the looser authority structure within the household.

Apart from gender, age also affects status, and therefore, the distribution of tasks between household members. The job of tractor driving is as much associated with a married young man as with an unmarried youth working under his father's orders. In fact, tractor driving is one of the major means of earning a livelihood for men who find themselves landless on marriage. As the head of the household gets older, he often finds means of acquiring land, has children and slowly withdraws from the active work in the fields, adopting a position of supervision. The same process marks the cycle of a woman's working life. Thus, women over the age of 35 and men over the age of 40 are less frequently found undertaking physical work in the fields. Physical labour in the fields beyond this point has a negative value attached to it. In the case of a man it indicates his inability to achieve an independent farming position, or, his inability to have a son, or his inability to discipline his son, if he has one. In the case of a woman, it also has similar negative overtones: it indicates that she belongs to a household which does not have the means of independent existence, a fact for which she is seen to be almost as responsible as her husband. By the age of forty, a woman should have daughters and/or daughters-in-law to whom she should delegate most of the agricultural tasks. In any case, by the time men and women reach middle age, they are supposed to have access to sufficient land, labour and/or capital to allow them to 'retire' from field labour. If they have labour, that is children, it is the latter who are supposed to undertake agricultural tasks. If man and wife have capital, they can hire labour and simply deal with management. If they have land and no labour or capital, they can rent out their land or find themselves sharecroppers.

Children begin agricultural labour on cotton fields at an early age. When girls and boys finish compulsory primary education (usually by the age of twelve), they are taken to the cotton harvest to 'help' their mothers and/or sisters. However they are not systematically forced to work.

Children of ten to twelve can harvest at least twenty kilogrammes of cotton per day. Hoeing, which requires the wielding of a heavy implement, does not begin until the age of fourteen. Boys of tractor owning-households are encouraged to carry out the simpler operations by the age of twelve. At fifteen, a boy is often an accomplished tractor driver.[13] Skills necessary for cotton production are gradually imparted to children, a fact which explains the superior quality of the work performed by local manual labourers compared to migrant workers. Children are not obliged to work regularly in cotton fields until about the age of fifteen. Agricultural labour is not seen as a satisfactory form of employment for boys, particularly if they belong to households owning little land. Boys are often urged to find an alternative occupation (such as going on for higher education or working as an apprentice in the many workshops of the village or of Söke), and the threat of agricultural labour is used as a 'stick' to encourage better performance in these areas of work. For girls, on the other hand, the skills of cotton hoeing and picking are seen as a concomitant of their status in life, a task which they will have to do. Thus, for many of these girls, work in cotton fields is a consequence of their gender identity.

Labour allocation within the household is based on notions of reciprocity and therefore cannot be seen simply as a 'pooling' mechanism even though many social scientists have argued otherwise.[14] Within the household, the allocation of labour between work on household fields and work on other peoples' fields is a constant source of conflict. As shown in chapter 6, women, especially unmarried girls prefer to work outside and preferably for a wage. To the extent that these girls accept the authority of their father and internalise values regarding the unity of the household, they supply their labour without resistence. Young men also prefer to work for wages rather than for their parents' households, especially if they cannot hope to gain much in the way of wedding expenses and inheritance. It is only through a consideration of when and how labour is remunerated within the household that we can begin to have an idea of the non-monetised costs of family labour.

Household labour is not only available for the farming processes undertaken by the family itself, but it is also made available to other households as well. While part of this labour is made available as a result of the household's own production calculations, there are other considerations which affect the circulation of labour between households. Relations with individuals from other households, considerations of friendship and cooperation, as well as the stigma attached to 'laziness' are among the factors that emanate from community pressures. It is to these relations that I now turn.

9.3.2 Village Labour

The basic unit through which village labour is organised is the household. Therefore, intra-village labour exchanges are a very important component of the totality of inter-household relations that together make up what I have been calling 'village social structure'. Within the totality of inter-household relations, there are areas such as the arrangement of marriages, which can be regulated only by women, at least where the most decisive stages are concerned. The recruitment of labourers for the harvesting and the hoeing of cotton is another such area where women figure as the main actors. The inter-household labour exchange networks are predicated on the already existing pattern of rights and obligations that define relations between specific households. These rights and obligations are re-defined, and re-calculated within the dynamic of every-day interaction, of which labour exchange is an important part. The pattern of inter-household cooperation that is exhibited on cotton fields reflects current alliances and therefore undergoes constant transformation from year to year. Nevertheless, there are certain ties, such as kinship and neighbourhood, which allow more durable patterns of cooperation. In short, the mechanisms of recruitment that I shall consider below are based on a rationality that significantly differs from the rationality of the market: I call this 'the rationality of the community'.[15]

In the sphere of cotton production, two contradictory factors define the conditions under which labour circulates within the village, namely the partial commoditisation of labour and the total commoditisation of its

product, cotton. The existence of various social ties between households is only effective with regard to the recruitment of labour, not where the allocation of the product is concerned. It is mlargfely market mechanisms that determine the latter. Through the activation of ties of kinship and neighbourhood, households in need of labour can be sure to find at least a few workers within the village. The effect of social ties on forms of remuneration is less direct. An equivalent of some sort is sought in all cases. Social ties can intervene to determine what the equivalent will be, in a way and at a time that will satisfy all parties concerned. While the bonds that guarantee 'outside' labour for any one household can be established in areas of life that have little to do with cotton production (such as kinship, or neighbourhood), the return of manual labour in cotton production can only be made within the same branch of production. In other words, a woman may successfully solicit the labour power of an unmarried girl whom she 'helps' with her trousseau, but the young girl will have to be paid in cash, or the woman must pledge that in return she will work on the fields of the girl's family.

Exceptions to this general 'rule' show that the separation of the sphere of commodity production from other areas of village life is not absolute. In this sense, transactions between 'spheres of exchange', or 'conversions' to use Bohannan's term, can be interpreted in two ways: either to show that commodity relations have penetrated all spheres of village activity, or else to argue that exchange systems characteristic of non-monetised areas of village life can affect the sphere of commodity production. One can argue that commodity relations are so dominant in the village that labour has lost all its specific qualities and acquired an 'abstract' character. The market price for any of the items that make up a trousseau is known, and so is the price of agricultural labour. Thus, in 1981 an embroidered scarf costing 300 TL. on the market could have been exchanged for one day's hoeing labour on cotton fields. This can be taken to indicate that labour is divorced from its fruits and exchanged as pure labour power. But on the other hand, the same exchange can also be used to demonstrate the importance of village ties in decreasing the money cost of labour. To secure labour by promising a scarf is only possible within village boundaries. Between strangers, no one would be willing to pledge

labour in exchange for an item belonging to another sphere of relations. The fact that both interpretations are correct shows that incomplete commoditisation of labour allows considerable flexibility.

Within the sphere of cotton production, payments for labour are often restricted to services performed within the same branch of production or to cash. Labour can be exchanged for cash (wage), for an equivalent amount of labour, or, for access to means of production, especially tractors. Payment in kind, a very important way of remunerating labour in other, less commoditised, branches of agricultural production, is almost absent within cotton production. After all, the use value of cotton is limited compared to that of wheat, beans, or olive oil.[16] The form of payment actually adopted depends on the relations between the households concerned and the mechanism through which labour is recruited.

The type of labour that is most frequently subject to these exchanges is the manual labour needed for the hoeing and the harvesting of cotton. This labour is predominantly female (see table 9.12 below). However, mechanised labour, that is, male labour is also exchanged according to the same principles that govern the exchange of female manual labour. Yet there is an important difference between the two categories: to the extent that male labour, whether manual or not, is divorced from its social context, the household, it is treated as a commodity and payment is always in wages. Compared to female labour, male labour is commoditised to a larger degree, and thus this separation occurs more frequently. Where it has occurred, the recruitment of male wage labour is divorced from any consideration of social obligation. All-male hoeing and digging teams are never made part of reciprocal exchange arrangements in the same way that all-female or mixed work teams are.

The exchange of mechanised labour between households can take place without the intervention of wage relations in contexts where inter-household exchange relations rather than pure wage relations dominate.[17] But, in this category the situation is ambiguous, because men can (and many in Tuz do) earn a livelihood as waged tractor drivers. Other facts also prove the lower commoditisation of female labour. Women from households

that are not cotton producers are paid wages, but the level of this wage is lower compared to the male wage. These women are recruited through the deployment of the same social channels that govern the exchange of labour between cotton-producing households. Women's agricultural labour cannot provide (and is not considered as capable of providing) a subsistence income. This view of women's labour is reinforced by the fact that none of the women in the village work for a wage outside of agriculture (except for a few 'educated' women who become nurses or teachers).

Since patterns of remuneration and recruitment are so intertwined, it is useful to concentrate on the latter to understand the operation of the former. The degree of cooperation between households in social as well as economic areas of life affects the nature of labour exchanges that may exist between them. In many cases, cooperation in economic life brings in its wake closer interaction in social life. Within the confines of cotton production, close cooperation between households extends further than the exchange of household labour. It also involves exchanges of cash and/or implements, detailed information about each other's cultivation process, and joint action in relations with townspeople and officials (often for the purposes of obtaining seed, fertiliser, or other inputs). These forms of cooperation take place between men. In cotton production, cooperative relations established between men may or may not extend to encompass the women's sphere of activity, namely exchange of labour in kitchen gardens, exchange of domestic labour (such as the preparation of winter supplies), or ceremonial labour (preparing food to be distributed on festive occasions or in the case of mourning). Interaction between women also includes the circulation of produce and the labour of children, as well as involving a complex pattern of visiting, the pre-requisite of all relations that are established among women (see Figures 9.1 and 9.2). Unless cooperation takes place in the sphere of women, the exchange of labour on cotton fields is doomed to remain undeveloped.

Cooperation and interaction between women in the different contexts listed above is only roughly correlated with ties of agnatic kinship, the male sphere. Women play an important role in determining the course of



Figure 9.1 Meryem's neighbourhood: 1. Social relations, 1984.



Figure 9.2 Meryem's neighbourhood: 2. Labour exchanges, 1984.

inter-household interactions. Therefore it is relations of mutual help and support among women that appear to be stronger than male-male relations in recruiting labour, even where the two men of the household cooperate intensely during the mechanised processes of production. After all, it is very difficult for men to recruit female labour. The fact that unmarried girls are under the supervision of their mothers and that a man from a given household has little chance of contacting a woman from another household, means that women dominate recruitment procedures. Thus, neighbourhood (mahalle) relations which are voluntary and which are formed as a result of mutualistic ties between women are more important for recruitment purposes than any other tie that may exist between men. Labour from neighbourhood households is organised in overlapping pools, within which labour circulates more often and with less cash changing hands. These pools do not have absolute boundaries and some of the households within the pool may also have strong cooperative links with other households outside the neighbourhood, usually with agnatic kin. Since these pools do not often encompass more than three to four households, within any one area that can be designated as a neighbourhood, there may be more than five or six separate groups exchanging labour.

Within these neighbourhood groups, labour is recruited on the basis of already existing strong ties of mutual help. These ties between households are established outside the sphere of cotton production and constitute the channels through which labour and produce circulate on a regular basis. Unless there is a more pressing obligation that can be justified within the norms of reciprocity, it is not possible to refuse labour when it is solicited by members of the mutual aid group. To do so, would be one of the ways of breaking the relationship. The circulation of labour ensures that the relationship between the women of the households in question will continue.

Informality characterises the circulation of labour between households linked through women's cooperation. The time span over which labour circulates is very short. Payments are effected in cash or in equivalent labour. In the former case, the payment is made immediately after the task is terminated: a day to a week depending on the size of the field, and

according to the current wage level. Once payment has been made, the households in question are free to allocate labour in any way they choose, unless the original arrangement requires additional reciprocal labour. In cases where labour is to be reciprocated in its exact equivalent, cash payments may or may not be made after the first job has been completed. Hoeing wages are stable for the duration of the hoeing season and therefore, payment is easily waived. At harvesting on the other hand, the constantly increasing wage requires farmers to make the payment according to the level current at the time the labourers are engaged. Therefore these wages will often be paid out rather than delayed until all labour transactions between the households are terminated. What social relations guarantee is only that wage labour will be available from certain households when needed. After the payment of the wage, labour may circulate in the opposite direction. Thus, the payment of the wage does not necessarily end the circulation of labour: the relationship between the households is carried on through other exchanges that are part of areas of village life that have nothing to do with commodity production.

If, on the other hand, wages are not paid, labour has to be reciprocated immediately. When work on the fields of one household is completed, members of the landowning households start work on their former worker's field. Since the fields in question are rather small (at most 60 decares), manual work will take at most three days for a group of 10 workers (which may include members of two or three different households with which the landowning family may have entered into very different contracts). At the end of these three days, work commences on the fields of another member of the mutual aid group: thus payments take at most one week to be effected. Hoeing labour is never reciprocated with harvesting labour and labour debts are always closed by the end of the agricultural year, that is at the end of the harvest. The circulation of labour based on female networks is temporary in the sense that it allows for the existence of other demands on household labour. Male networks can always override obligations established between women: after all this is a patriarchal system. Even in such cases women try to 'help out' by offering other alternatives: either by locating other workers or finding another time to execute the task themselves. After all, these networks are extremely

valuable for the households in question; women's networks are the most reliable forms of securing an adequate supply of labour. They originate in cooperative relations between women and not in the sphere of commodity production. The activation of these ties for commodity production makes labour exchange in the latter sphere flexible, durable, and able to sustain long periods of reduced cooperation.

Unless the head of a household is a woman and can as such offer the use of agricultural machinery, cash and equivalent labour are the only ways of paying for manual labour recruited through women's networks. Male networks are characterised by the circulation of labour in return for the rental of a machine, especially a tractor, in addition to cash and household labour. These are also informal exchanges of short duration. As in the case of women's informal networks, payment, whatever its form, is made as quickly as possible. A man can pay back for the rental of a tractor needed to transport workers to the field by offering the labour at his disposal, namely household labour. The market-set rent for the tractor and the market-set price of labour constitute the basis on which reciprocity is calculated.[18] Men enter into cooperative relations with agnates and cognates, or with heads of households whose fields are contiguous and who, due to inheritance patterns, may often be kinsmen. More often, men, like women, prefer to cooperate with non-kin of equivalent farming capability. But, as already stated in another context, since the majority of the manual workers are the women of the village, cooperative links between men have limited effect in securing manual labour. Hostility between the women of two households can, in fact, be quite effective in terminating inter-household relations whether of kin or non-kin.[19]

Seasonal wage increases and the wage level as established by the market play an important role in calculations of reciprocity. This situation often leads to serious disagreements. When the households concerned are non-kin, it seems that the settlement of disputes is less problematic: the relationship can be broken off completely if other issues point in the same direction. On the other hand, since the relationship is voluntary and mutually advantageous, settlements are also more easily reached than among kinsmen. Between close kin, particularly agnates, the

situation is more complicated. Many ideological factors dictate close cooperation, but at the same time there are quite powerful forces which may pull two brothers apart, the most important of which is the fact that cooperation between agnates is by definition a relationship between men who are not equals (see chapter 4). One example of the labour exchange between two households whose heads are half-brothers will illustrate the way in which differential wages can lead to serious disputes between agnates.

Hasan and Saffet began cooperating in cotton production when their father, Mustafa, died in a traffic accident in 1977, leaving his family without an adult male. His oldest son Saffet was away at the time, doing his military service. Hasan was Mustafa's son by a prior marriage and had long since established a separate household and farming enterprise. He took charge of his father's widow and his half-siblings and managed their farm until Saffet returned. After that, the cooperative relations between the two households continued, but Saffet was increasingly unhappy with the realtionship since he thought Hasan was being unfair. The main problem was that Saffet who was trying to establish himself as an independent household head, was finding Hasan's interventions degrading. Saffet's fields were located on higher ground where cotton matures faster. In 1979 Hasan's wife and children had worked at Saffet's first harvest when the village piece rate was set at 1.00 TL/kg.. They worked for seven days. Hasan's fields were ready to be harvested when the rate had gone up to 1.50 TL/kg.. A day before Hasan's work was due to start, Saffet sent him the cash for the cotton picked by Hasan's family, who, outraged, promptly returned the money. Saffet grumbled but accepted the cash and the reprimand. By 1981 all cooperation between the two households had ceased. By sending the cash, Saffet had hoped to increase the money income that his family could earn. In 1979, he had been growing less cotton than Hasan, but had more labourers within his household. Hasan, on the other hand, was hoping to minimise his cash costs by using the labour in Saffet's household. Being the elder brother, he had hoped to do this by relying on his authority over Saffet. When the attempt failed, toning down the relationship seemed the only alternative.

This example shows how the level and the timing of the wage can be used by producers to minimise cash expenditure. But at the same time, the relations of authority or equality between household heads determine the extent to which this can be achieved. Given the fact that kinship relations include elements of authority relations between households, they will be important in determining the timing of the payment. The closer the relation of kinship between the two households, the more frequently will the payments be deferred. Between households of equal standing, either exactly equivalent amounts of labour are exchanged, or else the wage rate will constitute the basis for reciprocal exchanges. The relative amount of land cropped to cotton and the number of labourers within the households concerned also affect the way labour is exchanged. The example also shows that the way these payments are effected is a negotiated process and the result not necessarily determined in advance. In consequence, entering into such relationships does entail a certain risk factor.

More formalised ways of organising the circulation of labour between households also exist. These are of three kinds. One of the more formal labour exchanges is associated with sharecropping. Since the landowner's share depends on the size of the harvest, s/he will supply labour when needed, and thus both the landowner and the sharecropper involved equally regard the enterprise as their own. Strictly speaking, this type of labour recruitment cannot therefore be termed 'exchange'. Both parties being peasants, try to cut money costs as much as possible by substituting household labour. As a result labourers available in both households cooperate regularly on the fields subject to the sharecropping contract. Moreover, relations of cooperation are often transferred to work on fields which each household may cultivate independently of the other. To the extent that these exchanges are regular, they take the guise of more formal and therefore reliable ways of obtaining labour.

The establishment of exclusive labour-sharing groups constitutes the most formalised and the most reliable way of allocating labour between households. In this type of labour exchange, four to five farming families pool the labour available in their households for the duration of the whole farming season. These groups, which people sometimes refer to as firms

(sirket) order the various plots of the households according to the state of the crop and hoe (or harvest) each of them in turn. These labourers rarely work for other farmers. Exclusive labour-sharing groups are often composed of the sons and daughters of neighbours or close kin, who farm approximately the same amount of land. Farmers with over 100 decares of land under cotton cannot enter into these labour-exchange systems, since their needs often exceed the number of labourers that four to five households can provide. The maximum number of workers that these groups are able to organise is about fifteen. Fifteen workers are able to undertake the manual work necessary for about 200-250 decares of land, on average, the total amount farmed by all the households of the 'firm'.

Labour is shared between these households on the basis of a strict accounting system where exact reciprocity is always maintained. Each household keeps a record of the number of days worked for or the amount of cotton delivered to each of the households within the group. Until the end of the hoeing (or harvesting) period, cash payments are excluded from the relationship. At the end of this period, the work performed is compared and any outstanding debt is settled by cash payments. Shadow pricing is also operative here, since the magnitude of the debt is calculated on the basis of the average wage rate received by village workers. Labour is not transferred from one household to another as a result of these labour-sharing firms.[20] 'Labour firms' are found only among certain yürük households. The special nature of the relationship between these households as described in chapter three provides the social cement necessary to do away with cash payments over long periods of time. Even among these households however, the desire by the women workers to change workmates frequently and the need to maintain links with as many households as possible curtails the stability of exclusive labour-exchange groups.

The allocation of labour between households that are tied through sharecopping or labour-pooling mechanisms exhibits certain similarities. Compared to the informal mechanisms described above, they result in much longer-lasting exchange arrangements between particular households. Although accounts are often settled at the end of hoeing and harvesting, it is implicit that the relationship shall continue until the end of the

harvest, if not longer. Many of these arrangements last over a period of two to three years, or until conditions change so much that new arrangements have to be devised. Another similarity between these two types of labour exchange is the limited extent to which money changes hands. Rather than the sum of money involved, it is the amount and kind of labour expended that constitutes the basis of the exchange. The third point of similarity is that these relations are often established between households of similar status.

Between households of unequal status on the other hand, labour may circulate on account of debts which the poorer partner has contracted. Labour circulation of this kind is also formalised and thereby relatively predictable. Debts can arise for a variety of reasons; some of them originate within the process of production. Thus a small farmer without a tractor but with a large family may, on the basis of the surplus labour power at his disposal, risk cotton production. Debts may also be contracted in the sphere of consumption. Many of the less well-to-do households buy consumption items on credit from the three large grocers in the village. Since these grocers are also cotton farmers, the debtors attempt to pay back their debts by working on their creditor's fields for the larger part of the hoeing and harvesting periods. These workers are often paid cash by their employers according to the current rate. It is then left to the household members to decide when the original debt is to be settled. Thus the wage relation in this case conceals a debt relation that is settled by providing labour. In this way, within village boundaries, labour can be used in exchange for means of production as well as means of consumption.

Within the village, labour available in households is therefore allocated between these households according to relations of cooperation established primarily by women. The long-term viability of these exchanges depends on the successful establishment of relations of equality and mutual advantage between the households concerned. However, it is noteworthy that women organise the circulation of labour only as long as the relationship remains one between equals. In exchanges between equals cash is paid and shadow pricing dominates. As the relation becomes more unequal, women's

networks lose significance in obtaining labour, while cash payments decrease and labour is increasingly used to obtain scarce goods and services needed for production and consumption. Thus, demands on household labour stemming from sharecropping or debt obligations, apart from men's cooperation networks, interfere with the short-term labour networks activated by women. Nevertheless, given the tendency for people to cooperate with fellow villagers of equal status, the dominant means through which labour is recruited within the village is through women's networks. The reliability of the labour acquired through these networks is predicated on relations of cooperation and support that characterise patterns of inter-household interaction and competition. Since the recruitment of village labour is primarily based on an identical return of labour, it is logical that women of non-producing households participate in these exchanges to a much lesser extent. It is the obligation to help out a neighbour, rather than the need to earn a wage that explains the circulation of labour between village households. Non-producing households in need of cash supply manual labour to non-village producers rather than to fellow villagers. Conversely, village producers resort to outside labour, regional and migrant, as the amount of land put under cotton production increases.

9.3.3 Regional Labour

Inhabitants of the Söke region who do not cultivate cotton make up what I have called the regional labour pool. Although some villagers of the plain region such as Tuz participate in this pool, the majority of these workers come from the mountaineous areas that mark the periphery of the Söke plain. Although social relations between these villagers and their employers are still effective in regulating recruitment and forms of payment, it is the wage relation that plays the dominant role.

On the mountain ranges surrounding the Söke plain, animal husbandry and the cultivation of olives provide the subsistence base. The cycle of work in both of these branches of agricultural production fits in well with the cycle of the cotton crop. In Güney, one such village that I visited in 1979, a few of the wealthier villagers rent (and subsequently may even buy) land on the plain in order to cultivate cotton. The remaining of the

villagers spend the months of July, October, and November hoeing and harvesting on the plains. According to Gökalp (1980), who, in 1968, conducted research in Sofular, a mountain village close to Güney, some village men also work for a wage in irrigating cotton fields. Gökalp calculates that a man working in cotton fields as a wage labourer for four to five months was able to earn up to $280, that is, about a third of the total income he would have acquired by selling, if that had been possible, the whole of his olive harvest.

Social relations play a non-negligible part in the recruitment of this regional labour force. This is illustrated by the fact that there are distinct geographical areas from which day labourers are drawn by farmers in a particular district. These labourers come from villages within a radius of at most twenty kilometres and with whom interaction is not limited to the wage relation. Thus, villages around Sari rely on day labourers from the Milas region. Sari villagers often own large tracts of olive groves in near Milas and are therefore in close economic cooperation with those villagers. When the labour available within Sari is insufficient, it is these villagers they turn to for extra labour. Similarly, Tuz villagers obtain extra day labourers from the tobacco producing villages of Batnos, Yeni, Balat and Ak that lie to the southeast of the plain within a radius of twenty kilometers. These are also villages whose inhabitants are linked to their neighbours of Tuz by multiple relations. It is also through channels of affinity that Tuz women are recruited to work in these villages as agricultural wage earners. The Güney cotton farmer mentioned above not only obtained his own labour force from within his own village, but also provided labour from among his affines in Güney for his 'neighbours of the field' (tarla komsusu).

The intensity of inter-village relations decreases with geographical distance. Consequently, even when neighbouring villages were concerned, the number of labourers that farmers can establish contact with is much more limited. This problem is solved through the intervention of labour recruiters, or middlemen, who are able to organise a large number of labourers from within their village. These middlemen, dayibasi, operate only in villages where there is a large number of landless labourers.[21]

This is the case in the large villages of the region where recent settlers from the East find that cotton is their only source of cash income. Thus, in At and Sari the large Kurdish population, which, due to the ethnic barrier, has rather tenuous social relations with the local population, can only be mobilised through the mediation of such a middleman.[22] The same situation also obtains for the smaller gypsy (çingene) population in Balat and Ak, the Çepni of Sofular, and the Tahtaci of Güney and other mountain villages. These middlemen are able to compensate for the imperfect operation of the regional labour market.

Regional labour organised through the agency of a middleman is largely used by medium to large producers in major villages or in Söke. These producers, even those residing in Söke, do have links with villages where face-to-face interaction aids labour recruitment.[23] It is the large numbers of hoers and harvesters necessitated by the increased scale of production that induces the more important employers to use middlemen. In these cases, village networks are not adequate to secure the required number of workers when needed. Major producers contact the middlemen themselves by going to the village from which they habitually recruit labour. They then provide tractor-drawn trailers to transport the agreed number of workers to their field at the appointed time. Middlemen receive about 10% of each labourer's wages in return for their services. This amount is deducted from the wage, which, nevertheless, is always a little above wages paid to fellow villagers. Since the number of workers obtained through this method is large, the hoeing and/or harvesting of a 200 decare field does not take more than a week. Wages are calculated according to the rate that obtains at the time the work is performed and payment is made as soon as the task is completed.

The role of non-commodity ties in recruiting regional labour becomes apparent in the relations between labourer and middleman, and between middleman and landholder. These relations may be based on social as well as economic obligations. Vis-à-vis the workers, the middleman is first and foremost a co-villager, someone they have known all their lives, and a close kinsman. The word dayibasi expresses this closeness, as well as the power component involved in the relationship.[24] But, even so the worker-

middleman relation is often exploitative. Workers are frequently dependent on the dayibasi in more than one way: he finds them work, and lends money when needed. As moneylenders, many middlemen are assured of an adequate supply of workers whenever they need them. However, not all middlemen are in this position: many are in fact simply the most articulate among a group of workers. Their position as middlemen depends on their previous relation with the landowner (they are in fact often affines) and their ability to organise a large group of workers.[25] Therefore, the particular context within which middlemen recruit manual labourers affects the nature of the relationship that obtains between all three parties involved. The economic structure of the area from which the workers are drawn, and the role agricultural wage labour plays in generating income are important factors in determining this relationship. These factors, in turn, influence the duration of the contract, the reliability of the work-force, and the organisational and supervisory structure of the work.[26]

Regional labour can also be recruited without the intervention of a middleman. Such recruitment procedures depend on social ties established between individuals living in different villages. The most important of these are affinal ties. In other words, the role of women in obtaining labour can also be observed within boundaries that exceed the village setting. The flow of labour between neighbouring villages is reciprocal and depends on the agricultural activities of the affines.[27] These exchanges of labour are more frequent if labour demands do not coincide, that is, if not both households are involved in cotton production. Labour exchanges between villages through affinal channels are also possible in branches of agricultural production that are less commoditised than cotton or tobacco (eg. animal husbandry or olive cultivation). Nevertheless, compared to village labour, these regional pools of labour constitute a small portion of total labour expenditure.

Reliability is the main problem associated with regional labour. Many middlemen are not even able to provide the same number of workers from one day to the next. The availability in Söke of non-agricultural and longer-term work that pays higher wages makes agricultural labour less desirable. As a result, many producers in the area employ regional labour only for the

hoeing of cotton, a process where timeliness is less critical compared to harvesting.[28] Migrant labour, which, for reasons that I shall explain in the following section, is more reliable, is increasingly becoming the major source of labour during the cotton harvest. At harvest time, regional labour is used in emergency situations, or for the third picking after the migrants have already left.

9.3.4 Migrant Labour

Towards the end of September, large numbers of seasonal workers arrive in Söke to undertake the major part of the cotton harvest. Although the majority come from inland provinces immediately to the east and south of the region (Denizli, Afyon, Mugla), the number of Kurdish workers from Adana, Bitlis, and even Kars, travelling a distance of more than 1500 km. is also high (see map 6). According to the Söke Agricultural Extension Officer, the population of the region more than doubles with the arrival of these workers. According to a questionnaire administered in 1981, most of these labourers come from villages, rather than semi-urban or urban settlements, and, are consequently involved in agriculture themselves.[29] This agricultural activity, which may concern commodities such as tobacco, or else subsistence products, is of a small-scale, non-irrigated, low technology type that does not yield adequate income to the producer. Often, a few of the members of the workers' households stay behind to tend crops or animals. The composition of the migrant labour force displays interesting features when compared with local labour:[30]

The table below shows that in both groups, unmarried women make up the largest section of the work force. The proportion of men in the migrant group is only slightly higher than the proportion of men in the local work force. The latter, moreover, includes a higher proportion of older men and women. Both of these facts can be explained by the nature of the relationship of the local work force to the land: they are in large part owner-workers harvesting cotton on their own land. Within each group, married women and women over the age of 35 are more numerous than men of comparable status, showing the relationship between gender/age position and agricultural labour. Slightly less than half of the workers are married



Map 6. Provinces Sending Seasonal Workers to Söke

(47.5 % of the migrants and 45.2 % of the locals). Although the married men in the migrant teams are cotton pickers, local men are occupied with supervisory tasks.[31] The fact that no regional work teams have been encountered in this limited survey is indicative of the lower incidence of such work groups.

Table 9.12 Percentage Composition of Migrant and Local Work Teams

	Men	Women	Marr.* Men	Marr. Women	Men 40+	Women 35+	Total No.
Migrants	40.4	59.6	20.9	26.6	5.4	7.2	851
Locals	39.5	60.5	21.1	24.1	7.4	9.6	365

Source: Raw data from the METU Seasonal Migration in Agriculture Project, 1981.
* Percentages are calculated separately for each work team. Thus, of all the migrant male workers, 20.9 % are married.

With the development of agriculture and industry in the Söke region, the periodic shortage of labour felt in the area has become more and more acute. Consequently, the number of migrant labourers arriving in the region has been increasing over the years. In the absence of regional statistics, it is very difficult to illustrate this point. However, the increase in the use of migrant labour within Tuz is quite indicative of the trend. Until 1976, village and regional labour was employed in Tuz. In 1979, six households were employing about 100 workers from the nearby province of Denizli. By 1984, 49 households stated that they had contracted migrant labour for the coming harvest. Moreover, five farmers had, for the first time, also employed migrant labourers for hoeing. The trend in Tuz shows that migrant labour is being increasingly employed by village-based producers. Although, the employment of migrant labour is closely associated with the amount of land under production, many of the medium-sized Tuz farms are able to utilize migrant labour by forming groups within which labour as well as recruitment costs are equally shared. At most three households join resources to bring in one group of workers, of about 20 individuals, who then pick cotton according to a strict system of rotation. In this way a farmer cultivating 60 decares of land is able to have access to a relatively reliable source of labour. The system works even to the advantage of small farmers not part of these 'employers'

cooperatives'. When there is no work on the employers' fields, the migrant workers are free to offer their labour to small farmers in need. As a result of these mechanisms, the employment of migrant labour has ceased to be a characteristic of large-scale capitalist producers.[32]

As with regional labour, the recruitment of migrant labour is generally, although not necessarily, effected through the agency of a middleman. Those middlemen who can form large teams often come to the plain in May or June to contact large landowners in Söke. By contrast, village producers who need smaller amounts of labour often have to undertake themselves the trip to the villages where they recruit labour.[33] Work teams employed by small farmers are often made up of two or three related families and one of the household heads acts as middleman. Whether a middleman is involved or not, all producers have to advance a sum of money in order to make sure that the agreed number of workers will arrive when the time comes. The amount of money advanced varies considerably. In 1981, middlemen demanded on average, 5000 TL per person (about one fifth of the total earned by a person in forty-five days), and the actual sums varied from as little as 1000 TL (just enough to cover transport costs) to as much as 7000 TL. Middlemen who brought labourers to the region without having made a specific arrangement with any of the landlords did not receive any advance. Having brought workers before, many of the middlemen know the area and the landowners quite well and come for the specific reason of obtaining advance cash which they, in turn, use to build up a following of workers. This is done by strategically distributing cash in the guise of short-term loans, to be repaid after the harvest is completed. Thus, the sum of money received as advance payment varies enormously from worker to worker: from as little as 5000 TL to as much as ten times that amount.[34]

Migrant labourers are contracted for a period of 45-60 days at most. This usually covers the time needed to harvest a large holding twice.[35] During this period, the farmer provides shelter, drinking water and wood; food and bedding are provided by the labourers themselves. Additonally, the farmer has to cover half of the costs of transporting workers from their homes to Söke, a sum which may amount to 5 % of the total wage

bill.[36] Wage payments are divided into two parts: apart from the initial sum advanced before the workers arrive, payment is effected upon departure according to the amount of cotton delivered.[37] Bulk payments (often at times when cash is scarce) and the extra transport and accomodation costs make migrant labour a more expensive labour force compared to local workers.

The level of the wage paid to migrants is another factor that increases the cost of migrant labour. First of all, a single wage rate applies, making it difficult to reduce costs by taking advantage of a changing wage rate. Secondly, this level often turns out to be slightly above local wage rates (see table 9.10). The middleman's share is usually about 6-10 % of the total wage rate.[38] In 1985, migrant wages were set at 41 TL/kg., out of which only 35 TL (about 85 %) accrued to the cotton pickers: 3 TL went to the packer and the remaining 3 TL was the middleman's wage (about 7 % of the total). If there is no packer in the team, the wage level is correspondingly lower. The distribution of the wages among the workers is carried out by the middleman.[39]

The higher costs of employing migrant labour are to a certain extent compensated by the security involved in the contract. But under conditions where the labour market cannot be formally organised and controlled, there are also serious risks involved. Middlemen can go back on their word and not bring the agreed number of workers, or worse, they may not turn up after having accepted the cash advanced. Conversely, the landowners may also refuse to uphold part of their contract, by not paying their share of transport costs or not providing proper housing, or else the cotton crop may be lost to some disease, leaving the workers stranded. Certain sanctions do operate to ensure predictable behaviour on the part of all parties. The impossibility of bringing labour to the area after a serious breach of contract is the most important consideration that affects the behaviour of middlemen.[40] Large farmers who have a bad reputation also find it difficult to establish long-term relationships with any one labour team. These landlords have to cast their nets wider in order to recruit labour. Tan, who puts his labourers up in tents, was therefore the first landowner to bring workers from the East.

The role of non-market relations is much reduced in the process of recruiting migrant labour. Rather than playing a part in the relation between worker and landholder, non-market relations are only important in determining the composition of the labour teams. Moreover, strong social ties may bind workers to middlemen (or team leaders). Village farmers are an exception to this rule. In an effort to reduce the difficulties and the cash costs of obtaining migrant labour, they attempt to reduce the social distance between worker and employer. In a sense, this is an effort to 'villagise' migrant labourers. Certain characteristics of the labour teams employed by village producers attest to this tendency. There is no middleman involved, each year the same group is sought, the workers are housed in the village and made to take part in village social occasions. Repeated visits to the home village of the workers, visits which include the wife and children of the landholder, are even more effective in bridging the social gap. The most successful way of converting migrant labour into village labour is through the establishment of affinal ties. Already three young men in Tuz have married migrant women whose families and neighbours are then recruited by many of the Tuz landholders. Two villages in the province of Denizli have by now established such close links with Tuz, and it is these people who account for the majority of the migrant labourers that work on Tuz fields.

The mechanisms of recruiting manual labour depend on the type of labour employed, and this in turn, is a function of the amount of land under cultivation and the amount of cash available to producers. As a result, there is a definite pattern governing the distribution of these different types of work teams among Söke farmers. Large capitalist farmers employ nothing but migrant labour to undertake both hoeing and harvesting. Large to medium farmers who still retain ties with a particular village (by still residing there or, after having moved to Söke, by regular visiting) complement migrant labour with regional labour. Medium village farmers also employ migrant labour for the bulk of the harvest, but rely on village networks for hoeing and some of their harvesting. They may also on occasion use regional labour. Small farmers depend on village labour almost exclusively. With the movement from village labour to migrant

labour, the role of social relations in recruiting labour decreases, but is not totally supplanted by market mechanisms.

9.4 Conclusion

The extent to which cotton producers can manipulate monetised costs of agricultural production is a major factor that explains the different forms of production observed in the Söke region. Labour is the most malleable of all the factors of production considered so far. It shows the most variable monetised cost. This variability stems from the existence of the category of household labour which, due to the nature of the social relations in which it is embedded, has no monetary costs. Furthermore, inter-household networks of cooperation, predicated on concepts such as kinship, neighbourhood and affinity, can be used to extend the amount of work that is carried out by 'unpaid' household labour. In this way, wage labour within the village becomes one of the ways of reducing cash outlays within cotton production. As a result of the nature of village social relations, abstract labour on which the existence of wage labour is predicated, is converted into 'social' labour. The extension of village ties to cover migrants, is another factor that adds to the malleability of labour drawn from another social group, with whose members social links are initially absent.

Within the confines of the village, money is not the main means by which labour is remunerated. Labour prestations are more important as a way of obtaining labour in return, and in addition, a means of consolidating existing relations of cooperation and mutuality. Refusing to work for a fellow villager is a way of cutting off all social exchanges. However, as the social distance between worker and employer increases, cash becomes the sole manner in which labour is remunerated. Regardless of the scale of their operations, capitalist producers in town are, therefore, linked to the sphere of commodity relations to a much larger extent than village producers. But, under conditions where a market for labour has not fully developed, even capitalists have to resort to mechanisms of recruitment that involve more than simply the circulation of commodities. Nevertheless, unpaid labour is not available to these producers. Calculations of

profitability can be made by capitalist famers since labour is a category to which a definite monetary value is attached. By contrast, under conditions where household labour still pays an important role, such calculations are not possible.

The foregoing has, I hope, shown firtsly that 'domestic labour', which is often used as a gloss to depict allocation of labour within the production unit (Harris 1981), is predicated on the existence of complex relations of authority and reciprocity that constitute the household. Secondly, I hope the present chapter also has indicated the extent to which 'unpaid' household labour in the circuits of production depends on a wider set of social ties that bind such similar units together. As G. Smith argues, domestic labour is not the only source of unpaid labour: the community "...is a source of 'unpaid' labour through a myriad varieties of labour exchange institutions" (1986:101). Labour which, within village boundaries, may not be a commodity, may nevertheless circulate as a commodity outside the boundaries of the community (which may include a group of interacting villages, rather than just a single village such as Tuz). Even Tuz production of cotton is marked by the use of both commoditised as well as non-commoditised labour, and the distinction between the two is not always immediately apparent. Commoditised labour has high money costs, and producers constantly attempt to convert it into a non-commodity. It is on the basis of the utilisation of non-commoditised labour that peasant production of cotton persists.

Many approaches to peasant and/or petty commodity producers rest on the distinction drawn between cases where labour is commoditised and others where it is not. If labour is commoditised, it is argued, then we have a situation where the universal categories of political economy apply. But, PCP seems always predicated on the existence of some form of labour (as well as other inputs) that is not commoditised. This reliance on non-commoditised labour is even inherent in the definition of PCP. The problem that I would like to pose is the following: 'if we conceive of PCP as "a class of combined labourers and property owners within a capitalist economy" (Friedmann 1980:162), what kind of relation are we positing between labour and property except one of unity? This notion of unity

between labour and property may be an accurate way of depicting the American farmer driving sophistacted agricultural machinery, and, undertaking all productive activities on his own, although even that is doubtful since his wife's and children's labour may still be important. Unless the owner and the labourer are one and the same person, the question of labour recruitment will remain problematic in terms of the limits imposed by the categories derived from political economy. The variations that can exist in the labour-property relationship will always put into question the notion of predictability, and produce a situation where non-commodity circuits will be crucial in reproducing the conditions as well as the units of production. In other words, by Friedmann's criteria, all commodity producers can only be peasants. As G. Smith argues (1986), the effort to create a universal category of simple commodity production is as problematic as the universalisation of the concept of 'peasantry'.

Notes to Chapter 9

1. There is a high correlation between area under production and magnitude of output (0.94) as well as between total manual labour used and area under production (0.92) These are results of simple correlation tests, and are not very reliable. Using a Time Series Program, where total household labour (THL), number of consumers (CO) and area under production (A) were included as variables that may determine output (Y), the latter emerged as the one variable that explained output:

Y=-910.44 + 198.171 A + 0.568 THL + 195.50 CO
(-0.76) (27.38) (0.05) (0,825)

R^2 = 0.88
F = 314.3
The only variable for which a reliable T-Statistic is obtained is A.

2. Exchange labour is simply a way of extending the use of household labour beyond the limits imposed by the time schedule.

3. As indicated in chapter 8, international as well as national factors affect the price at which producers sell their cotton to merchants as well as the state cooperative.

4. The high wages received by cotton pickers in 1979, were compared to wages earned by Turkish workers in Germany, and called 'Germany Money' (Almanci Parasi).)

5. See Soysal (1976) and Seker (1986) for descriptions of a similar situation in the Adana region.

6. For example, in 1978, the first harvest on early maturing fields was picked at 1 TL/kg.. The same employer then paid 2 TL/kg. for the second pickings on the same field, at a time when most of the first bolls on other fields were being picked at 2 TL/kg., thus equalising the rate for the first and second picking. The workers objected and the rate for the second picking on the early field was increased to 2.5 TL/kg. It is important to take note of the fact that it was the young girls and not their fathers who voiced the objection. The latter, employers themselves, were in two minds about the increase.

7. See table 9.3. which shows that only farmers sowing land between one and ten decares are able to manage largely with household and exchange labour. Moreover, even these small cultivators hire about 12 % of the labour they need.

8. The number of households in table 9.11 equals the number of farms in the earlier tables because of the way I have defined households. See chapter 3 for a fuller explanation.

9. According to Scott, 'right to subsistence', is a peasant maxim that characterises relations of exchange between all peasant households (1976:167). In this way, Scott wants to show that peasants give produce and/or labour to one another without waiting for an immediate or an equivalent return. But in Tuz, I find that, even within the household, such

a 'moral' principle does not necessarily apply. Moreover, I do not think that the difference in degree of commoditisation between the peasants observed by Scott and the villagers of Tuz is sufficient to explain the differences between the two cases.

10. It is often observed that one of the mature sons already established in a separate household undertakes some of the manual operations on his father's field in return for the free use of a tractor.

11. The case of Fikret, muhacir fisherman, is quite instructive as to the way this process works. In 1978, he eloped with his elder brother's wife's sister (BWZ), a form of marriage which, since the two parties were already kin, is very much frowned upon by the muhacir. One of the main reasons which prompted Fikret to elope , that is marry without the permission of his as well as the bride's parents, was his suspicion that his brother, Ismet, would drag his feet about arranging a marriage for him. Their father had died about eight years earlier, and the household had continued to exist under the uniting influence of their mother, Sabahat. Ismail and Sabahat opposed the marriage violently. As a result, Fikret and his young bride, Asiye, had to leave and set up a household on their own. This he had to do with nothing, no gold, no house, no flour to tide them over until the cotton harvest when both husband and wife could find work. Fikret soon started to work as a fisherman in the cooperative. Until his mother dies, he expects to receive nothing from his brother with whom he is not on speaking terms. A year after Fikret's marriage, he 'sold' the family tractor to a man from another village (who did not know the circumstances of the family). He based his action on the following reasoning: he had worked just as hard as Ismail to purchase the tractor (it was purchased before Fikret's marriage), and since he had received nothing when he was married, and Ismail lived in the parental home, he was its legitimate owner. The tractor, could, of course, not be sold: it was registered in the name of the mother Sabahat, who from the beginning had sided with Ismail.

12. When the eldest brother later attempted to prevent the younger, more independent-minded sister, from working with a girl of questionable reputation, she immediately pointed out that the TV was for the family, in other words that she could not take it with her when she married, and that he therefore could not tell her who she should or should not work with.

13. Labour in other agricultural tasks (such as food gardens) begins even earlier than that. Children are taught to plant and harvest vegetables, to recognise weeds and pests, and to clean out stones and other debris from the garden. These skills will also be helpful in cotton fields later.

14. Sahlins (1974), Wallerstein et. al. (1982). For a criticism of these points, see Harris (1981) and (1982).

15. I have deliberately avoided the term 'moral economy'; especially since Scott's influential book on the subject (1976), this term has acquired a specific meaning thought to be applicable universally to all peasantries: the norm of reciprocity and the right to subsistence (Scott 1976:167). I am using the concept of 'rationality of the community' to indicate that labour and produce circulate within the boundaries of the village according to considerations that are not simply economic. I do not wish to impute a

moral (in the sense of 'ethical') nor a universally valid content to these considerations. I certainly do not think that either of the principles stated by Scott is shared by Tuz villagers.

16. However, cotton is widely used in the village for bedding and upholstery. Before marriage, brides of households with no access to cotton may work for a return in cotton.

17. The example of the man obtaining the use of his son-in-law's tractor in return for supplying him with olive pickers is a case in point.

18. It is this kind of demand on the labour of the household that may override arrangements entered into by women.

19. The exchanges of labour between Meryem and Sevim and those between Meryem and Emine were completely stopped in the course of their disputes, even though close relationships persisted between their husbands (see chapter 3).

20. See Donham (1981) for an account of the ways in which labour sharing systems may result in transfers of labour between households.

21. Until 1981, there were such middlemen in Tuz organising labour for larger landholders in neighbouring villages such as At and Yuva. With the increase of productivity in cotton farming, local competition for village labour has increased to such an extent that village producers are able to employ all the floating labour available within the village. This has meant that the dayibasi in Tuz found it increasingly difficult to form an adequate labour team, and finally, in 1981, he totally gave up on the idea. Larger Tuz farmers rarely use a middleman to get access to regional labour: they prefer the more reliable, albeit more expensive method of recruiting migrant labourers.

22. One At landholder had married a Kurdish woman whose kin then regularly worked on his fields. When asked why they hoed and harvested for him with such regularity, the labourers said that he was their brother-in-law (eniste).

23. Many villagers try to move to the town when they can afford it. The move, however, does not necessarily prevent agricultural production. See chapter 10 for an analysis of the mechanisms involved.

24. The word itself means chief or most important mother's brother (dayi=mother's brother; basi=head, chief, most important). Dayi, in the urban context, is also used to designate a powerful street leader and fighter. In the Adana region, the middlemen are called elçi, representative or ambassador.

25. This is the method through which Tuz villagers are occasionally recruited to work for one of the large landlords in the nearby village of At or in the tobacco fields of Balat.

26. As the disapperance of middlemen in Tuz shows, under certain conditions, technology and state credit policies affect the availability of wage labour on a permanent or temporary basis.

27. The fact that women and men inherit equally means that many households have fields in other villages than their place of residence. These fields are usually leased or turned over to sharecroppers, a situation which increases the likelihood of cooperation in manual tasks. On the other hand, disputes that arise between siblings over inheritance issues reduce the chances of this form of labour circulation.

28. Technological improvements have recently begun to reduce the amount of manual labour needed for hoeing.

29. The questionnaire was administered by a team of social scientists, including myself, from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara as part of a project funded by Meawards on Seasonal Migration in Agriculture. During a period of 8 days, a total of 67 questions were asked to 1242 workers while they were picking cotton in the fields. I would like to thank the participants, especially Dr. Tosun Aricanli, for allowing me the use of the yet unpublished results.

30. Since no sampling was involved in the administration of the questionnaire from which these numbers are drawn, the proportion of local to migrant labour indicated in the table should not be taken as an adequate represenation of the composition of the labour force in the Söke plain.

31. Unfortunately the questionnaire is misleading on this issue. The main reason for this is the fact that men who were not picking cotton stated that they were working, and this was recorded as though they were picking cotton.

32. Of the 21 migrant labour teams encountered in Söke fields during the course of the 1981 survey, 6 were working for employers other than the farmer who was accomodating them, and only 8 were working for town-based capitalist producers.

33. A few workers also attempt to come to the region without having previously secured employement. That they are able to find work shows the extent to which labour is scarce in the whole region at this time of the year. An unattached worker in Adana, where landlessness is much higher, would not be able to find work in spite of the large number of extensive farms there (Soysal 1976:113).

34. The amount of money received by the worker as an advance is a good indicator of the extent to which the worker is economically 'bound' to the middleman. Many of the more established middlemen loan money independently of what they obtain from the landlords. For these men, labour contracting can be a full-time job that brings in a good income.

35. After the second picking, gleaning (<u>basakçilik</u>) is often allowed. Women and children of the outer neighbourhoods of the town, and migrants living in large villages glean fields in the vicinity, selling the cotton directly to gin mills.

36. Most of the labourers are brought in to the region on open lorries, a dangerous form of transportation which is officially banned. The longest journey may take two days and two nights.

37. Migrants who work on the odd day for other farmers are also paid at this time. On the other hand, migrant workers who come to the plain without prior arrangement, and therefore without having received any money in advance, are paid according to local rates when they finish a particular field.

38. This rate is similar to the one described by Sosyal for Adana (Soysal 1976:113).

39. Middlemen pay these wages after deducing individual debts.

40. There is a large turnover of middlemen who bring labour to the region. Many labourers begin to operate in their own after coming to the area under the supervision of a middleman for a number of years, during which they establish contacts with landholders and learn the 'ropes'.

CHAPTER 10: DIFFERENTIATION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AMONG TUZ PRODUCERS

The problem of differentiation among peasant producers confronted with a capitalist economy has been one of the most thorny questions faced by students of agricultural change. According to Marxist orthodoxy, small-scale producers would disappear in the face of increasing commoditisation. For the majority of small producers, this transformation was to entail proletarianisation. The persistence of independent commodity producers in many regions of the capitalist periphery (Smith 1984b), as well as in Turkey (Keyder 1983b), has put this assertion into question. Attempts to formulate a general theory regarding the conditions of reproduction of small-scale producers have stressed the inability of petty commodity producers to enter into expanded reproduction (Friedmann 1980). This form of production has therefore been associated with branches of production in which capital requirements are low (Kahn 1980). Recently several investigators have shown that under certain circumstances, small-scale producers may transform into capitalists and that differentiation through accumulation is possible (Bernstein 1986:21). In the case of Turkey, it has been shown that in certain branches of non-agricultural production, small-scale commodity producing enterprises have proliferated as a result of their flexible organisational structures (Ayata 1982). The argument put forward by Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) to the effect that places for petty commodity production are continually created/destroyed within the capitalist social division of labour, has even led Bernstein to the conclusion that "petty commodity production will exist as long as capitalism exists" (op. cit.:25).

Questions regarding the accumulation of capital by small commodity producers are closely linked to questions concerning the presence or absence of wage labour and problems of economic calculation and/or rationality. Accumulation based on the systematic extraction of surplus value is not considered by most authors to be a feature of petty commodity production (Scott 1986:6). This does not mean that small producers do not employ any wage labourers. As has been shown by Kahn (1980) and Smith (1984b), there are different reasons that account for the inability of small

producers to enter into expanded reproduction on the basis of the small amounts of labour power employed. While Smith stresses high wages and the competitiveness of the market to explain low profits (and correspondingly low investments in improved technology), Kahn looks at the place of wage labour in the structure of the production system. He argues that the logic of petty commodity production differs from that of capitalism, and that wage labour in the former case cannot yield surplus value (1980).[1] Kahn and Smith both argue that it is necessary to take into account factors that are external to the production unit: these factors are in addition to wage levels, input and output prices.

Other writers, by contrast, have indicated that increasing the scale of production by investing cash can be a feature of small commodity producers. Cook (1984) maintains that capital accumulation is possible within petty commodity production. In the case of Oaxaca valley producers, wage labour according to Cook is a systematic feature of production and provides the basis of 'simple capitalist accumulation'. In conjunction with this form of accumulation, Cook shows that family labour can also provide the basis for expanded reproduction ('endo-familial accumulation'). Smith also argues that expansion within certain limits (determined by the use of wage of labour) is possible (1986:33). In his later writings Kahn has also allowed the possibility of accumulation for small scale producers (1982:15).[2]

Many of the problems associated with the dynamic aspects of petty commodity production stem from treating petty commodity producers as a homogeneous group. Most of the writers stressing the viability of peasant/small-scale production have not looked into the differences that may exist between these producers.[3] In contrast, authors who are inclined to regard differentiation as the more dominant trajectory in the countryside have studied variations among producers in more detail. A good example is provided by Harriss's work (1982) among the rice producers of Tamil Nadu. Harriss identifies at least four separate classes of producers: capitalist farmers, rich peasants, dependent middle peasantry and semi-proletariat. By showing that all agricultural producers do not face the same constraints, especially with regard to their relationships with merchants and moneylenders, Harriss is able to argue that an unstable class

of independent middle peasants can exist under capitalism as a result of the external economic structure and the internal organisation based on kinship (1982:264). Above all, he warns against general statements about the peasantry, showing that different reasons may account for the 'persistence' of the different classes of producers (1982:289).

Similarly, Tuz farmers do not constitute a homogeneous group with regard to access to resources and scale of production. In previous chapters, I have alluded to these differences and indicated that differences between producers can be conceptualised in terms of their strategies of production and factors that limit their operations (table 6.1). The main distinction presented at that stage was in terms of the labour contribution of the owner/manager of the enterprise. All village-based producers meet (varying portions of) their labour requirements by using non-wage (usually household) labour. By contrast, town-based producers do not themselves contribute any labour. This, I argued, leads to important differences in production constraints and hence in modes of calculation. A more systematic analysis of these differences is however required in order to pose questions about accumulation and change. As Harriss argues, the different producers are not necessarily locked into the production strategies they pursue. Movement of individual producers across class lines is possible. What factors account for the fact that some producers try to enlarge their scale of production by renting land, while others sell land or turn it over to sharecroppers? A more dynamic approach can show that some of the town-based capitalist producers come from the ranks of the small peasant cultivators, and others from the ranks of the non-capitalist enterprises. In order to understand these dynamics, it is necessary to investigate the forms of calculation on which producers base their productive decisions (Kahn 1981:553).

In order to answer some of these questions, I shall look at the divisions that exist between producers within the village. I shall try to show the circumstances under which these producers can expand production and the mechanisms that account for this expansion. I shall show that the explanations advanced by the authors mentioned above can provide clues to understand the activities of some but not all of the producers. Thus,

Friedmann suggests that producers can only expand through fission, that is undertake generational reproduction without being able to concentrate capital (1978:88). But in Tuz, it turns out that this only applies to a certain category of producers, namely the middle peasants. Similarly, as Cook suggests, endo-familial reproduction can lead to expansion, however in Tuz this is a feature of the small producers rather than the medium ones. Finally, only the large farmers are able to enter into petty capitalist forms of calculation. However in Tuz, it seems that the transition to petty capitalist status is not possible on the basis of agricultural production alone. Other capital generating activities are usually required to keep providing cash to the agricultural enterprise so that the latter can expand on the basis of wage labour.

Bearing in mind those distinctions that apply to small producers, I shall finally investigate the strategies of production of town-based producers and see the extent to which they are able to continue to reproduce themselves as cotton producers. An analysis of the options open to them will help assess the role played by kinship and community and by the structure of the national economy in delimiting the conditions of production under which these various producers operate. Furthermore, it is by contrasting peasants with town-based producers that ways in which small peasants manage to reproduce themselves can best be understood.

10.1 Village Based Producers

A number of points regarding the conditions and strategies of cotton production within the village have already been made. Firstly, all village producers have access to unpaid labour, regardless of the scale of operation. Secondly, all producers need to have a certain amount of cash before they can begin to produce cotton. Increases in scale serve to raise the amount of cash and hired labour required in production. Thirdly, all village producers try to obtain as many of the inputs as possible without having to pay a cash equivalent. Ties of kinship (used broadly here to include household relations) and community allow village producers to construct networks of exchange through which labour power, land, subsistence goods and some of the inputs including cash can be secured.

Fourthly, the economic context within which cotton production is undertaken has also been delineated. To recapitulate, this context can broadly be defined as a capitalistic national economy in which cash, land and labour have been largely commoditised. As has been shown by Kahn (1981), commoditisation of all factors of production does not proceed simultaneously, a fact which is also characteristic of the Söke region. While markets in improved inputs and cash have largely been established, markets in land and labour have been developing at a slower pace.[4] Similarly, a market in labour is so developed that shadow pricing is a characteristic feature of the calculation of labour expended in the production process. Nevertheless, the mobility of labour is still restricted, a fact which leads to the existence of different wage levels in the cotton harvest (see chapter 8). Since 1980, increases in input prices and the retraction of state subsidies in credit and output markets have been counterbalanced by a rise in output prices.[5] As a result of these recent changes, a larger number of Tuz villagers have been able to enter into cotton production for the first time.[6]

Before the possibilities of enlarging the scale of production and/or accumulation within the context summarised above can be analysed, a clear distinction between the different types of producers present in the village must be drawn. Many different criteria can be used to differentiate between Tuz producers: area under production, amount and type of labour employed, extent of cash investment, level at which the production unit reproduces itself and finally strategies of production that determine production decisions. At the outset, it will be useful to delineate three broad categories of producers according to the income they obtain from cultivation: small, middle, and large farmers.

On the basis of average output levels and costs of production, it has been shown that a thirty-decare field barely sufficed to cover annual subsistence costs. As I demonstrated in chapter 8, such a field yields a net income of 540,000 TL, while average annual subsistence costs are at least 500,000 TL. for a family of four. This shows that if the cultivator has to rent land, or if in order to cover production costs, s/he needs to borrow cash at the current interest rate, s/he will not be able to make

ends meet. By contrast, if the land is his/hers, and s/he can cut subsistence expenditure, obtain his/her commodity inputs from Taris and from other sources in the village, and cut cash expenditure on labour, s/he will be able to continue farming his/her thirty decares and even save some cash. Below this mark, we can safely assume that savings are not possible and that moreover, additional income-generating activities are necessary to meet subsistence requirements.

Another important turning-point can be discerned around the 100-120-decare limit. Farmers cultivating on this scale are able to save about one million TL. per annum after deducting interest rates, costs of production and subsistence. This cash serves to enable these farmers to keep up with the changing technology and/or marry off sons (Friedmann's generational reproduction through fission). Farmers in this category usually try to consolidate their holdings through investments in land improvements and/or machinery rather than expand scale of production by increasing area under production. When the economic conjuncture allows it, these farmers also try to buy land and thereby leave their children a larger patrimony. In 1987, more than five farmers in this category bought land varying between 30 and 45 decares, while the larger farmers chose to invest in trade. In between the large and small cultivators a large middle category comprising farmers cultivating between 30 and 120 decares of cotton can be identified.

Above the 120 decare limit, hired labour becomes the most important factor limiting production.[7] In order to obtain the cash needed for wages and continue producing cotton, the large farmers of Tuz need to enter into other income-generating activities. In other words, diversification of productive activities is a feature of both small and of large Tuz farmers. The difference between them lies in the ways in which diversification occurs. While small farmers often sell their labour, large farmers invest cash in other activities such as trade or transport.

For most Tuz farmers income is a function of output and ability to reduce expenditures of cash, whether for subsistence or for production. The single most important factor that accounts for output is area sown.[8] Other variables such as supply of labour within the household, or level of demand

(number of consumers within the household) are less important in determining output:

Table 10.1 Output in Tuz Cotton Farms According to Yield (Y), Number of Consumers (C), Number of Workers (W), Total Household Labour Actually Supplied (THL) and Average Area Sown (A)

Output (000 kg.)	No. of farms	Y kg/da	A da	THL days	C no.	W no.
0	39*	0	0	66.8	3.8	1.9
1-5	36	191	18	114	5	2.8
6-10	40	202	38	122	5	2.75
11-15	21	192	73	152	6.2	3.5
16-20	8	245	81	101	6.4	3.1
21-25	10	206	114	100	5.9	3.1
26-30	5	225	135	134	6.2	3.4
31-35	3	249	141	172	5.7	2.7
36-40	4	268	158	262	7.2	3.75
40+	4	216	262	414	8.75	5

* Since I have defined households according to whether or not they are independent from other groups with regard to earning an income, the number of farms corresponds to the number of households in the village. Given this definition, there are 39 households whose members do not undertake independent farming activities.

As can be seen from the table, the majority of Tuz farms are either small cultivators producing just below the subsistence margin (6000 kg.), or medium farmers producing less than 26 metric tonnes of cotton. There is thus a large middle range of producers, the majority of whom cluster at the lower end of the spectrum. The table does not indicate a significant or systematic increase in the values of the variables except for area sown and number of consumers. In spite of the increase in number of consumers accompanying rising outputs, other tests show the latter variable not to be too reliable.[9] Nevertheless, it seems as though demand does influence output at least to certain extent.

Total household labour actually expended in cotton production, as well as the number of household workers increase steadily until the 15 tonne mark, after which variations in these variables do not seem to correlate with increases in output. Once this threshold is crossed, hired labour, that is the expenditure of cash for wages becomes a more important

variable than labour available within the household. Nevertheless, it is the most important producers with the largest number of workers who contribute the greatest number of work days to the labour process. Increases in the scale of production do not necessarily entail a reduction in the use of unpaid labour in the manual processes of cotton production.[10] The same relationship can also be observed with regard to mechanised labour. Both large and small farmers hire tractor drivers only when a suitable labourer cannot be found within the household. The large number of workers and consumers within the richest households does to a certain extent explain their success: although workers and consumers cannot account for levels of production under present conditions, in the past they certainly were an important determinant of success. Thus accumulation can only be understood in the context of a longer-term perspective which takes into account the histories of these large producers as landowners, in addition to their ethnic identities.[11]

The table also indicates that scale of operations does not affect yields very much. On average, Tuz farmers are able to produce about 220 · kg./da. The smaller farmers produce just under this limit while the larger farmers exceed it at most by 40 kg./da.[12] This shows that unless producers are able to procure the right input mix, production of cotton becomes impractical. And, furthermore, if yields fall below a certain level (or if costs rise too much), production of cotton ceases altogether.[13]

The cost structure and the competitive market therefore force producers to operate with an approximately similar input mix. Contrary to most cases of small production described in the literature, it is not possible to increase yields (or output) significantly by increasing labour inputs (Kahn 1981; Harriss 1982). As the table below shows, the inputs of manual labour are proportional to area sown; if anything, it is the larger landholders who contribute more labour (hired labour as well as household and village labour) per decare compared to small farmers:

Table 10.2 Inputs of Labour According to Area Sown

Area Sown	Total Farmed (da.)	Total Labour (days)	Labour per land (days/da)	Unpaid L. (hh+exch) (days/da)	Hired Labour (days/da)
1-10	61.5	184	3	2.6	0.4
11-30	941	3543	3.8	2.2	1.6
31-60	1655	7932	4.8	1.4	3.4
61-90	1269	7198	5.7	1.3	4.4
91-120	1157	6161	5.3	1.0	4.3
121-150	1562	8214	5.3	0.8	4.5
150+	1667	10465	6.3	1.2	5.1

Under these conditions, producing cotton in and of itself represents a labour-intensive activity. Use of labour thefore separates village farmers from town-based capitalist farmers, rather than indicating differences among village farmers themselves.

Unfortunately, lacking consistent data regarding the cash invested by every single farm, I cannot demonstrate the role of cash investment in determining output. However,a few general points can be made on the basis of the available information. Excluding labour, cash costs in production increase in proportion to area sown. Ownership of land and other means of production, such as tractors and other machinery, serve to reduce short-term cash outlays and thus make production of cotton easier, but at the same time limit the farmer's choices: producers who have invested in land and machinery are firmly locked to the production of cotton. The most effective way of increasing output through cash investments is to enlarge the area cultivated. This can be done by sharecropping, renting, or buying land; each of these activities requires successively larger cash investments. Land improvements, the proper application of fertiliser and pesticides, adequate and timely irrigation all have cash costs which, if foregone, will reduce yields. Thus, we can assume that cash will not only affect output, but will also be an important factor determining the variation in yields reflected in table 10.1.

As area cultivated increases, the monetary costs of labour grow more than the costs of other inputs. This increase is accounted for by the necessity of depending on migrant labour. As I showed in the previous

chapter, advance payments and the cost of transport constitute a large cash expenditure for which farmers usually have to borrow money. Borrowing entails payment of interest and therefore adds on to production costs. Yet in Tuz it is not only the very large farmers who employ migrant labour. As can be seen from table 9.3, farmers planting more than 30 decares of cotton employ migrant labourers for approximately half of their manual labour requirements. The added cash burden represented by the use of migrant labour can be reduced by forming 'employers' cooperatives' and/or 'villagising' migrant labour (see chapter 9). Household and village labour serves to alleviate the cash burden of labour for middle peasants (30-120 decares), while for small farmers it constitutes the main input of labour. In the case of larger farmers (120+ decare), unpaid manual labour is less important from the point of view of saving cash than mechanised labour obtained within the household or through village exchange mechanisms.

10.1.1 Small Farmers

The division outlined above delineates three categories of producers, the first of which is comprised of part-farmers, part-workers and /or fishermen, who, on the basis of the limited cash available to them, produce but small amounts of cotton.[14] Some of these part-time farmers own land (through inheritance or government distributions), while others obtain it through renting or sharecropping.[15] The majority of these farmers-cum-workers own very few farming implements.[16] As was shown on table 9.10, they spend most of their labour working on other people's farms for a wage. But in general they spend much less time working on cotton fields than do other cotton producers.[17] Most of these households hope in the long run to switch to cotton production on a more permanent basis. But, before they can do so, they need to accumulate cash and transform it into means of production. The sale of their labour power, other productive activities, and village networks provide the means through which such accumulation can be effected. As tables 3.6 and 3,7 show, the majority of small farmers are made up of newly married men and women and particularly of men and women who have to separate from the parental household within the first year of their marriage.

For this category of farmers accumulating cash is only possible if they can invest income earned from other pursuits into cotton production. The case of Hüseyin can serve as an illustration of the way such accumulation is possible. Hüseyin has five children between the ages of 5 and 18. He owns no land and works as manager/tractor driver for a large village-based producer in another village.[18] His eldest son works as an apprentice with the village blacksmith and Hüseyin himself receives a monthly wage of 25.000 TL. In addition, he has the use of his boss' tractor. Hüseyin rents 25 decares of land for 4000 TL/da. He used to own a flock of twelve goats which he sold in order to pay the 100,000 TL he needed for rent. He obtains his seed and his fertiliser from his boss who often does not charge him interest for the credit extended, and he hoes and harvests the land which he farms by using his family's labour. At the end of the harvesting season, he has enough money to allow him to rent land for another year, and, provided that he can sell his cotton at a good price, even save some cash.[19] But, as Hüseyin's case exemplifies, accumulation for this category of producers is dependent on ability to reduce costs. Hüseyin's relationship with his boss allows him to cut the costs of machinery, seed, and fertiliser, while the large number of labourers within his household helps him to keep labour costs at a minimum. He uses his and his son's wages to meet daily subsistence costs, and, by producing cotton, is able to to use productively the labour available within his household. Moreover, it is unpaid family labour which allowed him the possibility of entering into cotton production in the first place: it was his wife and daughters' labour spent in looking after and enlarging the herd of goats that helped him accumulate the initial 100,000 TL he used to rent land.

Other circumstances provided Mustafa a similar chance. After working as a labourer and a fisherman for nine years, Mustafa inherited eleven decares from his mother. His elderly father opted to live with him, which meant that Mustafa could farm his father's land without paying any rent. He paid the first installment of his tractor with the gold his father had given his wife on the occasion of her marriage to Mustafa, and was hoping to enter into a sharecropping arrangement with his father-in-law the following year.[20] He was also renting out his tractor in order to pay the

next installment of the purchase price. Hüseyin's and Mustafa's cases represent two of the most typical trajectories whereby small farmers accumulate capital and establish themselves somewhere, depending on their luck, in the middle peasant category. The frequency with which small farmers in Tuz try to enlarge their scale of activities is shown in the table below. It is the small farmers who attempt to farm more land than they own by renting and/or sharecropping:

Table 10.3 Amount of Cotton Farmed in Tuz According to Area Owned

Area	hh no.	Area Owned	Area Farmed	hh no.	Difference*
0	30	0	290	8	+290
1-10	10	70	354	9	+284
11-30	49	1137	1784.5	40	+647.5
31-60	54	2514	2826	46	+312
61-90	15	1104	1306	14	+202
91-120	8	830	835	7	+5
121-150	1	130	100	1	-30
150+	3	766	817	3	+51

* This diffrerence shows the amount of land farmers obtain through renting and sharecropping arrangements. A negative value indicates that farmers in the said category farm less than they own. In total, Tuz farmers share or rent out a total of 1063.5 da. of land, and they share/rent in a total of 2825 da. The difference of 1761.5 is the amount of land Tuz farmers obtain from landowners residing in other villages in the neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, for the majority of households with no land nor capital, this trajectory remains only a hope. Many of the fishermen of Tuz, for example, rent out their land, even when (both male and female) labour power is available within the household. Fishing cannot provide them with an income that allows the accumulation of savings to be invested in cotton production.[21] Some fishermen have been able to become full-time farmers by forming sharecropping alliances with close kinsmen. Salaried work which does not offer the special opportunities enjoyed by Hüseyin will not allow capital accumulation either.[22] For people in this situation, entering into cotton production is dangerous and may not even yield the returns that can be obtained by selling labour power and/or engaging in other income-generating activities. Hüseyin's good luck may also not hold out forever, since it depends on the balance between input and output prices. If the

balance continues in favour of cotton producers, rents may increase to such levels as to make it impossible for Hüseyin to rent land.[23] A change of the balance in the opposite direction may reduce returns to labour to such an extent that it may no longer be rational for Hüseyin to continue to produce cotton.

Another case illustrates the precariousness of depending on cotton production at very low levels of capital accumulation. A man who owns 30 decares of land and a flock of 200 sheep has been trying for more than six years to switch to full-time cotton production.[24] He sold part of his flock and paid the initial investment for a tractor, entering into a sharecropping arrangement with another villager. Since he could not be sure of the success of cotton production, he and his wife kept a part of the flock and left agricultural activities to their sharecroppers. Having limited capital, Ahmet could not improve his land, and at the end of the season the yield was so low that he had to return his tractor, which means that he has to wait until he can enlarge the flock to the original size before he can think of trying again.

Small farmers in Tuz, therefore, can only reproduce their farms and their households on the basis of their own and their family's labour. Enlarging productive capacity is dependent on the accumulation of cash, but such accumulation is not always possible. Accumulation is a function of the labour power available within the household and opportunities for reducing circulating costs. A relationship that allows the small farmer some chance to save cash, such as Hüseyin's ties with his boss, or Mustafa's inheritance (and his father's helping hand), may establish these small farmers in the category of middle peasants providing the economic conjuncture is favourable. These small farmers, as well as middle peasants, keep producing cotton since, this is the best way to utilise productively the labour of all the members of the household, which would otherwise be idle.

10.1.2 Middle Peasants

The category of middle peasants has been defined by the fact that these producers are able to subsist on the basis of the cotton they produce without having to undertake other income-generating activities. In terms of life style and status, it is these farmers and their households which set village standards. These are the 'farmers' (çiftçi) who, according to the villagers define the state of being a villager. Compared to the previous category, these farmers have larger amounts of cash at their disposal. In the hope of consolidating their farms, they usually invest this cash in means of production. By contrast, extending area put under production plays a less important role.[25] The majority of the local female labour force employed in Tuz fields come from the households that comprise this category of producers. Furthermore, it is these producers who most depend on unpaid labour found within the household in order to be able to meet production costs. Between 19 and 27 % of total household labour is expended as exchange labour; thus exchange labour is much more important in the life of the middle peasants than in the productive activities of either small or large farmers (see table 9.11). The relatively high incidence of exchange labour also shows that the farmers in this category depend on links with other villagers in order to find labour.[26]

As in the case of small farmers discussed previously, middle peasants engage in cotton production in order to take advantage of the rather high returns to labour this form of production allows. The actual level of returns varies each year according to input and output prices, and especially according to the cost of credit. Many of the producers themselves maintain that if they were to calculate their own labour as costs, they should stop producing altogether. The returns obtained through cotton production, are comparable to wages in other sectors.[27] Although short-term seasonal work is abundant, stable waged work is scarce in Söke, and at most it is the heads of the households or their adult sons who are able to find such employment. Cotton production, by contrast, allows all members of the household to contribute to the generation of income. In other words, peasant strategy consists of tapping all the labour available

within the household, and, by using exchange networks, extending its use as much as possible.

Work in cotton production is limited to about six months. Most of the remaining 'free' time is spent in finding ways of either decreasing cash costs for the reproduction of labour, or in increasing cash income itself. Other forms of productive activities that can be carried out within the village serve in both of these ways. Thus, a number of these middle farmers profit from the relatively idle winter months to fatten calves to be sold as meat, to fish, or to tend olive groves. The first and last of these activities also utilise the labour of women and children within the household: women feed and milk animals, children take them out to pasture, while everyone can harvest olives. In contrast to the cash-generating activities of small farmers however, these pursuits are secondary, and the heads of middle peasant households rarely work for a wage.

However, not all of the farmers in this category are able to reproduce themselves at the same income levels. The differences in their incomes mean that while some of them are just able to eke out enough of an income to allow them to resume cotton production for another year, others can increase the size or quality of their land, and invest in farm equipment. For the majority of the farmers in this category, successful farming means generating enough cash to cover all monetary costs of production and enter into the following productive cycle without having to borrow. At the lower end of the scale, farmers simply repay their debts, while at the higher end, accumulation of capital on the basis of wage labour may even be possible. As a result, the uses of savings differ according to the producers' income levels. While some can think of buying more land, and thus allow their children to begin with a larger and better endowed farm, the farmers in the lower income bracket attempt to secure the cash needed to obtain the technology necessary for current productivity levels. Accumulation for middle peasants is dependent on the same strategy that is used by small farmers: saving on monetary costs, especially where labour is concerned. But, having access to more land, the ability of middle peasants to transform income into investment is greater that that of small farmers.

Expanding productive activities for many of the middle farmers towards the lower end of the scale is a way of financing investments.[28] The timing of expansion often corresponds with demand in the household for a larger income or the possibility of taking advantage of extraordinary favourable circumstances.[29] The production decisions taken by Osman, the son of a rather impoverished yeni yürük family illustrate the calculations involved in this type of expansion. Osman married in 1978 and continued to live with his elderly parents, two unmarried sisters and one brother.[30] For many years before his marriage, Osman worked as a shepherd and as a waged fisherman in the cooperative, while his family cultivated cotton on the 33 decares of land given to them by the government. His yürük neighbours often helped in undertaking the mechanical aspects of production, while the labour of his brother and sisters was used to pay back these debts. After his marriage, Osman used his wedding gold to buy a minibus. He worked as a driver for four years, at the end of which he sold his minibus and paid the first installment for a tractor. In 1984, he obtained 150 decares of land from Tan, who, as the owner of the village his wife comes from, offered him better terms than usual: Osman had to pay 8000 TL./da. but could also use the field in the winter to plant wheat. As it happened, Osman was unsuccessful. He had hoped to obtain at least 40 metric tonnes of cotton (approx. 250 kg./da.), instead of which he barely made 28 tonnes. In order to pay his debts, Osman had to return his tractor, but managed to buy his minibus back.

What Osman had hoped to do, was to establish himself more securely as a cotton producer, using his good relations with Tan in order to obtain more land slightly below the market price. In this way he hoped to utilise productively the large number of labourers within his household and the cash he had accumulated driving his minibus. Many farmers in the middle peasant category have used this strategy to consolidate and enlarge their holdings. Starting with the government-distributed 30 decares, these farmers have been able to buy between another 30 to 50 decares of land, as well as purchase the basic agricultural equipment. Isa is a good example of the way in which such accumulation is possible. In 1971, he and his brothers split their flock of goats and decided to settle as cotton producers. Having married in 1959, he already owned 30 decares distributed

to all heads of households in 1960. He bought another 6 decares by selling his wife's gold. In 1974, a year after the 50 % rise in the selling price of cotton he bought a further 15 decares of land, and another 15 decares the following year.[31] In 1976, Isa bought his first tractor, taking advantage of the good terms offered by the Fiat company in an effort to capture the Aegean market. For a ten years, he farmed his 60 decares and even managed to exchange his tractor for a more expensive one in 1985. In the meantime, he married of his daughter and son; but his wife fell ill, and he had to spend considerable money for her treatment. In 1986, he bought another 15 decares for his son by selling the bride's gold.[32] Unexpectedly good yields in 1987, coupled to the above average increase in the selling price of cotton, allowed him to buy another 15 decares for his younger son as well.

By contrast, Mehmet, Isa's younger brother is a landless grocer earning about 20.000 TL. per month. The difference in their economic postion is mainly due to the fact that Mehmet did not have access to the land distributed by the government since he was yet unmarried in 1960.[33] For a few years, he rented his brother Ali's 15 decares and planted cotton. But, having very little interest or cash to help him along, he soon became a salaried worker for the Ministry of Forestry. However, his contract expired within a year and he found himself without a job or prospects. For a while, the family's only income was his wife Meryem's labour on other people's cotton fields and olive groves. In 1983, Mehmet borrowed some money from Isa and opened a grocery shop in Tuz. His is the fifth grocery shop in the village, and, as a result of his limited capital, his volume of trade remains small.

As the difference between Mehmet and Isa illustrates, it often proves difficult to procure a socially acceptable standard of living by producing cotton without relying on previously accumulated capital. This capital can take the form of inheritance, government distributions, and income generated through other kinds of productive activities. Given the accumulated land, Isa's sons will be able to enter into independent cotton production with a similar advantage as that enjoyed by Isa himself. By contrast, it is often difficult though not impossible, to establish oneself as a cotton farmer

without such capital. The larger the intial capital, the greater the possibility of expansion. The large farmers of Tuz are all individuals who had considerable amounts of accumulated capital at their disposal. For the eski yürük, this capital was often in the form of land which they had appropriated prior to the penetration of commodity relations. For the yeni yürük, it took the form of large flocks of sheep and goats, which at a time when land was relatively cheap, could be converted tino means of agricultural production.

Isa is a typical middle peasant in many other ways. Although he employs migrant labour during the harvest, his daughter-in-law and his sons regularly work on the farm.[34] He brings in migrant labourers by pooling resources with two other farmers and neighbours who cultivate approximately similar amounts of land. He also exchanges labour with the same people labour during the hoeing season and the third cotton picking. He rarely borrows money to pay for labour, but tries to make do with savings from previous cycles of production to meet these costs. This is facilitated by the fact that he is a member of Taris which supplies him with a large portion of his inputs. He tries to keep borrowing from village traders only under special circumstances, for instance when buying a piece of agricultural equipment, building a house, or marrying off a son. Whenever possible, he tries to convert his savings into some form of productive (and sometimes reproductive) investment. In this way, he can keep abreast of technological advances and maintain the average productivity of labour and land predominant in the region. His wage bill amounts to about ten percent of his gross earnings from cotton, but makes up a high proportion of his circulating costs. He earns a minimum net income of 1,500,000 TL., or the equivalent of the annual wages of five salaried tractor drivers. This income includes the labour expended by his two sons and his daughter-in-law. Moreover, by breeding cows and producing olives, he can increase his cash income and decrease the monetary costs of subsistence.

For most of the peasants in this category, levels of accumulation are only sufficient for the consolidation of the enterprise; at best, such accumulation allows the establishment of more than one equivalent enterprise in the next generation. Behaving like petty capitalists by

expanding production in order to increase money incomes and investment, at best serves to marginally increase returns to labour. The 'profit' of a farmer cultivating 120 decares of cotton amounts to 2,820,000 TL., or a daily income of 7800 TL.[35] Assuming that this figure comprises the labour of four individuals within the household, daily wages per person amount to just under 2000 TL. By contrast, a harvester who picks 100 kg. a day earns 2500 TL. at the current wage rate.[36] But cotton picking is possible only for at most 60 days a year, thus yielding an annual income of 150,000 TL. Production of cotton, by contrast, yields an income with which it is possiblle to live comfortably for more than a year, depending on the area under production. Thus, to remain petty commodity producers, Tuz peasants have to accumulate, but this accumulation does not necessarily allow them to become petty capitalists.

10.1.3 Large Farmers

Variations among large farmers producing more than 25 metric tonnes of cotton each year and farming more than 130 decares of land, are as marked as those existing among the small and middle peasants of Tuz. Only four of the total of sixteen producers in this category actually own more than 120 decares of land; the rest obtain the land they cultivate on the basis of various renting and sharecropping contracts.[37] The four largest landowners own 350, 220, 196, and 130 decares of land each, while the remaining twelve own between 20 and 100 decares. To the extent that ownership of land reflects levels of capital accumulation, a number of these producers may very well be middle peasants trying to consolidate their holdings by taking on an extra 100-150 decares of land to farm. Osman, a man whose efforts to establish himself as a cotton farmer were described in the previous section, is clearly a case in point. As I have already mentioned, it is the amounts of capital they command and the type of diversification these farmers are involved in which confers them the status of rich peasants. Diversification through investment in other branches of production can also be a way of consolidating middle peasant status. This is the strategy followed by Osman, firstly to enlarge his scale of production, and after his failure, to accumulate enough capital to begin once again. Other households heads who stand to lose from the imminent

death of an elderly parent also invest as large a proportion of their income as possible into other forms of wealth which they hope will not be subject to division between heirs.[38] A closer look at the activities of those producers whom I consider large peasants will help to clarify these distinctions.

The four largest farmers are individuals who have been able to transfer to cotton production wealth accumulated prior to the full-fledged commercialisation of agriculture.[39] Two of these farmers are the descendants of the Delibas and the Akilli, eski yürük families who settled in Tuz towards the end of the nineteenth century and lived on sheep herding, camel driving and agriculture.[40] The agriculture that they practiced was small-scale and limited to the growing of summer millet on state-owned land that, during the winter, served as pasture. This land was situated on the high ground surrounding the present site of Tuz and was thus protected from the annual floods. Apart from opening up land on the plain, these families also appropriated mountain land which they turned into olive groves. Until the first land distribution of 1952, most of the available land around Tuz was therefore held in usufruct (zilyedlik) by these families.[41] By the early fifties, two of the men in these families had already risen to economic prominence by investing wealth in trading activities and thereby converting it into capital.

One of them, Ali Mehmet Akilli, managed to appropriate about 600 decares of land. He subsequently sold this land for cash which he invested in various business ventures ranging from trade in grain to cattle breeding. In twenty years he had reduced his holding to 200 decares and his ten children inherited about 10 decares each. But in the meantime he had established his eldest son, Osman, as the first and only village grocer, starting him in the business in 1957. It was the money he earned from his trading (and probabaly moneylending) activities that made Osman prosper.[42] His siblings all maintain that their father had been unfair and had helped Osman more than he helped them. Thus, although they are not as wealthy as Osman, they nevertheless are able to cultivate cotton as comfortable middle farmers. [43]

Kâmil Delibas accumulated his original capital by trading in sheep and goats. His father was also an established sheep drover and as such had been able to appropriate large tracts of pasture land. By the time Kâmil came of age, much of this land had been divided among the men of the large Delibas family. Nevertheless, with the income he derived from sheep trading over a period of twenty years, Kâmil bought a total of 350 decares of land.[44] In 1966, Kâmil and his children left the village to settle in Söke where they began to run a transport firm comprising two lorries. The business prospered and today Kâmil is a rich town-dweller whose children have received higher education.[45] In order to pay for this education, Kâmil sold about 230 decares of his land and today owns 220 decares of cotton land as well as a 55-decare olive grove. At present, Kâmil is an eighty-year-old rich man who owns a number of shops in Söke where he trades in agricultural machinery and spare parts for tractors.

Both of these men combined agriculture with commerce, investing income earned from the latter in expanding and modernising the former. It was these men who were the first in the village to purchase tractors. Being the older males of large and established families, they managed to channel the productive capabilities of their households for their own personal gain. The Akilli family depended on land for their initial accumulation, registering pastures in their own name, a process which had turned them into large landowners by the time agricultural production became an important source of income. The Delibas, by contrast, rose to economic prominence through the trade in sheep which their large family could raise at very little monetary cost. At present Osman Akilli who is seventy years old and the father of four daughters and six sons, is the owner of about 200 decares of land, and farms about 247 decares each year. For a long time, Osman was the only moneylender of the village, an activity which is now carried on by his eldest son, himself also a cotton farmer.[46] Another of his sons became a high a high-school teacher and he and his wife, a muhacir girl from Tuz, now reside outside the village. A third married son who finished a higher education course in management has been running Osman's grocery shop. In 1987, Osman had also opened a grocery shop for his son in Söke and was himself contemplating the move, leaving his agricultural concerns in the hands of his as yet unmarried younger sons.

Kâmil has already left agricultural production in the hands of his one son who did not go on to higher education. This son married a yeni yürük girl from Tuz where they both reside at present, farming the 220 decares of land belonging to the father, and using the latter's links in Söke to obtain cheap credit from banks.

Agriculture, for both of these producers, is a side activity entered into on the basis of income earned from commercial activities during the fifties and early sixties. At present they are investing in commerce rather than agriculture.[47] In terms of their farming activities, it is these farmers who employ the highest numbers of migrant workers. In the last couple of years, they have even begun to hire migrants for the much shortened process of cotton hoeing. They are among the ten or so farmers who own the most advanced farming equipment available in the region. In both of these households, it is male labour expended in mechanised processes that constitutes the bulk of the unpaid labour used.[48] Because of the limited amount of household labour expended in cotton production, net income for these farmers constitutes more a return to capital, than a return to labour.

The yeni yürük households who have enriched themselves during the past fourty yaers followed a rather different trajectory. Because they were late-comers in settling in the area, they did not find free pasture land which they could appropriate. On the contrary, they had to pay for the use of pasture, the recipients often being the two families described above. Most of the land they own at present was purchased over a period thirty-to thirty-five years.[49] Hasan Kara and his father's father's brother's son, Ismail, were among the yürük who opted to settle in Tuz. Starting in 1948, Osman Karadayi began to invest all his income in land, often purchasing small quantities of about 15-30 decares.[50] Today, he is the largest landowner of Tuz with 350 decares in his name alone.[51] Ismail, an orphan with less labour available to him, managed to buy only a total of 130 decares of land.

Both Hasan and Ismail have, during the past ten years, diversified their economic activities and invested outside of agriculture. Ismail's

younger son Abdi has not established an independent household and has used the cash accumulated from cotton production to buy a minibus. After working in the transport sector for five years, he has also been able to open a grocery shop in the village, which, contrary to local practice, is at present run by his young wife.[52] Similarly, Hasan and his two sons have opened a shop themselves in 1979, where, as all large shop-owners, they sell an assortment of goods to the villagers on credit. Moneylending was not, at least in the past, an important economic activity for either of these yeni yürük. Hasan Kara has only recently begun to buy olive oil and milk from villagers, an activity which for a long time has been an integral part of Osman Akilli's trade. Thus, in contrast to the men described above, it is on the basis of their agricultural activities that Hasan Kara and Ismail have been able to accumulate cash to invest in commerce. They both obtained the capital needed to expand their agricultural production and then diversify into trade by using unpaid labour available within their households. They both have eight children each, and have added the labour of their sons' wives (and in the case of Hasan, his older son's children as well) to the pool of unpaid labour they can depend on. It is these households which account for the high number of consumers, workers, and household labour available to the category of large producers, namely those whose output exceeds 40 metric tonnes in table 10.1.

All sixteen producers in this category of large farmers are also among those who use the largest numbers of hired labourers, the majority of whom are migrants.[53] Wage labour accounts for more than 80 % of the manual labour employed in hoeing and harvesting cotton (see table 9.3). The extraction of surplus labour through the wage relationship is therefore an important aspect of the richest peasants' productive process. Like other village producers, they also attempt to employ household labour productively through the cultivation of cotton. Very few of these farmers employ hired tractor drivers; but their need for hired male labour during irrigation can often only be met by hiring village men. The net yearly income of these producers exceeds 2,000,000 TL., a sum that, under conditions of village life, allows substantial savings. The larger the area put under production, the larger the net income that the producer can use for investments. But

without more capital, it is not possible to enlarge production beyond the level characteristic of middle peasants. And it is only by using capital accumulated in other economic activities that the limits of the middle peasantry can be surpassed.

Accumulation of capital only on the basis of commerce is rare, but possible. Two men in Tuz who own little or no land have been able to establish themselves as cotton traders and during a relatively short period of time enlarge their scale of activities. One of them, Osman Akilli's father's brother's son Ahmet, acted as trader and moneylender in the village for a period of ten years or more, at the end of which he had accumulated enough capital to set up as a tractor dealer in Söke. The other has begun lending money in 1983 when the volume of cotton production in the village had reached considerable proportions. The much smaller amount of capital that this man has accumulated has only allowed him to plough back his profits into agriculture, and by 1987 he had bought 60 decares of land. Thus using commercial profits, he has been able to establsih himself as a middle peasant. If the return to capital in moneylending holds constant, he may enlarge his landholding, or invest in commerce; if not, he may continue as a peasant farmer.

The final point of the trajectory of expansion through accumulation in commercial activities is movement to town and urbanisation of life styles.[54] As was shown above, agriculture plays an important, if not dominant role in the accumulation that allows urbanisation. It enables the entrepeneur to utilise as much as possible the relations of kinship and community to facilitate capital accumulation. Ties in the village also serve accumulation processes outside agriculture, as in the case of moneylending and commerce. Even after migration to town, agriculture can continue to supplement income in an important way. For example, in 1984 Ahmet, the tractor dealer in Söke, has rented 150 decares of land from Tan with a view to increasing his capital. He plans to buy a couple of cotton gins and establish a ginning mill with the approximately 2,000,000 TL-profit he hopes to make from the cultivation of cotton. As was illustrated by Kâmil Delibas, in the long-term the move to town is accompanied by the restriction rather than the expansion of agricultural activities.[55] The

persons able to undertake this move are the ones who no longer need to rely on household labour in order to earn income and make profits. Their sons and daughters can now be sent to school to acquire a profession and in this way become sources of expenditure rather than labour.

As the discussion above has hopefully demonstrated, capital accumulation through the production of cotton mainly serves to consolidate middle peasant status. Intensification of production is rarely possible under the present conditions and any increase in output can only be obtained by extending area under production. This expansion is undertaken mostly by middle peasants in order to meet pressing needs, or in order to consolidate their holdings. Even large peasants, those who already have considerable cash reserves, undertake expansion to leave their children a larger patrimony, or to start a new business venture. After a certain level, increases in income (which are rarely observed from agriculture alone) serve to remove the individual from village life altogether. At the same time, migration to cities from the other end of the spectrum, described by Kandiyoti for central Anatolia, is infrequent in Tuz.[56] The possibility of securing adequate levels of subsistence in the village, coupled with prospects of inheritance and/or accumulation make outmigration too risky for the majority of Tuz villagers.

10.2 Conclusion: Comparisons With Town-Based Capitalist Producers

As a way of concluding the discussion on capital accumulation and differentiation among cotton cultivators, I would like to point out some of the production strategies pursued by town-based capitalist producers. In this way, I hope to show more precisely the special characteristics of village producers.

Compared to villagers, town-based producers have less access to non-commoditised inputs, especially labour. Since they undertake production in order to obtain a certain level of return on capital rather than labour, their mode of calculation is very different. Each input has a cash equivalent and therefore a calculable opportunity cost. As a result, cost per decare is often double that calculated by village producers. In 1978, a

farmer cultivating 500 decares of cotton calculated his costs per decare in the following way:

Fuel	180.25 TL.
Seed	36
Pestcide	120
Fertiliser	105
Driver, Guard, Cook	120
Land Improvements	50
Depreciation of Implements	150
Land Tax and Protection	37
Irrigation	120
Hoeing	400
Harvesting	1000
Rent	800
Total	**3118.25**

In the same year, a village producer cultivating 50 decares of land put his total costs at 70,000 TL. (1400 TL/da.) and a man hiring a tractor to cultivate 36 decares and who only used household labour said his total costs had come to about 1100 TL/da. Many items in the large farmer's list such as rent or depreciation, are not calculated as a cost by village farmers, and others such as taxes do not represent a cash cost for village producers. The sale price of cotton in 1978 varied between 13.25 to 14 TL/kg. Thus, for the capitalist farmer, net profit per decare was just above 380 TL.[58]

As the cost list above shows, labour constitutes more than half of the production cost for town producers. The difficulties the latter face in finding a secure labour force for hoeing and harvesting and the limited returns to capital in cotton production mean that many of these producers are turning away from the cultivation of cotton. Sunflowers are rapidly replacing cotton among these producers, since this crop can be mechanically harvested. Cattle breeding and the growing of fodder crops are among other alternatives which capitalist producers find more profitable.

Many of these town-based capitalist producers are in fact former villagers who have settled in town as a result of successful capital accumulation.[59] The rest of the town-based capitalists are descendants of large farmers such as Tan who have tried to rationalise their holdings by selling large portions of land.[60] To the extent that they can retain their

links with their former villages, these former peasants try, as the case of Ahmet illustrates, to cultivate cotton at a relatively low cash cost. They do not employ farm managers, but use male household labour for these as well as mechanised tasks. As they become more settled in town and can begin to undertake commercial activities without needing the added security provided by landownership, they often divorce themselves from agricultural production altogether. In this way, we can see that the distance between village producers and capitalist producers is not too great and that in reality, they represent a continuum whose gradations are not too clearly demarcated. The only way of differentiating between them is to consider their levels of capital accumulation and the production strategies they pursue.

Village-based petty commodity producers are small-to-middle peasants who use household labour and ties of kinship and community as a means of limiting monetary costs of production. The proportion of wage labour used in the process of production is small in comparison to the total amount of labour expended; nevertheless, labour still represents the largest item of cash costs. Peasant producers try to obtain other inputs, which are also commoditised, outside commodity circuits. Land and agricultural machinery are among such inputs. Access to these inputs without payment of a cash equivalent is largely made possible through the kinship and community networks of exchange that constitute 'villageness'. Another class of inputs such as seed, fuel, fertilisers, and pesticides can be obtained at a reduced cash cost as a result of state intervention.[61] Under these conditions, small producers can keep up with technological improvements and maintain the normal level of land and labour productivity.[62]

Under these conditions, the accumulation of capital mainly results in the consolidation of a class of middle peasants. Contrary to the case described by Harris (1982), the position of these middle producers has not been precarious over the last ten years. Political factors, as much as any others, are responsible for this state of affairs. The fortunes of middle peasants are tied to state economic policies which regulate the price of cotton and the price of inputs. As argued by Smith (1986), the speed and nature of differentiation among peasant producers thus emerges as a process

that can largely be controlled by the state.[63] Many of these middle peasants combine 'endo-familial' accumulation, that is savings that result from the use of familial labour power with simple capitalist accumulation based on the use of varying levels of wage labour. Without such accumulation, it is difficult to enter into the production of cotton. For middle peasants, cotton production represents a labour-intensive branch of agricultural production in which returns to labour make the expanded reproduction of village households possible. To the extent that capitalistic accumulation takes place, it is largely outside the agricultural production process, and it leads to the migration of the entrepreneur from the village and ultimately from the production of cotton itself. At the lower end, on the contrary, agricultural production combined with other pursuits (such as fishing and agricultural wage labour) allows a steady income without transforming the individuals in question into full-time agricultural wage labourers.

Notes to Chapter 10

1. The surplus that it does yield (in the form of the 'share of the workshop (apa)) is in any case too small to invest in improved technology.

2. Scott (1986) sums up the different positions of the debate.

3. This may not in fact be an omission, but may reflect the actual case as the examples from Indonesian blacksmiths and Guatemalan craftsmen suggest (Kahn 1980 and Smith 1984b).

4. Land has been bought and sold in Söke for a long time, but as was shown in chapter 7, many village producers take kinship considerations into account when allocating land.

5. The latter results from national export policies and the movement of international cotton prices.

6. One indication of this trend is the slight decrease in the Gini coefficient of land farmed in 1984, compared with that obtaining in 1978. In 1978, this figure was 0.5884, while in 1984, it had gone down to 0.571.

7. A farmer cultivating a 200-decare field that yields between 40 to 50 metric tonnes of cotton will need 1,000,000-1,250,000 TL. merely to hire cotton pickers.

8. See note 1 of chapter 9.

9. The T-statistic for C is below 1.0 in regression analyses and this variable on its own only explains 16 % of the cases.

10. See also tables 9.2 and 9.3. The largest farmers provide more manual labour in absolute numbers than any other category of farmers, while in terms of percentage of total labour employed, they supply more labour than farmers cultivating between 60 and 150 decares of cotton.

11. The largest four farmers of Tuz are all from yürük households.

12. One farmer in the penultimate category maintained that he could obtain yields reaching 400 kg./da. Having no way of verifying this statement, I have included it in the table. Without this figure, the average yields in the said category is 223 kg./da. The farmer in question farms 100 decares of land that is his own property and explains the above-average performance in terms of the effort he spent in improving his land. His fields are moreover contiguous and are situated by the main irrigation canal.

13. Thus, for example, distance from the irrigation canals may determine whether or not a particular field will be cropped to cotton or left fallow. Similarly, as I shall show below, large producers may limit the area cropped to cotton if harvesting costs become unmanageable.

14. Since many of the people who did not farm land in 1984 either did so in the past, or hope to do so in the future, I also include them in this

category. On this basis, only the immigrant craftsmen can be excluded from the category of 'farmer'.

15. Some farmers in this category may own larger amounts of land but are unable to turn all of it to productive use as a result of a lack of cash and/or labour.

16. As table 8.3 shows, only 29 % of these own tractors. Tractor owners usually have a plough, a planter, and a rake, and have to borrow the other implements.

17. The women in the households which make up this category do not regularly work on other people's farms since they do not require much labour in return. The men of the household, by contrast, are the main income earners.

18. His father owns 80 decares of land, which on his death will be divided between his seven children. Thus, Hüseyin can expect to receive at most 10 decares from his father and another 20 from his wife's father.

19. Hüseyin's cost are at about 8000 TL/da since he pays no interest nor any wages. At the end of the first year, he will sell at most 850,000 TL's worth of cotton (200kg/da. × 25 da. × 170 TL./kg.) for which he will have spent 200,000 TL. This will leave him 650,000 TL. with which he may rent land for another year and/or enlarge productive activities by buying implements. His wages bring him about 300,000 TL per annum (25,000 TL × 12), while cotton production yields 550, 000 TL.

20. His brothers maintained, of course, that it was their father who had paid for the tractor, since, they argued, Mustafa had already sold his gold.

21. Many fishermen, however, argue that it is temperament rather than lack of cash that keeps them from becoming farmers. Sefer and his two sons spend all their time at sea and their 21-decare field is leased out to Sefer's brother's son every year. Every year Sefer maintains that this will be the last year he leases out his land, but the necessity of marrying off his sons and his own high consumption levels, largely due to drinking, have not yet permitted him to farm his own land.

22. One man who works as a truck driver for the fishing cooperative has neither the time nor the opportunity to enter into cotton production. His wife does not work in cotton fields, and his two daughters who do, spend most of their income on building up their trousseaux.

23. As it happened, Hüseyin proved successful. In 1987, he was renting 45 decares of land and was hoping to buy his own tractor. He had left his boss and was working as a tractor driver for Tuz farmers on an ad hoc basis. He maintained that planting cotton earned him 50,000 TL per day, while as a salaried worker, he would only receive 2,000 TL. per day. What he forgot to mention, of course, is that it is not only his own labour that earns him 50,000 TL., but that the labour of his wife and children is also needed to secure this income.

24. Looking after sheep means living a semi-nomadic life. Members of this family, composed of Ahmet, his wife, and their 10-year-old daughter, have to look after the sheep themselves since they cannot employ full-time shepherds. At a time when village life is becoming the norm, living in tents at the margins of the Söke plain, as well as at the margin of village society, is quickly losing its attraction.

25. As table 10.3 shows, middle peasants farm 519 decares of land in excess of the land they own, while the small farmers cultivate 1221.5 decares more than is registered as their property. In contrast to small farmers however, the courtyards of middle peasant houses often boast a covered garage in which the tractor and some of the more expensive agricultural implements are kept. Seventy-four percent of the farmers in this category own a tractor.

26. Although I cannot illustrate it numerically, it is also this group which obtains most of the other means of production, cash and land, through kinship and village networks. Moreover, the highest incidence of village endogamy is found among this group.

27. Average wages per annum are about 300,000 TL. Average income on a 30-decare field varies between 500,000 TL. to 800,000 TL.; this is equivalent to the wages of one and a half to almost three person.

28. These investments may comprise buying a tractor or some other expensive implement, buying more land, or buying gold needed to marry off a son.

29. For example, the addition of extra land through the residence of an elderly parent or labour as the result of the marriage of a son.

30. The fact that his brother is mentally retarded means that the latter may never marry and thus Osman may never separate from the parental household since he is the only able-bodied male who can provide income. The fact that his brother and mother are not normal reduces his sisters' prospects of marriage considerably.

31. The land he bought was a 75-decare field sold by a muhacir from Dogan who had become rich during the 1950s and moved to town. His elder brother Ali bought 30 decares of the same field, and his wife's father's brother Ismail whose career is described in the following section bought the remaining 30 decares. They paid 2000 TL/da. A year later, his wife's FB decided to sell half of his field and allowed Isa to pay in installments.

32. This field was bought in his son's name, but is farmed jointly since the latter is still part of the parental household. On paper, Isa still owns 60 decares of land.

33. Mehmet also made certain decisions that did not prove to be judicious. After the division of the flock, he decided to try his luck in Germany and left as a tourist without job security. In order to meet the expenses of his trip, he used the money that accrued to him from the sale of the flock of goats. A year later his wife joined him and this time, to finance her trip, they sold the olive grove that they had inherited from Mehmet's

father. When in 1974 Germany repatriated illegal workers, all Mehmet came back with was a black-and-white television set!

34. After her long illness, Isa's wife Sevim stopped working in the fields. See Appendix 5, for a kinship chart explaining the relations between these individuals.

35. I am employing the term 'profit' here in a way similar to that used by Smith in her study of the Guatemalan weavers referred to above (1984 b: 75), that is by dividing net daily income to the number of individuals within the household who have spent any amount of time working for the product. This is a very rough measure of profit and I include it only as a guide to the argument.

36. In Isa's case described above, the daily 'profit' is about 1000 TL. These calculations exclude fixed costs and land rent. Thus, as Smith argues (ibid.), the wage rate in cotton production is high in relation to the rate of profit.

37. Three of these producers farm the land of their father and/or mother who reside in their households and thus pay neither rent, nor a share of the product.

38. Apart from minibuses, these people try to purchase land or agricultural machinery in their own name.

39. As I explained in chapter 2, the involvement of Söke inhabitants in the production of commodities, was, until the nineteen fifties, restricted to the exportation of grains from the region and its hinterland to the Greek islands, and to the production and export of valonia, licorice and animal products.

40. According to local oral history, these two families who now have numerous descendants living in many of the villages of the lower Meander plain were the sons of two brothers. One of them was aggressive and quick-tempered and was therefore called 'mad-head' (deli=mad; bas=head), while the other was calm and respectful. Akilli in modern Turkish means 'intelligent', but in the villages, the usage is more akin to 'responsible person'. Thus, two opposites, namely the mad-blooded and the responsible are considered to be the founders of the village.

41. Three other eski yürük families, the Savran (=cattle driver) and the Akgül were also among the founders of Tuz, but it seems that they were smaller groups. The kinship identity of the eski yürük households in Tuz reflects this situation. While ten of the household heads in Tuz are Delibas, and ten are Akilli (see Appendix IIIa), there are only two Savrans and three Akgüls. Moreover, these two families own only about 100 decares of land each. The Kor, another eski yürük family, that never managed to appropriate pasture land, make up seven households.

42. Kandiyoti (1975) describes a similar trajectory in the consolidation of large wheat-producing farms in the Central Anatolian plateau.

43. During the fifties, Osman's younger brother, also called Ali Mehmet, managed to buy 100 decares of land which for a long time he used as pasture. But, because he has not been able to accumulate the cash necessary to turn it into a cotton farm, his wife's brother farms it as Ali Mehmet's sharecropper. Another brother had for a long time been cultivating cotton on his 30 decares distributed by the government. It was not until the mid-seventies that his land on the outskirts of the village became valuable as a result of the expansion of the village towards the southeast. This land became the new village square surrounded by shops and coffeehouses. By selling a small portion of his estate to village shop owners, he managed to acquire some capital and invest it in tractors and other agricultutal equipment. This man's widow is now the owner of 80 decares of cotton land and is able to rent 150 decares, thus farming a total of 230 decares of cotton.

44. During the course of the 1952 and 1960 land distributions, the Delibas family was dispossed of much of the land they held in usufruct since it had not been officially registered. Hence, Kâmil's agnates in the village, (his brother's son and his brother) are in a worse economic position compared to Kâmil.

45. One of his sons is an industrial engineer living in London.

46. Osman bought his son a 30-decare field a year after his marriage. Otherwise his children will inherit only about 18 decares of land each.

47. Osman maintains that he takes in more land than he owns in order to help his sons who will have to remain agricultural producers. Kâmil, by contrast, does not attempt to expand agricultural production since he and most of his children are well established in town. They, in fact, no longer consider themselves 'villagers'.

48. Only two of the Akilli women work as cotton pickers, while in the Delibas households no female labour is available for work on cotton fields.

49. As was described in chapter 2, the yeni yürük of Tuz lived as transhumant sheep and goat herders who travelled more than 300 kilometres to the east to find summer pastures and spent the winter in the mountainous terrain of the Söke-Milas area. It was not until the mid-sixties when the government restricted access to the Samsun ranges that these families permanently settled in villages. Many of these yeni yürük began to purchase land in their winter pastures (kislak).

50. His younger brothers maintain that they have a right to some of this land since it was their labour which contributed to the growth of the herds that were sold to buy land. Hasan, as the oldest of eight children, could, after the early death of his father, control and allocate income as he pleased. His mother and his brothers have for a long time refused to even speak to him. See Appendix IIIb for kinship relations among this group of yeni yürük of Tuz.

51. Villagers maintain that he owns more than this amount, but has registered it in the name of his two married sons who still have not separated from him to establish their own independent households.

52. His father is too old and too ill to work and his children are too young.

53. Unlike middle peasants, these farmers on their own account bring in more than thirty migrant workers each and are able to offer them uninterrupted work for a period of 45 to 60 days.

54. See also Kandiyoti (1975:215.)

55. It would be interesting to speculate whether Kâmil would have sold all his land if his youngest son had not been willing to resume cotton production. One yeni yürük man who was able to move to Söke after having sold his flocks, has in fact totally cut himself off from any agricultural activity.

56. Only 13 Tuz men who at present reside outside the village earn their living by working as manual labourers. I suspect many of these to be temporary migrations since many of them have left as a result of disputes with their father and are working as fishermen in various fishponds in the region. A total of 34 men live outside the village out of which 22 work as civil servants following an education or are engaged in trading and other commercial activities. These make up the total number of outmigration from Tuz.

58. The farmer calculated his profit in terms of cost per kilogramme of cotton produced. Thus, with a yield of 250 kg./da, he calculated that he produced one kilogramme of cotton for 12.47 TL (3118.25/250). This gave him a profit rate of 11 % (100-12.47/14×100), or 1.53 TL/da.

59. Tuz villagers explain this capital accumulation in terms of widely-circulating myths about hidden treasures. Treasure hunting (define avciligi) is a very important part of rural folklore in Turkey (Uysal 1985). In the Aegean region, peasants maintain that departing Greeks buried their gold and that many of the successful entrepreneurs owe their initial capital to such finds.

60. As I have shown in chapter 2, large holdings in the Söke plain have also diminished in size as a result of inheritance.

61. The policies that guide state intervention also are intricately linked to the nature of Turkish society within which the rural-urban divide remains a crucial consideration in development plans as well as in the political process.

62. As argued by Kahn, even where labour power is not fully commoditised, the drudgery of labour inputs experienced directly by producers helps to establish a standardised level around which returns to labour will fluctuate (1982:12).

63. Thus, as Margulies argues for Turkey as a whole (1985), the emergence of a class of petty commodity producers may itself be the result of state intervention. But see Keyder (1983b) for an alternative explanation.

CONCLUSIONS

The study of cotton cultivators in a village of the Söke plain in Western Turkey shows the number of different factors that have to be taken into account in order to account for the continued existence of a class of 'independent' agricultural producers. Economic relations dominant at the level of the wider economy in Turkey have increasingly taken on a capitalist character. Especially after the 1950s, a growing national market and the production of commodities have characterised much of rural Turkey (Singer 1977, Aydin 1980, Keyder 1983b). As I show in chapter 5, since the early 1960s the state has been a major agent in shaping generally the development of capitalism in the country and specifically, in determining the conditions under which cotton has been produced in Turkey. The state has also been instrumental in the consolidation of village communities. Extension of roads, education, and electritification, especially in the West of Turkey have helped the integration of these communities into the social, economic and cultural life of the nation as a whole. Contrary to the experience of other similar communities in Turkey where change has produced massive upheavals, especially large-scale outmigration (Stirling 1974; Keyder 1983b:37-8), or extensive dispossession of land (Aydin 1980; Hinderink and Kiray 1970), transition to commodity production in the Söke region has been rather smooth and has not destroyed the fabric of social relations within the community.[1]

Peasants in the Söke region have increasingly been drawn into the circuits of commodity production. The dominance of the cultivation of cotton shows the extent to which wider economic forces shape the production decisions of these villagers. In this context, 'independence' is a concept that has to be treated with care. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, these producers are independent in so far as they own or control their means of production, especially land and labour. Due to the high levels of return to labour that it provides, cotton production has emerged as the only option open for producers to remain independent agricultural cultivators. The amount of income they obtain is largely determined by input and output prices which they normally do not control.[2] The process of production necessitates the establishment of credit

relations with the state and with private merchants. In many studies of the Turkish peasantry, the latter have been identified as the major agents through which peasants are exploited (Aydin 1980; Boratav 1980; Margulies 1985). But as Friedmann maintains (1980:169-70), in conditions where factors of production are mobile, exploitation by merchants, banks, and landowners becomes a theoretical impossibility. As I showed in chapter 8, competition among merchants and banks in the region and in the village have largely produced uniform prices for land, credit and other inputs. It is in this sense that I consider Tuz cotton producers to be independent.

If Tuz farmers are not themselves exploited, do they exploit others? Many of the participants in the debates on the nature and persistence of petty commodity producers have stressed 'self-exploitation' as an important factor in explaining continuity (Bernstein 1986:18). It is nevertheless still necessary to look carefully at who it is that carries out the bulk of the tasks involved in production. In this respect, two categories of labourers employed by Tuz farmers have to be considered, namely the seasonal migrant labourers used to harvest cotton and the unpaid family workers who undertake both manual and mechanical tasks during the course of the production process. On the basis of his fieldwork among small tea-producers in the East Black Sea Coast, Hann maintains that sharecroppers inhabiting the poorer inland regions where they own non-viable farms, do constitute a separate class "best described as a rural proletariat" (1985:106). According to Hann, class cleavages may emerge within a system of petty commodity production, especially when, as is the case in Tuz, seasonal labour migration is an integral aspect of the production process. It would indeed be impossible to deny the existence of exploitation in cases where the wage form dominates. And to the extent that Tuz producers employ wage labour, they certainly extract surplus labour.[3] But the extent to which this surplus is transformed into capital ready to be invested in production depends on the amount of total labour they employ during the production process, a variable that in turn depends on the amount of land put under production. For middle farmers, as I showed in chapters 9 and 10, wage labour represents a small but regular part of the total labour needed for production. The productive cycle with its peak labour demand during the harvest makes the employment of wage labour an integral part of

the process of production.[4] Accumulation of capital on the basis of this surplus may to varying degrees be a feature characterising Tuz cotton producers.

Nevertheless, as argued by Smith (1984:62), wages in cotton production are high compared to the farmers' profit margins. Thus, the role of the wage relation in accounting for accumulation may be limited.[5] It is probably more relevant to look at the unpaid labour used by these producers in order to explain accumulation. Yet, many of the attempts to explain the nature of commodity producers within the agricultural sector have, until recently, failed to consider relations of exploitation within the production unit.[6] As argued by Harris (1981), the tendency to view households as units within which economic relations take the form of pooling rather than exchange have led to the neglect of conflicts and divisions that are internal to the household. Many of the theories that try to define petty commodity production identify the productive enterprise as an undifferentiated whole without distinguishing the relations of power that structure it. Whether the productive unit is constituted by individuals or by households/families has no relevance within the terms of political economy. Recently, however, Friedmann (1986) and Roseberry (1986) have tried to analyse petty commodity production as a combination of relations of class and patriarchy, a point also taken up by Bernstein (1986).

Conflicts within Tuz households and the ways through which they are verbalised and resolved does point to the extent to which appropriation of labour within these units is an important part of the process of accumulation in cotton production. Young girls try as much as possible to work for a wage rather than for exchange labour, sons try to divert as much of the income as possible to their own (future) households, and fathers threaten to cease supporting dependents within the family. Struggles regarding the division of income within the household show that as long as the owner/producer is not a single person, subordination if not exploitation will continue to be an important feature of petty commodity production. Therefore the concept of 'self-exploitation' which, beginning with Kautsky and Chayanov, has been used to explain the persistence of family farms, has to be reconsidered. In the case discussed here, it is

clear from the differences in the access of individuals within a given household to cash and other items of consumption that the enterprise product is controlled by the (often male) head of the household. Gender and age, the two most important criteria according to which power relations within the family are structured, serve to allocate control over the product and labour of the family enterprise. Conversely, the central role played by women and young men within the productive process of the household also allow the 'juniors' (young men and women) the possibility of struggling for a larger share of the product.

Nevertheless, it is largely the dependence on unpaid labour that makes the peasant farm more viable as a cotton producer than capitalist enterprises which depend solely on wage labour. The latter find on the one hand that the wage bill is too high to yield adequate profits, and on the other hand, they do not have the means of securing the necessary work force. In spite of the peak time labour shortage experienced during the harvest, finding labour is less of a problem for peasant producers. Ties of kinship and community, often extended to cover complete strangers (such as seasonal migrants) mean that peasants can count on a more reliable work force. Thus, the shortage of labour at harvest time is more of a crisis for capitalist producers than for village-based peasant enterprises.[7] Moreover, not all of the seasonal labour employed by peasants (whether obtained within the village or through migrant workers) is paid in cash, a factor which is very important for cash-poor producers. By deploying mechanisms that are only available to peasants, the latter succeed in obtaining labour without an immediate payment of cash. Thereby peasant producers are able to turn to their own advantage a situation that limits capitalist production.

Under conditions where accumulated cash constitutes a major factor of production, ability to enter into production with a minimum outlay of cash is crucial. Survival and accumulation are based on reducing monetary costs. Village life, by making possible the production of a number of subsistence items outside market relations, allows producers firstly to reduce the cash necessary to reproduce labour. As argued by G. Smith (1986), labour constitutes only one of the inputs that are obtained through non-commodity

relations. As I showed in chapter 3, within the village a number of exchanges involving labour and produce that serve to satisfy daily consumption requirements also take place outside the market. Secondly, many of the commoditised inputs necessary for agricultural commodity production, among which land and labour figure most prominently, are obtained without requiring cash outlays. Thus, in order to explain the viability of peasant production, it is necessary to take into account structures that are larger than the individual production entreprise. In the case of cotton producers in Tuz, the village community provides the context within which enterprises can continue to operate. Moreover, the role of the community in reproducing relations of authority within the household cannot be overlooked. It might even be possible to transform the term of 'endo-familial' accumulation used by Cook (1984) to describe the process of accumulation among petty commodity producers. Instead of 'endo-familial', one might in the case of Tuz, speak of 'endo-communal' accumulation. Kahn (1980) and Friedmann (1980) stress the dissolution of community ties under petty commodity production. The evidence presented here suggests that if we take into account the ways in which producers get access to productive inputs, we find that such ties are an integral part of the process of petty commodity production.

The inclusion of kinship and community within a consideration of petty commodity production brings immediately to mind various conceptions of 'moral economy'. As used by Scott (1976), the term simply implies the existence of a tendency among peasant producers to secure adequate subsistence levels, a tendency which often leads them to forgoe higher incomes that can be obtained through other less secure strategies.[8] But the term has come to denote a set of social relations rooted in a pre-capitalist past that allows peasants to resist the penetration of capitalist relations.[9] My usage of the term relates to the type of relationships that are supposed to characterise intra-village exchanges. The absence of money in a large part (but not all) of these transactions allows peasants to reduce expenditure of cash in production as well as in consumption. Far from implying a resistence to involvement in market relations, these exchanges for many farmers in the village in fact make such an involvement possible. As stressed by Friedmann (1986) and Roseberry (1986), existing

intra-village as well as intra-household relations should not be seen as relics of a pre-capitalist past; quite to the contrary, these relations respond readily to pressures from the wider capitalist context. To cite an example, as land acquires a different meaning under commercial production, relations between husband and wife in Tuz, may have undergone a significant change, a fact that I have pointed to in chapters 4 and 7. Furthermore, the relations between agnatic kin as well as those between neighbours within the village may very well be reshaped through the changes that have affected the region within the last thirty-five years.[10] Only a more detailed historical analysis can reveal the particular nature of this change, a task that has not been undertaken in the present study.

Tuz producers live in rural areas where an ideology of 'peasantness' is still operative in regulating social interaction. Many of their inputs are obtained outside commodity relations as well as a part of their subsistence. At the same time, they produce commodities in a largely capitalist context within which the major inputs have largely acquired the character of a commodity, and they depend primarily on household labour for the production and reproduction of their farms. The theoretical implications of the different concepts developed to analyse peasant production help us on the one hand, to analyse various relationships that are observed in the course of empirical research. On the other hand, the lack of a complete fit between hypotheses derived from theoretical contructions and data produced by fieldwork encourages the production of new questions and new data.

The importance of peasant ideology, or the system of meaning which imposes limits on behaviour, for the study of peasant economics also points to areas of further study. As much as analyses of economic conditions of production, this sytem of meanings will provide clues to the forms of political action taken by peasants. One of the implications of this study is that notions of identity as constructed within the context of a community may provide important clues for a study of peasant ideology. As indicated in chapter 1, many theorists try to explain the persistence of peasant/simple commodity forms of production in terms of struggles between

different classes. Such struggles involve the operationalisation of specific systems of meaning according to which producers who occupy 'contradictory class positions' live out their daily lives as well as formulate long-term aspirations. To the extent that political economy strives to conceptualise the forms and determinants of political action that various rural producers may adopt, it cannot ignore the grammar that guides daily interaction, nor the shape that these long-term aspirations may take.

Notes to Conclusion

1. Although Stirling maintains that as a result of changing attitudes regarding land among the young people "village society is no longer self-reproducing" (1974:222), he also notes the continuities that accompany change and even concludes that after a period of twenty years or more, "the village is the same village" (1974:229).

2. The importance of Aegean producers in the 1987 general elections in Turkey has shown that at certain times, peasants may influence prices. According to newspaper reports, the very high cotton price offered during the course of the elections, coupled with the subsidies received by exporting merchants has raised the price of Turkish cotton above world prices and this has, in turn, led to drastic falls in cotton exports.

3. The fact that many of these seasonal migrants are also owners of subsistence farms, may, as has been argued by Aydin, lower the value of labour power in agriculture, and even in industry. Bazoglu (1984) offers a good description of the economic activities of seasonal migrants.

4. Thus, contrary to Friedmann's arguments, wage labour is not simply a result of demographic variations within the household. Almost all cotton producers have to hire some labour at harvest time. The number of female workers within the household determines the extent of wage labour needed.

5. The second part of Smith's argument which links the lack of differentiation among producers to the low level of technology that serves to reduce entry costs, itself a product of the low profit margins, does not hold in the case of Tuz cotton producers. Land and technology represent a high cost which producers in Tuz are able to meet on the basis of non-commodity relations defining the village community.

6. For example, Glavanis (1984) limits her analysis to the relations of cooperation between households in explaining the persistence of small commodity producers. She furthermore maintains that exploitation within the household is impossible and that the family as a whole is exploited by the dominant capitalist relations (personal communication). Aydin (1980) constitutes an important exception with regard to Turkey.

7. See Taylor (n.d.) for a similar case in Egypt.

8. As adequately shown by Moise (1982), Popkin's (1979) characterisation of Scott's position as imputing an anti-market mentality to all middle peasants distorts Scott's views considerably.

9. See for example, Taussig (1980).

10. Similarly, Bazoglu (1984) indicates that the structure of households and, in particular, the role of women in the southeastern province of Adiyaman may have changed as a result of seasonal migration.



Appendix I. Exchange marriages among yeni yürük.

In the diagramme above, each capital letter represents a named group of close agnates who, at present, share the same last name. Four generations, of which only the last two are still live are depicted. Individuals who have married outside the mahalle are not indicated. The genealogical relationships between these groups are no longer clear to a great many of the individuals themselves. It is possible that, in the past, they may each have constituted a separate, sister-exchanging mahalle. The diagramme shows five cases of direct sister exchange; the other forms of exchange marriage illustrated involve a wider group of agnates and take place over a longer period of time. For example, in group E, a man who obtained his wife from father's brother, reciprocated in the following generation, by giving his daughter's hand in marriage to the son of another of his father's brothers. Two points have to be mentioned. Firstly, this chart only indicates the marriages that were known to me and that took place in Tuz. Only one of the groups, group F, is resident in a Söke village other than Tuz. Marriages with members of the yeni yürük groups who settled in the Izmir region are therefore excluded. Secondly, only the third and fourth generations represent individuals who are active heads of households in Tuz; members of the third generation are, on average, over the age of fifty, while the last generation is composed of married couples in their late thirties. The majority of the children of the third generation have married into other ethnic groups within the village or outside, and the boundaries of the wife-exchanging unit is broadening to include sometimes a whole village.

Appendix II. Marriages between ethnic groups.



△ ◍ eski yürük
△ ⊛ yeni yürük
△ ⊙ muhacir

Appendix II shows the extension of affinal ties across villages and across ethnic boundaries. Some of the marriages contracted by members of four families living in three neighbouring villages, Tuz, At, and Yuva are indicated. The yeni yürük family of Tuz shown on the left hand side of the diagramme has affinal links with eski yürük from Tuz and Yuva, and with muhacir from At. Only one exchange marriage has taken place among these families: that between the muhacir of At and the eski yürük of Yuva. This marriage is unusual since muhacir do not like to repeat marriage alliances.

Appendix III a. Genealogy of the oldest eski yürük family in Tuz.



△ ◍ eski yürük

△ ◍ yeni yürük

△ ⊙ muhacir

* head of household

Appendix III b. Genealogy of a yeni yürük group.



* head of household

Appendix III c. Extent of genealogies and marriage relationships among 26 Tuz muhacir households.



△ ⊙ muhacir

△ ⊙ eski yürük

△ ○ other

* head of household

Appendix III compares the genealogies of three families belonging to each of the ethnic groups of Tuz. In general, the heads of households belong to the last generation indicated in the charts. These individuals are over the age of fifty and in most cases have grandchildren themselves. The eski yürük family in appendix IIIa is Ali Mehmet Akilli's whose carrier as a landowner has been described in chapter 10. His is the family with the largest number of inter-ethnic marriages. The marriages of the yeni yürük family (appendix IIIb) are shown in appendix I. The yürük can trace their genealogies to at least the fourth ascending generation, while for many of the muhacir, the third ascending generation is the limit. For the latter, the individuals of the third ascending generation are shadowy figures who have little significance in the conduct of everyday life. As appendix IIIc shows, genealogies among muhacir extend laterally rather than vertically and affinal relationships link many village households. Starting with the marriages contracted by one muhacir household in Tuz, it is possible to link almost all the muhacir of the village. I have only included twenty-six households which belong to twelve separate families (represented in the chart by capital letters). Because of lack of space, children who reside outside the village, particularly married women resident in other village have been excluded.

Appendix IV. Agnatic and Affinal Relations in Meryem's Family.



* head of household

muhacir

eski yürük

yeni yürük

Appendix V. Annual calendar of tasks according to gender.

	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
Men	Harvesting barley manually Initial preparation of cotton fields	Sowing cotton Harvesting wheat manually	Applying cotton fertilizers Hoeing cotton with a tractor Fishing	Preparing cotton fields for irrigation Applying pesticides Irrigating cotton Fishing	Irrigating cotton Fishing	Controlling cotton growth Fishing
Women	Hoeing beans Planting summer vegetables Planting tobacco in neighbouring villages	Planting tobacco Hoeing cotton	Hoeing cotton	Hoeing cotton Collecting sea salt	Washing wheat Preparing winter staples (eg. tomato and pepper paste)	
Men and Women		Irrigating beans	Irrigating kitchen and hill-side gardens		Weeding olive groves Harvesting green olives Finding winter fuel	

Appendix V. (continued)

	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
Men	Supervising cotton harvest Fishing	Supervising cotton harvest First sales of cotton Fishing	Fishing Ploughing cotton fields Ploughing hill-side gardens	'Washing' cotton fields Hunting Fishing	Fishing	
Women	Harvesting cotton	Harvesting cotton Harvesting beans	Planting winter vegetables		Planting onions, garlic and lettuce	Planting spring vegetables
Men and Women		Threshing beans	Harvesting olives Planting wheat and barley Weddings and other ceremonial occasions	Weddings and other ceremonial occasions	Tending and pruning olive trees	Preparing bean gardens Planting beans and chick peas



Appendix VIa



Appendix VIb

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following abbreviations are used for official publications:

DIE Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü (State Institute of Statistics)

DPT Devlet Planlama Teskilati (State Planning Organisation)

Köyisleri Köyisleri ve Kooperatifler Bakanligi (Ministry of Village Affairs and Cooperatives)

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TURKISH DAILIES

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